TAPE 1M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

February 21, 1957

MY EARLY LIFE IN UNIONTOWN

RECORDED INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
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The questions were made out by Forrest C. Pogue.
Sergeant William Heffner ran the tape recorder.

Uniontown, Fayette Co., Pennsylvania

I am making a start at the notes for you on the place of my birth. I have no idea how to approach this because there is so much that I might say—and it is much too much—and just what angle I should take is a matter still to be determined, but I thought the best way to do was for me to make a start and then you could advise me as to what is needed and then I could follow your advice and get underway in that fashion.

To begin with my first very clear recollection is going out to our barn in which we kept a horse, a cow, and a cow. It was rather large for a place in town and when originally built, it had been on the edge of the town.

My recollection goes back to climbing up the ladder, which was fastened to the side of the barn, in an effort to get to the haymow—the first time I had ever tried this. My brother had gone ahead of me and had disappeared in the haymow. And as I climbed up the ladder, being very cautious and a little frightened, I came to a windowless opening which I could look out of between the rungs of the ladder. In a sense, it seemed to—this is my recollection—that this was my first look at the world.

A creek ran through our place and my line of vision went down the line of the creek. And I saw some little distance below me some highly colored ducks swimming about, which of

course attracted my eye immediately. There was a dog or two along the bank. There were chickens wandering about. All of it fascinated me and it seemed a whole world exposed in an instant to my eye.

The barn was part of our place. There was also a carriage house and a smaller building—for what purpose I do not recall. All of this played a very important part in my early life—which I will touch on later.

The National Pike, the famous Federal Road from Cumberland to Wheeling, to connect up the freight line, we might say, from the east by the Baltimore and Ohio Canal to Cumberland by the great Conestoga wagons, from Cumberland to Wheeling, West Virginia, and down the river from Wheeling and then possibly up the Mississippi and then again on up the Missouri and further out clear into the really far Middle West, I would say, that was the approach. This road, as I said, passed in front of our house.

The house was at the one end of a very monumental arched bridge of the type that was common along this National Highway. Directly across the street from me was a red brick house in which lived my chum of those days. His name was Andrew Thompson. His father later became a tremendously wealthy man and of great influence in Southwestern Pennsylvania and in a sense a sort of rival of the Mellon financial structure.

However, to get back to me. I don't remember much of the very early days. But as I grew a little older, Andrew Thompson—or Andy as I called him—and myself became inseparable. We had a delightful country in which to roam.

This creek went through our place, and there was a little island and what we called an orchard—though it was only composed of four very large apple trees—in which we had the

privilege of crawling about all we wanted to and in which we had a tree house. There was a spring house there—a brick spring house—which was fed by a spring and there's where the milk and things of that nature were kept. I can still remember seeing my mother skimming the cream from the milk, with a long flat spoon. Against the side of this spring house was a very crude shack, built against the wall, and that was the great place of business of Andy and of me, where we later on ran our restaurants, where we kept rabbits and two or three other things that I don't recall at the moment.

The life was very simple. The country was very beautiful. And it was very rich in surface farming and in the coal which underlay the region and which eventually destroyed a great deal of its beauty. But it hadn't reached the immediate vicinity of my home town.

Beyond our house stretched some fertile fields and what we called the first and second and third hollows—one of which had a tiny waterfall which fascinated us—and we became curators of all the lizards out of the stream there. Altogether it was a very charming place for a boy and we were allowed complete liberty in a sense to deface that portion in which we played.

To jump across considerately in the time element, I remember when Whitney, I think it was, was Secretary of the Navy and they constructed what we called in those days, "The Great White Fleet." Well, Andy and I had built a canal—a tiny canal—about two inches wide, maybe more, which paralleled the creek bed for quite a lengthy distance and we whittled out these ships with matches for masts and thread for guys and constructed the "Great White Fleet." And we would sail it down this canal we had made. I recall that because it was very fascinating for a boy and most of the other boys in town came there in order to participate in this aquatic performance. (Incidentally, that region there of our place became quite a playground for most boys because

none of them had quite a similar opportunity—with a creek and an island and a little orchard, and a number of other things of that nature).

The trees on the place were very interesting because the man who had built the place some years before, I don't of course remember when that was, was quite an expert in fruit growing and he had developed these threes so that most of them bore two kinds of fruit. I remember our cherry tree, as I recall, had three kinds of cherries and they didn't all come in at the same season. I also recall that the stricture on the cherry tree was—made by my father—that we could climb as much as we pleased to get the cherries but we must not break off a limb. But that was very difficult because lots of the cherries were far out and ours was always a race with the birds to see who would get the cherries first.

There was only one peach tree but there were a number of pear trees—some very large pears and others rather small, like sickle pears. There was one rather very fine apple tree; the others were not so good. Altogether it made a very attractive playground for a boy and, of course, that is my main recollection of the place.

I am going to proceed without relation to the orderly development of the story on a time basis.

One of these houses on the place, as I explained, was the carriage shed and the carriage that was in it disappeared after a time because father had the stable torn down and only the foundation stone left and the lumber all piled up to one side. He thought there was a possibility of selling the stone from the foundation and also selling the lumber. Neither of these things occurred and both areas became the centers of our boy playing and developing. We first started out by building rafts out of the lumber and sailing them down the creek. But the lumber was too

large and clumsy and too heavy and too old and that didn't go very well. But there was a friend of mine, an elderly man who had lost his great toy store by fire in Pittsburgh and who had opened a small store in Uniontown, had his brother make for me a fine flat bottomed boat that navigated the lower reaches of this stream. That played a tremendous part in our activities of that day.

We ran a ferry and had tickets for the ferry. And while the ferry was only the width of the steam, yet to us it was a very important crossing. And the girls from school would buy tickets from us with pins and pennies and would come down after school to cross over and back on the ferry. We ran the ferry with great formality.

My chum would be the engine man and pole it. I don't remember his costume, particularly, but I know I was the conductor as a rule and I had my mother's punch from the 500 counting business (that was the card game of that day). I wore my hat backwards and I took up the tickets.

One of the incidents of my young life that occurred here and made a definite impression on me was the girls had gone over to the far bank and now came the return trip. They had these elaborately prepared tickets that we had made by hand. (We used a typewriter, a rather primitive machine for children of that day). On the return trip the girls got obstreperous and refused to give me the tickets. I was terribly humiliated—with my cap on backwards and my 500 punch machine in my hands to punch the tickets—and what made it worse was my chum Andy began laughing at me. And here I was with the girls in the flatboat all jeering at me and with my engineer and boon companion laughing at me, and I was stuck. Just then my eye fastened on a cork in the floor of the boat which we utilized in draining it. With the inspiration of the moment,

I pulled the cork and under the pressure of the weight of the passengers, this stream of water shop up in the air. All the girls screamed and I sank the boat in the middle of the stream. And they all had to wade ashore and promised me what their fathers were going to do to me. I never forgot that because I had to do something and I had to think quickly, and what I did set me up again as the temporary master of the situation. And our boat sank in the middle of the stream and we had to get it ashore later on.

(Another thing that occurred there that had very interesting aftermaths—looking back on the childhood period—was one of these buildings, the carriage house. No, it was the other house in which we established our greenhouse). We had gone with our mothers to the real greenhouse on the outskirts of the town and we thought that the green related to the color of the house. So when we came back we went to our friend in the carriage shop—who I had to write to when he was ninety years old out on the west coast in later years—and he gave us the remains of green paint left in the cans left from putting the Brewster Green on carriages. We got this out with a little turpentine and painted as much of this house as we could, green, and it was therefore a green house.

Now we had to raise plants. Well we had no plants, so we raised weeds and used tin cans painted green as the receptacles in place of flower pots. My father, who had quite a green thumb, happened to look at this greenhouse and was much struck by what you could do with a weed if you fertilized it. Of course, there was ample fertilizer available because we had the inside of this stable to dig in, which had the fertilizer of years, from the animals that had been in the stable. It prompted him to suggest to us that we put some real plants in. He told us we could get seeds and grow them and we could also get some little plants from the greenhouse. So, as I recall, he gave me seventy-five cents and, I think, Andy's father or his mother rather gave him

the same thing. We went to the greenhouse. I have always regretted that I never kept track of this man because he did something that I thought was very, very thoughtful in his dealing with children. We picked around so long that he asked us just what we had in mind. We were looking at the smallest pots he had, because we thought we could get more for the money and we only had $1.50. And when he heard that we were getting it for our greenhouse and were going to be his competitors in business, he gave us quite a large selection of these small pots in order to amplify what we otherwise could have only been able to obtain with our $1.50.

From then, this greenhouse, as it were, began to grow. And we began planting outside in what had been a little chick yard and finally we began planting on the side of the old barn. And out of that came a very interesting occurrence. We read in the seed magazine of Peter Henderson and Company an advertisement that there was a new tomato that had been developed and whoever could suggest the best name for the tomato would get fifty dollars. Well that was the largest sum of money I think we had ever heard of at that time. So we sent for the seed and proceeded to plant this and grew the plants. And as they got a little larger, we transplanted them to the stable—not the stable yard—but the actual site of the stable in this very, very rich land. My father showed me how to prune the plant by taking the suckers out from between the branches. And we grew these very large tomato plants and further pruned so that we had only a little fruit on each one. So we grew these tremendously large tomatoes. In the first place we took these downtown to a grocery store and sold them. We got a very small return but we were very proud of the pennies that we got for these tomatoes. My father was rather contemptuous of us for selling them so cheaply. Then the grocery man communicated with us and he wanted some more. On inquiry, we found that one of the richest clients had gotten some of these tomatoes and immediately wanted some duplicates. But he didn't have them. We came back

and reported with great glee that our stock was in demand and particularly by this well-to-do family. Then my father told us, "Now, you set the price," and he suggested the first price. Well the grocer blew up when we gave him the price because the thought he would get them for almost nothing and we actually put a good price on this large tomato.

Well, remembering the advertisement of the Peter Henderson magazine, we took a Kodak of the tomato with a silver dollar leaning against it in order to furnish a scale as to its size. (These were the first dollar Kodak's issued by the Eastman Company and we got a very good picture). And we sent that on to the Peter Henderson Company as our offering in this contest. We suggested the name—two names as a matter of fact hitched together—and they came back with a reply and thanked us for sending in our piece and told us that the two names, they thought, were inadvisable. It ought to be one name, but they wanted to say that that was the largest tomato they had ever seen and wanted one of our parents write and describe how that tomato had been raised. They could tell they were dealing with children because we have written all this on our toy typewriter and it was very much a childish offering. I told this to my father and he was intensely interested in this and he wrote to Peter Henderson and explained how this was done. But he observed in finishing that you couldn't tear a stable down every time you wanted to raise a tomato. However, that was our first proud boast that our tomato had been the largest one they had ever seen. That was the Ponderosa tomato that you see advertised to this day and the man who proposed Ponderosa was the winner of the contest.

So a great deal of our life circulated around these buildings we had at our disposal—our greenhouse and other things we had there. Then we began raising our game bantam chickens. My mother was very much opposed to our fighting game chickens, so we took her out and showed her two game bantam black breasted red chickens fight. And they were very cute and

they didn't hurt each other and she thought it was all right. After she left we put the steel spurs on, which the blacksmith made for us out of horseshoe nails, and now they could walk around in their steel spurs and then they were dangerous fighters for their size. I remember that our prize cock weighed exactly one pound and I can recall that his name was Dinkum.

The girls would come down after school to buy our green things and then I received an education in what happens in connection with the middleman. We were always exploring the country, we were getting old bones to sell, old iron to sell, and very little rubble because there were no rubber tires in those days. But we'd use a pony cart and go all over the countryside, which was open country right up to our house.

Out there on spring day we found the side of the hill with a very large clot of blue forget-me-nots. Well this appealed to us, so we took the spade out of the pony cart which we always took with us and spaded up quite a large number of forget-me-nots. When we got them back to our shop, as it were, we took empty strawberry boxes, the same as we have today, and cleaned them up and painted them green—again the paint came from our friend, the carriage maker—and put a black stripe around them. Then we planted the forget-me-not in them and put moss around the forget-me-not. Then during the recess period at school, we hustled home, having gotten permission from our teacher to go a little early—and took these strawberry boxes—green with the black stripe—with the blue forget-me-not and the moss around the top. It was a very attractive looking little affair and the girls all bought them. I don't remember what we charged them for them but it was some infinitesimal sum.

Later on we were having a May Day picnic and these same girls, largely, and they saw this forget-me-not patch out in the country. In fact, we were fool enough to take them near it, to

this hollow as we called it, where the little waterfall was, which was our favorite playing place in the country. And they saw that we had gotten these for nothing and we had spaded them up out of this plot. And they immediately turned on us and thought that we had cheated them, and they boycotted our whole enterprise and that put the greenhouse out of business. But they gave us no credit for finding the patch, for digging the plants up, for finding the strawberry boxes, for painting them green and black striping them, for getting the moss to go around the plants and for transporting them to school. In other words, all the middleman activities in this thing, between the blossoming of the plant and the sale we carried out and which was responsible for the attractiveness of it, but we were boycotted and that put us out of the greenhouse. But it also taught me a little bit about the position of the middleman.

The town at first, in my recollection, was very simple, and very attractive. Of course, a boyhood recollection of a place like that is rather difficult to compare to modern recollections. But I always thought it was a charming place to live and we had great fun out of it, and it largely centered around our yard which was fairly large. And the creek, of course, was the great jewel of the production.

Later on—well I might explain some of our activities which will tell a little bit of boyhood life there—we ran a restaurant in this lean-to we had constructed against the spring house and had it very carefully fixed up with a counter. And then around to one side of the counter—where you couldn't see it from the counter—we had an old stove. And Andy was the cook and I was the waiter. I valued my job because it allowed me to use the terms that they called out for apple pie and other things like that in the first restaurant of that character in the town. So I would advertise our food in a very loud tone of voice.

And the boys could enter this building by crawling in a double entrance. You first went in head first and then you turned to the right and got out. That had one door against the cold. There we sold, largely, sweet potatoes and such apples as were left from the trees. Most everything was anointed with sugar. We had a little shaker, I remember, with a little tin handle on it. And the favorite thing we sold were sweet potatoes. We had a strike on the sweet potatoes and the boys refused to buy them [one day]. They said they were no good. I went back to interview the cook who had a newspaper representation of a chef's hat, and he protested that he was making those sweet potatoes like he had always made. He said that the only thing different was that he had run out of sugar and he had put sand in the can. I told him of this in after years and he resented that story that he could have been that dumb, but it was actually the truth. And he afterwards became a millionaire and he may have sold them more sand. I don't know.

But we had a great deal of fun around this. The rabbit affair was the usual one with too rapid production and the burrowing out and getting down under the walls and getting out.

But the railroad came through this valley, purely a freight road because it tapped the richest coal region around in the country, the famous Connellsville seven foot vein of coal and wonderful cooking coal—and the trains that came along there were only hauling out coke because they converted the coal into coke before they took it away from the mines. This railroad had not been there in my youth and it narrowed the valley, it abolished the island, and it produced a situation where floods became prevalent, because there was no longer the width of the stream to carry the water that there had been and it made the basement of our house, which had the kitchen and several nice rooms, unusable except at intervals between floods and it could no longer be used as a kitchen.

This again offered quite interesting things and I remember my father who was always putting his finger into new things when he saw them advertised or on display, coming home with the first recipe and mixtures for making root beer. My mother was always protesting against these performances of his but he made a trail lot of root beer and it was terrible. Nobody could drink it. The family all liked beer. (I didn't and never have). And we had a great many beer bottles. In those days they had a rubber stopper on a swing that put it in and pushed down one side and clamped it in the bottle. So we used these bottles for this root beer which we couldn't drink and it stood there. And then accidentally about six months later, Andy and I found out that this was delicious to the taste. So we opened up a bar in the cellar. We sold corn-silk cigars and we sold beer. And we had the whole town in our cellar. My father came home one day and found this affair going on at full speed. And he went into the cellar and sampled the root beer and he seized the whole issue because he found it had aged and was now really delicious. And we went out of action as bartenders and we regretted this bitterly.

Then we got into the development of game chickens—I mean the large game chickens of which the black-breasted read was our favorite as it had been of the bantam chickens. And we had these chickens "pitted" by the bartender [*blacksmith*], George Gadd, who was quite a friend of our youth and his blacksmith shop was our "club" as it were. If one of us would pull the bellows, the rest of us could sit there and talk and listen to the other talk. This shop, blacksmith shop, faced on a great cobblestone square, which was the inner square of an inn, which had persisted from the days of the earliest development in Uniontown. I will interrupt this story to explain that being on the National Pike, this inn was used by all the great of those days who went to the West and almost every prominent man in the West and part of the South would came through Uniontown because it was across the mountain and you had to take a rest—either

coming or going—at Uniontown. So this inn was built in this old fashioned way and had this great cobblestone square of which the blacksmith shop was a part—of which the butchery, where they killed the hogs in the fall, where we flocked around to get the bladders for footballs as it were, and the granaries and other things—fronted on it. I remember when I was given a welcome in Uniontown after I was made chief of staff and I hadn't been there for years. I found that the hotel was built on the site of the square and where I was sitting at the table was identified as one side which had no buildings on it. And across the room from me, my host identified the location of George Gadd's blacksmith shop, the butchery place and other prominent points in this square from the days of the coaching on the National Pike. It also—I was sitting back to the alley where my sister in our young days found me playing hooky from school and went home and told on me. She denies that now, but that was the fact of the day and it was a very painful interlude. I will go a little further. I had to make a speech. I had just been made chief of staff a few weeks. They were all concerned about the war which had just developed in Europe on the first of September. And the press, of course, would immediately surround me. I wished to make no statement, and yet I knew I would have to say something. Some of the pressmen came on from Pittsburgh and there was one from Philadelphia. It was my first introduction to that sort of thing. I identified where I was sitting with the old square before I got up. Searching around for something that might be of possible interest and to save me from talking about the European situation of which I knew little in detail at that time, but with which I was going to be so intimately connected as the days developed—I decided to identify the relationship of where we were to the days of my youth. And I recall the first explanation I gave was singling out a lady in a red dress, evening dress, and I called all their attention to that and there were about four-hundred people in the room and I explained that was the side of George Gadd's blacksmith shop.

And then there was a lady in another colored dress, a little further up the line, and she was sitting where they butchered the hogs in the fall and where we assembled to get the bladders. I remember that my stepdaughter and Mrs. Marshall were with me at this time and she was very much embarrassed by my talking about bladders and sort of shrank into insignificance when I got to that part of the tale. But I could identify things all around the square with my youth. And now it was this lovely dining room of the new hotel built on the site of this old tavern which had sheltered Andrew Jackson and any number of the prominent characters of that day who had travelled over the National Pike to get to the Ohio River and down to the Mississippi.

The schools in town, for children of my associates, began first in earliest form with a school [run] by Miss Thompson, who was an old maid that ran this school. And it was a very bitter period to me, because I could never do anything at all well. I only had one great struggle. I was very much taken with a young lady who now lives somewhat near here, as matter of fact in Richmond. She was quite brilliant in comparison with me, and she stood at the head of the line in the spelling bee that occurred every day. So I made my first superhuman effort and worked up the line of the spellers in order to be close to her and win her respect and I got up to next to the top and fell down the same day and went to the bottom and I never tried again and I still spell in a very fantastic manner. My only consolation is both my wife and my stepdaughter spell as badly if not worse that I do. So I am rather a one-eyed man in the Kingdom of the Blind when it comes to that.

In this life of Uniontown, I say what was I guess you might call the end of an era because it was a very simple life and a very charming life and it had a long history behind it. The families there went back to the days of George Washington and his farm which was nearby and the coal and coke oven plant that my father ran was right across from the Washington farm. And

that plant that my father operated was, I think, originally purchased by Gist who was the guide for Washington when he made his first famous trip to see the French up near Lake Erie north of Fort Duquesne (which is now Pittsburgh). The Braddock Trail ran through near this farm and my father pointed out these historical facts to me. And as a matter of fact in our hunting [trips] which he frequently took me on, particularly for pheasant which were really grouse, we would follow the Braddock Trail which remained to a large extent a clearing with attractive green covering of grass on it because the pheasant would often land in their flights in this clearing and we could work with the dog pretty well there. So I became familiar with long strips of the Braddock Trail. On this trail, about seven to eight miles from home, was the site of Braddock's grave. When they were building the National Road through, they dug up his grave and identified it by the brass buttons and skeleton and other things there. And they reinterred him close by in a very picturesque little plot. I don't think it was over fifty yards square. It had these little pine trees in it and had his grave with a very small headstone. In fact, I don't remember what the grave looked like. We would go out in that vicinity to picnic. And this little white fence had a flat board top and we could sit on the fence and lots of my early courtship efforts were made sitting on that fence on a moonlight night after one of these picnic suppers in the mountain.

Now just a few miles beyond Braddock's grave was Fort Necessity where Washington had to surrender his force, though he did it with the honors of war and he retained his weapons and marched off, when he was outnumbered by the French and Indians. That has now been built up into quite an impressive fort. But in my day there was just a slight ridge in the field which showed where the entrenchment had been, which my father showed to me when I was about seven years old. I went to the dedication of the new markers—the rebuilt fort—not so long ago. And they had identified exactly where the fort was by finding well beneath the surface the lower

end of the log which formed the palisade, because they had been preserved by the dampness of the soil which was next to a stream which flooded frequently. And now you can see this same replica of the fort at Fort Necessity which is just a trifle beyond Braddock's grave.

So these were all old places to me in my youth. My father was very much interested in history and he was interested in telling and showing me these factors. I always thought it was tragic the fact that none of this was included in our schooling. I went through the public school—not through the public school— wasn't good enough, but I went through part of it and nowhere was I taught anything of what had happened in what was a remarkably historic region. There was a creek ran through the town that was discolored by the sulfur from the mines—Redstone Creek. I guess it had always been somewhat discolored and it ran a short distance of say ten or twelve miles into the Monongahela River which was largely navigable as far as Pittsburgh, about thirty-five miles from there and this again was a scene of very historic affairs.

At Williamsburg at this time [he is speaking of the seventeen-hundreds] there was a meeting of very famous characters. I have forgotten who was governor of Virginia at the time, but I know that George Mason was one of them and I think Alexander Hamilton. Anyway there were three of four very famous characters and they had a meeting to decide what to do about the fact that the English were established on the Mississippi river next to what is now Illinois at Kaskaskia. That was pretty far south of Detroit which was the English headquarters of that day. The French had held it and the English had taken it over and this group of men, the governor of Virginia and other state officials, felt that something had to be done. And their decision is rather interesting because it was so brief and shows the extreme simplicity of organizing an army in that period. All you had to do was take the rifle down from the deer horns across the fireplace… [Interruption]. I was speaking of the ease with which an expedition could be organized if it was

local in a sense—if they didn't have to cross the water. You took your rifle down from the mantelpiece and went to war. The concentration—the organization rather—of the force was directed and a very famous leader was selected whose name I forget at the moment but which I'll think of later. He organized these men there and they were to go out to Kaskaskia. They went to the vicinity of Fort Duquesne and got a little better organized there and went down the Ohio River and finally left the river and went overland in order to effect surprise—to Illinois or what was then Virginia and made a very difficult march to Kaskaskia. There they surprised the British garrison. They were having a party—there are many illustrations of this, frequently on calendars where the Indians are lying around the rim of the room and they are dancing in the middle and this famous leader was coming in and with very dramatic battle cry demanded the surrender. They found the actual British commander in bed with his wife and Kaskaskia was surrendered to the expedition. (George Rogers Clark is the man I am trying to think of). And then Clark turned around and went back to take over from the French at Vincennes which is now in Indiana and had a terrific march through the swamps in order to get there. But that is the way this phase of the struggle went up, which was started on Redstone Creek at my home.

Later there was another expedition, equally historic and much more determining in its results. We were in distress by the British backing up the Indians or utilizing the Indians and the country, which was the Northwest Territory at that time, largely Ohio and Indiana, had strong Indian garrisons. Washington sent his first expedition out which was General—oh, I have forgotten that name but you can look it up—and he gave him particular advice, Washington did, this commander, about avoiding surprise by Indians. That is quite clearly accounted for in history, though it may be that the Washington enthusiasts thought up a good bit of it after it occurred. However, I have no reason for saying that. Anyway this expedition went out and was

ambushed in a terrible massacre in what is now Ohio and greatly shocked Washington and he is attributed with a display of anger when he received the commander. He (Washington) immediately turned to find a commander who could manage this thing. And he selected Anthony Wayne.

And this expedition is very interesting for the reason that "Mad Anthony" didn't seem to be exactly the proper nickname for him because he was a most careful man and one of the best organizers that I have come across in early history. He again organized his for, its beginnings, near Redstone Creek, on the Monongahela River and paused below Fort Duquesne, now Pittsburgh, for quite a long time to discipline these fellows which is a very difficult thing to do with the old frontiersman who are the epitome of independence and individuality. Finally, they left there after some months—I think they wintered there—and they then went down the Ohio, and they paused at the falls of the Ohio, which I believe is Cincinnati, where a volunteer regiment of fine shots, volunteers, from Kentucky was to join them. They waited there quite awhile and then went on down and cut in from the river to, I think it's Greenville—it's Green-something— where he went ahead with his further organization, getting these men into shape. This is most unusual because most of those volunteer organizations were organized today and went to battle tomorrow. He then built an advanced post at what is called Fort Defiance and I think still is Fort Defiance which is on the Pennsylvania Railroad between Pittsburgh and Chicago.

He sent a fairly good-sized force there and they were attacked by the Indians in considerable force and the British may have been there with them, but I don't recall that, and they drove off this force successfully—in other words they "blooded" the command—which he thought was quite necessary. He then organized a lot more of them up to Fort Necessity [?] and

finally moved out. But I must say before this, although this is not about Uniontown, though it had its beginnings near there, a very remarkable thing had taken place. The chief, whose name I've forgotten—I will call him Little Chief or Green Kettle or something of that sort—had adopted a son and this son was a white boy captured when he was six years old. And he had become the adopted son of the chief and had become the sub-chief of the tribe. And, of course, that made him a very valuable person if he could get into the Americans' hands—the American being the white man. But he was so shocked with the scene of all these bodies of white men at the time of this massacre—I think it was St. Clair who was massacred there—at the time of this massacre—that he left Little Chief and went over to the white man's affairs. So when Anthony Wayne was organizing his force, this man came in and offered his service as a scout and he, of course, became the chief scout. Of course he was a scout without really parallel because he was brought up in Indian training which is so wonderful for a woodsman and he knew all about them because he had been sub-chief of the tribe and now he was the chief scout for Anthony Wayne's force.

Anthony Wayne's people moved out from Fort Defiance and encountered the British and largely Indians in what is known as the battle of Fallen Timbers, where these huge trees were blown down by a hurricane of that early day, and defeated them completely and moved on toward Detroit. There they did not attempt to assault the fort, because that would have been difficult to do and also it had to do with the diplomacy of that day. But they put out all the British trappers who lived outside the fort and then they retired into Indiana and destroyed some thousands of acres of corn, because that was a great corn crop there that the Indians raised for the winter. Then they retired to Greenville or wherever this was and dominated the whole region. The Indian chief came there with some of his sub chiefs and they had a meeting with Anthony

Wayne, and they had to parley with him in his favor because he dominated the whole region. Among the things that he determined upon, which they had to concede, was a tract of land where what is now called Chicago River empties into Lake Michigan because that was a means of connection between the Illinois River and the Mississippi river and New Orleans. It was going to have a great value because of that factor. And that is the origin of the site of Chicago and its build-up by the white men of that period.

(Afterwards this chief scout, this Indian trained boy, played a dramatic part in the final massacre of the Americans, whose commander had given up and destroyed all his munitions of war, and this fellow, this chief scout who had for some time been out in Michigan or Indiana or the wilderness in some sort of civil job in relation to the Indians, I think, and he took command of the advanced guard in this desperate situation which he wholly disapproved of and near the site of what was the social center of Chicago of those days, they met the Indians, who had promised them a safe exit and he died, fighting in the advance guard. And he rode with his face painted black, which is the custom of the Indians when you are on a desperate mission in which you have no hope really of surviving. This street in Chicago, which is parallel to LaSalle Street, Wells Street, is named for that man).

Now to go back to Uniontown which I mention because of its proximity to these things.

Another place of my youth which I enjoyed was trout fishing—in the streams in the mountain, and the one stream in particular which arose out of a deep ravine in the mountain rose at the site of Washington's encounter at the opening of the French and Indian War where the first shot was fired there which was literally heard around the world in those days—upset the thrones in Europe and pretty much changed the face of political Europe. I am sorry I can't remember the

name of this Frenchman who was ambushed here by Washington, who was as familiar to me as the name of the street in front of our house, but I will remember it later and I am sure you can find it in any history. Anyway, Washington surprised the French patrol commander and he was killed, as well as his men, and that was used against Washington very much by the French at this period. And that was where we started our trout fishing—Jumonville—Jumonville's grave is marked with a pile of stones which the occasional visitor puts in place and in those days no tourist got anywhere near the place and only those rather familiar with the mountains there would go into it—largely fishermen—like my chum and myself.

But the story of Jumonville was recited to me by my father and nearby was the scene of Washington's council of war with an Indian chief who was friendly to the Americans or English of that day. So there was a great deal of history, and very, very important history was written in that vicinity. And there was this great life of the nation which flowed through the National Pike and stopped overnight at the inn, just two blocks beyond the house that I lived in as a boy.

In looking over the account of that inn, I think almost everybody in the Federal Government from the West, the near West and the South spent a night at that inn. Historically, you might say, the life of the nation, short of Boston, New York, Baltimore, places like that in the East, flowed through that particular town. I remember, rather amusingly, that my first wife's mother who was a very ardent Virginian of an old, old Virginia family—one of her progenitors was a signer of the Declaration of Independence and was one of the leaders in Williamsburg and who is buried at the head of the aisle in the chapel there, which is always visited with historical interest—she was a very ardent Virginian. She thought that the name Uniontown sounded rather common and she was rather ashamed of where I came from. It wasn't until Beveridge's *Life of John Marshall* came out—which had no relation to me—which disclosed the fact that

Uniontown was a far older settlement than her home in Lexington, Virginia. And it had been in Washington's day and before that. And the name Uniontown came when two so-called townships of that day were united and there were many old families there who has persisted through these years and formed a very exclusive community, which my father came up to after the Civil War in a position with the iron furnaces nearby.

I repeat again that I hardly know just what trail to follow.

I have said once that I thought this was rather the end of an era in the town life that was presented. It was very attractive and very simple and I thought the people were very kindly. They had old families, very old, that went back almost to Washington's day. In fact, it did go back to his day. It had its record of good fighting men in the Civil War and it had its men who had gone to the Mexican War and then what was more exciting to me, it had a few bandits in the mountains. That was right after Jesse James and that period and of course that excited me tremendously and I remember when they had one surrounded up in the mountains, I wanted very much to go and my father wanted to go and my mother put a stopper to that. But they finally got the fellow or fellows, because it was whole gang.

This is certainly out of place as to the timing element, but that reminds me of an amusing experience I had. The geological survey came through that region, completing its mapping, and as the basis for the mapping first had to be the triangulation stations and then came the levels—precise level run through to carry the exact elevations from the seal level and then the local level lines which were not so exact, but were comparatively exact as we would understand it, but they wouldn't carry their error on through long distances such as the great base lines based on the triangulation. Well, I got a job as an assistant to the man who ran the levels—local levels—and

it was largely done with a stadia rod which I carried and he ran the transit. That was my first real close up of engineering, though it was a very simple form. I enjoyed this very much in the summer. One night he reached the peak of that range of the Chestnut Ridge of the mountains and we stayed overnight with this mountain family. There was no other place anywhere near them. This mountaineer was an old, dominant character, and as I recall he had two married daughters and one married son and his wife and himself and of course they had some babies. And we all slept in the same room. We slept on the floor, my level man and myself. I don't know what arrangement of beds was, but they couldn't have had more than two or three, but that put the whole family away there. They were very generous to us and we accepted their hospitality very gratefully and we were very happy to have this opportunity for rest. But they had a greatly valued old clock, a standing clock which, seemed to me, struck the hour about every five or ten minutes. And I had a little trouble getting to sleep because I wasn't used to sleeping on the floor and I couldn't dig a place for my hips. And while I was young and not too heavy, nevertheless it was pretty uncomfortable. The thing which amused me was the life of the family under these circumstances. They didn't have much argument because they went to sleep promptly, but they would all stir around and, of course, that would wake me up. And then they woke me up very early so I would have the private privilege of bath in the horse trough and that was outside. Altogether it was a very funny night, particularly with this clock which seemed to me struck at very, very frequent intervals.

Something happened—it's a very tiny thing to tell here, but I have never quite understood it. Like all young fellows of that age, I was apt to lose the intensity of purpose in the job which the level man would not. He was an older man, must have been about thirty-five. Several times he had to correct me for being absent-minded and not holding the stadia rod correctly for him to

read. On one of these occasions I sought an excuse, as a boy always does, and I told him I was looking at that bird on the fence which, as I recall, was a swallow. Well he stopped and in a rather scathing tone said, "What about that bird on the fence?" and without any real idea of what was happening or why I was doing it, and certainly with no premonition of the result, I walked over to the fence and picked up this swallow. It wasn't wounded; he didn't fly and I picked him up. That paralyzed my surveyor friend. And then I turned him loose and he flew off. And he thought I had some mysterious quality which enabled me to handle birds. But I never had a similar occurrence in my life. But it dug me out of that embarrassment of being rather asleep on the job.

Now in this mountain country, as I say, Andy and I fished, explored, hunted grouse (which we called pheasant), and generally disported ourselves in a most entertaining and educational way. And I remember afterwards, years and years afterwards, when I was with General Pershing in Washington, at a dance at the Chevy Chase Club, which occurred every Saturday night, a very lovely woman was sitting on the sidelines and she spoke to me. Well I didn't know her at all, so I responded by walking over and introducing myself. And she introduced herself. And it was Lillian Russell. She had married a Pittsburgher at that time. Of course she was a woman well up in years now and she was good enough to say she admired my dancing and that she was sorry she had passed the dancing age and that she would like to meet me. I said, of course, I was greatly honored to meet her. I said, as a matter of fact, I met you years ago. I said, "Of course, you have met thousands of people and it just barely registered on your mind and you made an indelible impression on them." She said, "Where did you meet me?" And I said, "I came in from fishing, one day up in the mountains where a man from Pittsburgh had a rather large estate, and the lower end of the estate, which was almost a virgin

forest, had one of our good trout streams in it. And we got in there, without his permission incidentally, and fished there. And we came out on the National Pike right at the foot of one of the ridges of the mountain. And, there, sitting on horses on the other side of the fence were these two very lovely women—one in particular and that was you—Lillian Russell—and you asked us what the country was like around there and where you might ride and I told you and I have never forgotten that. At that time you were appearing in one of your earliest light operas, I believe it was called 'The Mountaineer.' And you were the most famous and beautiful woman in America. And she was very much interested in my recollection and finally identified where the place was and in a faint way identified the place. She had been left alone with her companion because the had had to rush off to Pittsburgh in connection with his coal interests, because he was what was called in that day a coal baron. But I have never forgotten meeting her out on the road, when we were in one our fishing things.

Now in connection with our fighting chickens, as I say the man in the blacksmith shop "pitted" our birds for us and was our boon companion and was the president of our club, which was the blacksmith shop. We took our chickens up to a "main," as they called them, up in the mountains, where a lot of Pittsburgh sports seventy-five miles away were to be present. And that attracted us because we had good chickens. We had gotten eggs from Georgia—Georgia Reds and things of that sort—and really had very good chickens but we couldn't pit them ourselves and they would not have permitted us to enter a ring in an affair of this kind so George Gadd had to be our performer.

And we took the horse and got up in the mountain where this "main" was to be. And it was very much in defiance of law of that day. So we hitched the horse far remote from the pit as we called it where the chickens were to be fought and thee were quite a number of "sports." I

can't remember, of course I think it was a larger one than it actually was, but there were forty or fifty men and very heavy betting. We wanted to get the horses as far away from the activities as possible and as possible from the other horses as possible. And then we went to attend the "main."

SECOND SIDE

The chicken fighting began. I don't recall now whether Gadd got our chickens entered at this moment or not, but in any event, the affair had just gotten well underway when we were raided, and most of these men were herded in. Well, of course, Andy and myself were experts in rapid motion under such circumstances and we were terrified and we just squirted out into the forest there and got separated and hid out. I hid most of the afternoon, I think it was. And finally, it all seemed quiet and I began in Indian fashion trying to get back to see how to get out of there. I supposed our horse was gone and our little two-wheeled car was gone. And finally I encountered this shadow of another party and there, really in Indian fashion, I scouted him and it developed he scouted me. And after about an hour of this, we found that it was my chum and myself and we were the only people left up there. Then we met and we were very much disturbed rather terrified as a matter of fact, that we had lost the horse and the cart, and so we decided we'd go over where the horse and cart was and we found the horse was right there grazing. We had removed the bridle from his mouth and put him out on a long longe and so we got into the cart and came down the mountain.

And I didn't get home until about one in the morning. And I got into the house without waking my father up and slipped up to my room and my mother immediately appeared. I might explain that she had a very powerful influence on my youth. And I think in the first place she

was not only a woman of character and great determination, but she was a woman of great understanding. I told her everything I did and she never corrected me. Because if I told her, I realized it was wrong and there was no use in telling me again it was wrong. And I told her what it was and she understood that. And she had quite a sense of humor and as she didn't give any indication of it verbally herself very much, but she was a very appreciative listener. And I remember in this case, I was describing to her why I didn't get home until one in the morning when I had left the previous morning. I told her of the escape from the chicken fight, hiding out through most of the day up there and finally finding Andy and then being terrified about the horse and cart and finding that and then coming home and arriving at one in the morning. Parts of it she thought was very funny and I remember she laughed till she cried. And nothing was said about reprimanding me. They didn't need to reprimand me. I was not going back to any other chicken fight and going through that experience again. And she didn't tell my father because he would have been severe and would have corrected me. And for that reason, I wouldn't tell. But on the contrary reason, I told her literally everything. And she was always rather glad to hear. Sometimes she may have been worried, sometimes she may have been ashamed. Sometimes she may have been shocked. But she heard what the matter was, what the affair was, and whenever there was any humor in it, it amused her very much.

I remember on one occasion, as an example, we were copying the ways of this gang in the mountains. And we had air rifles and we went out in the country and we would go through the motions of a holdup by letting the buggy, generally of a farmer, pass and then getting out in the road and shooting at the rear of the buggy. Well in one of these buggies the little isinglass window was absent and our BB bullet went through the window and hit the farmer in the back of the neck and we had one of the most thrilling escapes that we ever went through. The only thing

was that we could run faster and roll under the fence faster than he could and we got away. But we were afraid to go home. So finally we turned our coats inside out and turned our hats on backwards and made ourselves as conspicuous as possible in the feeling that we were now disguising ourselves and returned home. My mother thought that was the funniest thing she ever saw when we showed up in this "disguise" as we called it. But we were afraid to go downtown for about two or three days and she protected us against any questions that might be embarrassing to us. But that was my sole holdup and it ended up very tragically.

Now I'm trying to think of things in connection with Uniontown that would be of interest to you. The development of the town during my younger days went along very rapidly. The streetcars came in, I guess, when I was about fourteen and I was fascinated with that as the other boys in town were. There was a train already going through—the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad—they were branch lines both of them, because it was a very valuable coal region and for that reason the railroad connections built up much more rapidly than they otherwise would of. But, as I say, in my earliest day we were spared the curse of coal smoke from the coke ovens because they hadn't begun to develop close to the town.

After I got through this little early school to which most of my companions went, I went to public school. We were very hard up at that time, so my father took me to the public school and I remember the agony he went through when the superintendent examined me to see what room I should go into and I failed to answer obvious questions. I could see then I would make a very poor showing on these present programs where you earn $100,000 or $10,000 or any sum like that for your answers and these children of seven, eight, and ten star in these performances. I was very poor in school. My sister insists that this is not true. Mrs. Marshall insists, though she only has hearsay to go on, that it is not true. And the legend at home is that it is not true.

Now the actual facts of the case are that it was true. I didn't get along well in school. I never learnt how to study until I left school [in Uniontown] and went away to school.

I had a very painful time in the public school, because I was ashamed to admit my ignorance and so many in the room knew these—particularly these arithmetical problems so quickly and much better than I did. If it was history that was all right—I could star in history. But the other things I was very, very poor in. Grammar I knew nothing about. Arithmetic I knew nothing about and still know very little about. It wasn't until I went away to school that I learnt how to study and began to put up a performance. And my first year away at school was very poorly done. I think I was 35th in a class of one hundred fifty or thereabouts. And my last year, I was fifth. I was developing yet and learning to study and finally when I went to staff college and gave a year in a very intense competition, which has been compared to the Prix de Rome at the Sorbonne in Paris, and in those days was marked down the hundredths and thousandths of a per cent, I finally came out "one." It was a terrible year to me, but it fixed the habit of close study that I had never really gotten up to that time.

So we have had many arguments about this in which they think I am putting on a front and saying I didn't do well, but I had a very humiliating career in school except in something like history. And I was very much ashamed of it, but I did nothing about it. My father was very impatient about it; my brother was very impatient about it because he was an excellent student. And what really changed me a good bit was I wanted to go to the V. M. I. and he had gone and he had finished and he had done very well scholastically and unusually well in the course he had elected, chemical, and started the pursuit of chemistry in his earliest days connected with the iron furnaces. But when I was begging to go to the V. M. I., I overheard him talking to my mother and he was trying to persuade her not to let me go because he thought I would disgrace the

family name. Well, that made more impression on me than all the instructors, parental pressures or anything else, and I decided right then that I was going to "wipe his face" as we say or "wipe his eye" and I ended up at the V. M. I. As I say I was fifth at the end, by general standards only about fourteen, but that took in this year when I was 35th. And I was the senior cadet officer—I was the first captain of the Corps of Cadets—so I did finally get ahead of what my brother had done and that was the first time I had ever done that and there's where I had really learned my lesson. But the urgency came from hearing that conversation and it had quite a psychological effect on my career.

Now some more things about the pleasant little life we lived there in Uniontown. I remember there were only two pool tables in town. One was in the beautiful home of a great friend of mine who is near here now and one of the few remaining companions of my youth, if not the only one, in her house. Hers was a fairly modern house for that day and the other was in a house of one of the oldest families and the nephew of this judge who owned the house would invite us there to play pool. The room was a little bit constricted, which interfered with some of the shots. And I played very poorly because I found I had very poor hand coordination, which has persisted to this day. But what interested me in the poolroom there was a painting of Christ with a crown of thorns on his head. And I unfortunately made the observation to the nephew of the judge that I thought that a painting of Christ, with thorns on his head, and a poolroom was rare combination. Well, this was repeated to the old judge, who was a very severe character, and he forbade me the house from then on, so my pool education ceased right there while all my friends could go and play. And I learned early in the game the lesson of keeping your mouth shut unless you thought very particularly of what you were going to talk about and who you were going to talk to.

I might tell a very tragic and interesting thing about this old gentleman—this old judge. There was a branch of the railroad that took off near the station. I think of the B & O Railroad, maybe it was the Pennsylvania Railroad, and crossed one of the nice streets of the town pretty far out. They had tried to get the railroad to put a watchman there or to put a gate—they didn't have gates in those days, I must say, but to put a watchman there—because you couldn't see the train because of a cut. And it rolled right out of one of the principal thoroughfares where there was a great deal of traffic. But they were stopped every time, largely by this old judge, because he was a heavy stockholder in this road and he was for keeping down expenses. Now I am telling this thing from the recollections of my youth and what was hearsay to me at that time—when I was a very small boy—and it may be quite wrong, but nevertheless this is my understanding of the thing. So he opposed the installing of a watchman at this crossing. Several people were killed there and finally, tragically enough, the old judge was killed himself with a silk hat, I recall, in connection with attending some church function. Which I thought was a very tragic result of the unwillingness to put a watchman at this corner.

I recall this other railroad, and the lesson I learned from that, which crossed not far from our home and took off part of our grounds and an island in the creek which I valued very highly. But they had to cross the main highway which, as I have said, was the National Pike. The town was opposed to their crossing the highway or was unwilling to let them do it unless they paid more money. I don't know which. I expect the latter was probably the case. At any rate, the railroad had all these hired laborers in all sorts of clothes, good and bad, water with oatmeal in it for them to drink, which I got twenty-five cents a day for carrying at times, and they couldn't get across this National Pike. And I remember that there was a complete stalemate there and the first

thing I knew the railroad crossed the Pike in the night and when morning came they were in possession of the route through the town which has lasted ever since.

But I went back there and went over all this to remind me of my youth and found it was largely under a twenty foot hill. And I couldn't recognize anything very well around it. They had buried my youthful associations there, as I say, under a twenty foot fill.

There was another thing that made quite an impression on me which really, only in an abstract way, relates to the town. But one of the friends of my youth was a black terrier, a short haired terrier, named Trip. He was owned by a boy friend of mine who played with me practically every day. Trip always went with us. He was devoted to us and we to Trip. A couple of other dogs formed part of the gang—one celebrated dog named Towser, who afterwards we discovered had three names and boarded at three hotels. I could give a description of him in detail, but I don't think that's appropriate to what we are talking about. Anyway this Trip business is a little bit. I came back for a very brief visit to see my mother who was still, was at home, this was while I was a second lieutenant, I think after I had been in the Army three or four years. I went up to Trip's home—his owner I think was dead then—and the owner's old mother was still living there and I went in to visit her and then came out and Trip was lying on the stones by the old pump in the sun and his black coat had burned almost brown. He paid no attention to me. He didn't bark at me. He was so old he was just indifferent to me. Well that was quite a blow because Trip was one of my close companions of my youth. So I sat down on this long flagstone that was around the pump and succeeded in petting him, although he rather resented it in a way and was rather unwilling. And I talked to him quite a long time trying to renew my youth and very much distressed that he couldn't remember me at all, when after, I suppose, five or ten minutes, he took a little careful sniff of me and then he sniffed at me two or

three times and then he just went crazy over me. He had finally gotten a scent in his old nostrils and he remembered me and that was the most flattering thing that occurred to me on that short visit home after many years of not being there.

I am always surprised now when I think of all the various places I showed up at in Uniontown when I was a boy. As for as I can figure out I seem to have stuck my nose into everything. I remember getting in to see the hanging of the only man I ever heard of then being hanged and getting into the funeral in some way through the courthouse. I remember so many particular exhibitions. I remember the first exhibition of the long distance telephone when they had about twenty phones on one board and you could come in and talk to Chicago or wherever you elected and I, of course, talked to Chicago which was quite an event in my mind. But it was the introduction of the long distance telephone which was just entering my life at that time. I must have been about thirteen or fourteen years old at the time. By a little subtraction, you can figure out when that was.

The circuses of that day—of course I was deep in them. I arrived at the circus train and watched it unload and got out to the circus and my main occupation was getting in without paying for it.

Then the thing that very much absorbed the attention for one week a year, of my chum and myself, was the State Fair. They called the State Fair. Whether it was the real State Fair or not, I don't know. But it had a half mile race track for trotting and pacing animals and a few running but not many. It had the midway pleasance of that day where you put your money down and watched the wheel turn around and stop at the Alaska diamonds or the revolver or the alarm clock, which appeared very large in our eyes, or you bought the ten cent paddle on the wheel

where you won a dollar if the wheel stopped at your number. And all of that sort of thing. There were a great many different gyrations to the plot. Well, we arrived at the opening of the fair before the things were put up. We saw everything put up. We saw every snare involved in it. We saw how the man could control the thing and dupe the credulous guests and having all this knowledge we indulged in what you might call refined blackmail. They would have to let us win the big prize, but we would take it back until we got to the last day of the fair and then everything we won we kept and we would hide. And we had a great time there.

But what has stuck in my recollection was a brand new wooden tub, with sort of light wood on the inside and with nails around on which were hung tin cups and that was lemonade and all you could drink for a nickel. Well, that was the best lemonade I have ever tasted—I have never tasted any since that just touched it—and all you could drink for a nickel. But the trouble was we tried every way we could to drink a lot, but they wouldn't allow us to pause. And after we got to a certain point, you developed this pain in your temple and you couldn't drink anymore and then they would take our tin cup and we would have to produce another nickel in order to go any further.

But we had a lot of interesting things and we learned a lot about such things during that period of our experiences at the fair.

Another way of raising money was to get into the grandstands and then to crawl out the back and sell the pass ticket we got at the reduced rate which was a nickel instead of a dime. And then crawl out the back again. My father caught me at this and I was very severely reprimanded and not allowed to do it anymore.

We knew the stable intimately—the various horses, some of the owners and could have advised betting pretty well, but we never became involved in that phase of the matter.

Altogether it was a very enjoyable sort of recess in our life in this small town.

Unfortunately, we didn't have a river or a very large stream in which we could do swimming, so we had to swim in ponds out of which I finally got typhoid fever. It wasn't until I went down to the Ohio River in Kentucky in my father's and mother's home at Augusta, Kentucky, that I learned how to swim. I remember I had a very amusing uncle, rather a man with a very keen sense of humor and a devilish performer of practical jokes, who used to go down with a chair—down the grade as they called the beach—and watch me learning to learn to swim and splashing desperately in trying to keep up for a few feet.

My last years at home were in a private school which only had a short life. It was built up by a very brilliant man, but one who was not very good on a business affair and was very apt to become diverted by other things. He was very handsome, very popular, beautifully educated, but he was an uncertain quantity in the world. Afterwards some people from home, some of the men, met him in Paris with two very lovely women and he cut them dead. He ran the school and had a number of teachers and I remember when it broke up there was no money to pay the teachers. That I think was my last school experience there.

I thought the years of public school were not very long, but they were valuable to me. I think every boy in a democracy should attend, for at least a period, a public school—although I must say the teaching is often far below par and creates considerable difficulty if the boy tries to go to a very high grade school where he has been intensively instructed. But the democracy of it is very important, I think, in the life of every young American. I think working, ordinary work,

is very important. It is pretty difficult for a wealthy boy to do. But if the parents can get him away where he has to go on his own for a while to make his own money, to find his own job, I don't know anything better for you as a preparation for the roughness of life and the necessity for understanding life as it is lived in a democracy and among the many particular kinds of people with which you are associated.

The development of the town was very rapid after it once got started, it seemed to me and the first great move was putting in the streetcar line. The next one was paving a good bit of the street. I didn't like that at all because my father made me wash the street with the hose and I had to wash both sides of the street—both my chum's side and my side and the streetcar track—and I had to do this in the morning right after breakfast and before school. And all the other fellows going to school and the girls all made fun of me. And, of course, that is very painful to any young person, but I had to do it every day.

We had a number of dogs—two or three hunting dogs and then " Towser" our famous pet. And when we went to taking our meals, during the days when we were having difficulty with the servant question, which was very difficult there, I had to carry home scraps from the kitchen of the hotel. This was very painful and humiliating performance for me. However, it contributed to my education, though I didn't enjoy it at all and it was always sort of the black spot on my boyhood.

The dogs were very interesting. My mother was very fond of them. We all were. Several of them were fine hunting dogs. Towser, the old fellow, who had every kind of blood in the world in him, was a very curious citizen and a very fine one. He would take my father down to his train when he would go down to the coal and coke works and he would learn in time when

the other train came back and he would meet him at the train. He took my chum's father, who was president of a bank, to the bank when he would go at 7:30 in the morning. He would meet him for lunch and would take him back after lunch and would meet him when he went late at night and he would often stay at the bank until eleven or twelve o'clock, but Towser was always there to meet him.

Towser had very famous fights with a bulldog. The bulldog got the best of it when he'd pinch on Towser's neck and ear and afterwards this ear became quite a problem with his state of health. But he stayed with the bulldog and finally they dragged the bulldog off—killed. The bulldog belonged, incidentally, down at this place on the banks of the creek where I saw the ducks in my first view of the world from the ladder in our stable.

We played a great deal in the country. Andy's grandfather had this very valuable farm, which they farmed in the splendid way of those days and was very profitable. It was underlaid with coal, but they didn't mine it. The next time I saw it was two or three years back and it had been ruined by the coal veins taken out from under it. But then it was a very rich farm. When we could go out there, we would be allowed to sit at the table with the harvest hands and listen to the conversation of the harvest hands. And Andy's old grandmother would help wait on the table and help with the cooking and they were very wealthy people. Later Andrew's father became one of the richest men in western Pennsylvania. His grandmother was very well-to-do but she worked. She helped the maids in the kitchen and she waited on the harvest table.

And the masses of food these men ate! While it didn't impress me much as a boy, I can look at it now and think where they got their appetites and where they got the food and how they could eat so much. You all washed out in the yard near the horse trough and you had a tin basin

and there was one little broken mirror and an old comb and you would slick your hair down and make it sort of curl around on your forehead. But that was the way you got ready for lunch. And then the conversation at the table seemed to me smacked very much of that I get in the Westerns I read of the cowboys in the West where they are always making fun of each other and dressing down one of their members if he in any way seemed to brag about any particular achievement of his. They were always tearing down a fellow and making little of him to the immense amusement of all the others. But I never heard of fighting or anything else of that sort.

I learned a little bit about farming because I helped with a great deal of it. I helped as far as I could in the barn—and they had a beautiful barn. I helped out in the fields, hauling the hay shocks. I helped in distributing the manure on the parts of the land that showed from lack of crops in that vicinity or the grass that it needed refreshment. I learned a great deal about it, without really being conscious of the fact that I was learning. Of course, when we got bicycles, which was an introduction during my day, we could go there much more frequently and we were always rewarded with whole pies and that was a wonderful thing.

Going back to the bicycle, I first rode and very briefly the tall bicycle with the little wheel behind it and most of the time I was on my nose. Then came in the "safety," as they called it, which had spade-like handles and a hard rubber tire and was a very heavy machine. And then very quickly after that came the inflated tire and the light machine. I learned to be very expert in changing the tire because we had a great many punctures. Dunlop was the first pneumatic tire of my youth and I think that the Dunlop patent made a great fortune in this country as well as in England. But that came in during that period and that changed the life of the countryside very much because we could now ride out on our bicycles quite a long distance. And I picked up things that seemed very distant and very remote and was unheard of until I got onto the bicycle.

I remember so well getting on the boat on the Monongahela at one point. We had ridden to that point and were about exhausted when we got there. The river bank, or beach, was covered with pottery which was there to be loaded on the boat—uncrated, just the pieces of pottery of various designs and types. And on inquiry, it took quite a bit of inquiry to get this straight, I found out that all resulted from a Swiss who had settled in that part of the country and became a very well known statesman and he had brought with him the Swiss industry of making this pottery and had established there at a town called Geneva. I didn't know Geneva was name from Switzerland and I didn't realize that this pottery all came from the knowledge of these people who came from Switzerland—settled in what was called Geneva, and where this beautiful place was built up by Glass—Glass something another [Albert Gallatin?]—who was Secretary of Treasury I believe. Anyway he was involved in the purchase of Alaska and he was a very able statesman. And the beautiful place he built still stands and still is occupied and was purchased by my chum Andy in later years when he became a well-to-do man before his father's fortune and his fortune crumbled.

All these things developed certain steps and the population of the town was changing. It was about five thousand as I first knew it and as I recall. I don't know what it could have been at the time of stages coming through on the National Pike from Baltimore to Wheeling. The next stop was Brownsville by the way which was the birthplace of two very important men, James G. Blaine and Knox who afterwards became Secretary of State and Attorney General. But Brownsville was very remote from me. It was only twelve miles but you practically never saw it until we got bicycles, and then I saw Brownsville a little though it had been as remote as a dodo from the earlier activities of my youth.

In this respect I remember being visited by nine boys while I was Secretary of State who wanted to see me regarding a plan they had for feeding the poor boys in France or otherwise in Europe. I saw them because I thought that was unusual. I thought of my own youth when all these places that are so familiar later on were just maybe matters of history, but certainly not places that I have every visited. When these boys came, they had all been dandied up in their Cub Scout uniforms. And they'd all had their hair cut and everything was freshly starched. I invited the Press up to hear this interview, but I didn't tell them what it was. And they were very much incensed that I had dragged them upstairs for nine boys of about nine years average age apiece. I seated them at the table. I didn't know yet what they wanted. And the boy on my right told me that they wanted to give this money they were going to make, and they had yet largely to make, to a fund for the poor boys in Europe. They had gotten the use of a movie and they thought they had the borrowing of a theater. And they were going to put on this special matinee and invite all the school children and mothers, fathers if they could get them, and others and they wanted my endorsement. That was all he said and I remember complimenting him on the completeness yet brevity of his statement. They didn't appreciate just what that meant. And then I got to thinking at that moment—just at that moment—of what a contrast that was to my youth. My radius of activities at nine years old didn't go as far as Brownsville which was twelve miles away on the Monongahela River. It went up into the mountains because we summered there. But it didn't go over five miles from home—I don't think much. I had only heard of Salt Lake as a tale of history, and not very serious history at that age. I had heard of San Francisco—the Golden Gate—but that very briefly. I had never heard of Manila—I am quite certain I never had. Pittsburgh was the furthest point and that was because I was taken there with my mother shopping when she went to the City as she expressed it. I had gotten down to Kentucky to my

father's home, but I don't believe I really got there until I was about twelve. Anyway it was a very restricted, circumscribed area in which I lived. Now here were these boys talking about Europe and nine years old and raising money to feed these European boys who were really on the verge of starvation.

So I described this all to these boys, what my youth was like in contrast to theirs. And if I do say it myself at the moment, I talked pretty well, because I was rather moved with the whole contrast. Then I went into the present day. I first described the short history in an international way of our country as we know it. The fact that we never had an ambassador in this country nor an ambassador that we gave to another country until very late in the development. And at the time of Dewey's battle of Manila Bay there wasn't an ambassador accredited to the U. S. nor did we accredit an ambassador to any other state. We were hardly noticed except as having a Wild West. I think most of the information about us related to the Wild West—the buffalo and the magnificent hunting and things of that sort and the sort of wild life they thought we led. New York, of course, was in touch with a few Europeans and Boston and maybe Baltimore to certain extent, but not much, and Charleston and Savannah, and San Francisco, in a very brief way, with the western Pacific. But it is hard to realize now how limited was the U. S. at the time of Dewey's battle of Manila Bay. And there began our international involvements, however, you may term them, whether we want them or not. That is the international beginning, in a way, of the international history of the United States as I see it. And it developed very quickly and there were very serious political campaign battles in regard to it, notably the Democratic campaign in regard to the development of the Philippines and the Republican campaign in connection with the development of the Philippines for as they said its eventual return to the Filipino, when he was in a position to govern himself, which he certainly was not at that particular time.

All of this happened in that period of my youth and I can recall so well my father walking up and down and discussing the dispatch that had just come in about the battle of Santiago in Cuba. I recall equally with that going down to the 8:15 train in the morning and getting the newspaper, which I wanted to read more than my father and mother, but they both wanted to read it, which gave the description of the fight between John L. Sullivan and Corbett. Later on when the telegraph would give the news of the fight, I remember waiting outside the window of the telegraph office where they read the messages aloud to us—the Corbett-Fitzsimmons fight. And I remember the discussion there to this day between two men arguing about Fitzsimmons who won the fight in the thirteenth round, as I remember it. They announced the winning of the fight when we were getting the eleventh round and then we had to wait to get the remaining three rounds. These men were now arguing about Fitzsimmons who was the national hero of the moment and just of that moment. This man was insisting that he was a great American and this other fellow says, "No such thing, he was born in Australia." This man said, "He was an American, he is an American citizen." And the other man said, "He was born in Australia." And the reply was "Just because you were born in a stable, you are not a horse." I have never forgotten that to this day. The Sullivan-Corbett fight when that came in the newspaper on the train—the Fitzsimmons-Corbett fight—I don't remember about the others as I guess I had left home at that time.

All these things came as a common denominator of my day—the early day when I was a little boy, running a green house and things of that sort, and the latter day—the bicycle day I would call it, when I got into that extension of my activities.

The return of the regiment from the Philippines was a very great day. They painted the street red, white, and blue for the local company. And they turned the town upside down. They

had arches made of coke; they had arches of bunting, they had other arches. And they gave these men everything they could in the way of hospitality, including drink. But very shortly after that, they failed to support the National Guard company, so the remaining history there was no National Guard company from that town, which I thought was a very unfortunate thing. They began making money so fast that they didn't look into any of these things until the crack came—the crash came—and everybody was next door seemingly to the poor house. But I was gone and forgotten at that time. But I saw great prosperity without realizing just what it meant. And I wasn't there in the days of extreme financial stress.

I am trying to think of other periods there of my youth which would be interesting in recording development of affairs. I always marched in the torchlight processions when they allowed me to, but I was pretty small for the purpose. I liked the William Jennings Bryan campaign, because they gave me a gray hat and a cane. I think I was about fourteen then and I walked in every Bryan celebration. I was very proud of myself with my cane and gray fedora hat and the intense amusement of my mother.

These things all seem very small. I had a very attractive coterie of friends—one or two of them who won great national prominence as athletes—particularly one who was the fullback on the Yale team, the pitcher of the Yale ball team and the broad jumper of the Yale field team—all in his first year became very well-known all over the country. He was just about my age or about a year older than I was, but a companion of my youth. There were several others who won great fame. We had a very interesting ball team. There was a lawyer there who was very fond of baseball and who had played on the Lafayette team. So he was a lawyer and busy, but he couldn't get away from his fondness for baseball so he organized a team on which he played first base. And he got most of these boys, country boys. Well it just happened he landed on two

wonderful pitchers who afterwards made great records—one at Princeton, in particular, and he refused to go on in national baseball because he got his education and became a doctor. The other fellow I met years and years afterwards when I went back for the first planned visit for me and he was at the plane to meet me in his shirtsleeves, but I won't say any more on that.

But this team that this lawyer organized had great success. Finally it developed that he was getting a little old for the team and they put in a young man playing first base which rather broke his heart. And the management of the team was taken over and while they were all volunteers, in a sense it became semi-professional, although there was no professional league at all. Then the trouble was finding anybody to play. They licked everybody and defeated everybody around them. And if my recollection is correct though I may have an exaggerated recollection of the circumstances, I know that this lawyer succeeded in getting Johnny Ward, the first baseman of New York, to bring that team over when it was first or second in the National League and the Pittsburgh team which was either first or second the same year, came over. I don't know who its manager was but I know its great pitcher was Red Erick who fascinated me because he kicked as high as his head when he made his delivery in pitching. They came over and with the New York team was Rusie, I think is his name, who was supposed to pitch the fastest baseball of that day and maybe later, I don't know. But whatever it was, we had one colored man at the time—Hucker McClure—who played right field. And Hucker came to the bat his first time up against New York and knocked a home run off the famous Rusie. I think Rusie sort of slacked up on him and the home run leaked out. Now, I am not quite certain of the result, but my dim recollection is that they defeated New York. I won't say that they defeated the Pittsburgh team, too, but they gave them a rapid run for their money. However, these were destructive of the team, because they were signed up all over the country and there was no team

left. Most of the men went to colleges, some went to professional football. They were largely country boys, but that was the great interest at home—that ball team and it was so completely destroyed that there was never any fine ball team organized in the days of my youth after that.

I think that I have given you everything but the murder trials which I used to try to attend and got put out of the courthouse, but those were the activities of youth.

One thing I delighted in was when the snow was on the ground and we could sled ride and when it really got frozen up and the main roads, which were all macadam roads and sometimes not even that, could be used. One road cut right across the town over to Main Street. When that got into excellent condition, they would put somebody on watch at Main Street in order to stop any traffic when a sled was coming down. And they had these big sleds that called "Panics" where the front part was connected in a loose way with a long slant of the sled and where the head man sat with a skate on one foot and his legs crossed over and guided the sled and held on with two hands.

Later on a sled came out which was purchased and they still have it, I think—the Flexible Flyer. They got me the largest size. There were only two sizes, I recall. That was very fine—there was nothing like that in town, and we got a plank for it so that we could put on two extra people and when the sled riding got really fine and we could use this main road right across the town and on down stop the traffic in the evening. And on a moonlight night, my father would go and take a friend of his. And we like that because the weight made the velocity of the sled much greater and we had this board along the length which extended over the rear and allowed them to get a little bit out over that. I sat in front with the skate on my foot—or my chum—and my father would sit behind and was supposed to swing the sled. And we would come down this

road, and it had walks across the road which were built up, which really made "jumpers" as we called them, and the sled would leap out from them and you had to be very expert to sit and prevent it from turning turtle when it landed on the other side of the crossing. But the whole town would turn out and it was quite a fine sport to have all the men, old and young, and the boys all playing together. And playing together was what it was.

I saw in the *Saturday Evening Post* the other day an illustration in colors of the local barbershop, apparently of this day, and apparently out in the west—a very amusing illustration, very expertly done. I was reminded of my youth. There was one barbershop, as I recall, in the town, run by a Negro man, who was quite a friend of mine, and he had about four Negro assistants, so he must have had about five chairs. And that was sort of club. There were no clubs for men in those days. There was no country club and no town club. The Elks Club had just gotten formed but that wasn't much except on the Elk night. So there would be a great deal sitting in the barbershop where you could get all the news. They didn't like the boys to come in there then. They liked all the chairs available for the men. Most of the men, as I recall, came there to get their shave in the daytime. Whether they got shaved every day, I don't remember. But I know they got their shaves there—didn't shave at home—and there was no safety razor. Each one had his own cup with the soap and his name was on the cup in very fanciful letters. So you could see the names of all the patrons in these cups in the rack which interested me as a boy. And all these men came in, many of them came around noontime to get their shave, many in the evening after dinner, and then immediately after work in the afternoon.

It was a very solid town in its ways. I remember that one young man there, a very attractive young man, a fairly good fellow as I recall, was almost blackballed because he didn't work. He had enough money to have some good horses. He rode horse back and drove good

rigs—and it was a beautiful country to do that in—and he had organized a riding club which went up in the mountains. And he was rather taboo because he didn't work. Later on he took a job at a plant about a mile out of town and he would have to walk down the railroad a mile to that plant every day and would have to walk back for lunch or eat out of a lunch pail and walk back in the evening. And I think he really did it to take the curse off this taboo on him because he didn't work. Later on there were many who didn't work, but they didn't improve the life of the town at all.

(If I think of anything else that will go with this or if this gives you any ideas of what I should really furnish you in way of information of these days, I will do it.)

I remember I got one lesson when I participated in a political parade for a Governor of Pennsylvania. I don't remember who he was, but he was the Democratic candidate. And they had a tremendous to-do. And they had these torch lights and people cheering out the windows. And, of course, to me he was just the governor-elect of Pennsylvania. Well, he was snowed under by a terrific vote which came largely from Philadelphia and which was very much a controlled vote. And I got my first lesson in politics there, because my mother finally explained to me why though this man was successful where we were and successful other places around, he was completely defeated by the political organization of the city of Philadelphia.

I knew about everybody in town. I walked to everything I went to. I walked to school. I walked to these other things. I seldom rode on the streetcar, because they were always too short a ride to pay a nickel to get. But I always remember my mother going shopping and coming back to the house and getting off the streetcar, which was rather high up, the street hadn't been bricked yet and it made it a little bit high above the macadam road. And she stepped in the

middle of a dog fight. We had two or three dogs there and my chum had a dog. And a strange dog had gotten involved. Our dogs had a bad habit of barking at the horses. And in this general melee— they were all fighting— mother just stepped down in the middle of the fight. I remember she landed sitting and lost her hat and lost her basket, but even that didn't make her so mad because she was very fond of the dogs and she recognized a dog did that. Ours weren't so well-trained, but they were beautifully trained for shooting, which was their principal activity, which allowed them a considerable liberty in their ordinary dogdom.

(I think I will call it a day. I am going to send this reel, because I would like to get your reaction. I know you don't want to print all of this nonsense, but maybe you can find something from it which will give you a little eyesight into the life of the town in which I grew up. But I think you can tell me better what will be suitable).

TAPE 2M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

February 28, 1957

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BOYHOOD IN UNIONTOWN

RECORDED INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
AT PINEHURST, February 28, 1957

(The questions were made out by Forrest C. Pogue. Sergeant Heffner ran the tape recorder).

My comments on Uniontown days. There were several incidents which I forgot to mention and I recall others and now that I have received word from you that you approve of this procedure, I shall go ahead and add anything I can think of.

Our home, which was a two story brick house, rather large, and with a very delightful side porch on which we did a great deal of our living during the seasonable portions of the year, I might describe it because I have never seen another quite like it. It was up about ten steps or more above the ground level. The roof of the porch extended beyond the house quite a ways. The overhead of the porch itself was the second story of the house.

The side porch upstairs [was] off my bedroom or the nursery. The front hall led directly into the side porch. The main door or side door to the porch led into the dining room. We always had a sort of Gloucester hammock on the porch and, of course, a number of chairs. But the fact that the roof of the porch, which was really the roof of the steps down to the yard level and beyond, extended at least ten feet beyond the foot of the steps and had quite a slope to it.

Upstairs off the rear room, which was the nursery and my bedroom the side porch had grapes along an arbor. The leader from the grapes around our springhouse passed over to a large maple tree which early in my youth collapsed--that is the top fell off leaving more than a stump. And this leader from the grapevine passed on to the upstairs porch, so that it was possible for me as a boy during the season of the bearing of the grapes to step out of bed and walk out in my bare feet on the porch and pull down bunches of delicious Concord grapes and another variety which I have forgotten. I am struck by the fact today how easy it was to grow things in those days. Every bunch was more or less

perfect. Now today at our Leesburg place, unless we put each bunch early in a sack, it is ruined by worms.

And I have never grown a successful crop of grapes up there though I have ten varieties. But in my boyhood, the arbor around the spring house was covered with grapes and the extension to the side upstairs porch had two varieties which bore prodigiously—though that is hardly the word.

The house was on a level with the street, the National Pike I have referred to, but the side of the house toward the creek was very much lower and the retaining wall was about eight feet tall and was actually the approach to the bridge over the creek of the National Pike.

Another incident of my young boyhood was the very pleasant habit of young men--young lawyers and so forth who lived at the hotel, one of the hotels of the town-and as there was no golf course, no clubs, there was no place for them to go much on Sundays and nothing to do. My family—my father and mother were from Kentucky—and they were accustomed to a very bountiful living and continual hospitality. There were always people for meals, there were always many around. That was not the case at all at home. They had very old families that went back to the early days, but they entertained very little and particularly on Sundays led a very austere life. On the contrary, my mother and father enjoyed having young people about—meaning young men for example—and the habit soon formed of half a dozen of these young fellows coming to our house on Saturday afternoon and sitting out in what we called the backyard, which was the edge of the orchard and not far from the creek.

There built up at home the first ice plant in that part of the country and I became a temporary employee of the ice plant whenever I could get the job and have the time in summer. So it was a very easy matter for me to put the choice watermelons my father picked out in the room where the ice blocks were stored. So on a Sunday afternoon, I would go [to] the ice plant with my wagon and haul a couple of watermelons home. On a black Japan tin waiter, father would carve these melons out in the yard, with an admiring group of young men, and cut them into large V like slices. And everybody of the male variety, in their shirtsleeves, would sit and eat watermelon and squirt the seeds out on the lawn. That became a regular business during the watermelon season and I think was the

only entertainment offered in the town of any kind, except to sit in the hotel lounge window and look out at the street which was more or less vacant on a day like that. But I always remember these watermelon festivals, and they persisted the entire length of the watermelon season. And as I recall the watermelons cost about ten cents a piece.

Another thing at that period which I overlooked the other day was my employment in the church—St. Peter's Episcopal Church. I pumped the organ—the place for the pumper was in a very narrow region in rear of the organ and the pump was just a handle like the tiller of a boat. The pumping was not difficult except you had to be there. But there was a long period of wait during the sermon. And on one of these mornings, I was occupying this period of waiting by reading a five cent novel of that day about Nick Carter. Just in the most exciting portion, and it was very much like Jesse James, my attention was called to the organ by the thump, thump, which the organist, Miss Fanny Howe, could make from the keyboard. And I realized that she had started to play at the end of the sermon and no music was coming out. So I pumped the organ very hurriedly. And, of course, she was not only displeased but rather outraged. Miss Fanny was a very fine person, a woman well-to-do, of one of the old families there, and was a great pillar of strength in the church. I have said in recent years that she relieved me of duty with the organ. I think she did, but I am not certain. At least I can't remember who took my place. I mention this because I have seen it referred to several times.

Another item of my youth which made a great impression on me at the time was my inability to make a speech--meaning a recitation. I seemed utterly unable to do this. And when I went to public school, they had just had an addition of a very large assembly room, which took in most of the pupils. They could all sit in there for these Friday afternoon occasions. And I had to recite on this particular Friday. I have never forgotten this, because never again have I experienced quite such agony. So I looked through the book—I remember some of the things—pieces of poetry and matters of that kind. I remember one was "Riding Home from Bangor on the Evening Train" and this particular one which caught my fancy because of its excitement was "Asleep at the Switch", where this boy goes to sleep when he is watching the switch and the train is going to be wrecked and as I recall he wakes up to find it a dream. However it was, I contracted to recite "Asleep at the Switch" to the more or less entire public school. And as they got started on the program and mine wasn't

until towards the last, I realized that I had forgotten entirely part of one verse. Well I struggled every way with my memory and I couldn't recall what that verse was. So I sat there in agony knowing that my turn was coming and I couldn't recite because I couldn't remember one of the leading verses—or at least a portion of it—and I went through positive agony there which was much prolonged because the program stretched out quite far. But this eventually saved my life because the time ran out and the session was dismissed. And with it passed from my life "Asleep at the Switch."

I never had to make any talk, I don't think, until years later when I was senior captain at the V.M.I. and I had to talk to the whole corps at some meeting when we were under duress, as it were, and I remember the Board of Visitors was there to state their side of the question and I was called upon to state the side of the cadets. But I don't recall any previous recitations speech or anything until that occasion and I don't recall any after that for many, many years. So my talent, whatever it was, was certainly not existent at that time.

Speaking of the very attractive side porch of our house, which was connected to the front door by a straight hall, reminds me of another affair which now delights my wife. My sister's schoolmate, from her school in Philadelphia, was the daughter of the Governor of Pennsylvania at that time, Haskell some might remember that he is referred to in a very flattering way by Li Hung Chang in his supposed diary of his journal of his trip to America. Anyway, Helen Haskell arrived and she was a very pretty girl and she was going to be entertained at a five hundred party on this back porch on a pleasant summer day. And the stipulation of my sister was that I was barred from the house during this party because she regarded me as a rather turbulent member of the household. So I retired across the street to my chum's house, yard, and we went back to the stable in their backyard to find some activity that would amuse us. And we stirred up a bees' nest. Well, it was quite the fashion in those days to fight bees. You whittled out a handle on a shingle and cut out some air holes so it would be easier to swing. And with this sort of tennis-like paddle you proceeded to fight the bees. You stirred them up and they came at you and you hit at them. And if you had bad luck you got badly stung. So we were fighting bees. In the group, I remember—the boy that led to my misfortune was named Bowman, Herbert Bowman, who became a famous Yale athlete; I think he was pitcher on the baseball team, fullback on the football team or broad jumper on the track

team, all in his first year—and he displayed these talents in a battle with me when we were both trying to get under the other to protect us against this bee which was determined to get us. We were hitting in every way with our paddles, and we broke our paddles on each other, not intentionally, and we were having a desperate fight and the bee was just humming right in the rear of our hairline. And it was [in] a desperate effort to get free of the bee that I broke loose and the bee chased me. And I came from the far backyard of my chum's home and passed his house in a flash and across the street and the front door was open—it was a summer afternoon and I went straight down the long hall. And I remembered at the last moment that I was forbidden the house and the card party was going on, on the side porch, peaceful and delightful. So I turned to the right and went off into the dining room. But the bee went straight ahead and stung the guest of honor, Helen Hastings, and I didn't dare come home until late that night. This is an actual fact. It stung the girl. They wouldn't believe me. They claimed I took the bee in there. (Chuckles) My reputation wasn't too good.

I recalled after my dictation the other day one item connected with our greenhouse which was next door to the carriage house, where we painted it green as much as we could in order to keep in line with the name for these flower shops. We learnt in the first place-we with a struggle made a flag—it was white, some kind of cloth, and on it with great difficulty we printed "Marshall and Thompson," "Florists" below the name. The only trouble was we left out the "l" and it was "Forists." We made a pole beside the house and hoisted our flag and that stood as our advertisement of our greenhouse. When our home there was broken up, I was away of course; matter of fact, I was in the Army, I think—my mother found in the attic this famous flag. And while she kept many things which I couldn't understand her keeping, she destroyed our flag which I would have delighted in having today.

The other thing about the greenhouse was that we learnt that Congressmen in those days would get you free seed from Washington—free seeds. That was the only free thing we could think of, so on our toy typewriter we wrote to our Congressman, whom I had never seen because he was from another town, and I never did see our Congressman until long after I was in the Army. Anyway, we wrote to him for free seeds and in due time there came from the Agriculture Department a packet of seeds. The only trouble was they were cotton seeds, which was sort of out of place in Pennsylvania. However, we planted them and they grew a little in our strawberry boxes but that was not much of a success.

I recall years later when I was before a Committee of Congress, hearing a remark by one of the members in a question to me, that I probably had had no relations with Congress in any way until I became Chief of Staff. I said no, that was not correct. I had a relationship with Congress that went back to my early boyhood and so my mind was not entirely the military mind which they so often would claim when they were opposed to what I was saying. They wished to know what that connection was and I told them of the cottonseed and they were very much amused at that. And I said I never had any other relationship with my Congressman after that. The cottonseed experience was enough for me.

I got a great deal of amusement out of our black breasted red bantam chickens. The hens looked almost like quail, lacking the topknots. The roosters, of course, were highly colored, long tails, black tails, and red plumage with a black breast. But they contented themselves largely with strutting around. But the hens not only appeared a little like quail, but they flew a little like quail. And when I would open the henhouse up after they had been shut in for the night to save them from any animals who might destroy them, they would generally take flight and sail up to the top of the apple trees. And this was particularly the case if they had been shut in during snowy, cold weather. And it was quite a sight to see them all break loose like a flushed covey of quail and sail up into the top of the apple trees.

Another incident of my boyhood always strikes me as amusing. In those days there were paper, large, thin, paper novels—the Nick Carter series, the Frank Merriwell series, the Old Sleuth series. We were forbidden from reading all but the Frank Merriwell series and those were highly recommended. And, therefore, while they were very well adapted to boyhood, they were a little bit despised because they were approved. In order to read the Nick Carter series which was very much like Jesse James at his best, we would retire to this springhouse. (I have told this didn't I? Cancel that; I'm retelling the same thing.)

You ask the question as to how I probably became interested in the Army. Well, frankly I don't know. I recall that at the earliest school I went to—Miss Thompson's—that at recess I used to try to drill a company of boys with stick guns, and they would march at my command. I have a dim recollection that they didn't like it and we didn't do too much of it, but that we did do this at recess. That's the only key I can give to my military desire except that when my brother went off to school, and a military school with a very famous record of fighting during the war and I had been taken over that battlefield at New Market, I was intensely

interested in that sort of thing. And my interest was much increased by the fact that we met Colonel Charles Marshall of Baltimore at that time, who was a very, very distant highly collateral relative, who had been Lee's aide during the war. And he talked quite a bit to mother and I think he was responsible for the interest that developed in sending my brother to the V.M. I., where I followed. Other than that and the fact that I, more or less, like all boys, we always played fighting Indians in the woods; I don't know otherwise why I should have espoused a military career.

There was no particular ancestry of mine—that is near to me—of a military nature. I have already told of my father being captured, when he was about sixteen, I believe, by Basil Duke, who was a cousin, in the Home Guard defense of their town, Augusta, Kentucky. He was released by Duke after he had gotten down to Frankfort, Kentucky, I think. I know two of my father's brothers were in Lee's army. He was just a boy in the Home Guard which in its essence, I guess, was Federal—was Union.

You asked me about my comments on the developments during my youth, such as the automobile, the airplane, and other phenomena. As a matter of fact both of these two occurred after I had left home. I saw very little of my home after I went away to school because there was no vacation during the winter. We had to be present even at dress parade, evening parade, on Christmas Day and if we didn't have a special permit we had to be there for lunch on Christmas Day. The session ran sometimes up into July, but as a rule about the 15th or 20th of June. And when I would come home, the family as a rule would be off up in the mountains. They were nearby—they were about 2500 feet high at the highest point nearby—and there were a number of old mountain houses where you could board very reasonably and get a wealth of food, particularly chicken—broiled chicken—gravy and waffles and honey. I know I had a record of twenty-three quarters of waffles at one time. It's a wonder if didn't kill me. But then the family would not come back until it was time for school. So I was away from home practically all summer and I was completely away from home when I was off at school at the V.M.I. So my intimacy with home life more or less ceased when I was sixteen years of age.

I don't recall the introduction of electricity. We had carbon street lights which killed hundreds of thousands of bugs, and they had to be cleaned of bugs almost every day. I

remember that, but I don't remember the other lights and their introduction though it may have happened at that time.

My family came all from Kentucky on my father's side and halfway from Kentucky on my mother's side. Her father was a doctor in Augusta, Kentucky who went to a medical school in Philadelphia—Jefferson Medical School, I believe, and there he met his wife who was the daughter of a man named Bradford (no she was the daughter of a very well to do, able businessman [Stuart] in Pittsburgh). He incidentally owned a great deal of the property down on the Point which has now been made beautiful through the Aetna Life Insurance Company, I believe. He owned property all over Pittsburgh, mostly farm property, and when the National Pike crossed the river at Monongahela thirty-five miles away, he sold this property and bought extensive property on either side of the Pike at Monongahela City. Of course when the railroad developed Pittsburgh, Monongahela City fell flat. The great traffic over the Pike died away. The great Conestoga wagons became a thing of the past and his wealth was very much decreased, though he was still a very well-to-do man. One daughter of his never married and lived to be, I think 96, though I am not certain of this. She was my great aunt and she lived with us quite a bit of the time. She was a very remarkable woman in her intelligence and retained her mental faculties up until the last I remember my brother and myself going to see her the last time I ever saw her alive. And she was questioning him about his studies at the V.M.I. He was specializing in chemistry and going to be a chemical engineer. She wanted to know where he was in his progress in that study and h e spoke of Davy's atomic law. She immediately recited it. I asked him afterwards and he said she had that word for word. And she hadn't had to do with it since she was eighteen years old. So she was a very brilliant woman intellectually. I remember even in those days when she had to read with a large magnifying glass, that she read her Hebrew Testament and her French Bible every morning. She had had a great many interesting experiences and she recorded them all. I think somewhere I mentioned that she rode horseback to and from a number of times—from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia.

I recall one incident regarding the family which was a profound irritation to my father. He was very much interested in the genealogy of the family—very much so—and was very proud of our connection with John Marshall. As a matter of fact John Marshall was a very

distant, collateral relation. His father, Thomas Marshall and his brothers went to Kentucky and they left him in Virginia—or rather he chose to stay in Virginia—and his great reputation grew up there along with the charm of his personality in Richmond, while his father and brothers settled near Maysville, Kentucky, at a place called Little Washington. I remember going to visit there in my youth with my mother to some of her old friends when we were down in Kentucky

visiting her brother in Augusta.

The point that I recall that rather delights my recollection today was there was a book—there is a book, you can find it in the Congressional Library—on the Marshall family. I had a copy in my younger days, but I lost it in all my books being flooded in transportation on one of my trips to the Philippines. Anyway, there was other copies--the other children, my brother and sister, both, had copies. (Incidentally, I am sending you separately an outline of this book so far as it relates to me, which my secretary in the War Department at that time when I was Chief of Staff, had compiled in order to mimeograph and answer questions which were continually coming in about me and my progenitors, so that you can see just what it is). But to go back to the book, it didn't interest me at all because I wasn't mentioned. I was born too late. My brother and sister were mentioned. My father and mother and brother and sister just got a mere brief paragraph of about two or three sentences and that wasn't very exciting. But as I say, I wasn't mentioned, so I wasn't at all interested. But there was one portion of the book that I did enjoy immensely. It was a description of one Marshall lady who married a famous pirate of [the] South Carolina coast and of depredations in the Caribbean and elsewhere. He was called, I believe, Blackbeard. I haven't got the book here so I can't check. Anyway he was a terror and he was afterwards, I believe, captured by Lt. Maynard of the Navy and hung from the yardarm in execution of his crimes. That was near Charleston, S.C. Well I enjoyed very much reading about Blackbeard and his atrocities—that was the only interesting thing I found in the book. I enjoyed it so much that I took it out of the house and took it either to school or somewhere with my friends and read it to the boys. And they liked it very much and boys always have quite romantic conceptions of who their progenitors are and they generally have very celebrated people and very ferocious possibly. I had them all beaten because I had a pirate who had a very bloody and cruel history and a long

beard to help out. Well, it seems some father had heard this mentioned by his son at the supper table. Anyway, he poked a little fun at my father who was quite sensitive about his family. And father was perfectly furious that out of all this book which he thought owed a fine line of progenitors, I had chosen Blackbeard as the only one which interested me and had publicized him in the town as being descended from a pirate.

I am going to your questions—first on ancestry.

Q. 1. Do you have anything you want to say about the Marshall and Bradford background? (See also Tape 3M for Question 1.)

A. 1. I think I have said all I can say on ancestry.

Q. 2.Where did the Catlett in your father's name come from?

A. 2. I do not know where the Catlett came from, except there are Catletts in Kentucky and you have Catlettsburg as a town.

Q. 3. Is the Uniontown home place still standing? Do you or other members of your family have photographs of it?

A. 3. Next is home. Our home place in Uniontown is not standing. It has been built over and the low ground is filled up. That is where I spoke of the twenty foot fill blotting out a good many spots of my youth.

Q. 4. Can you describe the place itself? (You have given a good picture of the grounds and barn).

A. 4. I have already pretty much described the house and you have a description of the place. I might say there was one thing that figured in my boyhood and I have always regretted that my parents didn't enliven my interest until it would have had a great educational value. In my chum's yard, there was a honey locust tree and it was about twenty feet from their springhouse—from their wash house where the week's washing was always done. Between the wash house and the honey locust tree a deep trail about—you could rest your thumb in it—and a continuous procession of ants going and coming to the tree or to the wash house and those going one direction would generally carry some little white burden. Well, we would lie and watch these ants by the hour when we had nothing else to do—when we completely ran out of play time affairs and we would watch this ant procession. There would be these great floods which would put that portion of their yard under about two feet

of water but after the floods were over the ants would return. When I went back to Uniontown for a reception, after I was made Chief of Staff, I was very curious about the trail of the ants and I went down to this house which was still standing but was rented by some seemingly Lithuanian—I could hardly understand him—but he was an old man sitting there in a rocking chair. And I asked him if I might go out and look in the yard and he told me I could. But I couldn't find this trail. The springhouse, of course, was gone. But the honey locust was still standing and I came back and told him what I was looking for. And he said I was turned around as to the location of the wash house. And he pointed out where it really was. And I went out there and I immediately found the trail of the ants running exactly as it had in my boyhood so many, many years before. I have often thought if they had given us a big magnifying glass and some book on insect life, we would probably have become very deep students of it and have gone into the other manifestations. As it was, it was merely the ants, the long trail, and the burdens they carried.

Q. 5. Is the Marshall home place in Augusta still standing? Any photographs?

A. 5. My father's home in Augusta is still standing and I believe my mother's too. My father's was a three-story brick house and took up, with its grounds, the block in which it was located. In that part of the country it was quite different from Virginia—from eastern Virginia. There were no great country houses. They were almost always in towns. My recollection of my father's home was that it had a very wide brick hall right through the center of the house—very wide—that was overlooked by a balcony, off which the bedrooms opened, a very curious formation. It was more or less ruined in prospect by the fact that the railroad came through—the C. & O. I think—and came into the side of town, very close to the house.

Q. 6. William Frye says that your father as a boy of seventeen participated in the Home Guard under Joseph Bradford against a raid by General Basil Duke. He says that since the Marshalls were of southern background, the participation was perhaps unwilling. Any comment on this incident?

A. 6. Parents: Frye's comments on the family seem to be correct as nearly as I can recall except he doesn't mention, as for as I know, that Basil Duke was a relative. His

comment about the Marshalls participating in the Home Guard action against Basil Duke, I don't think is justified by the history of those days. The raiders had burnt some village covering a ford into Ohio at one time, as I recall, and this time, they were expected to burn the town in order to protect the ford. And just why it was so protected I don't know because they were headed for a raid into Ohio. And for that reason the Home Guards turned to defend the town. But there were apparently a great many Union sympathizers in the town. But, as I said, in my father's family two brothers were in the Lee's army and the oldest member of the family, a sister, ended up by marrying a Union colonel who had been wounded and she nursed him. That was accountable later on for my father going north and getting a position with an iron furnace because he [the colonel] was a furnace man and in his early days a very well-to-do man. The legend is that after this fight, which largely centered around my father's home, this older sister (who married the Union colonel) came out of the cellar and was met by Duke who came in to find if any of the family had been hurt. And she is said to have met him on the lawn, slapped his face and ordered him out of the yard. I don't know how true any of this is.

Q. 7. Frye says that your father was pretty much of a joiner and stood very high in the Masons and Knights Templar organization. Any comment on these activities?

A. 7. I think he is right about my father—Frye is right—about joining the Masons and the Knights Templar. His Masonic interests were very intense and always took him one or two nights a week away from home. I remember a very ludicrous incident. I think he had the high post in his lodge at this time—he was either preeminent commander or past preeminent whatever they call them—and he brought home his robes which looked very much like a Catholic bishop's or an Episcopal bishop's robes to get my mother to mend them. And she mended this tear, my sister helping her, advising her or commenting on it. And when my father tried them on after she mended them, my mother and sister, Marie, were hilarious because it developed he had been wearing them backwards for years. He was very sensitive about this—outraged at their levity—and they were just continuously amused every time they spoke about it.

My father was very fond of shooting and was a very good shot, and the hunting was wonderful around there—quail and grouse in the mountains and so on. And he was very

fond of fishing and I believe a fine fisherman, and he was very good at what I believe they called salmon pike, a very large fish which they found in the Youghiogheny River, not so far from home in a direct line, but very far in the way we had to go in those days. I remember his taking me up several times bass fishing and it was very hard walking because the banks of the stream were covered with huge rocks about a quarter size of a house sometimes and I had great difficulty in climbing over them at my age—if you could climb over them. I remember on one occasion, which was my most famous fishing exploit, even to this day. My father's two companions and my father had not had a, strike all day and in the afternoon about two o'clock they decided to go to a place called Rattlesnake Hole which was two or three miles upstream. Well, of course, the walking would be very difficult as there was no real shore there—only these great piles of rock. And my father knew that I would not be able to make it, so he very generously and unselfishly declined to go with them, and went off to occupy me, fishing where we had not been able to get a strike all day. We went up to a great rock which had halved off, which left a flat surface on one side, about three feet above the water, which was in quite a pool, since the river ran in alternate pools and rapids.

I had one of my father's old rods, but I didn't have a reel. He didn't think I would be capable of managing a reel. And when he baited my hook with minnows—two minnows—I threw it in and he was going to bait his own. And I got a strike, the first strike of the day for any of us. And when I began to pole these fish in, I had two bass, one on each hook. My father had to help me land them and, when we got them in, we had to lift them quite a ways out of the water because they were two or three feet up, he had to get them off the hook and re-bait my hook. And then he turned back to his own line and before he got his own straightened out—of course he had a reel and a fly and all that sort of thing— I had another strike and he had to abandon his preparations and help me land my fish. Well to cut this story short, we caught in the neighborhood of thirty bass of which I caught a fair part. I delayed all of his catching because he always had to help me land my fish. I had no reel and we didn't want to break the leader on the line and that was the finest fishing anyone had up there for years and my finest run of bass fishing that I have ever had. I have caught larger bass but never so many bass all standing in one place. We went back home to this mountain house where we were staying, because we had all the

bass our creel would carry and we had strung some which we were carrying outside of that, and went up and got a bath and went to a big mountain supper. And my father's two friends didn't get back until after dark and they'd never had a strike all day. And when they found him with this tremendous collection of bass their expressions even to a boy of my age were interesting.

Q. 8. Do you or members of the family have photographs of your parents and of the entire family?

A. 8. I will see if I can find any photographs. I have none. My possessions of that nature have largely been lost or destroyed in the many moves I have made—to the Philippines several times, to China, typhoons—and other places of the United States and a careless attitude on my part to all such manner of things.

Q. 9. Will you describe the appearance of your parents: height, build, eyes, hair, general appearance, temperament?

A. 9. My father was a very handsome man. He was about five feet nine or ten—a heavy mop of hair—very strong features and blue eyes—carried himself very erectly, was very fond of walking. I remember on one occasion when we were up in the mountains, about seven or eight miles away, across a ridge of the Chestnut Ridge Mountains, he walked out of church and was lonely for the family and in his striped pants and cutaway coat of that day, and cane, he walked straight up in the mountains by a shortcut trail and arrived at our house in time for the midday meal.

My mother was a very quiet woman with a great deal of strength of character? As I have said, she had a keen sense of humor and always observed with much interest the passing people on the street and, of course, they were very much the same people day after day in the life of the town.

I think a partial explanation of being unable in later years to find much of a record of my father or mother is the fact that the town in my youth was about five thousand people and the next time I went back to it, I believe they told me it was about thirty-five thousand. Well, that would pretty much drown out the former life of the town. I know I found very few people I knew. My boyhood acquaintances had largely moved away. My brother and sister left home, very early in young life. My mother finally left and lived

with my sister, spending her winters at Haddon Hall at Atlantic City, so her departure from home occurred fairly early of my life period. And the town completely and utterly changed, particularly in its relation to people and social life. And I find very few families now that identify with the old days.

I remember when I was given this reception in Uniontown after I was made Chief of Staff, they had a dinner for me, which I believe I mentioned, at the old White Swan Inn. But this was the new building in which the dining room was located on the site of the former cobblestoned courtyard. I didn't realize at the time I was talking at that dinner when I was called on that it was being put on the broadcasting of a short wave affair there at home. So I told a great many stories of my youth in order to avoid anything in relation to the war situation—war just having developed on the first of September and this must have been the tenth or fifteenth of September. I was appointed Chief of Staff on the first of September, though I had been acting Chief of Staff since the previous July 1st. Not realizing that this was being broadcast though locally, I was astonished when the people passed by to shake hands with me afterwards—and incidentally it was not an arranged affair and I was on one side of the table and they were on the other as they passed and forced me to do a lot of leaning over to shake hands with them. But the thing that interested me and amused me too was that here would come a lady in evening dress and right behind her would be a fellow in his shirt-sleeves and maybe his sleeves rolled up and maybe half or a little bit tight. I remember one fellow, I remembered of my youth, who was quite a character. I don't want to identify him further, and he had a heavy load on and he was right between two ladies, both of them were in evening dress. And he got to me and took my hand and he had heard this broadcast in the barroom where he was and he and a great many had come down to see me right away because I was talking of their time and their events and they had appeared in some of my stories that I had recounted on that occasion. And he told me about this and how glad he was to see me and how interested he was in what I said. And he interlarded about every fourth word with a violent curse word and these two women stood there in their evening dress just being showered with curses. It made a very mixed-up affair. But I must say I was interested and amused.

The change in the life of the town, as I say, was complete. In addition to that the region

had been opened up in its coal and coke, being first I think expanded by the Federal Steel Company which brought a good deal of coal and coke there. My chum's father, the banker, had very carefully and judiciously-invested in coal lands and became immensely wealthy and immensely popular and made a large number of the young men who worked with him, in connection with the bank and all, also wealthy. And that developed quite a thing. I remember there was one fellow who was a bark stripper up in the mountains, and he had got connected with some of this coal land and he had made a great deal of money, and he was famous at the Waldorf-Astoria and everybody liked him there because he was so rough he was an uncut diamond. And everything he said was more or less amusing and was certainly a shock to any New Yorker who patronized the famous Row that the women used to parade on in those days.

Q. 10. You mentioned the other day that your father could be severe. I gather, however, that he was generally interested in your activities. Did you consider yourself close associates?

A. 10. My father was rather sensitive about things and rather high-tempered when he got stirred up. My mother was very calm and more or less deliberate. I remember my last licking. I was squirting the hose and cleaning the brick pavement in front of the house free of all dust which I had to do before school, when I thought my sister was coming to the door. And she had been jeering at me out the window—the upstairs window. So when she opened the door, I turned the hose on her and hit her square. She screamed as I continued to play the hose on her. She couldn't call much because the water would go in her mouth. And when finally I varied it a little bit, I discovered I was sprinkling my mother and I was in a great dilemma. She, after she recovered her glasses, was rather shocked but very much amused because she knew the terrible plight I was in, which arrived shortly with my father. He needed no explanation at all, but he took me into camp and that is the last licking I ever recall getting which mother at first laughed halfway through and then became sympathetic with me but without much avail.

In the home life, I realize today, I got a great deal of benefit from reading. My father read aloud, very well, and liked to do it, strange to say. My mother read to me a great many things like Ivanhoe and all that series of books. But then her eyes went back on her and she couldn't read much any more. Then my father liked to read and we all liked to listen. And he

read a great many things. I can recall some of them. I remember the *Saracinesca* series—*Sant Ilario* and *Don Orsino* by our writer [F. Marion Crawford] who lived in Rome. I remember the Fenimore Cooper stories that he read to us and particularly the famous story by Conan Doyle which begins at the court of Louis XIV with Mme de Montespan and Mme de Maintenon in Versailles and then goes with these fleeing people who wouldn't change their religion and they came to America and landed in Quebec. They were pursued all the way by a member of the church, of the Catholic Church—I am suffering from one of these failures to remember names—but this religion of which a great many settled all over North America and contributed a great deal to American life, they were a very industrious and a very clever people. You will know right away what I am talking about [Huguenots]. Anyway, when they got to Quebec, they had to flee from this priest who was after them. And Conan Doyle gives a marvelous description of their passage through the Canadian forest trying to keep away from the Iroquois Indians. They finally paused to rest with the forest chateau; you might call it, of this titled Frenchman who was married to an Iroquois Indian chief's daughter. And he persists in all the procedure of the French grand seigneur in France. Finally his party moves on with the famous scout taking them--Greysolon du Lhut--and they find the fort they are going to had been seized, burned down and the garrison tied to the trees, scalped, and, of course, dead. They return to this chateau, as it were, and have a very perilous and marvelous trip trough the forest with these great timbers and their scout, Greysolon du Lhut, saves them in a most remarkable way. Then the Indians encircle and attack this chateau and finally at the last take it in a desperate fight. And these people are all captured and then, of course, they are freed by a relief patty from another fort. But it was one of the most thrilling accounts of that sort I have ever read and his description of the appearance on the trail of this Iroquois chieftain on the warpath with his son beats anything I have ever heard of that kind in my life. But a number of these books my father read to us and I remember them today very clearly and it is a delightful recollection. I am sorry I can't remember at the moment the names because they were everything leading of that day. Our evenings when he was home--at least several nights a week--were spent in listening to his reading. I am very sorry I can't remember more of the books because they were all--*The Conquest of Mexico* was

one of them. That's all I can do for this. To go back to the photographs, there are photographs of the family. I don't know where they are. I haven't got them. My sister has them—what they are. I think Mrs. Marshall has one or two. My photographic history ended rather abruptly during the dancing school days-in the same building where they had the dancing school.

SIDE 2

As I said my photographic history rather came to a check at the time of this dancing school. In this same building was a photographer named Kough, and my mother and sister led me down to the photographic gallery while I was dressed up for dancing school—one of the few times they would catch me in such a costume. Then they together posed me for the photograph, not jointly but I might say differentially. Each one took a turn in putting me in the posture that they thought would be best for the photograph. And in those days they generally had you leaning on scenery and they would always have a prop back of your head to keep your head still because they were time exposures and in this particular case they had me sitting on a log—a piece of scenery—and they didn't agree at all as to how I was to sit. And one would pose me a little bit and then the other would pose me. And finally they reached an agreement and took their hands off me and I went over backwards. They had left me on only two points of support so that I didn't remain for the photograph. I fled because it was too much for me. My mother was very hugely amused by this, but my sister was furious I that they should get me into position where I went over backwards when they let go their grip on me.

Q. 13. Was your family financially hit by the depression in the nineties?

A. 13. Well this opens up quite a special streak of history of my family. My father had gone to Fayette County to accept a secretarial position, either secretary or treasurer, of the Dunbar Furnace Company, which this husband of his sister had procured for father. In this same company was Mr. Bliss, from Muscle Shoals, as I recall, Alabama. They were compatriots as it were—they were both men of the southern touch up in the colder stratum of the north—and they were both hard workers. As I recall they joined forces and while they continued on their jobs, they purchased a brick works right close by,

which was very profitable. And as soon as they got the brickworks out of debt they then ventured into coal mines and coke ovens and finally they developed a very large installation about six or eight miles north, up the railroad as we would say, from Uniontown, called Fair Chance, which has now been consolidated into one word. After they had gotten these large installations of ovens built—and father was the great expert on the building of the beehive oven and they had gotten the mine opened up, or mines, and they had gotten the tracks in for the freight cars, they had a very heavy burden of debt to carry. So, it being very good times, they made a most successful sale to H.C. Frick—I don't know whether it was Frick and Company—but H.C. Frick was the principal. Frick and my father had been associates in his younger days up there. I remember father had a frock coat and silk hat with trousers which he had won in a bet with Frick. However, they had become completely dissociated. Frick went in for the financial end and father followed the operative end. And the Oliver interests and the Frick interests were the predominant interests in the coal region. And this region was largely founded on the famous seven foot vein of Connellsville coal. Father made quite a handsome sum of money out of this sale and as a young man was in quite a prosperous position. He then made the great mistake of his life, and much against my mother's advice, by investing in this land boom which swept over Virginia and that region at that time--just prior to the financial crash. Just how they expected this thing to prosper I don't know, it was like the South Sea Bubble. However, his interests were largely in the vicinity of Luray, Virginia. In addition to making this heavy investment in it, even to interest money on his recent profits, he signed himself in one document without putting the word "president" after it, which legally made him responsible for everything and which wiped out every cent he had. Because the failure came, of course, as it did all over that region, all these land companies blew up and father went down with the crash, and had to accept, I believe, although I am not so certain about this, bankruptcy as his stake for quite some time to come.

It was quite a long time after that when he either recovered possession or in some way retained possession of a rather small coke and coal plant nearby which was on the Gist farm that I have mentioned before, right across from the famous Washington farm, to

that is right off the Braddock trail. He held on to this up to the time he died and he and Mr. Bliss, no I don't believe Mr. Bliss was interested in this. He was involved with another family who had loaned him some of the money and stipulated that a certain relative of theirs was to be employed, which was not at all helpful to father. So the days of my boyhood, from the eighteen-ninety crash up to the time I went away to school, were very limited financially and only my mother's very modest income from some property she still held in Pittsburgh saved the situation. I know when I was going to the V.M.I., she had put aside the money or succeeded in having father put aside the money for my brother's and sister's schooling, but that was not done for me because I was much younger then. And now when my turn came to go away, it was with the greatest difficulty that mother scraped up enough money to get me entered at the V.M.I. And I remember very well that after I was in my second or third year there she told me that there wasn't going to be enough money to continue my education. And then she found she had one lot that she had hoped to build on there and she sold that lot and that carried me through the remainder of my education at the V.M. I.

We had to economize very bitterly. It was exceedingly hard on my mother. She had to do everything. She not only kept house, but she did everything in the house, and this continued all through that period immediately following the nineties and up to about 1899. I know when I graduated from the V.M. I. in 1901, we were still in a state of very strict economy, so I was quite accustomed to that sort of life, which wasn't my natural reaction, because I was very careless about money, indifferent about money matters Now, of course, I had to be very, very careful. My allowance I know at the V.M.I. for the first three years was $5.00 a month and my roommate Nicholson took care of that for me. My last year it was $7.00 a month. That took in everything—girls, dances and all. But I might interject now that while I went to dancing school at home and the little dances we had there, I didn't go to any dances at the V.M.I. for almost two years. The life of a Rat, as they called them there, was so humble that I chose not to try any social engagements.

Q. 14. Frye indicates that your family was what was called well-to-do, but not at the same time part of the main society of the town. Is this accurate?

A. 14. I don't quite understand the question. I think I catch the meaning though. Uniontown was a very conservative community. There were several old families there that dated way back almost to George Washington's day and while the name sounds new- Uniontown--it actually was very, very old. They were very conservative and they led a very restricted, constrained life. Father came up from the South, mother came up from the South and it was a long time before they were fully accepted in that circle. There were many others of the newer families that joyfully accepted there because father was very convivial and liked people and they liked him. And mother, of course, was a woman that commanded respect anywhere, though she was not particularly socially inclined. But for a long time, I know, there was a restriction to our social activities in relation to some of these oldest inhabitants--particularly those concerned with the gentleman who owned the pool table in which the head of Christ was crowned with thorns which got me into trouble.

Q. 15. Did your father take an active interest in party politics? Did he prefer the Cleveland brand of politics to that of Bryan?

A. 15. My father took a deep interest in politics, but he came to a highly Republican town with a Democratic instinct from his Southern exposure. He remained very much interested, I think, until the end. I think at one time he was party chairman, but they were seldom if ever successful. They were generally swamped by the Republican vote. But he never gave up. The organization was against him and his associates were very reputable but very solemn and uninspiring men.

Q. 16. Were your early political views best described as conservative or liberal?

A. 16. My political views at that time were largely those of my mother's. She was inclined to be Republican in her instincts, but she didn't have much to say out of her respect for father and his intense Democratic feelings. We had no Congressman from home. He lived in some other region and I never saw him and knew nothing really about him. The first time, as I recall, when I had any connection with that[was] when I was standing at the desk of the New Willard Hotel, when it was just new, and on my honeymoon. And Mrs. Marshall was waiting for me when this man came up and introduced himself either as the Congressman from home or associated with somebody from home politically and wanted to meet me and meet my wife.

Q. 17.Frye mentioned the partnership of your father with A.W. Bliss and the close friendship between the families. Any comment on these business associations?

A. 17. I think I have mentioned the association of my father with Mr. Bliss. There was a very close friendship between the families. Mother and Mrs. Bliss were very- fond of each other and very intimate. The Bliss's lived in the old home of the head of the stage company on the National Pike—Stockton I think was his name—and it was a very fine old house and it always intrigued me because it had an extension which was attached to the house by an arch under which came the coaches, right outside the dining-room bay windows.

Q. 18.Frye says that the two chief influences on your life were those of your mother and of the Rev. John R. Wightman. Is this accurate?

A. 18. I think that is quite correct. My mother exercised the most profound influence on my life. And Dr. Wightman—John R. Wightman—undoubtedly did also. The point with him was, he was a new minister. He succeeded an English minister who had been the minister at St. Peter's Church, I think for thirty odd years and died in the pulpit, incidentally. Well he was very conservative and he had a conservative backing. And when poor young Mr. Wightman came had a very difficult time. As a matter of fact, he left in the end. I think I had gone off to school by the time he left. There was no club then at which men could meet and all the men worked, as I have referred to before, so there was almost no associate during the workaday period for Mr. Wightman and there was no club where he might meet them at night. And they didn't entertain very much. So the net result was particularly during vacation periods, Mr. Wightman and I used to take long walks and he seemed to be very glad of the association with me because I was literally the only person that he had to go around with at that hour of the day and time. And I came to know him very intimately and I was very much impressed by him. I don't recall his exerting any influence on me, but he undoubtedly did and profoundly.

Q. 19. Frye spends about four pages on your boyhood. He mentions as playmates: Andy and John Thompson, Alex Mead, George Gadd, Will Wood, Frank Llewellyn, Mary Kate O'Bryon, and Helen Houston. He says that your desk mate at Miss Thompson's school was O'Neil Kennedy. Later friends are Billy Ewing and Jim Conrad. Then later, there

are the names of Jap Shepler, Sid Bieghly, Herb Bowman and Ed Husted.

He mentions such names as the White Swan, Gilmore's hill, a horse named Old Billy, a hired man named Fred Hallow, Hospital Hill, and Natty Brownfield.

He says you had a nickname—Flicker—which was given you by Mary Kate O'Bryon which was given to you because of the color of your hair, but which was a nickname that didn't stick with you. (Is this correct?)

(You have mentioned Andy Thompson: are there any others you wish to discuss?)

A. 19. Boyhood friends. Among those you mention, I would have to go into a little better description. There were the members of the Gadd blacksmith shop--the crowd that loafed there. That would be largely my chum and myself and one or two others. Will Wood, as you have it, which we called Bill Wood, whose father ran a harness shop—Bill's place was beyond my chum's place. He was a very frequent daily associate in our playtime and I was very fond of him. Bill died rather early in life, but he ran a very successful shop for making stogies, which was a popular smoke there in those days. Bill was of a sort of philosophic frame of mind and became, I think, rather influential politically but that was after I left home. Frank Llewellyn was an older man in the carriage shop who I kept in contact with for many years after they moved out to California and I became fairly prominent then I would hear from him quite often. Mary Kate O'Bryon was a young girl. She must have been about four years or more—maybe much more—younger than I was and I didn't remember her very well. I never saw her father that I recall. I never saw her mother that I recall. But he occupied a very romantic place in the opinion of Andy Thompson and myself, because he was the night engineer on a train which to us was very dramatic. Helen Houston was one of my girl friends who lived nearby. Adele Bliss was another one. Catherine Lindsey, who is now Mrs. Egbert Armstrong and a widow living in Richmond, Virginia. There were two or three other girls whose names I will remember in a little bit. But those were the particular ones of my early youth. Catherine Lindsey had a sister named Nannie Lindsey, who was a little younger but went with our crowd. I was very fond of her. I hear from Catherine occasionally now, though she and I are both getting well up in years.

My principal intimates at Miss Thompson's school were Andy and Jim Conrad,

Billy Ewing a little bit. O'Neil Kennedy was younger than I was, but I remember him quite distinctly. Jim Conrad did very well at school, as well as Catherine Lindsey, and I did very, very poorly. Didn't I tell once about the spelling bee? (Sgt.Heffner: I think you did but it might be well to recall it). I think I told you about the spelling bee in which I made my first heavy effort in studying in order to get up to the head of the class which was held by Catherine Lindsey who was the pretty girl I was devoted to, though she didn't pay much attention to me. And after what I thought was a terrific effort I moved up to number two in the class and was only there a day when I got spelled down and I never studied after that for many years.

I remember Billy Ewing very well. He had a goat car which he could sit up in. And he came down with his goat cart, which was a very rare thing with him, as he was very conservatively brought up and he didn't play with we boys though he wanted to, but his father who was a widower and a judge had him very closely held in. And Billy came down with his goat cart and turned into our yard and drove around into the general boydom of the orchard and the creek when one of our prize cats, the big Maltese, took after the goat. I think Billy's cart was not a goat cart but a big dog cart. And the cat went out of the yard sitting on the dog's head and Billy in the runaway. He was upset outside and it ended in a total disaster, but of course very much amused all the rest of us.

Jap Shepler was considerably younger than I was, but I knew him very well and his sister, Mary Shepler, strange to say, is married and lives here at Pinehurst.

Sid Beighly must have been much younger than I was because I don't remember him. Herbert Bowman was the great Yale athlete I have referred to Ed Husted was a very close friend of mine and he was a fine bicycle rider and a very handsome fellow and very much liked by everyone. It was his father who was in command of a troop of cavalry which was the escort to a battery of artillery commanded by Senator Dupont at the battle of New Market where the V.M.I. cadets fought and they watched this advance of this famous charge and when they finally made out these were boys, they then decided they would send their sons to this school whatever it was. Ed Husted's father, Captain Husted, as we called him, did this and he sent his older brother to the V.M.I. but he only stayed a year, I think, and didn't like the strict discipline and went to

Lawrenceville and to college. Ed did the same thing. He didn't go to the V.M.I. His father was very much disappointed and I know after I went there they would always ask me to call on them and to tell them how I was getting along and they took great pride in the fact that I gradually went up until I was first captain.

I will tell another delightful period of my boyhood. Mrs. Husted was an awfully sweet woman and they had a rich farm out in the country. And therefore they had lots of milk and cream and things of that sort. She would mix ice cream for us. She would put all the things that belonged in it, the fresh strawberries or fresh peaches or whatever was current at the time and then Ed would call us up and we would go out there and we froze the cream down in the cellar and we ate it. We cut for who would get to lick the dasher and then we ate ice cream until we had such a pain in our forehead that we couldn't eat any more. But I have always remembered that business of Mrs. Husted fixing things up for us. She would never come down. She would get it all ready and then we would just gorge ourselves.

You mention certain names and ask about them. The White Swan was a tavern from the earliest days of the Pike which was only a block and a half from my house. It was on the side of a hill. I have described the great cobbled courtyard inside. I was never inside the building up above. It was frame and a series of individual buildings connected up. And it was run in my day by a fine old character called Natty Brownfield. And it was Natty Brownfield's butchering the hogs in the fall which always fascinated us, on the border of this cobblestone courtyard. Gilmore's hill was about a block and a half on the other side of our house, leading out the National Pike towards Wheeling, [West] Virginia, and Mrs. Bliss's mother was Mrs. Gilmore and that was their property and therefore it was called Gilmore's hill. Across the street, which was on a much lower level, was another home, a very nice home that was owned by Mr. Thompson's sister. Her husband had died rather unexpectedly and early of pneumonia and Mrs. Nichols inherited quite a lot of money and I think was let into better money by her brother [in-law] Mr. Thompson. Her daughter, Lida Nichols, had been left money outright by her father, who didn't dream of his dying so early. So she inherited this while she was still in her teens, and she is now the Princess of Thurn and Taxis, but a widow, I believe. I used to hear from Lida quite frequently. The last time was on my seventy-fifth birthday. But she used to dictate into records and send them to me on her views on political

questions when I was Secretary of State. I might say that very frequently she didn't agree with me.

You mention a horse named Old Billy. I'm sorry but my memory doesn't carry me to Old Billy.

You speak of a hired man named Fred Hollow. I don't remember him, but it seemed to me maybe you were talking about First Hollow which was one of our boyhood playgrounds back in the country.

Hospital Hill was named after my day. The hospital was built after my day but it was out of town about a mile and a half. And the Gilmore place, which was the brother of Mrs. Bliss, was right there and gave it its name.

Your statements as to Flicker was correct. I don't recall a nickname for any of the boys--all of my friends--they were called by an abbreviation of their first names as a rule. Herb instead of Herbert, Andy instead of Andrew and so on.

20. Q. Frye, quoting Alex Mead, tells of your liking for licorice candy you bought at Crane's store. He says you liked to read *Nick Carter* and *Diamond Dick* and that your reading of these books one day got you fired as organ boy at St. Peter's.

20. A. Boyhood incidents. You say Frye quotes Alex Mead saying that I was very fond of licorice candy. I don't recall that. I know he used to make licorice water and we were very heartbroken when it all froze and we lost the bottles which broke.

The Crane store –I think it's a mistake. Kramer was the store. It was very small. It had the conventional open barrel of oyster crackers and the tight barrel of dill pickles. And we were allowed to loaf, in there, I guess much to Mr. Kramer's irritation, though he suppressed it, but his clerk was very nice to us. One penny, as a rule, was about the extent of our investment as we went along, but a good bit of our life was led in that vicinity.

I have mentioned about liking to read *Nick Carter*. I don't recall *Diamond Dick*, but I do *Old Sleuth* and *Frank Merriwell*. I have mentioned the organ boy at the church.

Q. 21. Mead indicates that you used to carry bats for Harry Wilhelm of the Amateurs.

A. 21. The comment as to carrying bats for Harry Wilhelm who was the pitcher of the Amateurs, I don't recall, but it may well be so because I went to all the games.

Q. 22. Frye mentions the fact that Professor Lee Smith, principal of the Central School,

took an interest in you despite a poor entrance examination.

A. 22. Professor Lee Smith's interest in me, despite my poor entrance examinations, I think is a little misleading. I don't think Professor Smith took a very keen interest in me until I achieved a little success at the Virginia Military Institute and later on when I got a little national prominence. He was a very fine man and very forbearing with me. I remember my father taking me to his house where he examined me to see what room in the public school I should go into when I was transferred from private school to public school for financial reasons, I might mention. I know my father suffered very severely about my inability to answer so many questions which to him were very simple and to me were an enigma As I have said before, I was very poor in my studies at that time unless it was history and things that you would read of that nature. I didn't come up to the scratch at all. And, as I say, my sister always disagrees with me on this and says that I say this as a sort of reaction of mock humility but that isn't so at all. I was just very poor. And I will tell now what happened to me that really transformed me. I was very anxious to go to the V.M.I. My brother had finished there with considerable merit in his performances academically. I overheard him (Sgt tells me I have told this) advising my mother against sending me there because I would ruin his record. And I think I added in telling it, I got ahead of his record because he held no military rank and I was first captain and I think I was one stand ahead of him in my graduation record despite the fact that I was about 35th in a class of a 135 or thereabouts in my first year.

Q. 24. Did you make any overnight hiking trips? (I am trying here to get anything that might tie in with your later army career).

A. 24. I don't recall any particular overnight camps except one and that was merely across the creek. And in after recollection it was rather amusing. The National Guard came to camp near our place and, of course, all of the boys immediately became very military. My brother, who was six years older than I was, and his friends made a gunny sack tent with a gunny sack tent fly in front and they put it up across the creek and they were going to spend the night in it. And, of course, I wanted to go too. The only rifle they had was a crossbow gun. There were no ordinary air rifles at that day. And they made a track back and forth in front of the tent fly where number one walked his post and

called out "Number one and all is well."

They were very antagonistic to having me go to camp with them, but I succeeded with my mother's influence in being taken. Early in the game I got pretty sleepy, but they were being very military. They were very much upset once by an enemy attacking, which developed into a cow. And about that time I went to sleep. What happened after that I didn't see, but I believe maybe the cow came in there. In any event the garrison fled. They fell I off the bank—it was a high cut bank—into the creek and dispersed and all went home. And my brother arrived a little bit wet at home. And when my mother inquired where I was, he had to admit he had left me high and dry across the creek. My father was perfectly furious and made him go with him while they recovered me and saved my life. They found me sound asleep. I had missed the entire affair and acquired some ill will on the part of my brother because he had been punished and he had gotten wet and I had merely slept through this great military adventure

Q. 23.What kind of fish did you catch mostly?

A. 23.What kind of fish did we catch? Well, in the earliest days, they were just chubs or large minnows and then when we got into the mountains they were trout. And I don't remember any larger fish until we got into bass in the Youghiogheny River when I was about ten, I suppose, at the time.

Q. 25. What did you hunt besides grouse? What kind of gun did you use?

A. 25. We used to hunt quail and that region was filled with quail at that time. I had an old gun of my father's. It had hammers on it instead of being hammerless. His own gun was a very fine one, which he later gave to me, which was hammerless. I think he paid, which was a very big price for those days, $300.00 for it. Now a gun like that would cost about $1500.00, because I remember it had two sets of barrels and I was very envious of it. It had a very beautiful stock. Of course, we shot rabbits and squirrels and things of that nature. But we hunted assiduously and I thoroughly enjoyed it and so did my chum.

Q. 26. Any sleigh rides, skating, picnics?

A. 26. We had sleigh rides and skating on the various ponds. I never learned to skate very skillfully because the skating was not sufficiently good. Some of my acquaintances, not my immediate friends, did learn to skate better. I had very poor skates. You had to hitch

them on to your shoes and they were always falling off or tearing the sole off. But such a thing as skates on shoes of which the skater was a permanent part were unheard of by our crowd.

We had Sunday school picnics, of course, which were the conventional ones with all the cake and lemonade and stuff in the world and also a ball game they would fix up. These were in the mountains. The sleigh rides were largely large wagons with runners put on it with straw and hot bricks and a jolly crowd and we had these quite often.

Q. 27.Did you go looking for Indian relics?

A. 27.We did not look for Indian relics. We were perpetually hunting Indians. And we were going where they had been and where their chiefs had been in consultation with Washington. But we didn't, as I recall, find any relics.

Q. 28. Any memorable picnics?

A. 28. No memorable picnics. I know we would go to mountain suppers which cost us, I think, seventy-five cents—maybe not that much—and I remember one place, called the Stone House, which was only about a mile from Braddock's grave and on a moonlight night we would walk out there with our particular girl after supper and sit on the fence and cogitate or whatever was the procedure of that day.

Q. 29. Did you ever take part in school dramatics or in Friday afternoon recitations?

A. 29. I never took part in any school dramatics and I think I have explained about the afternoon recitals which were very painful to me.

Q. 30. Did you have a favorite horse?

A. 30. I did not have a horse. My brother had a pony for awhile which threw me once or twice so hard that I didn't do much riding, though I was very young at the time. And the trouble was when I would get on the horse he would scare it because he didn't want me to ride and the horse promptly put me out of business.

Q. 31.Were there excursions during your school days in Uniontown?

A. 31. I don't recall any particularly.

Q. 32. Did you have any particular interesting Christmas that sticks with you more than others? Will you describe a typical Christmas?

A. 32.I had a particular interest in Christmas and I think our family had the most delightful

Christmases I have ever seen in a family All my friends had Christmas Christmas morning and the tree was lit just before daylight. And they got out of bed and the parents had worked half the night on the tree. And then daylight would come and the candles would dim and they would have to put them out and they would see their presents and then they would go back to bed.

With us, it was quite different. We had a very large dining room which opened through a rather open—not exactly a square hall—but a considerable hall into the library. We didn't have dinner that night and we were confined to the library while father and mother trimmed the tree which was on the far side of the dining room—the dining room table having been pushed aside out of the way. The tree always had the same thing at the base—a white bear rug—and the presents were put around the base of the tree. Of course there were all sorts of decorative illuminations in the tree. But as I recall very few presents were put in the tree. Almost all of them were on the white fur rug and beyond that. If there was any particular thing that could show up, it would be featured. For instance, it was generally something I was crazy about. I remember once they gave me a theater and it came from the big toy store in Pittsburgh. It was a beautiful theater and it had very attractive scenery. And they set the stage for this forest scene with the characters on the stage and the thing I delighted in was it had footlights, which were pretty dangerous incidentally. But you could light these things and when the doors were opened and we were introduced to our Christmas tree across the room, here was the tree on this white fur rug and here were the tinsel and glitter about it and on it and then the presents at the foot and there featured was the theater lit up by its own footlights—which looked magnificent to me.

I remember when they gave me my first toy typewriter that was featured. And the same way, each year something, as a rule, I was crazy about and I being the youngest, much the youngest, was always favored in the display. I can always remember my sister when she got a little chip diamond ring—it was certainly a chip—you could hardly see it. When she opened it, she was standing near the sideboard and against the side of the sideboard. Between the wall and the sideboard, were stacked up all the leaves of the table and when she opened this box and saw this chip diamond, she began screaming "a diamond, a diamond!" and upset the table leaves which landed on the floor with a great crash and was altogether a very

thrilling Christmas scene.

My brother got in trouble when he got his roller skates and began dashing around the dining room in those and, of course, I right away wanted them—as I seemed to want anything that the others got. And too often, I think, I was allowed to have them.

But these Christmases were delightful. We could eat all the fruit we wanted. We could eat all the candy we wanted. We hadn't had dinner and we could have our friends in. So we had—to me—a perfectly charming evening of which I still have the most acute and delightful recollections. Going to my friend's house in the dim dawn of the morning were very dismal scenes to me compared to the very delightful animation and charm of the Christmas at home.

Fourth of July was just 4th of July. I generally had a couple of cigar boxes full of my fire crackers and things of that sort. And I remember one 4th of July, for some unexplainable reason (chuckle) they all exploded on me and left me without anything very early in the day. We had some cannon crackers—we couldn't have many of them because they cost too much for us—but we delighted in the heavier report. We weren't allowed to have little cannon. I did have one but there had been so many accidents with them that my father put a taboo on the toy cannon. We had fireworks at night that we put up from our yard and spinwheels and things of that sort and the public fireworks didn't come along to very, very much later. You made your own amusement in my day rather than depend on the town for it. Maybe that was better because it let the poor folk in, which our procedure did not.

Q. 33. Were there favorite articles of clothing--such as boots or a special cap that you remember?

A. 33. As to favorite articles of clothing, I don't remember. Oh I think in my youth I was very fond of some boots with brass toes. I liked those very much. And I was particularly fond of black shirts because you didn't have to wash when you wore a black shirt until mother discovered that the black—the dye—was coming off over my waist and she couldn't scrub if off me. So she called a halt on the black shirt.

I don't remember any particular caps, except we liked a cap with a visor. But the visors weren't so common in my day.

Q. 34. What games did you play by the fireside--checkers, cards, dominoes, guessing games, etc?

A. 34. We didn't play many games by the fireside. We all had checkers, of course, and we had dominoes and we played a little casino. But mostly by the fireplace, we would have an iron upside down and a hammer and would be opening hickory nuts, and incidentally we always opened—cleaned all the hickory nuts—for mother's very famous hickory nut cakes. Walnuts were easy to open and we would go to get them and it would be quite a long time before our hands would clean up from the yellow stain which came from opening the walnuts. I always liked our fires, because we always had what was called cannel coal and it made a soft, delightful homelike flame to it and it was very agreeable to sit in front of. Later on when natural gas was piped in, the f ire-place lost a great deal of its charm, also of its efficiency.

Q. 35. Did you engage in small town horseplay on Halloween or other occasions?

A. 35. We participated in the conventional Halloween performance, but not so much as to make any particular impression on me. We upset the usual outhouses and things of that sort.

Q. 36. What were your favorite books in Uniontown?

A. 36. My favorite books were of a historical nature. I don't mean just histories, but books that bore on history--the Henty books. I read all of them I think. And my early Punic war history of Italy is largely based on Henty books and things of that sort.

Q. 37. Did you have to learn the Catechism at church?

A. 37. Yes, we had to learn the catechism at Sunday school. And I could recite it.And I remember my old great aunt paying me a certain sum when I learned finally to recite the catechism. Incidentally, she was a highly educated woman, very thirsty regarding knowledge, and determined that I should be well educated. So she began teaching me at about five years old and she so soured me on study and teaching that I liked to never have recovered from it. Because I would be held by her chair while she taught me and I could see out in the streets my friends playing. That was particularly horrible to me on Saturday mornings.

Q. 38. Were you regular in church attendance?

A. 38. We were very regular in our church attendance. And I, as a growing boy, took a very

leading part in the young church work of that day. I was very fond of the minister, Mr. Wightman, which as I have already explained, and I did as many things as I could about the church, around the church.

Q. 39. Was discipline in school harsh?

A. 39. I would not say that the discipline at school was very harsh. Certainly Miss Thompson in the elementary school was severe in words with us but that was about all. I don't ever recall her whipping anybody. Now in public school they did administer the rod very severely. I didn't get licked, which I expect is to my discredit, because it doesn't exactly indicate a very adventurous sort. But there were some that got very heavy lickings. They used to make them sit down and put their hands behind the bench and they would lick them across between the knees and the waist. My principal trouble in school was that I was ashamed of my lack of knowledge and the superior knowledge of those around me and I was always afraid of being embarrassed when I was questioned and I couldn't answer the question.

Q. 40. Were there any plays or pageants or special dramatic performances while you were in Uniontown?

A. 40. There were some dramatic performances, but they were for an older group than myself. My brother used to take quite a leading part. He was very amusing on the stage in such characterizations. And he played the End Man in the Elks minstrels for some years, particularly after I left home.

Q. 41. Did you have a phonograph? What were your favorite tunes?

A. 41. I don't recall our having a phonograph, but I think we must have. We had a music box which my father bought when we were stony broke and my mother was terribly shocked. Because it was the barrel wheel type with the little prongs sticking out and it only played nine tunes. It played those beautifully and they were very attractively suggested. But it had a very limited use and it cost quite a bit of money and it was a great extravagance.

My favorite tunes were largely those of my mother's production. She played very regularly, almost every night, and I enjoyed the music immensely. Hers was good music, semi-classical music. And I finally met my first wife through hearing her playing some of

the airs my mother had played to which I had become devoted. And I immediately set about meeting this girl who was playing so beautifully these airs. Incidentally, the first Mrs. Marshall was one of the finest amateur pianists I have ever known. And she could hardly read a note. She studied for years under [Alfred G.] Robyn who wrote a number of the light semi-operas of that day, "Jack and the Beanstalk" and things of that sort. And he didn't want to disturb her rendition. And she had begun playing when she was five years old, sitting on several large books, including a dictionary. Just where she had inherited her music, none of them could find out. But she was a magnificent pianist.

I didn't play any instrument, though I could pick out airs on the piano and on the banjo and on the guitar. But there was something missing in my music. It seemed to me there was a basic chord missing, and while I played in harmony I couldn't extend it very much. My brother played and my sister played and sang. And I was in deep trouble because when she came back from school in Philadelphia, and I was in the pew next to her in church, she sang with a decided tremolo, which I guess was an affectation anyway, for they were very self-conscious in that day and, whatever it was, I imitated it. And she was perfectly furious and had father put me out of church.

Q. 42. You mentioned summering somewhere north of Uniontown. Can you describe the place and the life you led?

A. 42. We summered in the mountains, the Chestnut Ridge of the Allegheny Mountains. To the top of the mountain from home was only a little short of four miles. The actual slope of the mountain measured up to the top was about two and one half miles and your horse had to proceed at a walk. At the foot of the mountain was a town called Monroe. And then it was only about a mile or a mile and a half straight into Uniontown. There were several of these old mountain houses where the people farmed and lived through the winters and were generally prosperous and they took boarders in the summer. And it was very delightful to live there—you got rich food, lots of it, and your pursuits were very homely, largely in walks. We used to play Indians there because it was Indian country with the Indian traditions all around you and we would usually go there in the summer.

Q. 43. Any memorable fights in school?

A. 43. I don't recall any.

Q. 44.Did you play at war as a child? Any toy soldiers? Did you build forts?

A. 44. Yes. I didn't have any toy soldiers that I recall very much. But we did build forts and we played at that sort of thing until finally my father caught us shooting at each other in the pants, corduroy pants- with air rifles, so he suppressed hostilities right then before we lost an eye.

Q. 45.When did you first get the idea you would like to be a soldier.

A. 45. I've answered.

Q. 46. Was there a military tradition in the family?

A. 46. I've answered.

Q. 47. Were you awkward and gawky when growing up? Were you abnormally shy? Were you teased a great deal?

A. 47. Yes, I had very large feet. I was cursed with my feet. I find now that they are not particularly large. In fact some people comment on the smallness of my feet. But they were a burden to me when I was a boy and made fun of me a good deal. We didn't wear long trousers in those days. We wore stockings and shoes which made the shoe appear very much larger and your whole procedure very much more awkward.

Q. 48. Did your father have a considerable library?

A. 48. No. He had a number of very choice books and we had a great many plain novels.] But I wouldn't say he had a fine library.

Q. 49.What magazines did you read?

A. 49. I read largely the magazines that came home, the *Century* magazine, the *Harpers* magazine, which were predominant in that day, and I don't remember quite what others. *Munsey's Magazine* came out when I was very young and I remember amazingly it sold for ten cents and I enjoyed it quite a lot, because it has sort of a variety of material in it.

Q. 50. Was the Civil War discussed a great deal when you were growing up?

A. 50. The Civil War wasn't much discussed. We were rather rite from it there in Uniontown. I used to always walk out to the cemetery in my bare feet--follow the parade on Decoration Day, but the speeches were too much for me and I would leave in a hurry. But it left quite an impression on my mind—these graves, these graves on

Decoration Day—and the brief periods that I listened to the oratory of the day gave me a flash into what it meant to that community though it was very remote from it as compared to places in the South. When I went to the V.M.I., I remember hearing Early make a speech that was almost treason in its enthusiasm for the Confederacy and its condemnation of the North. The whole thing was very intense there even in those days and it wasn't very tactful of you to have much to say about the fighting in the “War Between the States” as they very carefully termed it.

Q. 51. Did you go to the Gettysburg battlefield before your V.M. I. days?

A. 51. I didn't see the battlefield at Gettysburg in my V.M.I. days. We went to the battlefield of New Market my first year there, the first months there, and my principal recollection is that I had to carry two upperclassmen's rifles and there was a great deal of marching in order to get to the place. I remember the next time I went there—I had gone by it several times, but you had to get into it to really see the real scene of the battle—I took General Pershing in on his way down to the V. M. I. and I couldn't find the scene of the charge. I had gotten it confused in my mind with the steep hill and I was looking for a steep hill. I found the steep hill but I found nothing to remind me of the fight. Actually, I was way back in the region of the first deployment. And the General was waiting out in the car outside of this farm where I stopped. And in the farmyard was a tall, angular, Lincolnian framed individual, with a halfway beard and his beard and his cheeks somewhat stained with tobacco juice. So I went back in and asked him if he had been there at the time of the battle of New Market. And he said he had, though he was very cagey about saying anything, and I asked him if he had seen the cadets, and he said, "Yes, I watched them march by on that hillside right there." “Well,” I said, "Did you see the battle scene where they charged?" "No" he said "I didn't see that." I said, "Outside here waiting to be shown some of the battle scenes is General Pershing, he commanded all our troops in Europe." He made no reply to that. He just spat a little tobacco juice. Well, I wasn't getting anywhere, so I repeated again, I said, "Outside is General Pershing who commanded all our troops in Europe. He is going up to the V.M.I.” This fellow looked at him and said, "I heered you the first time." That is all I ever got out of him. And General Pershing told that, I remember, up at the V.M.I. and made quite a hit with its amusing flavor.

Q. 52. When did you make your first trip to Washington?

A. 52. I don't recall my first trip to Washington unless it was the time I went up from the V.M.I. to try to get an appointment to a new commission and you had to have an appointment for that in those days though after you got that, you had to take an examination. I had one of my father's cards and I remember now as an amusing recollection that I called on these various peoples and I just had to do it just sort of any way I could. I didn't have anybody, except Philander Knox, who was then just appointed Attorney-General and was afterwards to be Secretary of State, and he was a friend of my father's, though I had never seen him, and he had just been appointed. I got into his office with my card, but I got nothing out of him. My trouble always was getting the card back (have I told this?). The nicest one that I encountered, though there was nothing particularly nice in his manner, but I called at the house of the Chairman of-the House Military Committee, Captain Hull. And I think I got in there because Mrs. Marshall's brother had married Captain Hull's niece. And a reception was going on [chuckles] and yet Mrs. Hull took me in and took me upstairs to the den where Mr. Hull was resting. And he took time to talk to me though he didn't promise me anything much.

I thought I told how I got to the White House, didn't I? (Heffner says "No, sir.") I went to the White House and I had no appointment of any kind. And the office was on the second floor, which is now among the bedrooms and the upstairs private sitting rooms of the President. I think the President's bedroom, as I knew it in Mr. Roosevelt's day, must have been Mr. McKinley's office. And the old colored man asked me if I had an appointment and I told him I didn't. Well, he said, I never would get in, there wasn't any possibility. And I sat there and watched people go in by appointment, I suppose ten or fifteen, stay about ten minutes and be excused. And finally a man and his wife and daughter went in with this old colored man escorting them, and I attached myself to the tail of the procession and that way I gained the President's office. The old colored man didn't see me, or did see me I think and frowned on me when he went out, and I stood pat and after these people met the President, they merely wanted to meet him and shake hands, they went out and left me standing there. And Mr. McKinley in a very nice manner said what did I want. And I stated my case to him. I don't recall exactly what I

said, but from that I think flowed my appointment, rather my authority to appear for examination.

Q. 53. Were you athletically inclined in your teens?

A. 53. I was athletically inclined in my teens, but not talented. I couldn't play baseball because I had a defective arm of which the tendons had been pulled and gotten out of the main joint and seemingly formed a special joint. We had no x-rays in those days and they didn't find this for a long time until they noticed this lump on the side of my arm which has gradually shrunk up but it persisted very heavily for my first years and I noticed at the V.M.I. that my arm was very sensitive. I never could strike out straight with it and I couldn't throw. I had to bowl. I played some ball, as much as I could, but I wasn't very popular as a member of the team on account of my inability to throw. I caught very well—I used to catch back of the bat— but they wanted more prowess in batting than I possessed.

I played football on the private school local team and I wasn't a pronounced success at that. I was too light and they had some grown men on the team—though my friend, Herb Bowman, played very well considering his light weight at the time. When I went to the V.M.I., my mother made me promise for two years not to risk this arm in playing and then at the end of two years I told her that I thought I had done that and she might now let me use my own judgment, which she did. And I made the team that first year I tried for it. I made it my third day out for the team or second day I think, and continued on the team until I graduated.

Q. 54. Have you ever gone into the genealogy of the family? Where does the name Marshall come from?

A. 54. I have never gone into genealogy. In fact it rather bored me. And I was also rather sensitive about it. My father was so keen in family interest that I was rather sensitive about it because I was embarrassed by his keenness. I thought the continued harping on the name of John Marshall was kind of poor business. It was about time for somebody to swim for the family again, though he was only a collateral relative.

Q. 55. Boyhood ambitions?

A. 55. Of course I had boyhood ambitions, but they gradually centered on the Army as I grew

older. But a railroad engineer appealed to me. I worked a little as a civil engineer when I was very young, merely being a rodman, a stadia rodman at that. The cowboy was not so prominent in our lives in those days because we didn't have much cowboy literature. I was not interested in banking. I was interested in the railroad engineer largely from the view that my very young friend, Mary Kate O'Bryon's father was a railroad engineer as I have described.

TAPE 3M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

March 6, 1957

Virginia Military Institute

Why he went to VMI

Defends West Pointers

Running the block--slips out and risks punishment--to see his fiancée

Roommates--one becomes a general--the other publisher of the NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE.

To Nashville to march in the Centennial parade

New Market day--honoring the VMI cadets who were killed while fighting in the battle of New Market in the Civil War

His fiancée (skips several years and tells of marriage and honeymoon in Washington)

Books which were read

Routine of cadet life

Problems of a football player

Description of the buildings and food; I think they were paying off the Civil War debt and the food was not good

Tradition of Jackson and Lee

Confederate veterans

Marshall--a Yankee at VMI

Nature of his studies and comments on their content Diversions

Visit to Washington to get backing for a commission. Recalls McKinley visits, then speaks of visit with Harding at White House in 1921. Talks of first meeting with Roosevelt-gives view contrary to Roosevelt's

Pershing--willing to accept criticism. Gives statement on statement he made to Pershing on Pershing-March controversy.

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DAYS AT V.M.I.

RECORDED INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
AT PINEHURST, March 6, 1957

(The questions were made out by Forrest C. Pogue. Sergeant Heffner ran the tape recorder).

57A. Q. There is an often repeated legend that you did not go to West Point because your father was a Democrat in a Republic district and you could not get an appointment. I gather that you went to V.M.I. because your brother had gone there and because you wanted to go there. Did you ever try to get an appointment to West Point?

A. I had hoped to go to West Point, but my father told me he could not get me an appointment because it was a highly Republican district and further than that I had a defective right arm, a false joint I believe, which I still have and therefore I could not have passed the physical examination. I went to the V.M.I. largely I suppose because my brother went there first.

57B. Q. Did you intend to be an Army officer when you went to V.M.I.?

A. My hope was to be an Army officer, but the prospects looked pretty dim.

57C. Q. Did you ever regret not having gone to West Point?

A. I supposed I regretted not getting into West Point and I was particularly concerned because of the additional expense involved in going to the V.M.I.

57D. Q. Did the fact that you were not a West Pointer ever handicap you in the Army?

A. As to the handicap of not being a West Pointer, that is completely untrue. I think in a way I rather profited by not being a West Pointer because it was a little bit *distingue* as I got ahead and every West Pointer I came into contact with was exceedingly helpful to me. [They were] among the best friends I had in the Army, and did me a good turn whenever it was possible The West Point leaders, the Chief of Staff, a West Pointer himself, certainly acted with favor towards me when I was at Leavenworth, so far as it was in his usual procedure.

The rumor that is always prevalent in the Army that in time of war, that the West Pointers are highly favored is not true in my opinion. What happens pretty much, to take

the First World War when I had a good chance to see the whole operation, the appointments to the Army had been largely from West Point, almost entirely from West Point for a long period of years since about 1880 and maybe a little earlier. These men were near the top when the First World War came. There were almost none from civil life in that army at that time in high-ranking positions—a few but almost none. The most conspicuous example was General [Games G.] Harbord, who was deputy chief of staff and afterwards commanded the 2nd Division and had risen from the ranks. Certainly it did not detract in the least in his career that he was not a West Pointer. It has to be remembered that in an army such as ours in the time of war— a citizen army—you have a great many officers, particularly in the First World War, who have had very limited training, a very limited amount of training, and they were exceedingly jealous of any apparent preference that was given to a West Pointer. They would compare their own efficiency with that of West Pointers. Now say, the latter half of the class at West Point were ordinary fellows—they had a good education, but they had no special instruction at West Point to make them great leaders in strategy but they had a fine discipline instilled in them which meant a great deal and gave a great stability to the Army. But the lower echelons of the class, as a rule, were very undistinguished fellows, though some of our most prominent leaders have come from that region. I always found that I was given the greatest—a fair—treatment in dealings where the question of being a West Pointer or not came out. I remember as a contrast to what is the popular conception that while I was at Leavenworth, they organized a new bureau called the National Guard Bureau and a Brigadier General was appointed the chief of that bureau--maybe he was a major general—I don't remember that—but at any event, he chose me to be his assistant while I was still a lieutenant. That would have put me on the General Staff as a lieutenant, which had not happened theretofore, and would have been a very rare appointment. I was to be in charge of the training of the National Guard, just a lieutenant, of all the National Guard. And I was notified by the Secretary of the General Staff, unofficially because he was [a] great friend of mine, and I had just come back from Europe, not to unpack, as I would go to Washington as head of this division. And then I got another telegram telling me to go ahead and unpack that I would not be ordered in. (Now I will have to correct this last because it relates entirely to another incident and I will pick up the other story right here). I was at Leavenworth when I was notified that I would go to Washington as

deputy chief of this National Guard Bureau and it would be a very distinguished appointment. Then I was notified that I would not go and another officer would take my place. He happened to be a very good friend of mine. But when we found out what happened was General Bell had had a part in my selection, he was Chief of Staff and he certainly was a West Pointer. But the Assistant Secretary of War, who had held the job for many, many years objected to my appointment because he said as I was not a West Pointer it would detract from the position. So it turned out to be a civilian who objected to me as not being a West Pointer and a West Pointer Chief of Staff who selected me for the job.

58. Q. Frye's book opens with a long description on an occasion when you were "running the block" in order to have a date with the young lady who became your wife. Any comment on this? (He apparently got this story from Mr. Nicholson).

A. I did run the block a great deal, but I did it through the assistance of my two roommates, Nicholson and Peyton, and they never told anybody else so it was generally a secret confined to the three of us. In that way I was able to do it a great deal and though I was the senior military officer of the class there was no general suspicion that I was offending in this way. But I was very much in love and I was willing to take the chance. It was a dismissal offense if they had discovered what I was doing.

59A. Q. I will lump together a number of incidents which Frye mentions so that you can see the type of thing he wanted for a biography. They may suggest other points to you. These are: Since you were late in arriving your first year, you had to go to a room (88) on the Third Stoop instead of on the somewhat safer Fourth Stoop.

A. The statement that I was assigned to Room 88, for the reason mentioned is true. I arrived late and I will never forget walking down the long approach avenue to the barracks and hearing the bugle sound the assembly for dress parade and seeing the adjutant and the sergeant major strut out to form the line on which the battalion would form. I thought they were very wonderful looking figures to me.

59B. Q. He mentions, but does not say much about your first roommates: Johny Gilliam, Leonard Nicholson and an uncomed boy from New Jersey.

A. As to my roommates, I don't remember Gilliam. Nicholson, of course, was with me from the first to the last. Later on, Peyton became a roommate, but I rather think this wasn't

until my third class year.

59C. Q. He tells of a trip which the cadets made to Nashville for the Centennial Exposition your first year at V.M.I.

A. The trip to Nashville is correct. We went before the Corps was thoroughly drilled because it was quite early in the season and the whole Rat class was untrained, so that the Corps, I didn't think, made a very good showing. We camped on Exposition Grounds.

59D. Q. He does not mention whether the cadets marched in the inauguration parade in 1900 in Washington. Did they and were you along?

A. There was no parade of the cadets in Washington while I was a student at the V.M.I. The only places we went were Nashville and later on that same year, the celebration of the battle of New Market. My personal recollection of that was carrying two upperclassmen's rifles through most of the marching.

59E. Q. He mentions the fact that you narrowly escaped serious injury while being hazed by being placed over a bayonet and adds that you were not hazed thereafter.

A. After the accident I don't think there was any particular difference in the hazing. It always was rather robust in the earliest weeks but it continued the entire year so far as I remember.

59F. Q. He says that you and others used to sleep through the sermons of a rector known as "Whistling Mac."

A. As to sleeping through the sermons that is not correct. We may have fallen to sleep, but if you did you were immediately reported and you were in trouble. One of my great difficulties when I was captain was to be careful to stay awake myself because I had to see that everybody else stayed awake.

59G. Q. He mentions a hike to House Mountain which you talked Nicholson and "Rooster" Johnson into taking with you. Says your nickname was Pug.

A. The hike to House Mountain was correct.

59H. Q. The impressiveness of the roll call for cadets killed at New Market is described. Frye and others speak of the effect which the New Market battle and the reputation of Stonewall Jackson had on you.

A. I was much impressed by the May 15th roll call when some designated member of the

first class would step forward and salute and say "died on the field of honor" as the name of that man was called if he belonged to that company which he was in. There were two, I think, in my company. I think that was probably more impressive in my day than it is now because the little cadet cemetery was in a wooded dell, I guess you would call it, sort of a little swale in what is now part of the level parade ground. And my first New Market Day, Mrs. Stonewall Jackson was one of the spectators, when we honored the graves of the five young men, if it was five, who fell at New Market.

59I. Q. Frye speaks of a fifty-yard dash for a touchdown against Washington and Lee you made in November, 1900 and of the mention the *Rockbridge County News* gave to your tackling ability against V.P.I. the same year. He says that the victory over Washington and Lee set off a riot.

A. As to the fifty-yard dash, I don't remember exactly that. I remember more particularly running for a touchdown in one game, rather a long run, and then having it called off because somebody had held somebody else. I don't remember the riots with Washington and Lee though there was a first-class riot the first year I was at the V.M.I.

59J. Q. Frye says that you and Peyton got no demerits your last three years by making a deal with Nicholson whereby you and Peyton cleaned the room, while Nicholson's name was posted as room orderly every week. (This sounds like a Nicholson story).

A. As to the demerits, I don't think it was quite that way that Peyton and I got no demerits because Nicholson took them all. What happened was you often received demerits for some minor untidiness in your room and Nicholson the last year, his name was always carried as room orderly, so he would get the touch if anything was wrong. But we all did our work in turn as room orderlies ourselves though our name wasn't in for that reason. I remember one rather amusing thing that occurred there-my window either, in my second class year I guess, looked out on the parade ground and we were going to have a ball game that afternoon, I believe with the University of Virginia. The teams turned out for practice earlier in the afternoon than the cadets were able to get out. And, of course, we all wanted to see the practice. And a number of the classmates slipped into my room where they could look out and see the players practicing on the field. They were observed and the sentinel reported them-called the corporal of the guard. The sentinel's name was Marshall. The corporal of the guard's name was

Marshall. He went in and reported to the officer of the day who was Marshall. There may have been a sergeant of the guard, but anyway everybody was Marshall until it got to the commandant and he was Marshall.

59K. Q. He mentions your paying a Sergeant Wolf $2.50 to polish the stock of your new Springfield rifle.

A. The comment about Sergeant Wolf and the cleaning and polishing the stock of the rifle was correct. A number of us did that.

59M. Q. He tells of forbidden feasts in your room with you furnishing cans of pork and beans and with John Fleming on one occasion furnishing oysters his father had sent.

A. The feast in my room that they are referring to, I think, was an occasion when my mother was sick and therefore was not able to prepare me a Christmas box. Every fellow received one of these as a rule. Everybody had boxes and I didn't. My roommates did. So sometime after Christmas, a couple of weeks maybe, my father in Pittsburgh went into the big delicatessen store and ordered a whole barrel of things which included the canned goods you could get in those days and all the delicacies that could be packed up in that way. It was delivered to my room and the entire glass assembled there, I think. I remember myself being crowded up to the radiator where I could sit on that and watching them eating. We tried to pick out a few things that we could hold for late feasts for ourselves but I don't recall that we could hold anything out, because this was a rare treat and nobody was receiving any food at that time. And as I have never said before, I don't think, to you, the food at that time was something terrific. I don't recall the business of Fleming and the oysters.

59N. Q. He mentions briefly your first wife.

A. My first wife was Elizabeth Carter Coles. She was a very lovely looking woman. I guess you might call her a beauty. She was the finest amateur pianist I have every heard. I think I have already explained that I had heard her playing and that brought about my meeting with her. We became "steadies" you might say, very, very shortly—just a few weeks—and were engaged the last year and a half I was there, and married shortly after I left there. We were married for twenty-five years when she died after an operation at the Walter Reed Hospital. She had a very bad heart which had occurred before we met from excess strain of social things which finally culminated in St. Louis where she was bridesmaid and maid of honor and so on at one or two

weddings of her friends out there. It was called mitral-regurgitation.

Her mother was a Miss Pendleton of Virginia. One of her progenitors, I think I mentioned, is buried at the head of the isle next to the altar at the famous Bruton Chapel at Williamsburg. He was a signer of the Declaration of Independence and would be occasionally mentioned when any question of family came up. They were rather contemptuous of me because the name of my hometown sounded like a very recent affair and they were rather shocked when they found out if was much older than Lexington, Virginia, because it was a famous stopping place on the National Pike after coming over the mountains or before starting up the mountains which were only a mile away.

59O. Q. He notes you taught at Danville while waiting for your commission.

A. That's correct about my teaching at Danville.

59P. Q. He mentions that your honeymoon was spent at the New Willard Hotel in Washington.

A. That's correct about the honeymoon. The New Willard Hotel, at that time as I recall, had very recently opened and we stayed there. I know there were two theaters running in Washington then, so there were some theaters to go to although there were no movies. What was novel were the taxis. The motor taxis, which, strange to say, were made after the style of the hansom cab where the driver sat on top and you sat under him inside. We used those quite a bit to divert ourselves.

60.Q. Who were the professors at V. M. I. who impressed you most? (Frye mentions only a Colonel Price).

A. I won't comment on the professors at the V.M.I. except Colonel Nichols, who later became Superintendent, and who was a very fine friend of mine and very warmly supported me.

61. Q. What were the subjects you liked best? Liked least?

A. Frankly, I didn't like practically any subject best. In trying to think about it I can't recall now that any one pleased me. I was a very poor student and, as I have already said, I did very, very badly my first year. I think I was 35th in a class of one hundred and something. But I ended up, I believe, in my last year as fifth in my class. Ambition had begun to set in. But I started rather late.

62. Q. What were the books you read?

A. Of the books that I read at that time, it was pretty much anything I could get my hands

on, particularly the last year and a half. I didn't discover until about then that my roommate Nicholson—he and his brothers were orphans and they owned the *Times-Picayune,* which was just merely the *Picayune* paper of New Orleans—he made a casual remark one day that they got all these books to review and they sold them for five cents apiece. So we immediately got him to contact a friend of his on the paper find, and he, the friend, would send us a barrel of books at a time. You will find on the register there the record of the books contributed to the library by Nicholson. That's the way it came about. I was a rapid reader and Peyton was a rapid reader and Nicholson a very slow reader. Peyton and I just read through the barrel. Finally, a very thin, stern, sort of Creole-like character, a lawyer, a Mr. Rapier, arrived at the V.M.I. and he was Nicholson's guardian. And it was a few days, about a day at least, before we discovered, Peyton and I, that we were the ones that were being investigated, because Nicholson was not standing well and they thought maybe we were a poor influence. But it developed that Peyton was third in the class and I was about twelve or fifteen and Nicholson was next to last. So Mr. Rapier gave up the idea that we were a bad influence. The reading though was bad because Nicholson read very slowly and that absorbed a great deal of time. So they directed that the book supply be turned off. However, he managed to get other deliveries and we continued to read quite a bit. I read a little in the library. I remember coming across for the first time Rudyard Kipling and I read every book they had by Kipling. I don't remember the others that I read there though I think I did read some on historical accounts of life in Virginia in the early days.

63. Q. How did the appearance of V.M.I. differ then from now?

A. The appearance of the V.M.I. in part is very much the same. But the courtyard looks differently because it is closed at one end—very firmly. They did put a building there just before I left but that was not satisfactory. So the present firm continuation of the barracks and the additional barrack which extends beyond and which includes the Marshall Arch which they complimented me by giving my name to it [were added]. The parade ground is much larger. The little woodland where the New Market boys were buried is no longer in existence. The various new buildings along the lane leading up to the V.M.I. were entirely new. Over the parapet, as we called it, beyond the road, there was nothing then but woodland but now all of that is generally filled up with buildings including the gymnasium which is quite a structure directly in front of the main archway but far below it. The mess hall now is a single story building; it was then a

two-story building. The little shacks—almost as they were—coming down the hill to the mess hall have been replaced, I believe. Maybe one is there with the upstairs veranda on it. Anyway, it was where the military storekeeper, Colonel Poague, held forth who I discovered after I left there was a very celebrated artillerist in Lee's Army and played a very prominent part in a great many battles, particularly in the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, and at the opening of the Battle of Antietam.

64. Q. What was the routine of the life of the cadet then?

A. The routine life of a Cadet in those days was very austere, I might say. They didn't make any provision for our entertainment. They had a dance, I think, oh, very seldom. And I never went to the dances in my early days there because the position of the new Cadet was so humble that it was easier for me to stay away than it was to go, so I didn't go.

I didn't go out socially, I think at all, for the first two years that I was there. And we would go up town on Saturday afternoon and window shop. There were no movies, of course. There was a famous little store there on the corner—[H. O.] Dole's, they called it. He was quite a character and made a great point of favoring the cadets. On Sunday afternoon we were allowed to go in the back country but not uptown. We couldn't go until after midday roll call and we had to be back for evening parade. I remember one very ridiculous thing happened back there. We killed a duck and the farmer caught us at it before we could carve the duck up and cook him. So we had to take up a collection to pay for the duck or be reported. We had very little money, any of us, but taking about all our money together we paid for the duck and after we had settled with the farmer, we looked around and the duck had walked off. We had paid the money and we didn't have any duck. [chuckle]

66. Q. Did you dislike any of the routine of cadet life?

A. The routine of cadet life I became accustomed to and accepted. I think I was a little bit more philosophical about this thing than a good many boys. They would get very exercised over something of that kind. It was part of the business and the only thing to do was to accept it as best you could and as easily as you could and that I tried to do and I think I was fairly successful in doing it. A good bit, of course, depended on your roommates. If they were agreeable fellows, why you were all right. If they weren't, why you were in trouble. Mine were very agreeable.

67. Q. Who were close friends of yours besides Gilliam, Fleming, Peyton and Nicholson?

A. In 67 you asked me who were my friends besides Gilliam and Fleming. I don't even remember them. As the time went on, there were others [who] became pretty warm friends of mine—the older McCabe boy, Erskine Miller from Staunton, the Johnson brothers, or cousins—I don't recall which it was—those I remember in particular.

68. Q. What were the things you learned at V.M.I. which were to influence you most?

A. It would be hard to say what particular thing at the V.M.I. interested me most. Of course, I was being disciplined—I was learning discipline. I was learning responsibility and, of course, that was particularly the case as I rose in cadet rank where I had very great responsibility and quite different from that at West Point. At the V.M.I., I never remember a tactical officer coming into the mess hall more than three or four times in the year—it may have been oftener, but that's all I recall. So I was responsible for the entire corps in the mess hall every meal all through the year. And if I do say it, it was run with hardly a loud laugh. I only had to move the Corps out once ahead of time while they were still eating, when they had a new dessert, maybe it was strawberries. Whatever it was, there was a complete silence while they were eating and that attracted some fellow's attention, so he shushed the rest and they all settled down to complete silence and then looked at me to see what I was going to do. It happened at that time, there had been a famous case up at West Point of giving a silence to a tactical officer, meaning a sub-professor, and that had attracted a great deal of attention. I don't know but what that got involved in a Congressional investigation. Anyway that added to this silence and they all turned to look at me to see what I was going to do. I had a small table there with three others. And I merely got up and called them to attention and marched them out of the mess hall when the strawberries were only about a third eaten.

66. Q. [More for question 66]

A. The routine of cadet life that got me most was the early morning. I never did like that, but I suppose that is the same with all boys. And it was early morning, we generally got up in the dark. We took rather pride in sleeping with these very wide double windows wide open—in fact the older cadets made you do it when you were a new cadet—and the snow would fly in on us. And we had a strap around the blankets in the bunk to keep the covers from coming off of us, and we just slept like dead men which meant we were in very good health. Whatever we may say about the diet, we were in very good health.

69. Q. What was Lexington like then?

A. Lexington at that time was a little smaller town. One end of it out toward the cemetery, beyond the cemetery, has been much developed since those days, but it hasn't changed a great deal and it's pretty much the same town it was in my day. I think it is probably affected more by the fact that Washington and Lee has a much larger enrollment and, of course, those men are free to be in town whenever they want to be.

68. Q. [More for question 68]

A. What I learned most at the V.M.I. was self-control, discipline, so it was ground in, and the problem of managing men which fell to the cadet non-commissioned officer and cadet officer. He was very severely judged by his classmates if he was slack. They might be willing to try to pull things which would give him the reputation of being slack, but at the same time they would judge you very severely if you proved to be a very slack performer in the business of your military grade.

70. Q. Did any dignitaries visit V.M.I. while you were a cadet?

A. I don't recall any distinguished visitors coming there, except once when I was officer of the guard or officer of the day, I forget which. Anyway I was in the little room right in the sally port which was in the office of the officer of the day and where the delinquency book was kept and a very stern looking man came in--he was an officer of the Army. He had on a blue cape with a yellow lining and yellow stripes on his blue trousers and he wanted to see Cadet Godfrey. Then I realized that this was Colonel Godfrey of the famous 7th Cavalry, who took a leading part in the Custer battle, the Little Big Horn, and wrote a very interesting and authoritative account of it for *Harpers* or the *Century Magazine* years before. When I told young Godfrey that his father was here, he looked like he had been shot. Apparently he was under stern parental discipline and he wasn't doing very well.

I remember another occasion which stuck with me. In the archway, the sally port we called it, there was an old fellow with a scraggly beard and he was so sunburned and dark he looked like he was a colored man. And he sat there and sold nuts and things like that he had collected up on the mountain. Some one of the cadet officials ordered the old man out of the archway, it may have been a sub-professor, I'm not quite certain, but anyway later he was sent for by General Shipp and in the General's very ponderous voice, very stern voice,

he was informed that that man was a veteran of the Confederate Army, the Confederate cavalry, with a very fine record and he could sit in that arch until he died. So the man with the nuts came back.

71. Q. Was there any family opposition to your becoming an officer?

A. There was no family opposition to my becoming an officer.

72. Q. Did you visit battlefields a great deal in this period?

A. I did not visit battlefields a great deal during that period. I didn't have a chance because the session lasted from September until the middle or late June—once it lasted until the 4th of July—and there was no occasion to get to battlefields. And also there were no automobiles.

73. Q. Were you greatly influenced by the tradition of Lee at this time?

A. I was greatly influenced by the traditions concerning General Lee and General Jackson. They were both buried there. I went to frequent services in the Washington and Lee Chapel where the effigy of General Lee rested behind the chapel over the vault in which he is buried and I had plenty of time to reflect. I might say, incidentally, I persuaded General Pershing to go to the V.M.I. after he had finished a visit to West Point when he first came back from France. And he was received in the Washington and Lee Chapel with great ceremony and stood in front of the effigy of General Lee and made his remarks. We immediately received quite a clamor from certain men in Chicago and others who objected to General Pershing going there where Lee was buried. And I remember General Pershing left me to answer all the letters. He said, "You got me to go there, now you attend to the letters objecting to my having gone."

I used to be impressed by the recollection of the famous march on Washington by Early, which started at Lynchburg, and considering the distance they would march a day, slogging up those bad roads of that period, it was a long and tedious performance and it was quite surprising he could go so far without troops being mobilized against him. But the thing that stuck in my mind was, when I would go by the cemetery, was that his whole column turned in there on its march without halting and moved into the cemetery, circled Stonewall Jackson's grave and went on up the Pike towards Washington.

74. Q. Impressions you got from hearing of the Spanish-American War regarding our

weaknesses, the leadership of the Army, supply problems, medical problems.

A. As to the Spanish-American War, I got very little. The newspapers, of course, were lurid. They soon changed from vain descriptions into antagonistic accounts of one commander or the other. There were attacks on the Navy—that occupied all the attention—and General Miles came back and made some comment about this trial of the admirals--the investigation of the admirals—and Theodore Roosevelt reprimanded him so that everybody around in the upstairs of the White House could hear the reprimand. In that way the aftermath of the war was not very wholesome, but at least gave you an idea of what democracy could do and particularly what politics could do in military matters during and particularly after a war.

75. Q. Did your training in the last year show any effect of lessons learned in the Spanish-American War?

A. I don't think my training in the last year had any particular change resulting from our experience in the war. I remember, more particularly I remember, having to drill a new cadet who had been in the war and that was quite a performance watched by everybody with keen interest.

76. Q. Did you see or meet any of the leaders of the war then or later—Shafter, Fitzhugh Lee, Roosevelt, Leonard Wood, Dewey, Schley, Sampson or others?

A. The only one of the leaders you mentioned that I met afterwards was General Wood. That's quite a story and I will tell it at some later time. [He never did]

77. Q. From what you learned later by reading and by contact with officers and men who took part in the war, what is your opinion of the way in which the whole war; was handled.

A. As to the war I might state that we know pretty well what happened in the preparations for the battle of Santiago—the difficulty we had. I remember one ship captain—I travelled on his boat later on—was telling me how this quartermaster directed him to tie his boat to a tree. He said he was running out of coal and he wanted to coal up. The quartermaster, who was directing the landings, said he couldn't go. Well, of course, that meant that the boat would be helpless there off the rough coast with no coal to keep the engine headway. And afterwards they would be in still greater difficulty. So this army quartermaster directed the captain "to stay there like I tell ya and tie your boat to a tree”— which was a new form of ship business even for those days.

The first indication of the complete lack of preparedness was the assembly of the Army down at Tampa. Literally everything was wrong. It wasn't so much wrong in a sense as it was lacking. If it hadn't been for the resort hotels there where they could all sit on the porch and rock—some of the leaders and the press—it would have been a very grave business. Roosevelt and Wood with the Rough Riders highlighted the affair and sort of took the painfulness out of that situation. But there wasn't practically anything in the way of preparation and the troops had just gotten together from the western posts, company by company, assembled there almost for the first time since the Civil War. The best explanation of the situation on the West Coast was, as I recall, and I dug this myself out of the records, the first expedition sailed for the Philippines, seven thousand miles away, which were still in the hands of the Spaniards and the insurrection amy of Filipinos under Aguinaldo rapidly forming. It sailed with 150 rounds of ammunition per man. Now at that time, I think, the amount of ammunition you were supposed to have—not at that time but a little later—the amount of ammunition you were supposed to have on the man, in the train immediately behind the division and in the other train in a couple of days march back, was something like seven hundred--and all these reserves then available in this country to fill it out. Here they were going seven thousand miles from home with 150 rounds per man and God knows when they would get any more, if there was any more ammunition suitable for those rifles--like our tremendous shortage in 1939.

It was a sorry dilemma and only the gallantry, individuality, and the initiative of the men and leaders and the extreme weakness of the Spanish Army, which was debilitated by disease and all, in both Cuba and the Philippines, made it possible to go through with the early fighting up to the surrender by the Spanish without some great catastrophe befalling us.

78. Q. Were you made to feel that you were a Yankee at V.M.I.?

A. Was I made to feel that I was a Yankee at the V.M.I.? Yes, quite a bit. I was "hazed" on my accent up to the day of my graduation. And I remember that when, I was called on to make a speech at my class dinner honoring the occasion of naming this arch for me, my principal twist that I gave to it was while they were these southern fellows largely, and while they pretty much kept the pressure on me on account of my northern accent and all, I happened to be the one and the only one there who had an arch named for him down at the

V.M.I. But they were hazing me, as it were, even at the time I was a first captain about my accent, which had a little bit of the twang that was common to Pittsburgh. It improved a little bit with my first marriage, but it was always referred to in a rather derogatory manner.

80.Q. Did your cadet days mark your first real entrance into social life? Did you first dance then?

A. Social life. As I have said before I didn't go out practically at all my first two years and very little after that until I became interested in my future wife. And my social life then was concerned practically only with her. Whenever we could we would go driving because she had a fine little horse and Stanhope trap, where the lady sits up on a slightly raised seat and has a whip with a long lash

81.Q. Did you learn any language at V.M.I.?

A. At the V.M.I., I studied German and came away knowing about a dozen words. I knew a little bit about German grammar. I also studied French and I came away knowing less. I wasted all my language instruction. And the great fault, I think of language today in America, they are so busy teaching you grammar and things of that sort, they don't teach you how to talk. You've got to learn a language really by starting like a child does and they taught the officers Chinese beautifully without going into grammar at all. I could conduct an ordinary conversation in Chinese while I was out there the first time. It didn't do me much good when I got back here because all the laundry men spoke Cantonese and the others, largely the dialect of Shanghai, and it seemed to me I seldom encountered anybody who spoke Mandarin which was the language of about two hundred million in the north. Of course, if I had been in Washington going to the Embassy, I would have run into that there, but everybody at the Embassy spoke English.

82.Q. Do you feel that there are a number of differences between V.M.I. then and now?

A. So far as I can see about the V.M.I. today, it is much less strict, generous in vacations, particularly expensive, comparatively speaking, in what the cadets must spend for their dances and things of that sort. We spent little money—had very little money—and I think we got along much happier.

I will now go back to some of the questions and some of the matters concerning my youth. In the first place, I want to add some little to what I gave before. First as to my

reading. I remember now the name of the one book I thought was so perfectly written by Conan Doyle in which Hugh Everly—Everid—that was *The Refugees*, which began in the court of Louis XIV and ended up with the Iroquois Indians in Canada. I thought that was one of the most wonderful books of description that I had ever read and I still do. I had three or four copies of it, but they have always been carried off by somebody that borrowed them.

Another book that I remember my father reading to us was *The Wandering Jew* (about an hour ago I remembered two or three more but I can't think of them right now). That was a very lengthy book I recall.

1.Q. Do you have anything you want to say about the Marshall and Bradford background?

A. My father's parents and my mother's parents died before I was born. Therefore, I never had any living grandparents. Father told me something of them. Mother told me quite a little of them. But they were not striking things. She was very proud of her father who was a doctor, for his handling of affairs during the great cholera epidemic. I think it was in the seventies. It may have been back in the sixties, but I think it was in the seventies. I know she told me that he was out so much—he rode horseback on his appointments—that he had gotten into such a state of fatigue that the horse brought him home. He would fall asleep and the horse brought him home to the stable three times in one night before he ever finally made the patient. She also told me that he himself had developed the saline injection treatment for cholera, which I knew later on in my cholera experiences, which were pretty lively in the Philippines. That was the only thing we had that seemed to be very effective. The only trouble was, you cured the man of cholera and he died of heart failure, while he was so weakened.

I remember my mother telling me that my father's father ran for the Senate, as I recall, twice, and my mother's father became a very ardent opponent. Not that he was appealing for office himself, but he was opposed to father's father being a United States senator. The result was that the families didn't speak and it ended up with my father's sister marrying my mother's brother. So I had double first cousins. But I know that my mother and father had to wait until one or the other of their fathers had died before they could dare to marry.

I don't recall father telling me any particular story about the Kentucky Marshalls

except that they came to Kentucky, as I recall, with the father of Chief Justice Marshall who remained in Virginia. But his father settled there near Maysville, Kentucky, near a town called little Washington later on. And that was the beginning of the Marshall family in Kentucky. That is not so far from Augusta which was my father's home. Incidentally, I guess this question is down here later but I will tell you now, my brother and sister were both born in Kentucky and I was born in Pennsylvania. The family, I think, had moved to Pennsylvania at the time they were born, at least at the time my sister was born, but my mother went there for the birth of her children.

I visited Augusta several times for about a month at a time and I went to Maysville for a very brief visit—not in Maysville but out in the country—which was the first home of the Marshalls. The homes in Kentucky of the members of the family were all in towns. There was very little country life in those days, like there was in Virginia on the east coast.

I heard a great many Indian legends of that period--more tales than I read, of course, of Daniel Boone and Simon Kenton and Girty and of their days. My mother always referred to Kentucky in describing this period to me, as the dark and bloody ground, which I believe it was called in those days. I remember as a young fellow thinking it was a very beautiful countryside particularly out towards Masville.

19.Q. Frye mentions such names as the White Swan, Gilmore's hill a horse named Old Billy, a hired man named Fred Hallow, Hospital Hill, and Natty Brownfield.

A. Comments about Fred Hallow. I don't know. I don't remember him. I remember the colored man who cut the lawn if that was his name. He was always arguing for more pay, which I think he was entitled to, because they got very little in those days.

I remember mother's hickory nut cake and her caramel cake and except for getting hickory nuts I didn't help her very much. When she made the ordinary cake, like caramel cake, she always made a little one for me which I could eat right away. So I would sit down with a small cake and a glass of milk and generally eat it all up right off.

I don't remember any particular Thanksgiving, affairs although, of course, we had a Thanksgiving dinner.

Mother played on the piano. I think I have already explained that we had a good bit of music in the family because my father sang very well. He had a fine tenor voice. My

mother both played and sang. She had studied in Philadelphia when she was a girl coming up from Kentucky because she had an aunt who lived in that famous square—Rittenhouse Square. My principal recollection of Rittenhouse Square (and this isn't to be published incidentally because I can't root into the other part of the family) was that the husband of one of the relatives was a pretty lively chap and he belonged to the Philadelphia city troop and I liked the description of his hip boots and sword and plumed hat and a very fancy coatee or coat and particularly the description of his falling down the stairs in his uniform, plumed hat and all, and being picked up unconscious at the bottom of the steps.

But mother loved to play and was very willing with her music. And with my brother playing two or three instruments and singing fairly well but very pleasantly for a young man and my sister singing, I was the only one who didn't come up to the general standard of the family though I did play a little on the piano, a little on the banjo and a little on the guitar. The music I liked was the semi-classical. I don't remember “The Battle of Waterloo" so for as music was concerned. We did not have regular singing. Mother and father would sing together. I didn't much like that because I had to sit around on a hassock and listen and keep quiet--it was a little too long for me. And I believe, as I have already said, my principal recollection of the song was "When the Swallows Homeward Fly.” I didn't like that. I imitated it and got a licking for doing it.

No, our home did not have the illustrated life of Napoleon or of Lincoln. There was, I think, a history of Lincoln and Napoleon there, but I don't recall just what it was. There were a good many of the illustrated books common to that day with the steel engravings.

I remember the Homestead strike very well—the day it happened—all the things about it. The Molly Maguires had father on the black list. They killed his partner and they almost got him and they threatened to assassinate him in order to frighten him into not giving testimony, which convicted the assassin of his partner—which had to do with the brim of a hat. He had a very hard time with the strike business. And I remember as a young boy being down at the works of a place called Percy and seeing a striker’s army of, I suppose, of five-hundred or maybe a thousand largely armed with poles of the pitchfork tine wired to the end. On one occasion I was standing on the tipple through which the coal was shot down into the cars or rather I was sitting on the edge of a freight car—open freight car—which was below the tipple,

waiting for it to load, when a lump of rock coal was thrown from outside the picket lines and struck the tipple and came down the chute and hit me over the eye and knocked me out. I have a slight bluish scar there today. It's very hard to see now. But the whole Molly Maguire business appealed to me very strongly and I was quite thrilled by the procedure which led to the conviction of so many of them when this detective became a member. But this was largely in eastern Pennsylvania rather than western, though they were there--as I say, my father barely escaped assassination and his partner was assassinated.

I don't recall any particular reactions to Andrew Carnegie and Henry Clay Frick except they were great dominating influences. Frick more than Carnegie because he was more actively in the game as I grew to a more appreciative age. But I was quite familiar with Carnegie's buildup—great fortune—and I felt Frick was a very stern man.

6. Q. William Frye says that your father as a boy of seventeen participated in the Home Guard under Joshua Bradford against a raid by General Basil Duke. He says that since the Marshalls-were of southern background, the participation was perhaps unwilling. Any comment on this incident?

A. I do not recall telling you who was in command of the local Home Guards fighting in Augusta against Basil Duke's brigade of Morgan's command. It may have been Colonel Bradford, but it certainly wasn't mother's father. All I recall her saying is that she saw her father, Dr. Bradford, and father's father conferring at this time and that was the only time she ever saw them talking to each other. I have nothing more to add to this.

49.Q. What magazines did you read?

A. I read the *Youth's Companion* when I was a boy. There was a *Harpers Young People*, I believe, but I didn't read that. There was a *St. Nicholas* magazine too, but I didn't read that.

I started my riding after I entered the Army.

52. Q. When did you make your first trip to Washington?

A. I made the one visit to the White House, I described, when McKinley was President. And I was never in the White House again until I was Deputy Chief of Staff. No, until I was aide to General Pershing and I was there several times with him, and very frequently in the Executive Office of the Secretary to the President in connection with business that had some relation to General Pershing. I remember sitting out on the south veranda of the White House on the last

day President Harding was there and he and General Pershing were waiting for the parade of the Masonic order to arrive and it was an hour late. So they had quite a discussion there between themselves and part of it was in relation to General Dawes who was then organizing the Budget Bureau. Dawes was very violent about a good bit of it and he particularly wanted to have the Secretary of State compelled to report to him on all their expenses rather than require him to go search with their understrappers about the thing. He wanted each man, each cabinet officer, the head of his own department, accountable himself for it and he the budget chief in a position to dominate the investigation. This was very unpopular with them all and I remember the President assembled them all in some building there and Dawes conducted the affair—and I remember his describing one scene in which he took a broom and swept. The whole thing was the Navy had a lot of brooms of one kind and the Army had a lot of brooms of another kind, and the one couldn't use the other's broom, and he thought that was reaching the peak of absurdity. And he made quite a funny business out of it, but he pretty much made everybody mad. But he did get the budget going and did make it a very effective bureau. It lost its great prestige when he moved out. It lost its rather dominating power when he moved out, but it still became a very influential and dependable bureau. But he created it from the start. I got a pretty good insight into the thing because he would come in and talk about it afterwards and before these affairs to General Pershing and he talked to me because he was so full of it. He talked every time he sat down about these things and he would sit in my office and talk to me sometimes by the hour, so I was very familiar with these goings on, as you might call them.

Then I went to the White House when I became Deputy Chief of Staff but very officially and very few times. I had to go, of course, to the army and navy receptions and things of that sort. I remember I had to wear this special full dress with long tails and I had no cape to go with it, so I wore an overcoat over this which made rather an absurd set-up, but I was so stony broke in those days that I couldn't afford the cape and I just didn't have it.

I don't know how many times I had been to the White House before I became Chief of Staff but I was present at several serious conversations with the President while I was deputy and I remember—no I don't remember any conversations with the President much—I am thinking more of those which occurred while I was Chief of Staff. One of the first ones was quite an assembly of men and a great many of the New Deal protagonists, but it had to do with these

appropriations we were trying to get in a military way. And there was a great difference of opinion as to what it should be and the President, of course, was all for the increase in the air but he wasn't much for getting the men to man the air ships or for the munitions and things that they required. He was principally thinking at that time of getting airships for England and for France, but the French requirement quickly disappeared as France fell to the Germans. I remember the first one of these large conferences I attended—I believe I told you this before—I sat on a lounge way off to the side. I was deputy at this time. And the President finally got around to me. Most of them agreed with him entirely, had very little to say and were very soothing in their comments and he, of course, did the major portion of the talking. And he finally came around to me. I was on the end, sitting on the lounge there, and I remember he called me "George" – I don't think he ever did it again. Well, anyway, that rather irritated me because I didn't know him on that basis. Of course, the President can call you pretty much what he wants to, but nevertheless I wasn't very enthusiastic over such a misrepresentation of our intimacy. So he turned to me at the end of this general outlining, in which he had done most of the talking, and said, "Don't you think so, George?" and I replied, "Mr. President, I am sorry, but I don't agree with that at all." And I know that ended the Conference and the President gave me a very startled look and when I went out they all bade me goodbye and said my tour in Washington was over. But I want to say in compliment to the President that that didn't antagonize him at all. Maybe he thought I would tell him the truth so far as I personally was concerned, which I certainly tried to do in all of our later conversations. He thought I was too intent on things of course and he was having a very hard time raising the public backing for the money and there was a debt limitation during these early periods, but my job was to see that the country was armed if it was possible to do so which meant large appropriations.

I went into the White House once to see Mr. Coolidge when I was with General Pershing, but that was to go with a group and to second an invitation. I had nothing to say myself. I was thinking I went in once when Mr. Hoover was President, but I can't recall it.

I know when President Harding died, Mr. Hoover was on the funeral train when it came back from San Francisco and I was there too because the car, in which General Pershing and I were travelling at the time this occurred, was hitched to that train and we lived on that car.

I did not know any of the presidents intimately before F. D. Roosevelt.

With regard to my arm, it never was treated. They were advised very strongly against trying any operation. What had happened was a tendon had been pulled some way in my boyish performances of football or something— football I guess—and the arm had gotten out of its regular joint. And it virtually had to make a new joint and it was quite painful in those days. It was very painful when I went to the V.M.I. If anyone brushed into me or touched me, it hurt quite a bit. That got gradually better through the years, but it took quite a few years for that pain to wear off. But now I just can't use that arm in the normal way. I have to bowl instead of pitching; I have to hook instead of striking out straight and so on. I know my riding was different from other people, though I rode a tremendous amount. I didn't dare hold the reins partly with my left hand because I would not be able to pull up the horse if he stumbled because my right hand I know would be gone because of my right elbow. So I rode with the reins in one hand—my right one—and was prepared to make a short grasp with the left if anything went wrong, which occasionally it did.

You refer to typhoid fever. I had all the common diseases of that day it seemed to me, and as I recall, neither my sister or brother did. I had typhoid fever, I had measles, I had scarlet fever and I think I went right down the line. I was a great obligation to the family. I know when I had scarlet fever I was delirious, the only time I can remember being delirious in my life, and the typhoid fever was a very long siege which put me out of business for months and months.

The next question regarding where I was born I have already answered.

If I gave the impression that General Pershing told the story of the old man in the barnyard up near the New Market battlefield, I misled you a little bit because he didn't retell the story exactly, he referred to it, but I think it was a rather brief reference.

36. I read a little of Dickens and a little of Hugo or rather it was read to me, but I can't even remember just which books they were. I know it wasn't the Dickens' books I commonly remember. I remember Ouida *Under Two Flags*, but I think I read this myself.

To go back to the last question before this, General Pershing wasn't very good at telling stories in his speeches. He could tell them otherwise sitting around though he was rather restrained and he was not a free talker. He would sit up with me and talk until midnight particularly on the train—rarely ever go to bed before midnight—and he was

very, very sociable and rather youthful in his approach, but he didn't tell many stories. He told me about his youth, it was just a straight factual account, and I think was probably much more correct than mine about my youth.

I remember one absurd thing we had to happen on the train. And I might say it was very agreeable travelling with General Pershing because he seemed to be as young as I was when we were getting about until we got home and then it was business. We would always be laughing at some joke when we drove up from the train in Washington. But when I came to the office—when he would come in about eleven o'clock—it was just business as though we hadn't been together before. We were up in Lowell, Mass., where he had to make a speech. When we got on the car on which we had a stateroom, Senator Moses was on the train which came down and hooked on the car. Somebody had given General Pershing a fine quart of whiskey—Scotch, I believe—and he had been drinking some of it and he looked at the bottle and he said, "Now, there's just enough for you and I and a little bit left over for a parting drink." It was then about one o'clock in the morning. So he said, "I'll tell you what we'll do. We will give this Scotch to Senator Moses." Drinks were very hard to get in those days—real whiskey and not hooch whiskey, as we called it otherwise. So he poured out the remaining Scotch in the drink for Senator Moses and I went down the aisle carrying the drink and he followed me in his shirtsleeves without the collar and I was about the same way – dressed about the same way. And we came to the berth that we had heard Senator Moses state he was cached in and General Pershing scratched on the hanging and whispered "Senator Moses." And Senator Moses didn't reply. And he scratched again and said "Senator Moses" and lifted the curtain a little bit when this young woman's voice came and said, "What do you want?" Well, he turned and ran against me and we spilled the Scotch, between us, all over us and raced down the aisle and I had a hard time keeping out of his way because he was running right up my back, but we got into the stateroom and got the door shut and then he just sat down and laughed until he cried. We had no more Scotch—I think there was a little bit—and he suggested I go back with it and I told him he would have to get another aide, I wasn't going back out there again. But in the morning when we got off in the station in New York, we found sitting outside our stateroom door, where a berth had been made up, Senator Moses and the young lady that we had tried to root out of her stateroom. She had known him and she had told him what had happened

and he had identified General Pershing and me as being the culprits and we had a very amusing back and forth in regard to it. He was very youthful in that way. Not at all the stern disciplinarian one would think.

And I might say now in regard to General Pershing that I have never seen anybody who could listen to as severe criticisms, particularly personal criticisms-just as though it was about a man in another county. He never held it against you personally. He might not agree with you in any degree. But he listened to very, very frank criticisms in regard to his actions, in regard to the event or whatever it was he said or corrections if his memory had gone bad but as a rule his memory was very accurate and he was conservative to the point that he wouldn't say anything unless he was pretty certain what the facts were. We travelled together a great deal and it was not at all boring. Often we would just take a car where we were and go off on our own to this place and that place and the other place as the thought occurred to him at the time and as we found the people at home. It was pleasant, it was entertaining, and he was far more youthful in his reactions and conversations than officers very little my senior were, it seemed to me. It was always rather astonishing because he was supposed to be a very severe character. He was anything but that in his normal reactions. But when we got back to Washington and after he had gone home and changed and freshened up and had come back to the office and I came in to see him, he was just as stern as though we had never been together at all.

I can tell one incident about General Pershing, while I think of it which shows pretty much what kind of man he was to deal with, having in mind the stern qualities that, he displayed. There was something came up. General Harbord was deputy chief of staff then and he brought it to General Pershing and they were going to change this. General Pershing had a way of sending most all of these things into me and nobody knew about it and all he would put on the paper was Colonel "M. " Then it was up to me to take a look at it and tell him what I thought, but that was never betrayed outside of the office, that I was put into this position of maybe criticizing my superiors. Well, in this particular case, he had decided in agreement with General Harbord and it was about something that General March had done and they were changing it and I thought they were entirely wrong. And when I got paper with Colonel "M" on it, I dictated a little memorandum to General Pershing to that effect, why I thought they were

wrong and so on. General Pershing sent for me and when I came in, he said, "I don't take to this at all. I don't agree with you." "Well," I said, "let me have it, General again, let me have it. I didn't express myself well. "And I took it back in there and very carefully drew up my resume of the affair and why I thought it was wrong. And he sent for me again and he said, "I don't accept this, I think Harbord and I are right." I was very much upset because I thought it was entirely wrong. And I said, "Well now, General, I have done a poor job on this, let me have that paper again." So I took it back and rewrote the whole thing to give it a brand new flavor and then I took it in and handed it to him. And he read it and he put it down and said, "No" and as I recall he slapped his hand on the desk which is something I had never had him do before, and said, "No, by God, we will do it this, way." I got the paper back into my hand—I remember this pretty clearly—I said, "Now General, just because you hate the guts of General March, you're setting yourself up and General Harbord, who hates him too, to do something you know damn well is wrong." And he looked at me and handed me the paper—I didn't have it before—and said, "Well, have it your own way." And that was the end of this scene where he was bitterly determined to do this and yet he ended up by saying, "have it your own way," which I thought was very remarkable. No prolonged feeling—nothing—that was the end of the affair. I don't think it was the end of the affair so far as General Harbord was concerned. But General Pershing held no grieves at all. He might be very firm at the time, but if you convinced him that was the end of that. He accepted that and you went ahead.

The books you mentioned—Sir Nigel and others—I read later on in life. They were not read to me but they were great favorites of mine and when I come up to Leesburg I will tell you something that concerned the Sir Nigel series which involved King George and the Queen Mother and later on Princess Elizabeth and finally Elizabeth the Queen, which I had to do with the punchbowl down in Surrey and one of my trips there.

You must be very careful to caution George and Miss Spilman not to mention any of these stories that you happen to read to them. In fact it makes me rather timorous to realize that all these intimate recollections will be on file and I suppose read by people because I think it is pretty much an overdose of childhood and I go back to thinking in the end it is better to have the cherry tree story and nothing else, rather than this long list of affairs that look like I was trying to make a career of my childhood.

I am going to try to collect in my mind a number of items about the war which haven't been mentioned and you would not find the record. There are several quite important that I think of from time to time and I will note them down and try to get them together. I think they will probably have to be done in sequence and that way I can remember them better. That is all for the present.

TAPE 4M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

MARCH 13, 1957

V.M.I.,
SERVICE IN THE PHILIPPINES AND FORT RENO

RECORDED INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL AT PINEHURST,
March 13, 1957

(The questions were made out by Forrest C. Pogue. Sergeant Heffner ran the tape recorder).

A. Q. Did you take to a military type of life from the beginning or was it something you had to come to like?

A. Did I take to the military type of life? I think it would be more accurate to say I accepted it. Of course at the V.M.I., and particularly my first year there, it was a very severe life. The cadet life in itself was very strict, put the hazing which was very strenuous when I was there made it still stricter and the first year was quite an ordeal, though I came afterwards like all the rest of my friends to look back on it with more appreciation than I did any other year.

B. Q. Were you convinced that you wanted a military life before you came to V.M.I. or did you make this decision shortly before you graduated?

A. Was I convinced that I wanted a military life before I came to the V.M.I? Yes, I was of very much of that opinion. But with me it was a question of how in the world I could make it. I couldn't get into West Point and I was not familiar with the procedure of getting in from the ranks, and very, very few got in from the ranks at that time, until they began to pass laws to accommodate the men who were in the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection, so my problem throughout was, while I wanted to be a soldier, the question was how could I manage it other than by enlisting and starting off as a private.

C. Q. Did your fiancée have any objections to your military career?

A. My fiancée did not object.

D. Q. What were some of the things you feel that college did well? What things about your instruction would you have changed?

A. The V.M.I. in my day was a pretty stern affair. I believe they were still paying off their war debt--that is the rebuilding of the Institute after it was burned down by General Hunter--I know I could look out of my window my first year and count, I think, eight cannon balls sticking in the wall where they left them after Hunter had fired them at the Institute. I have

explained before that the mess was a pretty stern affair (chuckles). The main dish was called "growlie." I don't remember now much what was in it, but I think most anything was in it that was around handy to dump into it. But we were all so hungry and we ate so rapidly because you were not at the table very long, that it all seemed to go pretty well. The mess improved a good bit in later years there. Life was exceedingly austere. There were no delicacies--you might say--no arrangements practically to amuse the cadets. You had to amuse yourself. They had a gymnasium and that was rather new. But that was not made much of--certainly not on a controlled basis. It was pretty much a case of looking after yourself and the old cadets chasing you while you were doing it. The customs now have entirely, changed. I remember when going there on the Board of Visitors, the Superintendent asked me to take a look at the meals. There was much complaint about them and I told him I would do that if he didn't go with me. So I left the Board meeting and went down the hill and walked into the mess hall and walked over and sat down at the table of the first captain. He always had a table with about three--himself and the adjutant and the quartermaster and the Sergeant Major. They received me very graciously. I asked them if I could have some of the lunch and they had the waiter bring me lunch. And I got that. And then afterwards I told him that I would like to speak to the cadets. So he called the battalion to attention--or battalions as I guess it was at that time--and gave me the opportunity to say something to them. I told them exactly what had happened--that the Superintendent had asked me to come there and try the meals--that there was a great deal of complaint about them – and I said that I had, I had been very graciously received and had been served the luncheon and that it might disappoint them because it always irritated young people to be told about something in the past in their fathers' lives or in this case in the Old Grad's life when he was there. Well, I said, that the meal was such a vast, vast improvement over what I had known that I thought it was quite wonderful. I didn't make myself very popular.

As to the instruction of those days, some of it was very good and some of it was not as well managed I thought. The system I thought was fine, particularly when a cadet is assigned a subject and he goes to the board and writes his name up there and then writes the subject there and then proceeds to develop it on the board. And when the time comes to make his showing, he

starts off and says, "Sir, I am required to discuss or develop" or whatever it was--"such and such a thing"--and then he goes into the explanation of it. Well, that was a pretty good business I thought--the way you went about it and then the way it was accepted. I thought that they were short in instructors and the general instruction I think was not particularly fine. I should comment very mildly because I was anything but a star pupil myself.

E. Q. What was the impact of V.M.I. on your later leadership and career?

A. The impact of the V.M.I. on my later leadership was probably much greater than I realized at the time. Having been a First Sergeant and later a First Captain meant a great deal in control. I had specific things to do. I was responsible for the men and you couldn't go to sleep on that. That required your attention every minute. You had to know just what you were doing. And you had to have some talent at putting it over. This was particularly true of the First Captain because he took the lead on such matters and he had complete charge of the Corps while they were at mess, in going to it, and coming back from it. And, of course, if they could get away with anything that was considered a good stunt, and didn't particularly reflect on the cadet captain unless he was unable to manage it.

The fact that we had no vacations at all--just a part of a day here and part of a day there--I don't think we profited much by it. There was a great deal of time we gained in one sense, but I think we got so stale that we would have one very much better if we had had a breather here and there. I don't mean so much about going home and all, but we had so little liberty around about that section of the country.

F. Q. Are there any points you wish to add on your close friends there like Nicholson and Peyton?

A. Regarding Nicholson and Peyton. I don't think there is much I can say about that except we three lived together in harmony for a long, long time. And we were living very close together. Nicholson was quite remarkable. He kept his temper there for five [four] years. I never saw him lose it. When we were ragging him about something, I remember once he said he wouldn't be responsible for what he did if we continued, so we quit right there because he probably meant exactly what he said.

We lead a very pleasant life and amusing life. I know they had a habit of letting an older classman skip breakfast roll call. The company commander had to do that and I was the

company commander. So my two roommates skipped breakfast roll call. Then it was my job to single out a Rat--we generally had the someone all the time--I even remember his name--it was Smoot-a and he had to carry a bottle of hot coffee on his chest, so hot that it almost burnt the hide, and hot biscuits and a would bring them up and then we had concealed about the place--and it had to be concealed too- something to put on the biscuits. And he would fix that on the table with coffee. Our three bunks were in the other room, because as First Captain I had a double room, a sort of sitting room which looked out on the sally port in the front and the rear room which had no windows in it but had the door--of course the door was always open. And he was required by Peyton, who was the chief organizer of such things, to dress himself up in a coatee and my plumed hat and come to the door with his arms folded and wake us up and announce, "My lords, the breakfast is served." And then we would go in and sit down and eat our hot coffee and biscuits and whatever the condiments or something we could find to put on them. There were a lot of little things like that that were amusing or we got great amusement out of them.

But I learnt. I was in control of a subdivision of the barracks. I had to keep order there and get the reports at night--they were all present or accounted for. If anything went wrong I had to be out on the stoops--or the porches--as we would call here, with a lantern to see that order was kept--no yelling was started or anything of that sort--and, of course, I had the responsibility the Corps when it was going to meal's and at the meals which was the principal time you had to exercise some talent at leadership.

G. Q. You spoke of learning Chinese better than German and French. Did you use any of the Chinese you learned as a soldier in China when you went years later on your Mission to China or had you forgotten it by then?

A. Chinese. I was not able to use Chinese in Washington because mine was the Mandarin which applied to about two hundred million people in North China. The Chinese that I would encounter in Washington was almost entirely that of Canton-the laundrymen or people like that. Had I been at the Embassy, I probably would have found occasion to use the Mandarin. But they all spoke English, so it gradually faded away pretty largely.

H. Q. Are there any recollections you can give me which would show how your mental horizons changed and how you grew mentally from boyhood to manhood in the

years at College?

A. As to my mental horizon--I didn't know--I became more of a person of course. I had responsibilities which were very large for one of my age and which-kept me developing in that respect. If I had been a first class private, as they would always term them, I would have been rather indifferent about matters and made it a practice, as a matter of fact, to be as slack as I could be. That was the habit of all the first class privates. But I in my job as First Captain had to exercise authority all the time and had to do it in such a way I did not create resentment.

[Here he suddenly returned to Chinese]

When I went back to China, I couldn't of course understand the Shanghai dialect and I, had considerable difficulty in understanding Madame Chiang Kai-shek. I had forgotten a great deal by that time and strange to say the first time I began to make some headway with my Chinese was with the coolies up in the mountains where we went during the hot weather and though this was Central China and not North China yet I understood more of the talk of my chair bearers and I had eight to carry my chair than I did of any of the others.

I might say that the Chinese that we learnt in the regiment at Tientsin was very important to us because we had to keep things on an even basis there-to see that there was no interruption of, communications with Peking and to see that the international train which ran from Ching Wang Tao down to Tientsin, 185 miles, and then on to Peking, 90 miles. We had to be able to talk to the engineer about shifting the train and doing various things because during these special wars, these war leaders were mixed up all over the place and every now and then we would get six or eight or ten trains blocking each other and the fireboxes of the locomotives burning out and things of that sort and it was up to us to see that the jam was broken and the trains got started on a clear track to Peking or to Ching Wang Tao.

I. Q. What were the things you did which made you First Captain? Was it drive; tremendous attention to details; a tender of others to defer to your leadership? Were you tough as a cadet leader?

A. What were the things I did to make me First Captain (chuckles). Well, the first thing was I tried very hard. In all the military affairs, I was very exacting and exact in all my military duties and I was gradually developing in authority from the very mild authority, almost none,

shown by a corporal to the much, very, very pronounced authority as First Sergeant--because I fell the company in, I called the roll, and all things of that sort. I kept tabs on it entirely and had to march the details to guard mount every morning. As a matter of fact, I came back from breakfast and I had about ten minutes to get into a coatee and sash and sword--straight old non-commissioned officers' sword that the First Sergeants wore--and march my detail down to guard mount and stand behind them at attention during guard mount and then get back out of that rig and into my blouse by eight o'clock every morning all the cadet year.

I suppose they judged me in making me a First Sergeant in estimating what my development would probably be by the time might be made First Captain. Those advances were made on the recommendation of the tactical officers--that is, the sub professors--and also the recommendations of the four cadet captains, the adjutant and the quartermaster. I know that in my last year one of my classmates got down under the building in what we called the "catacombs" and got under the Commandant's office where he could hear what was going on and reported to me that I had gotten what they called "a solid rec," that is all the recommendations of all these people concerned for First Captain. That is not surprising because if I had had several dissenters it would have probably been questioned entirely whether I should be made First Captain at all or not.

I do not know what to add to V.M.I. days. There was so little latitude that was allowed. Football, of course, was an interesting departure and when I went out for football--I didn't go out the first two years due to a promise to my mother that on account of my arm that I wouldn't do it. Then when I went out my last two, I got on the first team very quickly and then I had to go out to practice every day. I might say in the light of what happens today, I don't know about the V.M.I., but I know generally there was quite a difference. We went out to practice at three o'clock: From three to four was covered the period of dressing, undressing, bathing, redressing in uniform and our practice of football in that hour. Then I had to go to drill for an hour--and then into full dress to dress parade which took about thirty minutes after that. That was every day, except Sunday, and then I had to go to what was called evening parade where I didn't wear full dress, but where the band played and we formed up again. So it was a pretty stern life as to requirements and there wasn't much latitude. There wasn't much play.

The traditions that went into the past, particularly the Civil War, had a pronounced effect

and were continuous all the time. In the catalogue it used to show each class by name until the numbers got too great. I know it always used to impress me to see that the names of the men that had been killed in action were always in heavy black type and the class of '61, as I recall, was practically every member of the class was killed in battle, which showed how much hard fighting the members of the Cadet Corps got into. They were all practically made officers and of course in those days with the battles fought the way they were that put them into actions, in leadership in the most dangerous positions and they paid the price very gallantly and very completely. The other years there were tremendous losses or killed in battle. . But the first year, I think--my dim recollection is--the entire class was killed in battle. I always thought it was too bad that that was discontinued in the catalogue. It was done for a very specific reason--there were too many names involved in later years. But it told a story that was very impressive to the young mind.

SERVICE IN THE PHILLIPINES

1. Q. Frye notes that you entered the Army at almost the same time the fight started over the establishment of the General Staff was in progress. He speaks of Elihu Root's activities and the opposition of General Miles and others. He cites arguments by Generals Merritt and Schofeld and Davis in favor of the General Staff.

A. I am familiar with all that and I have read all their testimony. The particular individual who was adviser to the Secretary of War was General William H. Carter, who became quite a friend of mine in later years and who talked to me at great length about the battle they had. And, as I said, I had read all the testimony, but I was unaware of it when I was at the V.M.I.

1A. Q. Were you aware of this fight as a young lieutenant? [Have you any comments on the development of the General Staff and its value to the U. S.?]

A: As a young lieutenant, I became a little more aware of it, but even then very little. I was so remote from Washington and from any Washington contacts that all I knew was that the older officers of the Army cussed out the young officers on the General Staff, notwithstanding they were a very select lot, like General Pershing and men of that caliber. He was a captain then. But the Army had largely been controlled by the Adjutant General's Department and all related to that. And all the older officers were "agin" it. As a matter of fact, it was to gain for the line of

the Army representation in Washington.

2. Q. Briefly Frye tells of your sailing on the Kilpatrick by way of Honolulu and Nagasaki to Manila in May 1902. He mentions your assignment to Company G on the island of Mindoro (Calapan) where you reported to Captain Charles Bent who had a cholera epidemic on his hands.

A. As to two (sailing for the islands an assignment to Company G in Calapan on Mindoro, and so forth) that's correct.

2A. Q. Do you recall any impression of Honolulu, Nagasaki or Manila at this time that you wish to record? Any impressions on the trip generally?

A. The trip was a very long one. Frye's record is not correct. The ship never touched port until it landed in Manila Bay. It skipped Nagasaki. It was a very dangerous thing because it went by a new route and it was a single screw boat, which would mean if the single screw failed we were off, he beaten track and might be hanging around the ocean there for quite a long time. I knew that at the time and we talked about it. It was rather interesting on the boat--I have vey clear recollections--there were quite a few officers who had been volunteers in the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection and now had received regular commissions and some of them were very industrious in telling me particularly who had come from civil life--how should function. They understood it all. Later on I discovered they knew damn little.

2B. Q. Is there anything about the cholera epidemic which impressed itself on you?

A. When I landed in Manila it was in the midst of a great cholera epidemic and as I recall, I think there were about five thousand deaths a day. I was in a great hurry to get out of town because it was very expensive and I had very little money. I had a tailor fit me for uniforms. But meanwhile I saw that staying at the Oriente Hotel-there were six of us in one room--which was right by the sally port which looked out on Binondo Square--I think it was Bernando or Tondo or something like that--I finally got at the port captain who was a naval officer and got permission to board a boat - *Isla de Negros*--the Isle of Negros--which was leaving taking the last passengers on that day and there wouldn't be another boat for three months. Well, I would be bankrupt in three months or three weeks for that matter--at the prices we were paying at the hotel. So I found the port captain--this naval officer--and he told me there

was a launch going out at half past one o'clock and if I made that launch I could get aboard. So I made a dash to the hotel to get my things and then to the tailor's to get my things. And he hadn't sewed up all these things. And I discovered when I got dawn there I had lost the pockets for the blouses and the leg on one pair of trousers and it was a long, long time before I was ever able to get these replaced because there was no such thing as a tailor where I was going. Fact was there were only six little shacks in the town and no communications except by water and that only about every three or four months. But I did get on the launch at the very last minute. In fact it was starting to leave when I reached it. I got aboard. I had to throw my things aboard and I went out to the *Isla de Negros*. It had a Spanish captain and a Spanish first mate and it had an American representative of the Quartermaster Department though he was not an officer. Very nice fellow.

The boat was very greasy and dirty. The food was particularly greasy- it seemed to be bathed in it, and the major domo was a one-eyed performer who won my antagonism immediately. Everything was very strange and there was practically no deck room. We had a little place right behind a tiny superstructure which was the cabin of the mate and the ship's captain. Then I found I had to lie--we had to lie--there in cholera quarantine for five days and the heat was terrific. Finally another young officer and myself, going with my regiment, went down the rope ladder and dove off into the bay and started to swim. In the first place, the bay was filthy and in the next place we had hardly gotten into the water when a padre there--Padre Isidro Sanz--whom I came to know very well afterwards at Calapan, began screaming to us and pointing and we looked around and there were two sharks with their fins sticking up and we had a swimming race to that rope. And I went right over the fellow's head, going up that rope. I never showed such strength and agility in my life as going up the side of that boat. That was the only cooling experience that we had and it could hardly be called that.

So we laid them, stewing in the heat. The deck was metal. And there was an old Philippine scout officer there who had been a first sergeant of cavalry, chasing the "Apache Kid" down in Arizona and he was the captain--though he was a first lieutenant--of the Scout Company on Calapan when I got there. He was taking down furniture for his house and among these items was a rattan divan, if you could call it that, which he had lashed to the side of the boat on the rail. Finally, we went out. We went by Corregidor and were

waved at and cheered--jeered--by the garrison, all of whom seemed to have bath towels. And then we turned down the coast.

We were not aware at the time that we had disregarded the typhoon signals and that night we ran into the damndest typhoon that I ever experienced. I am not exaggerating at all when I tell you--when I state--that the boat would tilt over until the lifeboats on the upper deck would go into the water. Then it would just poise there for a little bit and it would seem like it was never going back again. Then it would go back to the other side--these huge waves--. The captain got frightened or sick or whatever it was and left the bridge, which was on the some level with us, and went to his stateroom and knocked around there on the floor in a sea chest which was rattling around from one side to the other. The Filipino at the wheel, which is up against the superstructure, got his ribs mashed in and of course he was gone. That left nobody at the wheel and nobody in command up above. So this young fellow, Daly, who was a lieutenant, going back to his station on Calapan--he was a volunteer officer just given a commission--he and I took over the boat. I don't remember what became of the old scout officer--I think he was sick. The two of us got the wheel and of course we turned it in the wrong direction and were heading right into these forbidding looking mountains. Finally we turned it the other way and we just battled that thing all night long, until along about three in the morning, the first mate came up from the lower deck and he did it by climbing up the stanchions on the outside and he would go in the water every time the boat tilted over. I think what saved us in this tilting of the boat was that we had on a heavy cargo of meat and potatoes and all--very heavy. The hold was loaded full and they were all around the deck below us and I think that kept the boat weighted so that it didn't upset. But it was a nerve-wracking experience--and finally with this Spanish mate, we made Batangas Bay.

I remember one thing. The water would go in to the engine room--we could look right down into the engine room through this open ventilated space, which was the middle section of the deck. And the Filipinos started to leave the engine room and we leaned over there with our guns and threatened them and as I recall a shot once or twice but not at a man but someplace else to bulldoze them into staying with the fires. I wouldn't have stayed myself if I had been in their position. Of course, the Spanish mate-he handled that better than we did.

The next morning, we came into the peace of Batangas Bay and there, I always remember, a

captain--a very senior captain-he must have been just about to be made a major. He must have been about the class of '91 or '92 or maybe ‘93 from West Point. He was very contemptuous, though silently, of Daly and myself. We tried to tell him a little about what had happened to us during the night and we had gotten coffee and these big round hard crackers they had. But he just scorned us and he took his chair that was on deck that had projections to hold your feet up the side--took that away from us and went rather forward at the side. I endeavored to tell him that was a pretty bad place, but he scorned me. Then we pulled out finally and started across Batangas-Channel by that island whose name I have forgotten now for Calapan. The minute we got into the seaway between Mindoro and Batangas Harbor, the first wave that hit us, a captain sailed the whole length of the boat, going backwards and I just stood up and cheered him as he went by and went over backwards. I met him in after years. He was the father of a young lieutenant, but I never had much regard for him and I always remembered his flight from the forward part of the vessel as he was going backwards towards the stern.

Getting to Calapan was not too bad. But when we came in there, you couldn't go into the harbor, if you could call it a harbor. It wasn't any bay or anything and you had to lie about a mile off shore. But they couldn't lie offshore there because the sea was too rough. So we went around the point and came upon a barren coast. But it was only barren--there weren't any people but it had palm trees all along it. It more nearly came up to what you would expect in the tropics and in that sort of a thing. And then we lay there about a half mile off shore until a man on a pony came down--oh, about a half an hour or an hour later--and waved a white handkerchief or something to us. Through our glasses we could see that he was a white man. And he was waving his glass. And with that reassurance, they put me in a boat and rowed me a shore--I was the only person getting off. We got to the beach and got my bedding roll off, which was pretty large--I learnt later not to have it--and my trunk and box locker. And this officer had no other pony. So we walked up--he leading. We walked almost half a mile up through this jungle trail and there we encountered the outpost. Well that seemed like war to me, coming into the outpost out there--with these forbidding mountains that came up almost from sea level about 8500 feet. Then we got by the outpost and the picket and came into the town. And there was the great contrast. And it was typical of almost all American procedures of that kind. Here was the outpost--here was the town--surrounded by protective measures of that character. The hills were

full of insurrectos who would shoot into the town from time to time. Here in the plaza in a shed, without sides and just a roof of palmetto leaves, was a big buck sergeant teaching all the children how to speak English and how to sing English songs. That was the school and we had already started it and this sergeant was the king of all he beheld in the town. Because the children were crazy about him and the mothers had to admire that. Most of the fathers were insurgents and were out in the hills.

I was received there by the commanding officer, who was almost as new to the place as I was and almost as new to the Philippines as I was. He had been at West Point throughout the war and now as colonel he came to take command. He only had one arm incidentally--had lost it in the Civil War--a very nice man. But he was just as strange to the proposition as I was. And he was very strange to the wildness of this small garrison he had inherited. Because they were wild--about the wildest crowd I had ever seen before or since.

And we took our meals together. On account of the cholera everything was canned. And you certainly get very tired of canned food like this. And you couldn't eat anything that wasn't cooked or drink any water that wasn't boiled. I remember our principal amusement was to sit after meals with an old phonograph-the kind with the big receiver you know--you see on the advertisements—"His Master's Voice." We had one recording device. So we would shave our one wax record. We would shave it and then we would play. We would take the recorder and record our amateur performances. Even there with only about eight of us, they got very self-conscious. But we would make a record and then we would play it back and get great amusement out of that. That was the sum total of our amusement as I recall at that time.

I had a house which faced the plaza. Across from me was the church and the convent, built like fortresses, actually had been used as fortresses. Then the two, other sides were rather open. On one side was the mess of one of the companies. And on the other side were a few houses--oh, I suppose two or three dozen houses of the town-and then the river was right behind us. The kitchen was detached from the building and you went across a little bridge which went over the water to the kitchen. It was done that way to keep the, heat away from the house, and also was thought to be more advisable. There was where our meals were prepared.

We went to drill at 6:30 and then had company inspection about 7:00 or 7:30 and then went back to our quarters and had a bath and then to our breakfast. And then after breakfast two

fellows there that were nice to me--in those early days--would take me to call on the refined women of this little community--there were only about six in the town. But there were three sisters--I remember that the name of one of them was Polonia, which I thought was rather euphonious--I don't remember the other two. But we would get there about half past nine or ten. I couldn't talk any Spanish so the other fellows had the conversation and most of it was in making fun of me in a pleasant way. And the girls--one played the harp--and they played and sang very sweetly. And that was the morning entertainment and we came back about twelve o'clock. I mention these sisters in particular because suddenly the cholera broke out. It broke out almost in a day. We had no warning of it there and we thought we were safe. And it broke out and the three sisters--I helped bury them all by three o'clock that afternoon. Of course it was Asiatic cholera and it seemed to be extremely violent there. I was living then with a doctor--I think maybe you mentioned his name later on in one of these questions. However--oh, Fletcher Gardner--he was only one and he just worked until he was exhausted. There wasn't any treatment much you could give except saline injections and while they would frequently in a sense cure you of the cholera-you generally died of heart failure afterwards. Of course, the spasms of cholera are terrific and are a terrible strain on the heart. The men were confined to their barracks not allowed out at all. Of course, everything had to be boiled, the fingernails had to be cleaned, the hands had to be washed in hot water, the mess kits had to be washed in two or three runs of hot water and you had to enforce these things very carefully or they would skimp them--and a very little skimping would cost you your life. There was a spring, up the river about two miles, of good water. (The water we were getting out of our wells was brackish--the sea was sort of leaking in). So they established a cholera camp up near that spring and I would go up there to help my friend and had to go up there officer of the day. The first time I went up I found the soldiers peacefully eating their supper off a pile of coffins. Later on, there weren't any coffins. The deaths came too rapidly and they were buried in, probably, lots of dozen in a trench and a sheet was put around them and disinfectant poured on them. It was a tragic sight.

They had the sides of the tents rolled up so you could see the patients and they were on these gold metal cots without any sheets or anything of that sort--which we never used--and they were all drawn up with their knees almost under their chins and generally shrieking

with the agonies of these convulsions. But they didn't last very long. I think the death rate was almost one hundred per cent through most of the thing. I don't recall, myself, anybody recovering at that time.

But down where we lived--the doctor and myself--he came to me one night and explained to me that he had the cholera. And he had put some papers, there for me to see that his mother got and he put some keepsakes, notably his watch fob and things like that to go to his mother. And that's all I remember. I went to sleep. The room was L- shaped. His cot was around the L from my bed where I was and there was a big desk on the side. Next thing I knew I woke up and it was morning. I thought this was a dream then I realized it wasn't a dream, and I was horrified that I should go to sleep while a man was telling me that he was getting the cholera and he was going to die. So I got up and crept to the corner of the room and looked around the corner to his bed and it had been used and he wasn't there. Well, I breathed a great sigh of relief. I went over to my desk and there were the papers he had referred to. I went to the lattice window and looked out and he was coming across the plaza with some friends from breakfast. And he saw me and shook his fist and said "There's the damn fellow who went to sleep when I told him was dying." That was Fletcher Gardner and I kept track of him through the years and when I was Chief of Staff he was at San Antonio. I wanted to see him, but he wasn't able to move about and I didn't have time to run about. I was only there, very, very briefly. Anyway that was my introduction to Calapan.

Finally the cholera quarantine was eased up and on the 4th of July I was put in charge of the celebration. Unfortunately, in typical adjutant fashion, the adjutant had schemed out what was to be done. He wasn't content with saying I was to organize athletic things, but he had described each one and how it was to be done--the usual 100-yard dash and this and that and the other and tied me down to his routine. I went around and solicited funds from all the officers for prizes. I was wise enough to stick them pretty hard--there was nothing for them to spend their money on there. So I got a pretty fair sum from every officer. I think I got $10.00 to $15.00 from every officer and I know I stuck the commanding officer about $25. 00.

And then the rule provided that men must enter the day before the events they wanted to contest in and then they would turn out that morning and, of course, nobody entered anything. When I got out there the garrison office had to turn out. Those were orders and the men had to

turn out under orders. So I came to the first event of one hundred yards and I didn't have a single soul that had entered. And some of the older officers were laughing at me because the morale of the garrison had just been knocked galley west by the arbitrary and tyrannical handling, of the place by a predecessor of the then commanding officer. And they were all sore and all outraged and just in a sort of a sullen silence. I called out for entries in the first race--though under the adjutant's order none of them could enter unless they entered in advance. I ignored that and three men stepped up and entered. I describe this very carefully because, of something that comes later--a half a century later. They ran the one-hundred-yard dash. I gave the number one man $20.00, the number two man $15.00 and the number three man$10.00. Well, as a soldier's pay then was only $13.00 a month, these were huge prizes. Some of the officers objected to my doing this and I told them to just "get the hell-out of there, that they had left me to run this thing and I would run it." Well the next race we had so many entries we couldn't accommodate them on the track. And then the sergeant came up to me and said, "Lieutenant we have got a lot of captured ponies back here. I think a horse race would, be o good thing." I told him to go down and organize it and I would pay out the prizes. Of course, I had reduced the sum after that to normal amounts. He went down there and got these captured ponies and got something like a bridle on them, and let them go bareback, and started them in a race down the street of this little town where these nipa houses were and all the girls were looking out of the second story--which was where the family always lived, the first story was generally for the horse and pigs and things of that sort. And they had a wild ride down the street. Two of the ponies went through a house and the whole house dropped – took the women down to the ground. We had to pay for restoring the house—(chuckles) -- and it was a great success--it cheered everybody up and was the first laughs they had hg there in months. And then some fellow dug up bicycles and we had a bicycle race. And these things were added to. And then I discovered for the first time, because I just never paid any attention to it, that I was responsible for a show that night.

I tell all of this because it had quite a bit to do with my standing in the regiment afterwards, particularly with the men. And the same sergeant who had befriended me on the horse race came to me and I asked him what I am going to do about this thing tonight. And he said, “I will make the stage out of hard tack boxes and I will put up a tarpaulin as a curtain." He mentioned two or three other fellows and said, "We are going to organize this thing and we will carry it through." I

didn't know what was going to happen, but I went down to the affair that night and we all sat out there in the moonlight. And we had things equivalent to footlights for the stage. And the curtain went back--it didn't go up--went to the side rather. And they came on with some little stunts that seemed to amuse the audience very much. One fellow, in particular, with something I couldn't even see was funny, had them in an uproar. Well, laughing was a prize at that time--on account of the state of morale. And the sergeant came to me and said, "This is going pretty well, Lieutenant" and said "Up in the guardhouse is the most popular man here and he clogs and sings and if we could get him here it would help a lot." And I said, "I'll go get him." And he said, "The trouble is, he is in irons. So I went to the Colonel, who was rather timid, and told him that we were getting along. He congratulated me. I said "I want you to help me now, Colonel. I want the man that's in the guardhouse and is a wonderful dancer and sings and is very popular." I said "I want you to get the adjutant to tell the officer of the day to let me have him tonight." He consulted the adjutant who was rather dubious; why the devil he should have been dubious I don't know. It was agreed. And then I broke the news to the Colonel that the man was in irons. Well, he had gotten in that deep and I managed to get him to agree to take the irons off. So this fellow came down and when the curtains drew back and they found him dancing--with the band playing--they just cheered to the echo. And he put on a grand performance. He was out of irons, he was out of the guardhouse and the whole garrison was cheering him. So he made it quite a show. And his singing was good and the men were crazy about it and he did encore after encore. Of course, what they were particularly crazy about was his getting out and they thought it was not just that he was in there. He had suffered a little bit for what I call this tyrannical handling of the place beforehand. Anyway, it went off in good shape.

And afterwards my sergeant adviser came to me again and said "It is a shame to put that fellow back in the guardhouse--terrible to put the irons on him." I went to the Colonel and I said "You have seen these men tonight. They are cheered as they never have been, I'm told. Certainly that must be a valuable thing. And I have consulted around with some of the officers and others and this fellow, I don't think he is much too bad. I think he blew up with the injustice of the first arrest as he thought it was an injustice. I don't know whether it was or not. It is not a great matter anyway. And he has electrified the whole garrison. Can't we parole him instead of putting him back in irons?" Well the Colonel had never heard of such a thing. He said "I will

have to examine the charges and I will have to do a lot." Well I said, "Colonel isn't the time to strike while the iron's hot? You've got them all cheering; you've got them all laughing. You've got morale seemingly vastly improved. Why shouldn't we make a try of this?" And to my great surprise he agreed. "Well," I said "You announce, won't you, that this man is paroled." And I dimly recall that he declined to announce it. And I wouldn't do it because I didn't want to be too conspicuous. That isn't a very good business. My dim recollection, though I am not positive about this, is that the sergeant was allowed to go to the front and announce that Private so and so would not return to the guardhouse, would not return to irons, but he was placed on parole and in the charge of the garrison. Then there was uproarious applause to that, which lasted for about two days as a matter of fact- the applause--which psychologically was just what they needed.

Now, a half a century later I went to a meeting--I flew to a little resort on the lake between Indiana and Michigan--where a society of the veterans of the 1st Division--that is not the officers but the men--one of the few organizations of that kind I knew about--was having its summer camp convention. They had invited me several times and I had never been able to go. I was always interested in it, because they would always send me a report of the names of the various fellows and as time went on and numbers dwindled a little bit, I always felt if I ever had a chance I would get to one of these meetings. So I flew out there. It was just a half a century later--I found--they gave me an uproarious welcome I found that the chairman of the organization was the same fellow who had won the first race and got the $25.00 and, of course, he had a great deal to say. I had a tremendously enjoyable time. And it was very impressive to see how these men had changed--and many had been successful--because they were a terribly tough lot--it wasn't the citizen army as we know it today at all. They had been virtually enlisted across the tracks in Columbus and put on the train and shipped west. I don't know when I valued anything quite so much as I did that brief visit of twenty-four hours or a little more--thirty-six hours--to these men fifty years after I had first seen them as a young lieutenant in his first year out in the Philippine Islands.

3. Q. Frye mentions a number of people you met at this time: Captain Clark Wertenbaker, Lt. Henry Hossfield, Sergeants Shiebert, Smith, Brown, Gebhard, Corporals Allen, Donaldson, Privates John Willey and John Martin, Surgeon Fletcher Gardner, 1st Sgt William Carter, Sgt. Torstrup, QM Sgt. Sims. Any comments on any of these?

A. As to the people Frye mentions I remember Dr. Wertenbaker. He was the principal performer on the phonograph. He was the authority on who should do various things. Lt. Henry Hossfeld I knew very well and later on out at Vancouver Barracks when I was a general officer. Henry had an interesting experience. He had been in the German Army and had been kicked--he was an orderly and had been kicked--down the steps by a son of the Secretary of War. So the minute the term was up he left Germany and came to the United States and landed in New York City without being able to speak a word of English. He was a very highly educated fellow. But he enlisted in the Army because he thought he could learn English. That sent him immediately to the Philippines and he was an excellent non-commissioned officer. He had all the discipline instilled in him by the strenuous German system. And he learned his English. Then they allowed men from the ranks--and he had reached the grade of first sergeant I think--to apply for commissions under the new act--to allow men to come in from the Philippine Insurrection. He was accepted and he was commissioned a second lieutenant--not so many yeas after he landed in New York not being able to speak a word of English. And not until then did they discover that he was not an American citizen. So they sent him to San Francisco to get his citizenship. And I saw him the day he returned from San Francisco--a citizen now--and a second lieutenant. I remember Sergeant Schriebert, Sergeant Smith, Sergeant Brown and Sergeant Gebhard, very, very well. And I remember most of the others that you mention particularly. Sergeant Carter, Sergeant Torstrup, I remember him very well because he was with me--Sgt. Carter was with me also--when I was left with twenty-six men, I think, at Mangarin, Mindoro, and we went through our Christmas Day together—not realizing it was Christmas until almost afternoon and Torstrup and I boarded the boat when we were moved to Manila. Then he was back in the company while I remained with it until I came back to the United States. Just how he was discharged or not, I don't know. But to my great surprise when the special regiment which General Pershing had organized in France; which paraded in the U.S. was forming up in France, who should I find--no, when we got on the boat to come home with this special regiment--who should I find was first sergeant of one of the companies regiment but Sergeant Torstrup.

4. Q. What was life like in these early posts? What sort of-living quarters did you have?

A. Life, etc. Well, it varied entirely anywhere you were. Up at Calapan it was rather

pleasant. There were a lot of officers, a lot meaning about a dozen as I recall, and there was a band. There wasn't much to do, but we did that together--we all had the mess together. We were very much held in by the cholera. Finally a ship came by one night--it was this same *Isla de Negros*--and I learnt that on board was my brother's roommate at the V.M.I., who had just married a schoolteacher in Manila--so, I had myself rowed out to the *Isla de Negros* which was lying about a half or three-fourths mile offshore and introduced myself to my brother's roommate and he introduced me to his bride. I didn't have very long to talk to them because it was a long trek back to the boat and the wind and the tide were against us, and in a flat bottomed boat that makes it pretty tough. I didn't get ashore until well after dark. And Hossfeld met me on the beach and said, "I've got your bedding roll and I've got your trunk." I asked him what's it about. He said, "You are being ordered to Mangarin which is the southern tip of this island of Mindoro. And you are to leave tonight on this boat. “So I never got -off the beach. They put my things back on the boat and I went back out and we took off in the early morning following for Magarin.

I walked around this very limited deck up there to find where my brother's roommate and the bride were and finally I located her and went over on the other side of the deck to put up my cot--or rather had my boy do it--who was with me—and crawled under the blankets. Despite the noise of the winch loading during the night and coconut oil light burning right over us, I went to sleep. I was wakened up by the silence of the winch and I saw the quartermaster's agent--this nice fellow, Hitchcock, from Pittsburgh incidentally--was going round looking for a place to sleep. He came over and looked at me. I didn't say anything--I kept my mouth shut and my eyes apparently shut--and I presumed from what happened I looked like the bride because he went over and put his cot squarely beside the bride. And when the sunrise occurred-when the sun came out of China, out of China and something else, from cross the bay-whatever the Kipling quotation is, he found himself facing the bride with his face and a heavy moustache only about three or four inches from her face. She opened her eyes at the some time and screamed. And he leaped to his feet, with the blanket, and sprinted off the deck and went below. I thought that was all very funny. Hitchcock and I afterwards became very warm friends because he would bring me -my only contact with the outside world.

There were different living quarters at each place. Sometimes it was a shack,

sometimes a tent. Down at Mangarin, there was a little two-room shack. The partitions only went halfway up to the ceiling, a little hall along the side which was used as the mess thing and the whole side of the shack opened up and rested on posts which were put on the rail of a narrow porch. That was a very nice place. We always had dinner served when the sun was halfway down on the horizon across the China Sea. Then we would stay at the table until probably twelve at night.

SECOND SIDE

The quotation I fumbled for is "The dawn comes up like thunder out of China across the bay."

Now life at Santa Mesa outside of Manila, about eight miles, was quite different from that at Calapan. Ten or twelve of us lived in a nipa house across from the commanding officer's quarters and we would frequently go to town and go to the theater. The Army and Navy Club was our port in the city. And it was very peasant there to eat your dinner out in the open in the courtyard which the building surrounded. It was an old street called the Calle Cabildo. The whole regiment was there, so there were plenty of officers and plenty of amusement which would come from the contact with them. Had horses to ride- not very good ones--but still horses. And we would ride into the city or go to the Luneta to the band concerts- -Luneta is now for inland, comparatively speaking, and the thing has lost its attraction entirely--because everybody practically in Manila of our social order would go to the concert in the evening and circle the Luneta and call on each other from carriage to carriage and listen to the music. That, of course, has all disappeared. But it was one of the most attractive phases of life in Manila. As contrasted to the quarters in these two places I have just mentioned, I was stationed up in a small town on Laguna de Bay. There I lived in the extension of the church which was the convent. My room was off the gallery of the church and there I ate my meals and had my bed and did most of my living. Except in the evening, it was the custom to take a large quart tin cup of coffee up in the tower of, the church and drink the coffee and eat the cracker looking all over the bay. You got a magnificent view. I flew over that--very low--when I landed in the Philippines on my way to China in 1945.

Then there was another station, which was a good shack, but a terrible life. That was an island in Laguna de Bay--the prison island. The prisoners were the dregs of the

Army of the Philippine Insurrection. They were the toughest crowd of men I have ever seen. You had to count them twice each night. And to go through the barracks, there where they were lying stark naked on these gold metal cots without any sheets-(we didn't use sheets, any of us, at that time)--it was a very depressing sight. The kitchen--I saw a man attacked there with a cleaver--I don't know whether he was killed or badly injured, but I remember I was officer of the guard or officer of the day and I was in the kitchen about three in the morning when this attack occurred. We were not there very long because we were relieved by the 7th Infantry from the States. Their depression when they saw the place was very great. Our elation when we left was even greater.

I remember we had two dogs the company were very fond of and they had been puppies when they started to raise them at Santa Mesa outside Manila. And we came down the river this moonlight night being towed by a launch. I was riding in the launch and the men were in one or two large cascos as they called them. We finally came to the bend which was not for below Santa Mesa. And the men all bade farewell to the two dogs and they were thrown off the boat at that point. And there was almost weeping on the part of the men at their having to get rid of them because they couldn't take them to the States.

I don't recall any interesting points of my service at these other places. They were the usual things that happened to every young offer. It was a pretty rough, tough, hard drinking crowd. I didn't drink at all in those days. I don't think I ever took a drink in the Army until I had been in the service about three or four years. I never cared much for liquor anyway and I used to say, and it was rather accurate, that I only drank to laugh at a poor joke, but I started to take a cocktail, or whatever it was, after I had been in the service about three or four years.

Oh, I have forgotten a very interesting period of my service. When I had come up from Calapan--Mindoro rather--to Manila, I found I was ordered to post-coming reservation of Corregidor. They wanted to make it a military reservation. The first need, they had to notify every citizen. Well, there were very few--practically none of them could write. And all the little shacks were at the base of the heights. The post later on was built on the heights. That was just a jungle at that time. And I went over there and stayed with the two doctors who had a reserve hospital as they called it--a sort of convalescent hospital--at the foot of a bluff, and the little

settlement of San-Juan, I think it' as called that. I had to go--I went all over the island. I went up on top - saw the guns that had been there when Dewey came into the harbor. Then I had to go to each island in turn and post one of my printed declarations of the government that it was taking over the whole place as a post. Now, the first big island was close to the main island of Corregidor. That was not difficult at all. But there was one out at sea-about--as I dimly recall six miles. I went out there in a sailing banca, that is, it had a bamboo log on one side to offset the pull of the sail on the other. That was quite a trip. If the weather turned on you, it was pretty bad. There was nothing out on this island. It was bare rock. I think this was El Monja--the Nun. And then I had to go to another island which was El Fraile.There was where the gun fired at Admiral Dewey get as he came in. It was very hard to even get on the island--to scale it--because the little blown-out gun platform was well above the water, but I got my card put up thee. And then El Karabao was right next to the Cavite shore. That was about twelve miles across, as I dimly recall from Corregidor. I went over there in my canoe and got caught in a pretty bad blow. But finally I got back to the main island of Corregidor safely. I know when I returned and made my report in Manila, they didn't pay very much attention to me--there was nothing much lower than a second lieutenant and I was about the junior second lieutenant in the Army at that time.

I remember when I came up from the provinces I had to turn in some money and I had it in a sock and the Chief Quartermaster was in a rage because the Filipino boy had thrown out his wastebasket to which he put his unfinished business, not realizing it was papers that were still in use. So he was just infuriated with this situation and I blew in with my sock of money, he pretty much took me apart. However, I found he was pretty agreeable in the end and sort of laughing at himself, and afterwards became Quartermaster of the Army--- [C. B.] Humphrey was his name. I always had an interest in him because of the way he blew up and then in the way he was nice to me later on. This money was to be turned in from my last post--Mangarin.

Now I want to make a jump back to Mangarin, because I went on several expeditions up in the mountains and managed to surprise a couple of Igorot camps or mountain men--I guess we called them. But they were very effeminate--very small and really quite effeminate, the men--the women even more so and rather attractive. And they wore beads around their ankles and beads around their wrists and on their arms and around their necks and anywhere you could

fasten a bead--and they were very much frightened. You had to be pretty careful to surprise them first or they would turn loose with poisoned arrows and other things like that because they had never seen a white man and they were rather fearful of the Filipinos of that section--the Tagalogs--because I believe they had been pretty hard on them at times and of course they had firearms and the Manguianes--is the right name for them--mountain people--Manguianes. I remember I did one thing there. I went on an expedition trying to get at this so-called white tribe. I left the boat with the two men on it--anchored well offshore so as they couldn't be surprised--at a small town well down to the south. We got through and turned back into the hills, surprising a couple of camps of Manguianes, trying to convince them that we meant them no harm. I remember finding five women without any stitch of clothing, not even a breechclout on any of them, in a little shelter that was made about three feet off the ground. Each one had a baby. And they were just frightened into frozen silence when I came up and I tried to give each one of them a present. I gave one of them a cigar and I gave one of them the band off the cigar. I don't remember what I dug up to give to the other three, but they were all after the band [of the cigar] --that was the most attractive thing of all--and that made me friendly--a friend of all of them.

Later I saw a number of them close to the ocean. We were trying to get down to our ship or sailboat and we had too many for the boat and we knocked a hole in the bottom on a submerged coral reef and we had quite a trying time getting back to our base which was a camp of these Manguianes on the seashore. We found they were trading with a Chinaman who had a large boat there, and that, of course, was against orders, because all the ports of Mindoro were closed. However, I didn't see fit to say anything about this because they were just trading with these Manguianes and they were not at war with anybody and had no bearing on the conduct of the Philippine insurrection. So we had to wait until the tide came in, in order to float our boat, which was aground. Finally, I went to sleep--I had a pretty tricky time with the men because they had no opportunities to see women practically at all. And here were these little Manguiane women, very attractive looking, certainly very attractive, in comparison to the one or two Tagalog women down near where our station was. I knew that that would stir up a great strife and I had to stay awake to watch that. Finally, I got the sergeant and told him to sit by me and stay awake while I slept. And when I woke up he had been asleep too. Fortunately, nothing

had occurred about the women and finally I thought it was time to get the boat off.

The tide had begun to come in, but it had not come in enough to clear the boat. And I got own into the water with three or four others and we cried to push the boat clear. The Chinaman was near me. He was pretty muscular. And in the water at three in the morning--on this night--I asked him (he spoke, finally he betrayed the fact he could speak English) and I asked him where in the world he had learned English. Here he was with this boat on this god-forsaken shore there, trying to trade with these people and running the risk of getting in trouble with the military, where did he learn his English. To my utter surprise, standing in water almost up to his chin, he said, "in Chicago." He had made his stake there and gone back to China and bought this boat and was getting himself established. And I was very much surprised. It seemed an impossible sort of situation.

I will tell a little bit more about that because we got the boat off and to get on we couldn't get below deck. Because it was loaded up to the guards and it had a lot of nipa, I guess you would call it, shingles for building, and you had to lie on top of these. We started out that night. I woke up--I have never been so cold in my life. I thought I would have inflammatory rheumatism the rest of my life. The men were all in a heap, hugging each other. I couldn't indulge in that heat propagating procedure and I just lay there and speculated on how much of an affair I would have in the way of inflammatory rheumatism. We came in close to a great cliff, sheer, and these members of the crew, stark naked, oh with a breechclout, would run along the side with long staffs and pole the boat clear of the sheer wall and we ran around this point in that way. It was a weird looking thing to see at night. Finally we got back and found our own boat--I might say that this was his, the Chinaman's boat, all the time that I had seized--and bade him farewell. And I didn't know as much about Chicago as he did.

6. Q. Frye mentions Padre Isidore Sanz and Edudardo Lualjadi as two people you met at this period. He adds: "it was a tragically lonely assignment. Marshall had to rely on the dubious pleasure of the company of Padre Sanz or more frequently on close application to the limited number of books he had brought with him. Of Padre Sanz, he says: "He could play cards, or strum the mandolin, or sing Spanish songs of bawdiness truly Rabelaisian."

A. You asked me in 6 about Padre Isidro Sanz. He lived with me--that is, he took his meals with me. I furnished the coffee and sugar and flour and things of that sort and he

furnished the vegetables--the frijole beans and all the things of that kind which he could get his hands on and I could not very well. I found him a very interesting character. Unfortunately, my Spanish was so limited at that time it was very difficult for me to communicate with him or he with me. But his conversation was very, very interesting. He had been out there, as I recall, at that time eighteen years. Also with us for awhile was Padre Feliz and had been out there twenty-five years. One had come from Granada and one from Seville. Padre Sanz was not quite the quality of priest that the other man was. Padre Sanz was, I think, more of a business priest and he was down there looking after their holdings on what had been a very large horse ranch. They had had as many as ten thousand horses there. But the insurrectos had gotten in there and taken a great many of them away.

Eduardo Lualjadi was quite an interesting character. He was back up the river there quite a ways--it was quite a trip to get to him. He was the most natural boss I have ever seen. He dominated everything around him. And I went to the wedding of the daughter and this thing lasted two or three days. It was what we say—*muy boracho* but it was intensely interesting. And I had to keep the peace or rather the goodwill of Eduardo for he was a very important influence in the country.

I don't remember the padre playing the mandolin. My predecessor--Stone-Edward R. Stone--spoke Spanish very fluently and he and the father got along much better than I did because their means of communications were so much more fluid.

7. Q. Mention is made of a desolate Christmas, 1902, at Mangarin Bay while you and a detachment of twenty-six waited for relief. However you went to Manila on December 30, 1902, in time to celebrate your birthday there.

A. You refer in 7 to Christmas Day affair. Actually--I don't know where Frye got hold of that--actually we had forgotten it was Christmas Day and it wasn't until about midday that we discovered we were dealing with Christmas Day. The only thing we could get was a pig we had raised--which was still young and tender-so we killed the pig and roasted it and all sat down together to our Christmas dinner. I have forgotten any details of it, but it was the best we could do on the occasion.

8A. Q. Some other things mentioned about the stay in the Philippines are: Your duties included inspection of the newly built Fort McKinley.

A. You refer in 8A to my inspection of the newly built McKinley. McKinley wasn't built at the time I went out there. As I recall we went over the ground of the site of McKinley and I had the battle, which had been fought right there, explained to me and we found the line of cartridges that hadn't been picked up--the brass shells which showed the line of the troops.

8B. Q. You had malaria for two weeks in September 1903. Quinine put you on your feet in time to take over from Captain Eames in October.

A. I had dengue fever on the way up to the island in the Laguna de Bay. But it only lasted about two weeks. Captain Eames had come and taken over the company when we were still down in Calapan. And we went up to this island, he got a transfer to the 10th Infantry and he and Mrs. Eames left.

8C. Q. March 1903 saw a plague of grasshoppers.

A. I remember the plague of grasshoppers that you refer to in C. I think we had several, but I know it was so dense that riding horseback I could hardly see--turn back and hardly see the tail of the horse in this flight of grasshoppers which destroyed the natives' crops almost completely.

8D. Q. In May 1903, 2500 nipa dwellings burned in Manila,

A. I don't remember about the burning of the nipa dwellings in Manila.

8E. Q. November 1903 you headed back to the United States on the *Sherman*.

A. I remember very distinctly coming back to the United States on the *Sherman* in 1903. I think we went through Nagasaki about early December. My recollection is that we rode in a typhoon practically for four or five days and I think one day we didn't make even a knot forward. It was very severe and the whole sick bay was washed off the boat. There were three of us in a very stuffy little cabin and it was very hard going. You couldn't get on deck at all and you couldn't put a fifth of the people in the lounge. But that's the way things went in those days.

My mind comes up to something that occurred not long before that which had a rather amusing occurrence. A doctor gave us all a dinner at the Extremania (no that was a delicatessen store)--some hotel there which was right near the upper bridge across the river and we had a private dining-room upstairs and there were about twelve or sixteen of us--

congenial people--and there was a big bay window with red curtains at the side, almost like a stage, and we were arranging a little operetta, as we called it. We had several musical members and one or two very attractive members and we arranged the footlights out of all the various condiment bottles on the table in front of this bay window. And right in the middle of the thing the police came in--these were Americans (the finest police force I ever laid my eyes on - they were selected from the volunteers that had been in the Philippines and that was the police force of Manila). They came in there because somebody had been dropping chairs out of the window two stories down on the people in the streets. We knew nothing about that till we found one of our members who hadn't participated in the play was very solemnly going around there--he was pretty tight--and dropping these chairs out the window. Well we were in Dutch with the cops then. However, our most attractive member persuaded the cop to take part in the play. So he remained up there and became one of the cast in this operetta we were doing (chuckle). During those days I didn't drink at all so I could register pretty much what was happening. But I remember that the gentleman was dropping the chairs out. Afterwards he was sort of Inspector General as we called him and he was investigating the case of a student officer at Benning. I was running the school then--two student officers-and they had done something semi-outrageous. And he came to me with his report and he was seeking my advice as to what we should, recommend be done to them. Well I was sort of modifying his recommendation--though I wanted the place straightened up all right--and he turned to me and said, "How can you pass by in that manner anything like this?" "Well," I said, "at least, so and so, they didn't drop any chairs out the window on the people in the street." (chuckles). He remembered for the first time some of his earlier performances in Manila. So the boys got off light.

I remember on the *Sherman* stopping in Honolulu. It was quite a different place from what I saw in later years. It was still a very quaint place. We were there about a day and a half. I will go to the finish of it first. When the time came to sail I had to go to the jail and I found sitting out in the courtyard of the jail almost half my company. They had all been locked up for what they had done. So I bailed them all out and they went back to the boat--better boys. Something else occurred there which made some impression on me but I have forgotten entirely what it was.

9A. Q. Do you have any general description or comments on the Philippine insurrection and the problems of dealing with it?

A. As to the Philippine insurrection under 9, I didn't know much about it. I only got into a little of it down south and that was mainly with the Ladrones--as they called them--up in the mountains and I didn't see the great land battles and that part. So when I got back to the States I was very much ashamed of myself because I knew so little about what had happened. And as I will explain later, I had gotten hold of all the records of the campaign in the Philippines because they had advised every officer that there were a lot of additional copies of that and if the officer wanted it just to put "yes" on the postcard, I put "yes" on the postcard and, as I recall, I got six mail sacks full of these books. But they proved invaluable to me. They were illustrated--they were all the telegrams and letters and reports and happenings of the campaign in the Philippines and the adjustments with Aguinaldo and matters of that sort. And I went through them all in great detail and I remember seeing a request from Funston when he landed in Vera Cruz that if anybody had any copies of these things please send them down there because there was the whole scheme of the build-up of civil government by an occupying military force from the time it had started with the occupation of Manila when the Spanish surrendered down to the final formal organization on a peaceful basis. I learned a great deal from this--I learned a great deal from it. For instance, here were little fights going on all over the place--so many lieutenants were commanding towns and the towns were being attacked--and the lieutenants were being sent out on expeditions. Well, it was very interesting to read the reports. One officer would make a great deal out of the thing. I remember distinctly one officer was reporting that he had three men wounded in this encounter and he had burnt the town down. And the general--Hughes, I think it was--returned this thing and said if the fight was no more severe than three men wounded, it hardly justified burning the whole town down. It showed how they are apt to get out of hand when they are on their own in critical situations. I know that near Manila a cathedral there that had what was considered to have the finest library east of the Suez and it was burned down. I got at the facts from the records and I found that some of the Americans had taken the robes of the priests and the silver services from the chancel and were exercising a dance outside. So, however quiet you may be in your home district when you

get abroad on a wartime basis under conditions that are extremely difficult of heat and everything of that sort, you are apt to do things that you would utterly discountenance at another time. And of course the discipline is very loose because these troops were very hastily organized and they were serving under most difficult and trying conditions. And on the other side they were having very horrible reactions to our prisoners by our opponents in some cases.

Generally speaking the feelings of the men--the officers--at this time, particularly in connection with the trial of officers for participating in what was called the "water cure." I found the feelings of the officers and all were very bitter against the civil authorities who were trying to build up under Taft the civil government. I think maybe the civil officials went too far too fast. However, though I think the feelings of the Army were naturally very bitter and I do not think they were justified. I think that's the reaction you will always have, but it is pretty hard to keep the military, who have suffered so much from these things, accepting all the overtures of peace we might call it. Although it wasn't a general peace and the civil commission who hasn't been involved in that was rather impatient with the troops as to their reaction, both sides are wrong. Both reactions are perfectly natural it needs a very tempered control to be exerted and I would say one of the best things would have been to discharge the fine officers that they had, knowing they were fine, and to have made them into these civil officials who were trying to establish civil government. Because they would have a much better understanding of the point of view which is pretty hard for the man who just comes out from the States--never gone through any of it - and now he comes into these fellows who have suffered the tortures of the damned, as it were, in so many way land have had such violence in the treatment by the enemy and all, which has provoked them to do things they shouldn't have done. It makes altogether a regrettable situation. However, when the smoke all cleared away the Army and the native leaders were very friendly and it wasn't until the civil control got fully into place and the political reactions began to stir up that the general bitterness developed.

9B. Q. Did you every meet Aguinaldo?

A. I did not meet Aguinaldo. I saw him once but I didn't meet him,

9C. Q. What did you learn from your first command?

A. I learnt many things from my first command. It is hard to tell which one it was.

I remember one (chuckles)--one affair--we worked out from Mangarin. Sailed around and landed some distance out and there was little barrios (tiny village). And we were going through that in order to get on firm land away from the swamps in order to get up in the mountains. And we found these people working on a pony. It developed that a crocodile had almost bitten off the hip of the pony, haunch, I guess you'd call it-and they were just sewing him up without any regard to the pony's feelings and that horrified the men. Right close by was this stream--rather narrow but deep and heavy brush on either side. And we went into this stream, single file. I had seven men--they were behind me--and they were holding their rifles up and their ammunition belts up to keep them clear from the water. When we got about two-thirds of the way across there was a splash up above us and one fellow yelled "crocodile." In about a second they all plunged ahead. They ran over me. I was ground right down to the bottom. And their feet went up my back and over me and up the other side. I finally came to the surface pretty well done up. And I was confronted then by a situation. These men had really panicked. The sight of the pony with its hip almost bitten off by the crocodile and the splash and then this yell "crocodile" in this stream had just upset them completely. And they had not intentionally--but had completely--gone over me and I was ground right down in the bottom. I did some very fast thinking fortunately, and I got to the surface and then I went up the steep bank where the seven men were standing there and looking very guilty and very uncertain of themselves. All the time I was thinking, so when I got up to the top, I took my position in front of them--wet and covered with mud--and fell them in very formally. I then gave them "right shoulder arms" --faced them to the right and marched them down into the stream and clear to the other side. And as they reached the other bank, I gave them "to the rear, march." And they came back up out of the crocodile stream. Then halted them--faced them toward me--inspected their guns--and then gave them "fall out." Then we started on our excursion up into the mountains there trying to find this insurrecto holdout. They never referred to it. I never referred to it. I thought afterwards that I had done what I think was just about the right thing. It wasn't the time for cussing around.

9D. Q. Do you have any comments on our early occupation and governing of the Philippines?

A. I have no comment to make on the early occupation of the Philippines. My

Lord, I was just a second lieutenant with an extremely, extremely limited observation. I got most of mine by reading--which all occurred after that particular time. As a matter of fact it occurred after I got back home because I didn't get these books till then. Then I went back to the Philippines ten years later and went over battlefields and went into the entire history of the affair from the time of the occupation of Manila down to the final capture of Aguinaldo.

9E. Q. What was Army life like at this time?

A. Army Life at this time was diversified to put it mildly. There were all sorts and conditions of fellows. The Army had to be virtually re-made. Officers had been very hurriedly made; they had been made from the ranks largely. They were disciplined and undisciplined. They were on their own--irresponsible--some of them doing magnificent work and receiving no appreciation for it. Altogether it was quite a trying period. (Aside to someone—do you want to be recorded here?)

9F. Q. What type of soldier did you have then?

A. It takes a while to boil down and refine such a force: It invariably occurs. Nobody thinks it is possible at the start. What they were all looking at--old Army as it were with the type of officer and type of discipline and non-commissioned officer that existed in 1897--that had gone through the Indian campaign and out in the West. It was a long time before this new Army with all of the new blood that had been taken into it-all of the volunteers that had been given commissions and the exciting-things that had happened were absorbed and boiled down. For example, here I was straight from civil life--no school of any kind--no preparation of any kind--and I was virtually the governor of the southern end of the island of Mindoro at that time. I didn't even have enough blank forms to make out the returns. Because those that were in existence there had all been in a barrel and were ruined by a typhoon and I had to make up some blank forms that I had never seen before and they were a curiosity. But I finally whittled out. - But as I say, here I was from civil life--the only traditions I had were from the V.M.I. And, of course, they were very helpful there because I had some basis to go on. But the other takes quite a while in refining.

9G. Q. Any general comments on this phase of your life not covered by questions?

A. I will give you a few little examples to show you how curious the set-up was. When

we got up to Santa Mesa, five miles--eight miles--outside the city of Manila--as I say I was not doing any drinking and I had my ankle very badly sprained or fractured by a horse rolling on it--which confined me to my quarters in this place where there were about twelve or more officers--sometimes it went up to twenty I know. We had our mess there and all lived there. And some very, very hard drinking. Now they couldn't go home--this was during the demobilization of the Army--they couldn't go home until their papers were cleared. Inspector would come out--he was later my colonel at Fort Reno, Oklahoma. He would come out to try to straighten this up. Well it was pretty hopeless. Some of these fellows had great influence in civil life and to put it politely they didn't give a damn. They made little effort to get their papers cleared and they couldn't have cleared them by themselves to save their necks because they so smeared the thing up that it was very, very hard to get the straight of the affair. And each one was always accountable for property. One officer-this came later--he had gotten a commission in the Regular Service. He had been a captain of volunteers, and when he struck Seattle he had just left the ship--he was responsible for the ship--he was quartermaster of the ship--and went off and caught up with his regiment and went in the parades in Seattle and its entrainment for back home. Then he accepted a first lieutenancy in the Army and got back out to the Philippines and he came to me in great distress. He had a letter from the Quartermaster General. In going through this record they found that the man that--he had left all the things on the ship like the chairs, silverware, and cooking utensils--everything on the ship was listed--and he had gone off and left it all. And of course they had just socked it up--I don't mean they sold it--but they just got ahead that much so they would never get caught short themselves. He was responsible for it all and he couldn't get his finger on a piece of it. And of course he was just chained to the Philippines until he cleared himself. Well we had things like that all the time. We had one fellow who was the son of a very important man in the railroad world and he had just done ducks and drakes with everything. And he was intoxicated a good bit of the time and his papers were almost impossible to put together.

Well, in any event, this Colonel of the Inspector General's department would come out to see if these men could clear themselves so they could go home. Well, finally he quit sending for them. He just sent for me--I was right in the building—I was lame and on

crutches. And he and I would work out what this thing was and find out whether the man could go home or not. I became quite an expert on papers at that time. I knew more about them I guess than anybody else around there but the inspector. It helped me a great deal in later years with that sort of thing. But it was a most disorganizing affair. It seemed rather odd. I was the junior officer. The Inspector would come out from Manila--this very dignified colonel- and he would send for me and I would come in on my crutches. And he would say, “Bring me the papers of these fellows.” And I would bring them to the dining table and sit down there, and he and I would sit down and work on these things pretty much all day. And maybe he could clear some and maybe he couldn't.

9E. A. I have been explaining a, good bit of what Army life was like at this time. I don't think there is anything more I could add.

9F. A. I have said a good bit about the soldiers of this time. They were--there some of the old soldiers there. But most of them were fellows that had been enlisted very hurriedly and not at all like a citizen army. As I said, my company was largely enlisted across the tracks there in Columbus, Ohio, across the tracks meaning in the toughest place of town.

9G. I don't know anything I could add there. I went about and did my business. I had some very good friends. I had a sense of humor which helped me very frequently.

1A. Q. Frye mentions your assignment to Fort Reno in November 1903. He notes your lecture to troops on proper relations with Negro troops stationed nearby.

A. Fort Reno. We arrived there a few days after Christmas in 1903. We had our Christmas Eve party in the Harvey Restaurant at Omaha, Nebraska, and the waitresses stayed away from a party of theirs to wait on us and all danced with us later. Christmas Day party--I think it was Christmas Day--I can't remember. I know we all were guests of the manager of one of the Harvey eating houses and we got him to include all the waitresses and they sat at the table with us. And we had a very gay party and a very good meal.

Fort Reno was quite another thing. It was a very old frontier post. I used to like to look in the little cemetery and find that this grave was a man that had been killed at the battle of Turkey Creek and so on. And there were all the wives: here lays the wife of so and so--who was a very famous scout, very stunning looking man--he had four wives there. The surroundings were attractive. The reservation was about sixteen miles square and was next to the Cheyenne

and Arapahoe Reservation--two Indians--right across the river from us. And the hunting was superb. We went shooting almost every day of the year for something or other. We started up our first garrison schools down there and you might say my formal military education began at that time. The schools didn't amount to very much.

IC. Q. In the summer of 1905 you headed a four-months mapping project at Fort Clark, Texas.

A. I was sent down to Texas to the headquarters of the 1st Cavalry--Fort Clark, Texas--to map about two thousand square miles--I think that was it—along the Rio Grande and Devil's River out from Del Rio towards Sanderson, Texas. This was the hardest service I ever had in the Army. The thermometer would go up to 130. And I had to walk the track and count the rails. That gave me an exact measurement which I needed as a sort of base line. I got my distances otherwise from the odometer on the wheel of the wagon and from the time scale on the walking of my horse. It was a very trying life. I remember I mould have the effect of too much acidity from the bacon and no fresh vegetables of any kind and heartburn so badly that I could barely drink without gasping. As I recall, I went in there weighing about 165 or 170 and I came out weighing 132 pounds. A great many things happened there but I don't think they add to this tale. This required in a sense-more leadership on my part than almost anything else because it was all hard going and at times rather dangerous going. I remember one stretch there--the old packer and myself--were without water for eighteen hours and had to travel pretty nearly fifty miles. This was an endurance contest of the first class.

Here I saw for the first time the officer whom I succeeded as Chief of Staff-Malin Craig. He was captain of a company and I was using two of his horses on this trip. I had a heterogeneous costume of an old Panama hat which a mule had bitten the top out of and I tried to sew it together and I was burnt almost black and when the Sergeant took in the horses, Captain Craig met him and the Sergeant wanted him to talk to me and Craig wouldn't look at me--he didn't think I could be an officer--and he talked entirely to my old Sergeant who was a very fine character, with a long cavalry moustache drooping at the sides and he was about--I think--he was in his 27th year of service. This, as I have said, was a very difficult period and tried me out more in the handling of men as to my judgment than anything else.

9D. Q. At end of January, 1906 you commanded Co G, 30th Infantry, for awhile. Then

became Post Quartermaster and Commissary officer.

A. I did have Company G at Fort Reno and I was at the same time Post Quartermaster and Commissary Officer. This was a very trying period because the commanding officer was exceedingly difficult and he made me his adjutant and altogether that was rather hard going. It turned out all right, but it required very careful handling on my part--which was part of the Army experience. Of course, we went shooting all the time. There was shooting every day of the year there of one kind or another. At that time I was a pretty good shot and we would go out and camp ten days on Indian Reservation right next to the river. We would get channel cat, which is very good eating, in the river. I shot ducks that would fall on the tents. I remember on one occasion Mrs. Marshall and I were early for breakfast and we heard quail calling in a little sumac grove near us and I went out there. In about-thirty minutes I came back for breakfast and I had ten or twelve quail. Actually, I think I had fifteen but I don't want to claim that.

I (a). Q. What were some of the things of this period which impressed you most?

A. I couldn't--as to A--I couldn't say what things impressed me most. The main thing was I had a very difficult job and there wasn't very much understanding of it by the junior officer--not in age but in rank--at Headquarters who handled that sort of thing and it made it very difficult for the young officer out in the field. But it was part of the game and it was a great lesson to me and a very valuable one.

I(b) Q. What were living conditions like on an Army post then?

A. Living conditions on the post at that time were very pleasant if you could get a servant. I finally got hold of a fine girl from Canada. She was the daughter of a deceased enlisted man and her mother dwelt on what we-called Soapsuds Row at that time in the post. We paid her way back from Canada and she stayed with us for years. And was with us quite a while at Fort Leavenworth and we were very fond of her. Later on I saw her after the First World War, and she was the wife of a major who started off as a non-commissioned officer. I think he was a temporary major.

I(c) Q. What were some of the things you learned during this period that affected your later ideas?

A. You asked me what were some of the things that I learned at that time. There were so many things in all these things--there was a continual picking up of things and I

was rather given to analysis as to why and wherefore and so on--which unconsciously in the end was rather helpful.

I(d) Q. Did you meet any of the people during this period who were to work with you during the war?

A. Yes, I met some people during this period that I was to work with afterwards in the first war, but at Fort Reno almost none.

I(e) Q. Problems which army wives faced in those days?

A., An Army wife in those days had to face a great deal. If she could get a hold of a servant she was in luck. But the pay was very slender. I had an account book that I kept at that time. Because it was the only time I ever kept an account like that--but my pay was so limited, I had to watch every cent. Some of the things I think would be very interesting. I can remember very well two or three that always amused my wife in later years. A spring hat was $3.50. And the spring suit was $14. I can remember that quite well. I had to keep track of it down to the last dime. My struggle was to come out ahead. I really wasn't so much interested in whether it was $1.50 or $10.50 ahead for the month but it was to be ahead and not to getting behind. I always struggled in those days to have a month's pay ahead and I lived on that month rather than on the pay I was getting for the immediate month I was living in. I also would try to have a sum on hand which was equivalent of the cost of moving. In those days, you see the Government didn't move our wives or families and we got a very limited allowance for packing our things up. And we had to pack them ourselves and get things ourselves and get hold of the lumber ourselves or you were stuck. What the Army gets now, would have seemed very wonderful in those days. But, we got literally nothing. You see we had no representation by vote. A citizen army can vote and can get the attention of the Press and the attention of Congress in a moment. An army such as I served in then-the President wasn't interested in it -the Congress wasn't interested in it,-except to keep down the appropriation as closely as they could. It was not what we would call a citizen army. That has great political power. And we have seen the manifestations of it in one way or another.

My finish at Fort Reno occurred at the time the command moved to Fort Leavenworth for maneuvers. I was left in charge of the post, I was the only officer. I think there must have

been--no we had no doctor--we had a contract surgeon--a man who came from town to serve the garrison--on a contract basis. Some things were amusing and others very difficult. The women would all flock to me for this, that and the other thing. I remember I would go down the front line and a woman would come up and ask me to do something for her house. I had found a lot of white lead so I would always offer to paint her bath room white but that was the best I could do. And she would generally accept that. I would make her promise not to tell the women and then I would paint the next lady's bathroom white.

But the most enjoyable part of the thing was I went along what's called Soapsuds Row in the old days. And the houses were just little shacks and they were in dreadful condition. And the yards were just bare sand or clay--most unattractive-most unappealing. And I went by one woman's house and she came out to me--she was a sergeant's wife--and he was away at Fort Leavenworth—Fort Riley, I should have said all the time. That's where the maneuvers were. And she wanted me to do something for her.

[Second side ends at 758. As I recall he finished this story on the next recording several days later].

TAPE 5M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

April 4, 1957

FORT LEAVENWORTH, FORT LOGAN H. ROOTS, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
AIDE TO GENERAL BELL

RECORDED INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
PINEHURST, N. C. April 4, 1957

(in answer to questions of F.C. Pogue. Sgt William Heffner ran the machine.)

This is a continuation of Fort Reno where I stopped in the middle of answering E of the last section.

I was describing some affairs with Army wives at Reno and I think I was on the question of the period that I was left alone there in command while the troops went on to Fort Riley. Anyway, all the women would waylay me as I went to the office--to do, this and that for them. I had very little I could do either this or that with, but I had found in one of the storage stables a lot of white lead. My favorite reply was I can't do that for you, but I will paint you bathroom white. However, I think at the time I stopped the other day I was in the business of telling something about Soapsuds Row where these soldiers' wives lived--or soldiers' widows--and the houses were very poorly constructed and in perfectly miserable, outrageous repair. Apparently nothing was ever done for them. I doubt if the house itself was on the records of the post. Anyway, I came along one day, walking down Soapsuds Row in a routine inspection of the post – and this wife waylaid me and asked me if I couldn't do something for her kitchen. I do not remember what the trouble was, but there was something very bad and of course the entire house was in a very sad state of repair. Her yard was of beaten-down clay and there were tin cans and other trash things scattered about. An idea struck me and I made a proposition to the lady. I told her, "If you fix your yard up and make it look like something I'll fix your house up. And I'll come back here in about two weeks. But I will have this immediate repair done that you are

speaking about in your kitchen sink." So when I came back two weeks later, she had cleaned up her yard, she had made pots out of tin cans which she had painted green and she had really transformed the place and had done a fine job. And she was very much concerned with what I was going to say. So I looked it over very carefully--and I am quite susceptible to that kind of performance of gardening as it were--and I congratulated her and went into the house to see what was to be done. I had also found that I had a Muresco--quite a few cans of it. And I told her, "Now I tell you, I can Muresco your walls and improve the appearance of the inside of the house quite a lot." Well, she was most enthusiastic. So I sent the painter over to her house with these sample colors of Muresco for her to pick out what colors she wanted. Well, the way those are put up you dilute them. For instance, if you have a blue, the basic color in the can--the powder--would be an intense blue--the kind that stands out from the wall and you would dilute, I suppose, about ten times to get the color of blue you would want. The painter came to me in some concern and said she wanted these things done in the original intensity of the powder--the basic color--and it was going to be terrific in color. For instance, she wanted her living room red. Well it is very hot down there in the summer, and this red was just like lighting a fire. The blue was the kind that created a haze in the room unless it was diluted. I told him, "Now she has never had anything of this kind in her life before. And she did for me--she fixed her garden and all--and it's already having an effect on the other gardens--the other women are at work. You give her just the color she wants--however unfortunate it is." After he had finished it, he begged me to come over and see it. Well, actually when you opened up the front door of the room, the living room almost knocked you down. It was an intense red, just a terrible red. And the kitchen was this vivid blue. She was just pleased to death, and all the other women were coming there to see this to find if they could have something like that too. But I've always remembered the original colors that she did her house in. And she certainly got a dose of it when she finally went after it. Anyway, all the other women down the line started to fixing up their lawns. And it reminded me very much of a story in the *Saturday Evening Post* last week, where I think the title was (maybe it was the *Readers Digest)* that Beauty Develops Itself--or something of that sort. Anyway they took one little section of town--the Garden Club--and fixed that up, window boxes and things of that sort, and all

over that section others began to do the some thing. Anyway, that was one of my experiences in command at Fort Reno.

2a. Q. You went to Fort Leavenworth in June 1906 with an excellent recommendation from Major Abercrombie, your commanding officer at Fort Reno.

A. I do not remember the recommendation from Major Abercrombie. I do remember that we had had a competition in the Post School for the Leavenworth detail and I had come out [No.] one [for] two years, but I was never given it. It always went to some higher ranking officer, none of whom did at all well, and all of whom came back with many criticisms and attacks on the Leavenworth procedure. The third year nobody put in for it and they sent a list around later on account of an inquiry from regimental headquarters and it developed afterwards that I was the only one that put down "yes" that I wanted to go and therefore I got the detail. And that's the way I went to Leavenworth. I remember particularly my shock when I reached Leavenworth and we were in the business of selecting quarters, but in the meantime we lived in whatever temporary assignment we had and I was with a fellow from the 1st Cavalry. Well their candidate had been either first or second for three or four years and I discovered to my horror that this man had been coached for a year. He had been sent all the material of his predecessor at Leavenworth and he was very well prepared I'd never heard of such a thing and the first tactical problem--and the tactical problem he was working on--he asked me a question about. It developed I had never seen a tactical problem before yet he had solved or gone over every one of the previous year. And I wondered what was going to become of me without any preparation of any kind. But it was a rather dismal performance by the Colonel of the regiment to send a man there without any opportunity to prepare himself in any way. I discovered, on the other hand, that most of the cavalry regiments did this and the stand of their men was very pronounced. And as I recall afterwards, I heard that when they were debating about an increase of the cavalry of the infantry it was said in the War Department by the cavalry members of the permanent staff there that the stand of the infantrymen at Leavenworth showed that they didn't have the gray matter all that was desirable and the cavalry was very much ahead of them. All of which came back apparently from this fact that they were in no way prepared while the others were coached and carefully selected.

2b. Q. Frye speaks of the work of General Bell in attempting to develop an intellectual center at Leavenworth.

A. General Bell made a tremendous effort to develop Leavenworth--first while he was commandant and later while he was Chief of Staff. He was opposed in a great deal of this and it was called "Bell's Folly." It was made fun of and I finally remember that there, was an attack on it which got into Congress and that we were, I say we, I was not involved in that, they were developing the German system when the French system was much better. And therefore that came in for a few comments by those who wanted to attack General Bell and many older officers of the Army who were very critical of him because of his activity and his feeling that all the officers should be very highly educated which was not the case at that time. And until Leavenworth built up, West Point was supposed to be, in a sense, the end of your technical military education. When, as a matter of fact, it was hardly high school as compared to the rest.

2c. Q. Mention is made of Major John Morrison, Colonel Arthur Wagner, Major Eben Swift, Captain Thayer.

A. General Morrison came to Leavenworth as a major and was an assistant professor in the military art or tactical department. Another officer was the head of that and who didn't think very much of Morrison. The students all took to Morrison immediately and he spoke a language that was new to us and appealed very much to our common sense. He was a self-prepared officer. He had studied everything he could find, German and French, and I might say that they had the systems at that time, whereas we in our country had none.

Colonel Arthur Wagner was a War Department officer who tried to develop military preparation above the West Point courses and was very much ridiculed. He wrote one or two books and that damned him as being an impractical sort of an officer. All of which was quite outrageous as a matter of truth. But the opposition to any studious preparation of the older officers was very, very decided. They were particularly critical of Wagner and very, very hostile to all General Bell's proposals regarding Leavenworth.

Major Eben Swift was a cavalry officer of some standing as was Captain Thayer. They were instructors at Leavenworth when I went there and had quite outstanding reputations.

2d. Q. Classmates mentioned are Lt. Charles Herron, John L. Dewitt, 'Stephen' O.

Fuqua.

A. You mentioned several classmates of mine. Herron became a Lieutenant General. He commanded out at Hawaii towards the end of his career. DeWitt became the Quartermaster General of the Army. And before that he was the G-4 or great supplier of the Army that fought the great Meuse-Argonne battle. He was a very fine fellow. And later on, under me, he commanded the territory of Alaska and the West Coast from Mexico north to Seattle. That was during the war. Fuqua became was quite a friend of mine. And he noticed in some place in some of these he was carried as Chief of Staff of the 1st Division at the start. He was not Chief of Staff of the 1st Division until almost the end of the active fighting. Campbell King was once Chief of Staff and I was briefly Chief of Staff. Hanson Ely was Chief of Staff. Fuqua, I think was first under me at Army Headquarters. I was chief of operations and he was in the troop movement section of that division of my staff at Army Headquarters during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne battles. Later on, he became Chief of Staff of the 1st Division and I released him from Army Headquarters in order to give him a chance and then he went on from that to become Chief of Infantry--an officer of considerable prominence.

2e. Q. You were first in the School of the Line, so were sent on to the Staff College in 1907 where you finished first in June 1908.

A. Your comment on the fact that I was in the School of the Line. I think it was called the Infantry and Cavalry School the last year I was there and it included Artillery and Engineers and Signal Corps as well as Infantry and Cavalry. The name changed I think the second year I was there when I was a member of the Staff College.

The Staff College was obtained at that time out of about one hundred and some odd that were in the School of the Line--the first twenty-four were in the Staff College. And that made a tremendous competition to be in the first twenty-four. Later on the criticisms were so severe, so continuous as to the course was [being] too stiff, the requirements were too exacting, that they cut down on the marking procedure and also on the course which I always thought was a great mistake.

The time I was at Leavenworth it was going through a considerable change. They were in a sense finding themselves. Some of the outcomes were very interesting. I was

there two years as a student, first in the School of the Line and then in the Staff College and then I was an instructor for two years. Incidentally, I was the only lieutenant in the school at that time and it made it a little ticklish, but they all became my warm friends. The great majority I think of the division commanders in the First World War were there as students when I was an instructor.

Anyway, as the school developed, getting more practical all the time, it was a very interesting procedure. The competition was intense, but I always felt it was a good thing, because the officer that under a strain got rattled did exactly the same thing when they got into battle. I spoke of the difficulty about the courses that we were rather following the German model--were using the German maps--particularly around Metz. The reason was that we had no maps of our own suited to these problems. The problems as drawn up based on a German map--the Metz map most of the time. Therefore, the criticism of those who were against any education that caused you to have to study after you got your commission, and those that were critical of General Bell's efforts to advance the School and those who were just criticized on the general principle that if you did it you were wrong and, therefore it shouldn't be German, it should be French or something of that sort.

The only textbooks we had on any of these problems, which was a series of problems, were in German and based on the Metz map--Griepenkerl's it was called--by a Colonel Griepenkerl--problem after problem--and these were used in the school. We became as familiar with this map, very much more so than any map I ever knew in this country, we just knew every detail of it. Because the competition was very intense, and we worked at it very, very hard. So we became intimately familiar with every detail of these maps around Metz. Of course, the great battle of Gravelotte was fought on the Metz map--on the ground represented on the Metz map--and the later operations around Metz itself were on ground represented on the some map. I'm speaking now of the war of 1870-71 when the French were so terrifically defeated.

Well several things came up that harked back to those days, very decidedly during the war. In the first place, all these fellows became very intimately acquainted or associated with each other and in a sense fond of each other. It was like a college spirit only more intense because you were involved in struggles of your real career and a lot of

them would go through these same problems each year and of the Griepenkerl book until we actually finally prepared our own books--having had the Geological Survey make very complete maps around--Metz and later around Gettysburg.

Well when I was over in the war [W.W.I.] I was visiting two or three divisions to see if they were prepared to make the preliminary move out of the St. Mihiel action to the Meuse-Argonne which was being prepared for at that time in the midst of the action of St. Mihiel. And it presented very complicated conditions, because we had to take troops out of a going battle, cross them over the rear zone, tremendously active, of a going battle and move them up into the Meuse-Argonne sector, which is north of Bar-le-Duc and Souilly. The famous French headquarters during the battle of Verdun, was in the center, and the great road through Souilly, which was called the Sacra Via, because the eventual successful defense against the Germans in the famous Verdun attack was attributed to the fact that this road was so run that it handled this immense traffic of supplies and troops, etc., that went on at the time. Well, as I said before, I was visiting two or three divisions who had received, orders - preparatory orders-for this move, and I was checking up on what they had gotten and what they were preparing to do. I came to one division whose chief of staff became a very famous officer in the Army later--and a division commander in that war and a major general, Preston Brown. He was famous not only for his efficiency and his vigor but for his amusing comments which sometimes took the hide off. I had persuaded him to go to Leavenworth-- he was very contemptuous of it. We had met together at one of these shoots at the great target range at Camp Perry in Ohio and I enthused him with the idea of going there--and he put in for it. As he came out either one or two in the course he did very well--and marked the beginning of his great progression in the Army, which eventually came out to command a division in the Meuse-Argonne battle. I met him as Chief of Staff of this division. He was over on the right flank of the Army, not so far from Metz, which was in German hands. So he immediately took me up on the hill and had me look through the telescope range observation scope at a certain woods and he wanted to know what woods that was. And I said I didn't know. Then he allowed me to look at the map. And it was the Denkmal (no Denkmal is a monument). It was the Hospital Woods, Hopital Wald. Well, I said, “What do

you want me to look at that for?" "Well," he said, "they cut me about twenty times on that damned, woods, so every time I get sore I turn the artillery on it." I said "You have the privilege of firing two regiments of artillery on that woods now if you want to get any diversion and any revenge from your troubles at Leavenworth from the Metz map of Griepenkerl." So he did fire a regiment momentarily, very briefly, on the Hopital Wald. Well, all these places were familiar to us and we were coming right into them. Well, finally came the great concentration for the Meuse-Argonne. And as I say it went across the rear zone of the St Mihiel battle and then cut up towards the Meuse-Argonne front. When I went to work on this troop movement, it was one of the most difficult ones I have ever heard of in military performance prior to the great rush across Europe in the last war. I found that I was familiar with the names of practically every village and every city, more so almost than the little villages near my home. Because they were all on these Griepenkerl maps and had all been involved in Griepenkerl problems and were right in the track of these great moves we were making towards the Meuse-Argonne front. It seemed rather a commentary on the fact that we, were being criticized--even in Congress--for using German maps and all when it developed afterwards they were most useful to us in our being familiarized with the very ground we were going to fight over.

There was another interesting thing came up in connection with this battle. I was always interested in the fact that Sheridan-- Philip Sheridan--was sent over there as an observer. Being a famous cavalry leader really being the creator of the new cavalry tactics, he was greeted with very great consideration by the Germans. And he joined the German army in the preliminary phase before the battle of Gravelotte. It was the phase that involved the great cavalry action. And the officer who was looking out for him was the famous--well I guess he was the foreign--I don't know whether he was foreign minister or secretary of state or what he was I will remember his name a little later--but he was the leading character in this that was not the straight military commander. So he took Sheridan with him in his carriage. And he saw the preliminary movements for the transfer of the army that was going up to capture the French army at Verdun--no not Verdun--well it was the scene of the French army's surrender and that of the Emperor Napoleon III. So they first went a little east down, to the river and then back up along the road which led from

Metz right across that section of France that we were in through Bar-le-Duc and on to Paris. In the description that Sheridan gives, he is very detailed about parts of it. And it was very interesting to me for that reason because I was here on the ground in a war which involved that same territory. Commercy was the principal city before they got to Bar-le-Duc. I could really pick out the house that Sheridan stayed in with his distinguished host there in Commercy. He described the movement into Bar-le-Duc when they were going due-west and then the turn there when they turned to the north and headed up to what later on became the Meuse-Argonne field. He got on a balcony and watched the Bavarians come into the town and turn north there heading up towards what was to be the Meuse-Argonne front and then he and his host, and they were, following in the wake of King William, went up the road in that direction. When they got pretty well up almost to the Meuse-Argonne Forest, they learnt that some French troops had been surprised in their bivouacs well to the north. So Sheridan got permission to go off with this clump of staff officers who were going up that way. So he gives quite a description of that. And they came up to a certain forest--I have forgotten, I think it was Dieulot or something. I have forgotten the rest of it, and they went through this woods which was littered up with this war paraphernalia which had been cast loose and they came out of the woods and looked down into this valley where there was a little town down there. And it was in that town that the Germans had surprised the French literally in their billets, though some of them were, bivouacked outside. And this division that was surprised was pretty well destroyed or captured. (Beaumont I think was the name of the town). Well I tell this because in the Meuse-Argonne battle through this same forest (the forest of Dieullet or something like that) our 2nd Division pushed ahead through this narrow road through the forest and came out on this same hillside looking down on the village of Beaumont and captured German officers literally in their billets. They also went on to the river, turned north and paralleled the river bank (or northwest) and came out in high competition with the 42nd division at the capturing of the fords which led over to the village where the Emperor Napoleon III was made a prisoner himself. Now the remarkable part about this to me was that in the first case it was a German army, coming from Germany, pursuing a French army retreating and heading up north--towards the French army which was deployed to the north--and the early

surprise action occurred in the vicinity of this village of Beaumont. Now here again, generations later you find an American army going over this same route, moving west, pursuing a German Army and up through the same woods to surprise part of it In the same village of Beaumont. I thought it was a very remarkable historical repetition but in reverse of the troop setup. Here the Germans were retreating and the Americans were pursuing--it would have been the French if the French had been there, but they weren't there. The-capture--the surprise--occurred in the same identical place. So that it's pretty hard to tell in war what is going to happen next and its well to be prepared in any direction.

Leavenworth was immensely instructive. Not so much because the course was perfect -- because it was not--but the associations with the officers, the reading and discussion we did and the leadership, though he was put in a minor capacity, of a man like Morrison, had a tremendous effect, certainty on me, and I think on most of my class in those days when I was in the Staff College in particular. I know I was a little bit discouraged at the start--I hadn't any preparation. I found these other fellows had copies of all the problems of the previous years. I, myself, had never seen a tactical problem of that nature and I had it all to do. And so I knew I would have to study harder than I had ever dreamed of studying before in my life. And I just worked day and night. My great trouble was going to sleep at night. And I remember I used to get up and shine my boots in order to wake up. So I had very, very shiny boots at that early period. I finally got into the habit of study, which I never really had had, but I revived what little I had carried with me out of college and I became pretty automatic at the business. It worked out all right because in the end I came out number one, but as I say I was discouraged because I found in the library early in the course, back in the first week or two before we had gotten started and anybody had seen any of the marks and some of my classmates had been cogitating about, as they were bound to do, as to who would make the Staff Class, who would be of the fortunate twenty-four who stayed another year. That was very important because you couldn't go to the War College in Washington unless you completed that second year. And you couldn't complete the second year unless you made it by contest and became one of the fortunate twenty-four. (I lost the trail of thought momentarily).

I taught myself to study very, very hard and I took nothing for granted. If it was a

simple statement I memorized the statement. I just kept at it in the hardest possible way. It was the hardest work I ever did in my life. When you solved the problem they marked in tenths and hundredths--percentage carried out to that decimal point. We went through five different tests in the first few weeks, all very simple things in a sense. I developed a position which put me in another light to my classmates who had left me out entirely of the estimate of who was going to be in the next year's Staff Class, by coming out one, as I recall, in the first five subjects.

2f. Q. In 1908 you began a three year assignment as instructor in the Engineering Department at Leavenworth. Captain Cole, Captain Sherrill and Captain Eames were some of the other instructors. Lt. Walter Krueger taught German then, as did a Sergeant Bell.

Students included Captain-George Van Horn Moseley and Captain William Mitchell. Another was Captain John M. Palmer. (Most of your students were senior to you).

A. The names you mention are all familiar to me. Captain Coles was the engineering instructor. Sherrill was an assistant instructor and Captain Eames was Later, l became one of the engineering instructors.--.And also I had a little of the military, art part. Krueger was in the Staff College when went in the School of the Line and I did not recall that he was teaching German then. I knew he was translating. In the class succeeding me was Moseley and Billy Mitchell and John Palmer and a number of other men who reached great prominence in the First World War. The chief of staff of the AEF succeeding Harbord was of this number--either in that class or the class following. In other words he was a student officer and stood one. I think of the 29 combat division commanders that got into action in France, some 26 or 27 were graduates of Leavenworth during this period. That can be checked up on maybe it’s too many--I don't know. But, of course, what happened was these older officers saw the light and applied to go when other officers were super critical of Leavenworth and didn't go. The result was those older officers that went received preferment in the assignments and, as I say a large number of them commanded the divisions. The chief of staff of the AEF came out of this class and at one time four out of five assistant chiefs of staff were all Leavenworth men of my day.

You use the expression "most of my students were senior to me." I think they were

all senior to me. I think I was the only lieutenant in the school.

2g. Q. You were associate editor of the Infantry Journal.

A. There came a period there when I was chosen as associate editor of the Infantry Journal. I took a great interest in the work. I learnt quite a bit about the thing trying to do it and I also came into association with a very splendid officer, George Shelton, who died rather early in his army career.

2i. Q. Frye says you had little social life in this period, but hunted some and went riding.

A. Frye's comment on social life is fairly correct. As an instructor I went out to some of the dances and saw people around. I was not working at night like I was before, but most of the profit to me came out of my associations with these and also out of experience in dealing with these older officers with whom I am happy to say I got along with very well. I did some hunting--as much as I could find a place to hunt. I had a hunting dog with me to which we were very much devoted. I rode practically every day. I remember I bought a horse--young horse--and trained it. I wanted to learn how to do that. That occupied a great deal of my time, of course particularly in the riding hall, which I didn't like very much, but I undertook to try to train the horse and he was one of the kind that has the light colored mane and tail. I have forgotten the name of that but you will know what they are.

2j. . Q. Comments on National Guards in Massachusetts and New York.

A. We were sent off to National Guard camps during the summer and we were encouraged in trying to develop them into the business of having maneuvers, all thought they had to be very brief, of course. Out of that grew up an association with me from Leavenworth in the Pennsylvania National Guard. That was my state but the association came entirely from my being suggested by the Chief of Staff--General Bell--and sent to them in the summer. Later on they consulted me on these things and had me try to pick out the officers to go and to decide on the program to be followed, which took us to Gettysburg and back to Mt. Gretna and places like that, which built up very agreeable associations for me and also a very valuable one because I could try all these things experimentally on these Pennsylvania fellows and they didn't always know I was trying. 'The same thing happened up in Massachusetts. I went up to the 1st Corps of Cadets up the

first and then to the 2nd Infantry at Framingham. They treated me splendidly and I got a great deal of interest and a great deal of experience out of it and improvement in such matters. Because here I had a chance to plan and to do things I would have no opportunity to do at all in the ordinary regular garrison with my lack of rank. I went to Massachusetts as a special instructor, I think, two or three times and finally was taken over to New York and developed the plans for the Connecticut maneuver campaign--which involved quite a large body of troops--I think in the neighborhood of about 25,000 or 30,000. I had to plan the maneuver and everything connected with it and still was tied down to the necessity of having very short marches--in the early days with the National Guard four miles a day I think was the first march Even that took the blisters on all the feet. But it made it very hard to get a tactical problem that was logical with these restrictions in distances. But that was the way it had to be done and ought to be done. Because you can't take a man from behind the counter in a store and put him in heavy marching-shoes the next day and expect him to be able to trudge about the country without just taking all the hide off his feet.

[a] Q. A description of Ft. Leavenworth in your days there: what it looked like and how the school was run.

A. As to A B, and C and the general question: Leavenworth, I don't think has changed a great deal in its general appearance. On the outskirts are new buildings--coming from town and over towards the river. But as far as I know the old post is virtually unchanged. It was always very picturesque to me, particularly the ruin of the first frontier fort there on the edge of the Old Parade. We lived in an old set of quarters off the Old Parade at first and I became quite familiar with it. Later on we lived in bachelor quarters which wasn't so very satisfactory an arrangement for a married couple, but that was the best we could rank for. And finally we lived on Pope Avenue -- I think we were there two years.

As to General Bell--oh, to go back to the Post--it was a very attractive place to walk. You could walk up on the mountain there; you could walk on the road towards town. A great deal of our work involved us in riding all around the countryside.

[b] Q. Any comments on General Bell?

A. Now as to General Bell, he was there only on rare occasions. He was intensely

interested in the school but I didn’t come to know him at all well until after that date though he had to personally approve of my being held as an instructor because of the fact I was only a lieutenant.

[c] Q. Any comments on Major Morrison?

A. Morrison was outstanding. He brought us logic as to tactics, army organization and things of that sort which were of immense value to us.

[d] Q. What was the work like? Was it extremely difficult?

A. The work in one sense was not difficult; in another sense it was extremely difficult. The competition was so intense that you might say 95 per cent was not sufficient or at all. It had to be 99 or at least a fraction if not perfect because there were so many others who were going to be about the some. If you were going to compete you had to be near perfection in the particular subjects and that's what made it so hard. However, it was invaluable to me as a matter of training because I learnt a thoroughness which stood me in good stead through all the clamor and push and excitement, lack of time and also during the war--particularly in the preparation for the Meuse-Argonne battle where it was thrown in my lap--the concentration for it--all in the moment--without any previous warning of any kind--where I heretofore was working on the St. Mihiel action. But my Leavenworth training stood me in good stead, as to habits of work. And I was able to turn out the things within the time I was limited to. The first was the concentration for the Meuse Argonne battle. Then later on from about the 12th, of October on, I was moved into the tactical control phases.

[e] Q. What did you learn at Leavenworth as a student and instructor?

A. That's a little bit too much of a question. My reading, of course, was very helpful. My study of past operations was very helpful. And I had learned how to digest them--the coverage of various operations, of course, was immensely valuable. My habits of thought were being trained. While you might say in one sense you could almost say little. I learnt I could use, I learnt, how to learn. Right away I began to develop along more stable lines. This isn't said in criticism of Leavenworth--it was an outcome of the procedure--Leavenworth itself was learning all the time. And its problems were becoming more practical. At first there was too--much of a single problem here is the situation, what is your decision? That ended it. Later on it became a series of situations which they called

"troop leading," which are very hard to organize on a map and are very hard to manage, but are invaluable in training officers. The National Guard camps were immensely valuable to me. They were an experimental value, too, because I was able to do things there with a regiment where I couldn't even get command of a company, on a post. As a matter of fact, after leaving Leavenworth and being an instructor there, I was a lieutenant in the Philippines on a post where I never commanded a company one day for the first six months. And yet the captain of the company was a dear friend of mine and had been a student under me at Leavenworth.

[f] Q. What did Leavenworth do for the Army?

A. It would be difficult to characterize, estimate just what Leavenworth did for the Army except it started in its modern-education. We--pressed hard, 'stumbled frequently, pressed ahead and finally out of this all came very fine technique. I was very much worried at the start of the second World War for fear our--well out of the first World War--for fear our officers were too-theoretical. We didn't have an actual Navy in the water like the Navy--the Fleet--we had no fleet--we had no real Army. Had a name, but not an Army, like the First Army or the Second Army. So the officers had to get their training theoretically. And I was very much afraid there was going to be too much theory. But afterwards I discovered that our men were so well prepared in the theoretical part--the large factors in the thing--that they were far yonder, I thought, ahead of the preparations of that nature with the British. The British had an immense advantage in tactical information because of their battle experiences, particularly in the early part of the Second World War--but when it came to the other aspects of it, it was quite the other way around. The Americans had basic training--their staff officers--which enabled them to go into this work in a very well prepared manner. Much to my surprise because I thought they would have too much of that and too little of the other thing. I knew that they had too little of the other, but there was no way of doing it better. Because I think they said at that time you could get all of the non-commissioned officers of the Regular Army in the Brooklyn stadium.

[g] Q. Any comments on the National Guard camps?

A. The National Guard camps were a great asset to me in the experience I got because as I say, I could do things there. I could take temporary command-of a regiment

and go through some exercise, whereas I say the most I could hope to reach back at home was a captain's duties. I'll give one example. We were given a form of the new militia bureau--National Guard bureau or whatever it was called--to fill out on each camp--a lot of statistical information on the camp and then the schedules they went through and then finally remarks. For remarks there were only as I recall four or five lines. I went through six camps, I think, one summer--may have been seven, but I think maybe six. So I came down to this remark space I decided if I was going to these other camps, I would do much better by giving the benefit of the remarks after having gone through several camps. So I wrote in for remarks--"see report on such a camp"--which was one ahead that I hadn't gone through yet. That went on and I sent in my report still with the reference to the camp ahead. And finally I was getting up close to the "camp ahead. So I started and wrote the comments that I thought would have general application to all of them and which could be the reference for all of them. And as I dimly recall now it was about six or seven typewritten pages, probably single-spaced. And after I did that probably about the third of this string, -I cut it down to about four or five pages and by the next camp I cut it down again to about two pages. And I finally got it down to half a page. And I commented on several things, that I thought were ill suited to the problem of our army. One, I remember, referred to the Guard manual, another one referred to the drill regulations. In all of these things I thought we needed to have a much simplified set-up in regard to our instructions and our regulations. In the first place these men in the National Guard didn't have the time from their business for studying so much and our regulations were getting so voluminous that it would be very hard for a fellow to cover them all except in a most, superficial manner instead of boning them up very carefully. And I don't remember whether this got into this phase of it or not but I was of the opinion all regulations--tactical and all--should be written in two forms, one for the temporary forces and one for the-regular forces. The temporary force one would have everything they should know perfectly on the day of mobilization, which would be a considerable digest to a lot of the others. The other would be what the Regular officer should perfect himself in as he went along. It was impossible for a temporary officer to get through all these things and it was very important that somebody dissect it, digest it and get the part that he should know beyond a shadow of

doubt at the time when he reported on D Day-Mobilization Day--M Day. I don't remember what I had in this thing--maybe that was one of the things--one of the thoughts, I know it was always uppermost in my mind. So I sent this in.

Then I went abroad. Stayed six months, which is quite a feat on a lieutenant's pay. And this was done on a lieutenant's pay. Part of it you see--two months of it-- was done on half-pay. So when I came back, I arrived at a post in a blizzard--near Watertown, New York--Sackett's Harbor. Cold as--terrific--and how you could train men in that set-up except in a very indoorsy way, I never could find possible. But at any event, I had only been there for a short time until I was ordered to Washington. They had started the concentration on the Mexican border. Then I was sent on as assistant to the chief signal officer of the division that was concentrating down there--the First Maneuver Division, I think they called it. I found when I got down there that they had taken me into the Signal Corps affair just to get me present. I had a very interesting time there because here was the First Division we had concentrated since the Spanish-American war and of course that had been a very hodge-podge concentration. Everybody was looking at the division and I was attached to the headquarters of the division. I remember I worked out a brief plan of having maneuvers with all the staff, headquarters, communications details, and things of that sort instead of the troops at first and that took the chief signal officer very strongly and he advertised it very thoroughly and put it on and had me to draw up the problem and all for the procedure. It involved the whole division and a cavalry brigade. I remember I had to organize a corps of umpires to keep this thing straight. They had their situations which they opened certain places. And I have always been amused because the first message that I ever knew of that came in by wireless was used at that time--was sent at that time. I sent this one set that--we had--where two men had to turn the cranks to generate the electrical power--with the cavalry division and the umpire with the cavalry division was the lieutenant who afterwards became the head of the air corps an tested the first flight of the air at Ft. Myer. The first message that came in from this wireless set was from him, of course, reporting where the cavalry brigade had gone to. He located himself, he said, “I am just west of the manure pile.” I have never seen the manure pile to this day, so I don't know what he was west of. But it struck me as so funny to get this first message,

saying, "I am just west of the manure pile," which gave us supposedly a bench mark. Actually, as I say, I have never seen the manure pile yet, so I would have to guess where the cavalry brigade was halted at that particular time. Well, all these things like I have been describing were a constant development of knowledge of what you could do and what you couldn't do, which came to me as of great value and these summer camps were particularly valuable to me I could do it pretty much any way I wanted and I wasn't being criticized. I was being, accepted with enthusiasm and that was a great stimulant.

YEARS 1909-1913

Relative to the years 1909-1910. My father died in Uniontown and is buried in my mother's family's lot in Allegheny across the river from Pittsburgh. It was incorrect that my mother went to live with the Ewings. She remained in Uniontown for quite a long period, retaining the apartment, pursuing her own quiet life with the friends she had there. Later she began the business of going to Atlantic City (Haddon Hall), usually, in October and staying there until Easter. This was very satisfactory for her because she didn't have any involvements with traffic and things of that sort. Hotels were very delightful in the winter for older people and there were teas and music in the afternoon. And she could get in her chair in the hotel lobby and go out on the boardwalk. So this was her habit for quite a long time. My sister would go up and stay with her a little bit. I would go up from Washington and see her and her daughter-in-law, Stuart's wife, would go up and visit with her. Sometimes when she was ill, they would stay there for a rather lengthy period.

SIDE 2 (To continue on about my mother at Atlantic City).

She continued this habit of spending the winter there for a long time. She would spend some time in the early fall and sometimes in the late spring, when she came back from Atlantic City, at a hotel in Washington where, of course, I would see her, every day. I know one period there when she was not feeling very well. I would go over from Ft. Myer to the office and stop and see mother when she was having her breakfast and then I would go and see her while she was having her lunch. (Incidentally, I didn't eat lunch in those days). And I would go to see her on my way home to Ft. Myer at night. And of course we had abundant time to talk over many things. I had quite a time getting her to use--what do you call those things, radio or what those little early devices you listened into--what was

the first thing you got to put up to your ear? (A. Oh, earphones)

Q. Earphone, yes, but hell, what was the thing?

(A. The thing I was referring to was the crystal radio.) That's radio you call it. I had a great deal of difficulty getting her to use the radio. She insisted she couldn't talk on the telephone--all the time she was talking over the telephone. So when I tried to ask her something, she said, "You know I can't talk over the telephone." Finally, I had the radio affair put on the roof of the hotel and the wire let down to her window with the, extra wire there and then one day when she and I were having lunch together-she was in bed sick--the sergeant chauffeur came in and just put this up on the wall without saying anything--I instructed him not to make any comment of any kind--right above her bed and the earphones hung down. When she saw this she wanted to know right away what that was. She said, "You know, I can't talk over the telephone." I said, "You told me that about ten years ago and you are still telling me." This isn't the telephone at all--I chose a time when there was a service going on at the National Cathedral because mother missed church service very much. When she put this up--the bishop--I have forgotten his name-- the first bishop from there was on at that time. And, of course, she was fascinated, and from that time she went to church service about five times a day. Incidentally, the crystal phone, as you remember, had very little trouble with static. So she had a fine time with this and didn't have anything more to say about not being able to talk over the telephone. When several of the elder ladies in the hotel found out about this Mother became very much piqued because they all came up and tried to listen at the same time. [chuckles] And they only had one earphone. Finally, she took it all out because she could not have handled the crowd, which I thought was most unfortunate.

General Pershing would come over and have lunch with us once or twice. And that, of course, interested her as well as the rest of the hotel.

1. Q. What ships did you go to and from Europe on in 1910? Did you meet anyone of interest on the voyages or in the countries you visited? Did you see any signs of approaching war? What were your impressions of the countries you visited? Were there any interesting incidents you wish to record?

A. With reference to 1910 to Mrs. Marshall and I going abroad. I think I said

something, something about this once before--anyway, we had to do it on a shoestring but we managed to cover six countries and two of them while I was on half pay. We had a very interesting time particularly because we didn't try to hurry. We would stay at a place for weeks That took place in Paris in the chateau country, not so long in Florence, but a month or so in Rome and a considerable length of time in England where we went out to the Surrey country where the famous Hind Head is, which is the beginning of the famous Conan Doyle Sir Nigel stories. Incidentally, I had a discussion about this--the Conan Doyle Sir Nigel stories--with Queen Elizabeth just shortly after she was married as a Princess. I was having lunch with the family.

The trip was very interesting. When I was in Surrey the British maneuvers took place at Aldershot and I, as I recall, applied to the Embassy for authority to attend and that sort of thing. But, of course, they could do nothing for me. So I just rented a bicycle up near Aldershot and went there and went through all the maneuvers and saw about three times as much as our attaché saw because I wasn't restricted. I just rode all over the place as I wanted to and had an interesting time of it.

2. Q. Is Frye correct in saying that you followed the Ainsworth affair "with avid interest?" Any comments on this development?

A. 1911, I was intensely interested in the Ainsworth affair because my friends from Leavenworth in the class were involved very heavily in the arguments at the start. One was Secretary of the General Staff. One was working on new forms that did away with the--there were two things that you had to make out every month--one was for the pay and the other was for the other records of the soldier's service. These fellows combined these in all in one and made it very much simpler. And they were very heavily attacked by General Ainsworth and his people for daring to change any of the things that had been the affair of the Adjutant General's Department entirely. So they became very much involved in the first performances. And for that reason alone I was interested. I was interested in General Bell though I didn't know him at all well at this time, but all of the thing became a matter of history to me. But it is always very interesting in the light of my experiences later how difficult it is to change anything in the routine of government affairs if there is anybody at all in opposition.

I think I have described before that assent down to the maneuver division right at the start when it first concentrated out-from San Antonio and was assistant to the Chief Signal Officer. As a matter of fact he got me sent down there on that basis in order to get me down there. And then I became assistant to the battalion commander of the Signal Corps down there but that was just a sort of privately arranged affair. I have told something about that before so I won't repeat it.

Fort Logan H. Roots and San Antonio

3. Q. Are there any incidents you wish to discuss in connection with the duty at San Antonio and at Fort Logan Roots?

A. Beginning September, 1912, when I joined the 4th Infantry at Fort Logan H. Roots, I had a very interesting time, though a very deadly quiet little garrison, but I was allowed certain freedom of action. I organized the school in my own way and got a very satisfactory reaction there and a very favorable report on it. I also got in trouble; because somebody senior--the battalion commander--was a little bit irritated by my having been selected and I went through the usual experience of having that sort of feeling develop. But I had learned to be very quiet about these things and not ask for anything for myself and to do what I was supposed to do and do it as quietly as possible. The result was I generally had the backing of all the younger officers and a good many of the old-young officers, if you can put it that way. But there was generally some higher fellow who was very much opposed to any young man having much to say about how you trained.

When I finally got down to San Antonio and joined the Maneuver Division--well, I joined it at its organization. It had a brigade of cavalry attached to it. I had a very interesting time and a very instructive time. It was quite an interesting thing in development. I know I was given as a temporary occupation, when they were going out on maneuvers, the radio-wireless. None of these people had seen that in action. I have already explained about the manure pile. When I was set out to go along with the artillery and report its various maneuvers, do it by radio and wireless, there was an intense interest in all this. Incidentally I couldn't send anything myself, but I knew what it was for, who could work it and what it should be used about. So from that point of view it was very instructive.

1. A. I've forgotten what ship I went to Europe on, Mrs. Marshall and myself. It was a British line and it specialized in carrying cattle. It was a rather favorable boat and very steady. That's the reason we took it and we met a number of very attractive people aboard. We came back on the Austrian Lloyd boat which sailed from Trieste. That was six months later, and it stopped in Greece and it stopped in Algiers.

But these times in travelling about, the signs I got of approaching war were the bitterness of the opinions of various individuals. I remember particularly in Japan a young cultivated German who had been sent over to New York and given the temporary experience of a year in a bank--his people evidently were very wealthy. This extreme bitterness against the, British at this time was news to me and was quite evident of what was going on generally in that particular world.

We met a great many people that were interesting on these trips. We had very good luck in that. We met some quite distinguished people; some very brilliant people. And not the usual type of brilliance that you run into. Two archaeologists--one Viennese (Austrian rather) and one Princetonian and a paralleling activity where all the information was obtained from old documents--an Oxford don who was intensely interesting. And those three would be together. And I sat with them many hours in our pension which was quite an elaborate one--almost like a hotel, in Rome. I learnt a great deal by listening to them. At the same time on the train, Mrs. Marshall and I had met this most attractive Italian lady whose history of art in Florence was the standard work for tourists and who had been working fourteen years for the municipal government of Rome trying to see if they could not arrange some historical affair properly organized for tourists. The great difficulty, of course was the period of history covered so many hundreds of years, it was so extraordinarily difficult trying to compress this into a book without having a long book that no tourist would look at. She was very interesting, very attractive. Her husband was a colonel in the Italian army. She was with us on the train from Florence to Rome. Our acquaintance started with Mrs. Marshall wishing to have the window up. She had a very bad heart and she couldn't stand a stuffy atmosphere. But she had rather got in the habit of starting this thing right away before it got stuffy. I was contending on this occasion that it had not gotten stuffy yet when the lady spoke up and said, "I would like to have the

window open," And there led to quite an acquaintance where we used to see her almost every day in Rome. I was very fortunate because she used to take me to the Forum and other places, particularly the Forum. I would carry two cushions--one for her and one for me--and we would sit down there and she would lecture to me on the Forum. Well, it was fascinating and I noticed all the guides would come and stand around--it was in the winter time--there weren't many tourists—they would come and stand around and listen to what she was saying. So day after day after day, I would be in the Forum, there, sitting on some of the ruins on a cushion, and Madame Griffi--I think was her name--would lecture to me on the historical significance of what we were looking at. That also applied to some of the churches. And then later on, I would go back to the hotel and find these two archaeologists and the Oxford don in the evening there having their chicory coffee and they would begin to inquire of me what Madame Griffi had told me that day and that would lead to an argument that would last about all evening.

We had a very interesting thing happen there with an odd aftermath. We had never gone to the Quirinal Palace, the home of King and Queen--Emmanuel, I think was his name. Anyway, he was the one that was disposed later on in World War II. We went to the movie which was down at the bottom of the hill which the streetcar line tunneled underneath below the Quirinal Palace and we found the movie was closed. So I suggested that we go up and do the Quirinal Palace. Well, I got up and found it wasn't the day you could do it, but I went in and wept to the officer of the guard that we were leaving next day--which, of course, we weren't--and Mrs. Marshall was so devoted to her interest in this thing that he let us go in., So, meanwhile, she was waiting out in the edge of the courtyard next to the sally port. Meanwhile, the King and a princess--I have forgotten, I think, one of the Napoleonic strain-and the children came by in a low neck carriage to drive in the Pinchii Garden which they, did every day and we found out afterwards that Mrs. Marshall and the Queen (Eleanor I think her name was) looked very much alike. So the King stopped the carriage and stood up, looked at Mrs. Marshall and then took off his hat to her., She didn't know what it was all about, but of course was intensely interested.

So when I came out, this officer had us taken over and we went upstairs and came in where the family had just been having lunch. And I know in one room [there was]

the tobacco scent from the cigars, though the King himself didn't smoke and was very particular about it. I mention this because later on in years when General Pershing came to Rome and the King came in from the country to receive him, we were entertained at luncheon at the Quirinal Palace. We went up the same steps but this time there were guards in silver cuirasses with drawn sabers and helmets with plumes on them, and all very picturesque. But the point was I had been over it before in the some place. And then we came into the same place they had shown us, where they had luncheon, and we had our, luncheon there. I remember that I sat next to the Admiral of the Fleet. He probably would have looked at me a little bit closer if he had realized my intimate association with some of his fleet business later on in Africa and Italy and Sicily, the Sicilian campaign.

Altogether the trip was quite instructive. And we saw Europe--the last opportunity in its old guise you might say. That was 1910. In 1914 it blew up, of course, the lights went out and it never was the same again. I remember one ridiculous thing. We had a very fine lady who ran the pension we stayed in Paris, which was not so far from the Arc de Triomphe. She always planned our trips. She was very much interested in Mrs. Marshall. And she fixed lunches up for us. And we went out to Versailles. We went out on Monday because she said nobody would be there practically. And it was true. Apparently we were the only guests in the grounds. After we had gone around and seen a great many of the things we got out in a pretty place and started to eat our picnic lunch. Well the gendarme came up and said we couldn't picnic there. I suppose that was because of the trash the tourists would drag in. So we packed up our little lunch and went off. As soon as he got out of sight, we picked another place and started eating lunch and he hove to again and explained to us very politely that we couldn't eat there. So we affected not to understand him the first place, and apologized in the second place, there and packed up our things and started off again. And settled right down the minute we saw a good place and started to eat lunch again and he came up a third time. That time I had a brilliant thought. I invited him to lunch. So he stayed to lunch and we stayed at the Versailles Gardens and ate our lunch. And I was so interested when I flew over to France shortly after the capture of Paris and I went over Versailles and I could see almost the spot where we had our lunch on this interesting day.

We had a very stormy trip home. We didn't see anything of interest in Africa except to argue with the carriage men and others about the prices they were charging--Mrs. Marshall being very much embarrassed about my refusal to pay the price they put up. We had a young Englishman with us and she was very much embarrassed that I wouldn't swallow this, hook, line and sinker. It struck me funny afterwards when I came into Algiers and looked over the same harbor arrangements where I had come in so friendly not so many years before.

I think I told about the gala performance for General Pershing at the Opera. I won't repeat that. If I didn't I can tell it some other time.

A. I don't think of anything more about San Antonio than I have already told. One little incident-- [chuckle] The way I came in there as Chief Signal Officer -- I, of course, didn't have any equipment with me. I just came by myself. Now they kept sending men in to me which formed a sort of echelon of men in connection with communications detail. So I had command of this outfit. But I didn't have any equipment. All the other there troops had come down there with their own tentage and everything of that sort--their own cots and things and field ranges. I had nothing for these fellows. So I had to draw it and I had great difficulty getting it--they would only invoice it to me-like I was a depot quartermaster. And I was getting this stuff with a lot of paper work connected with it and a very complicated situation was developing. The only interesting part though was that the first of the pyramidal tents came up and I got the first of these for these men. They were such a tremendous improvement on the Sibley tent. They were just what the name implies--they were pyramidal. So I drew them and I drew pyramidal tents that I, could use with our own headquarters. It was very much simpler for us to use one pyramidal tent for all the four officers of headquarters than to have a lot of small tents. And, of course, they were much better weatherproofed in the way they were set up. And we went out to our artillery affair on Lyon Springs beyond San Antonio and struck a terrific rainy spell. Everything was flooded out; ground seemed to be almost under water. And it was very hard on all these fellows who only had pup tents or little A tents. The result was that the umpires in particular all came to this one pyramidal I had. We finally had eleven men in the tent at night. They would all come there to get in because you were assured of shelter. It was very

easy to walk around in the way the tent was arranged inside. You didn't bump into the tent wall the way you would with another tent. And all of them were very much impressed with pyramidal tents. We ran practically a club there of these various fellows, of various corners, ordered to various places--all coming in to stay with us at night at the time of this goings on with the artillery in this maneuver. I was meanwhile struggling with how I was going to get rid of this stuff off my papers.

4. Q. Did you have much knowledge of the disturbances in Mexico at this time?

A. We were aware of the trouble in Mexico. We knew that this was the reason we had been sent down there. But beyond that we didn't know anything other than what we saw in the papers. And that wasn't a great deal.

5. Q. Any comment concerning the work with the organized militia in Massachusetts?

A. The work with the Massachusetts Organized Militia was very interesting, very instructive, and a very hard job. I rarely ever was home in the evening. I had to travel a great deal and all the men responded though they thought they were getting too much work. I developed a number of what I thought were interesting courses of instruction, basing them on the drill regulations which had the tactical part in it. And all of which at the end they thought was very valuable. And they were very responsive. So this was quite an educational treat to me. The teacher was being educated at the same time he was instructing. But they accepted everything that I put up and was able to experiment and enlarge and subtract and so on.

Philippine Islands

[1.] Q. 1913 - After failing to get overseas duty in Panama, Hawaii, Alaska or China, which he felt would be better for his wife, who was not in good health in the spring of 1913, Marshall applied for duty in the Philippines. By the time he left, Mrs. Marshall's health was better so she went either at the time--her husband did or later (Frye says it is not clear from your orders).

A. Back to the Philippines in 1913. Mrs. Marshall went with me to the Philippines in 1913 and stayed with me until I came home in 1916. She went to Japan for the hot season and stayed there about three months. I went with her once on four months, leave which was a

two months sick leave and two months of regular leave which I snaffed out of the maneuvers where I was in charge of the larger of the two, forces.

[2] Q. In the Philippines, Marshall collected maps and histories and visited every major battlefield of the insurrection.

A. I got very much interested in visiting the battlefields of the Philippine Insurrection. I had all of the reports that had been made to the War Department and these surplus volumes they sent on request and I took them up--three mail sacks full. I didn't use them for a long time until I got out there and I found them of immense interest and I think I have referred to the use I put them to afterwards.

[3] Q. Friends included Laurence Halst and Frederick Walker. Marshall joined them in practicing sending wireless code.

A. Some of my friends out there were Jens Bugge, who was much senior to me and was made adjutant--or Chief of Staff--of this Maneuver Division as we called it out' there which consisted of the larger number of-troops of the Philippine Islands. His health went back on him, so I became Chief of Staff and when this division was suddenly mobilized for maneuvers, I went down in that capacity.

4. Q. Any details of the-amphibious exercise of 1914?

A. I was interested in after years at some of the arrangements they went through for amphibious operations. The only arrangement we went through for an amphibious operation out there was to get on the boat and we got down off Batangas and only found one launch and we had 1800 animals as I recall. You see all the escort wagons had four-mule teams to them and we had some cavalry. And we landed all of these animals from about one-half mile out and only lost one. We had one little launch there. And we made a very successful landing so for as the speed went and so far as the casualties went. I thought afterwards, when I saw them working on some of these things like that, they were getting entirely too refined, they weren't roughing it in, as I thought, quite enough. Of course, when they made those landings on the coast of Italy or in France on account of the-terrific artillery concentrations, the airplanes and other matters of that kind, we had to have there things very highly perfected which wasn't the case with maneuvers of the time I have just been describing. However, it gave me some familiarity with what you had to do.

What happened in these maneuvers that are referred to here by some of your questions was--particularly General Arnold's statements was--that there was this big maneuver campaign and the side I was on was the largest of all the troops in the Philippines. The other side had some infantry but it had, I think, mostly two regiments of cavalry and the first big contact was just north of Batangas and then the largest contact was in the city of Lipa and then on up the road later on. Well, I don't want to get into names here but the commanding officer was found ineffective by the Inspector General who was cruising around. He was about to retire very shortly, I think, anyway, and General Bell wrote him a letter and notified him that he could either be retired immediately or he could continue through the maneuver but he would have to leave all the commanding to be done by me. The reason they did it just that way was because the next man in rank was about as bad as he was. They told me they were going to relieve this first fellow, who was a very courtly gentleman, very nice fellow. He carried a zinc lined suitcase with him which he worked on most of the time. He would ride in the spring wagon and I would ride the horse, but every time we would stop the suitcase would be opened and he would refresh himself against the Philippine heat. But when they told me they were going to relieve him--retire him--I objected because I knew I was going to have a much more difficult time with the other man. So the arrangement was made whereby he continued through maneuvers, but he must agree not to give me any instructions of any kind but leave me free to act. So I had the advantage of being a first lieutenant with the largest force of troops in the Philippines which I could command in a very extensive maneuver campaign. This force had been-organized before and I was the adjutant of it. It was arranged so it could be mobilized quickly without any detailed orders to the various ones. All the detailed orders would have to be issued by me as the adjutant which as I say, when I was just starting to do that and concentrating, these people, I became also the chief of staff.

To show you how difficult it was they gave the situation to us in Manila. They sent for us. I was in the middle of a skirmish run--and in my soaking wet flannel shirt I went in to talk with this colonel who had been brought up from the provinces where he was in command of a portion or the force. He was the senior colonel and we were given the situation for the maneuvers. And then we had about the only car in the Philippines. I think

there was one out where we were and they had one down in Manila for the commanding general. And they went out to my house with the car and there had lunch. And all the time the colonel was eating lunch and he was a very agreeable man and, as I say, very courtly--I was on the telephone mobilizing this outfit and arranging for it to move to Batangas. And it came from all sorts of places in northern Luzon and they had to move by various ships and all and I had to get the whole thing together. I was having a great deal of trouble. I didn't realize the full reason for the trouble because I was mobilizing the larger detachment of the two and I was just a lieutenant and on the other side two full colonels were at the top and they were mobilizing their detachments [chuckle] and getting all the preference on account of their rank. So I was having a very hard time. I finally had to go in and see the Quartermaster and tell him I had to get this and finally he said I didn't have approval to see him. I said I came in because it was the only way I could get in. I had to get this outfit underway and I had to have stalls made on the boats for some 1800 horses before we could get that part of the command out. Well he said he couldn't talk to me then. I said I am sorry but we got to have to have an understanding. If you are not going to deal with me except as a lieutenant, I will communicate with General Bell who is in the southern provinces and find out what he wants me to do. Well, of course, then he wilted and right away gave me a reasonable break as to what I should get. But I was always up against the fact that I was dealing with a colonel and my opponents were colonels and I was just a lieutenant. It was a very, very instructive experience all around and lasted for quite some days, which would be a story in itself but I don't care to go into.

[4] Q. Frye quotes Major Johnson Hagood as telling a story of how you won a bet that during an inspection an inspecting officer would notice a soldier who hadn't shaved two buttons unbuttoned and a bayonet missing, but would miss three sensors in field exercises.

A. Frye's quoting a story by Johnson Hagood which I was very unwise to tell. Because it could have gotten me into serious trouble and the greater the truth here the greater the libel.

[3] A. Walker, Halstead and those fellows were all friends of mine who lived with me on the post. Bugge, Halstead and myself lived quite close together. I might tell quite a

different story here. Everybody takes a nap in the afternoon in the Philippines. The siesta period is one of supposed quiet. Well, the enlisted men had their ball diamond not so far in front of our house and of course we got all the yelling from that, but we could sleep through that. But then the next-door neighbors--his boy organized a kids' baseball team very young, very little, and they played between his house and our house, and all the kids in the, neighborhood came in and they made so darned much noise nobody could sleep. So finally, as a defense against this, I made myself the pitcher and umpire. And I pitched for both teams an umpired the thing. The real mark of distinction was the catcher and he used a coffee strainer as a mask. I was very much afraid he would get hit on the coffee strainer and it would take the skin off all around his head where this thing rested. The little children were out in the field and there were about two players for each place--one deep infield and one way out outfield. And when they got the ball, they would get so excited they couldn't throw it. All they could do was yell. A pitch used to be very, very exciting when the home base man would be pleading with them to throw the ball in and when they would finally throw it, they would throw it about twenty feet from him and he with his coffee strainer could never get the ball. I got a great deal of amusement, and in after years. I came to meet quite a number of them and they would always recall our ball games in the afternoon.

[7] Q. You bought a Model T from Sherrill in 1914.

A. I bought a Model T Ford--a new one that was just shipped out to the Philippines on a transport--from Colonel Sherrill (who was major then)--"Shaggy" Sherrill of the Engineer Corps--who later became in charge of public buildings and grounds in Washington and aide to the President and was Chief of Staff of the 77th division. That was my first introduction to an automobile. And my captain--"Zeke" Williams, as we called him, who had bought an old car and practically rebuilt it because he had a genius for that sort of thing, was having dinner one night (his wife was rather) and "Zeke" was in a white mess jacket, white shirt and white trousers--we didn't have dark trousers then--and I took delivery of this car from Major Sherrill, as he was-then, and we couldn't get the car started. We got over as far as "Zeke's" house and bogged down there entirely. So we went in and drew "Zeke" from the "dinner party in his white clothes. (Incidentally, they had a Filipino

boy under the table to fan off mosquitoes and he stayed under the table during the meal). So "Zeke" came out in his white clothes and took a great deal of the car apart. We couldn't find out where the trouble was at first. And I commented on the fact without realizing I was introducing real factor that Sherrill had poured gasoline into it without straining the thing through a chamois, which you had to do in those days, and he had a lot of filings, it looked like, that had gone into the carburetor set up. And Williams was completely outraged at this; he had been jumped by Sherrill, Sherrill. was really very much junior to him--but now with this increase in the Engineers Corps, Sherrill had become a major while "Zeke" was still a captain and was going to be a captain for quite some time to come. He crawled out from under the car with his white clothes very much soiled and he just damned Sherrill up and down--to have a man like that outrank him when he didn't know enough to strain gasoline through a chamois skin. That was the first time I ever learnt that with a car.

(Is that the same motor you tore down one time? asked Heffner).

Same one. Later on, I took the whole motor down in order to learn what made it work. I was not at all mechanical, but I just had to do it.

Every now and then we would have these war scares because they found several evidences of a conspiracy of Filipinos to try to seize the arsenal to get the weapons. Fortunately they always sealed the compact generally by writing in blood and someone would lose the compact. The secret service people would get hold of all the records and we would be able to foresee what was going to happen and it never happened.

Ft. McKinley was a big garrison for those days. It was a battalion of artillery, a regiment of cavalry --first the 7th, later the 8th Cavalry--two regiments of infantry which was considered very large for those days. I saw a very excellent exhibition of American efficiency in its practical application. We had a great pest of grasshoppers eating up everything--all the Filipino's crops--and the towns were required to turn out to arrange these things in order to kill the grasshoppers. Of course the grasshoppers would lay these eggs which would hatch out in--I forget how many days--and the big thing was to get them before they sprouted their wings. At first they could just crawl. And there would just be a dense mass of them. What they would have to do--we were turned out one hot afternoon, when everybody wanted to take a siesta--and this Filipino, who talked rather slowly and a little

brokenly, explained to us at great length how we dig this pit three feet deep and three feet wide, three feet square in this adobe rock. And we roasted out there. And then they took sheet iron strips and made a V leading up to the hole and then you got back and drove this herd of grasshoppers without wings into this hole and first you poured oil on them and burned them up and put dirt on them and buried them. Well it was quite a lengthy operation. Our people were not very enthusiastic about digging this three foot deep hole and six feet square in adobe. So the first thing they did was get rid of the galvanized iron strips by taking shelter tents and putting a pole at either end and hold it erect. Two men could hold that up instead of carting around this galvanized iron strip which was always very hot in the sun and heavy too. And then some other genius came along and took a double mosquito bar and put a cane in each corner. And instead of digging a hole you would bring that up and herd the grasshoppers into that and then turn it up, and then you would lift the native into it--he wanted the, grasshoppers because he could sell them. He would fill his sack with grasshoppers and we would lift him out and they'd empty the sack and we didn't have to dig the hole at all. So they finally got to the thing that all the soldiers did was hold up these little tents which made the wall to drive them into. There at the end was the mosquito bars turned on the side so that the light went right through them and attracted the grasshoppers. And then, when we got that, we turned it up, lifted the native in and he cleaned it out and nobody did any work at all and that all developed in one afternoon. They had been digging these derned pits for I don't know how many years, but the soldiers just cleaned this up in a hurry. It always struck me as very amusing to see how quickly they found out a more practical way of doing this thing.

I had a little interview about this because the fried grasshopper--the large grasshopper--if he still has his legs on him and all--is quite a delicacy to eat. But because they had never eaten it, they were all opposed to it. Matter of fact it is the cleanest thing you can eat. A hog was filthy by comparison. A grasshopper only ate green things, "but everybody was violently opposed to eating grasshoppers. And then when they mashed them up as we did--another way they served them was all mashed up in a paste--that was still worse, of course. So Mrs. Marshall was having a card party and I had to mash up these grasshoppers and spread them on crackers. You toasted the crackers a little bit and spread the

mashed grasshoppers on it and served it. And when I came home she told me that Lin--the cook—had done a very clever thing. (He had developed this new paste and all the women were crazy about it and wanted to know what it was and Lin wouldn't tell them). When she found out they were eating mashed grasshoppers, I was excommunicated around that neighborhood then for about three or four months.

Sgt. Heffner: I saw that in the Geographical Magazine and repeated it to friends, and they wouldn't believe me that they ate those things. They are better than hogs and chickens; the cleanest thing you could get. I gave the ladies a great treat.

Aide to General Liggett

10. Q. Any comments concerning your duties as aide to General Hunter Liggett?

A. General Liggett made me his aide in order to prevent my being, transferred from Fort McKinley down to the southern end of Batangas Province at Fort Batangas. He wanted me at Fort McKinley and the only way he could keep me was to make me his aide. So I became his aide. We had been in very friendly relations for years. As a matter of fact he had rather taken the Leavenworth course when I was an instructor because I would give him the problem after the class got it and then I would go over his work, correct his work, after I had the approved solution. He went through the whole course like that and then went to the War College.

After General Liggett became the Department Commander and moved into the city and I think we moved in--I am not certain—anyway, I left very soon after that and came back to the United States. Mrs. Marshall went over with me and came back with me.

2. Q. Any comments concerning Halstead and Walker?

A. Halstead and Walker were very nice officers. Walker afterwards became a division commander in Italy and later became adjutant general of the state of Texas, and some of the men in the Texas National Guard took great exception to Major General Clark’s handling of the operation and made quite an attack on him in Congress in which Walker became one of the principal testifiers, I guess you would call it, on the National Guard side.

3. Q. How did you get to know Major Hagood? (I gather he was one of your great admirers).

A. I came to know General Hagood--I think at this time--I'm not certain. He was very nice to me and seemed to admire the way I was--oh, yes, he commanded a training camp at Fort Douglas. I had picked him out to command the camp and I was adjutant of the camp and one of the principal instructors.

8. Q. Did you have any presentiment in 1914 and 1915 that we might enter war?

A. I don't believe we had any presentiment in 1914 or early 1915 that we would get into the war. It was a very gradual development.

9. What differences did you find between the Philippines of 1902 and 1913? Differences in living conditions?

A. There was quite a difference, of course, between the Philippines in 1902 and the Philippines in 1913 to 1916. The greatest difference of all was the fact that under a very fine road policy when they built these macadam roads and had men to tend them and sweep the macadam- it wasn't rocks, but powder dust- back into all the places where the water would accumulate, so that- the Philippines really had a better road system at that time so for as extensiveness and being connected up than in most places I knew in the United States. Living conditions were, of course, very much better because you had good houses and very good servants. And you had a very good general commissary to bring things out so that you got good things to eat and sufficient fresh things. So it was a tremendous improvement over the Philippines of the old days when maybe you got it and maybe you didn't.

My duties with General Liggett as aide were very brief because not so long after I was appointed I was sent back to the U. S.

1. Q. General Bell seems to have been a very fine person. Any comments about your service with him?

A. My situation when I got back home was a little bit like when I came up to Manila. I was made an aide in order to keep me. They couldn't hold me there I had to go on to a regiment in Mexico--at Colonia du Blan--as a matter of fact where General Pershing was in command. General Bell had lost almost all of his officers to this duty on the Mexican border and he only had retired officers helping him out and he was organizing three training camps. So he held me by the means of getting me detailed as an aide. And I went

first to the training camp at Del Monte. And I had to report to him of what I thought was wrong which was a very difficult thing to do because I was still a lieutenant; I wasn't promoted to captain until about that month. A general was in command--General Sibert--and he was having a very hard time because all the officers were retired officers--a good many had been retired before the drill regulations had changed--and this crowd they had down there were a very active lot. They were all the hot blood of San Francisco. I saw more Rolls Royces and other fine cars around there than I had ever seen collected around before and they all went to the Del Monte hotel at night. They were camped in the grounds of the hotel. It was very gay. They had gotten out of hand-- I don't mean wildly--but in a way. As a matter of fact, I think, a little bit because General Bell had been careful to caution these men not to be too severe on these fellows. As a matter of fact [chuckle] they liked severity and they had to have severity. So I was sent down there to see what I could find that was wrong. I said a large number of things were wrong, but I said a good bit of that grew out first of the fact that they were all retired officers, next that drill regulations had changed before a good many of them came in, and next that the instructors had been cautioned to be very easy on them and they were dealing with a very lively, sporty lot. I don't mean sporty in the way of dissipated--but I mean sporty in the way of polo and football and this and that--Rolls Royce cars--and all their wives or their sweeties and all would come down there with them so that it was quite a set-up.

I came in and I remember my first experience was--I got a tent there in the grounds that was on the path that led to the hotel's side entrance where the men from the camp would come by at night on the way to the hotel after their own supper at the camp. And they were all fascinated by seeing me open my bedding roll. All the officers were already in camp when they got down there so they hadn't seen that. Well, here was an officer undoing his bedding roll, which was pretty fat and big and round. I suppose there were fifteen or twenty lined up watching me, making a few clever remarks incidentally, to which I paid no attention to. And when I got my roll opened--the first thing on top was my saddle. But the next thing--under the saddle--were two of Mrs. Marshall's nightgowns which had been packed at the last minute and then a long string of stuff of hers which didn't look anything like a bedding roll arrangement for the field. And that amused them

very greatly. And I finally got my stuff out. It was a heterogeneous thing where we put everything that was left in the house in the bedding roll at the last minute before we went to the boat. And that made me famous almost in a minute. So they came back from the hotel to escort me over to have dinner. And with speeches and all as to my field equipment, I came to know them all very quickly that same night. They were awfully nice fellows. I came to know a good many of them later rather intimately.

So, then I started around the next morning and I found that there were just any, number of things that should have been changed right away because they would lead to slackness and complications and things of that sort. So I listed all these things and then I got to thinking about it. The fact that I was a lieutenant doing this for a general--his command and setting up for General Bell to criticize him, criticize this general. And I decided the only thing to do was to take it to the commanding officer and read it to him. So I went over to his tent, sat under the fly and told him what I had been ordered to do. And he said, "Yes, I have a copy of your orders." I said, “I have prepared this as far as I have gotten today and I think I should show it to you before I send it to him because I am in a very embarrassing position." And he said, "I should think you should be.” So he had his Chief of Staff there, or his adjutant or whatever they called the fellow. He was much older officer--he was a Coast Artillery officer--he wasn't retired and he generally kind-of ran the camp for the general. (The General was the man that built the Gatun Dam incidentally in Panama). And when I read all these fault findings, you might call them, this fellow was perfectly furious. The General took it very quietly. He had me go back over it again and issued the orders then for correcting this and correcting that and correcting the other thing until he corrected most of them, or at least better than half of them. Then I wrote a new telegram of the remaining half or whatever it was and didn't make any comment about these ones that he had issued orders about. And his adjutant was perfectly furious with me. He was a permanent colonel, as I say, and I was still a lieutenant.

So I started out next day. Naturally, I didn't find as many things by any manner of means--as a matter of fact very, few really--but that was my order and I carried it out and then I went to him again with a new telegram of fault findings. And he called his adjutant in who was just red-headed then, and dictated certain changes. When he got through, he

left over about half and maybe not so many as that. I said, "Well, General, I don't-think I should send these in. You have gone so far, I think it would be just an unnecessary performance for me to send in these criticisms after all you've done." So he didn't thank me for it, but they accepted that--the adjutant didn't take to it at all. And then he sent it in. What he didn't tell me was (this is the General) the same evening he sent another telegram and requested that I be detailed to the camp. So when the next morning came, I found I was in command of a company. But what made it worse was was I was put in command of a different company every day. Well that was a very strenuous thing because I couldn't really get control of them before I was taken on to the next company. I remember the first day they had a maneuver first and that was very easy. The company was in the maneuver. I just commanded them in the things they were supposed to do. Then in the afternoon, which was the time they normally would be worked out and sleepy, they had close order drill. There were two hundred of them and it was on a side of a hill and the ground was pretty rough and of course there wasn't any hope of doing this thing very well. And we had a big lunch and all of these Rolls Royces came out with all things to eat--I think even some of them even brought champagne--and the women were there to visit with them--lovely place under these live oak trees on the side of the hill--and then we went to this drill. It was a very big company—two hundred--and the drill was on rough ground and everybody was sleepy and tired and I couldn't get them to do anything together in unison with any snap. Finally I halted the company and said, "Now, listen, you fellows, came down here because you were enthusiastic to do something in this time of emergency and realizing we didn't have any trained men and you came down hers on your own to pay your own expenses and now you are organized and you are here in a company. Now this morning you were in a maneuver and you hardly marched at all, you were reserve, so almost morning you were sitting around resting. Then you had a big lunch here and your wives or girls all brought out good things and you had champagne--and its been quite delightful here under the trees and now you are so exhausted from this war service you can't do a damn thing." I said, "I'm going to go out here, and drill you again and if you can't drill, I am going to march you right in and report you are wholly ineffective." So we had a very strenuous drill and they were very much humiliated by this talk I gave to them. And they turned around and

gave me a big dinner that night at the hotel. I remember at the time I was called "Dynamite" Marshall, but it was really quite a funny thing and all of them became my friends and I continued these friendships for a good many years after that. The owners of some of those big department stores and all were among these men.

5. Q. Any comment on the tour at Governors Island?

A. I went to Governors Island as General Bell's aide. He was threatened with the flu and at first he went to his hometown in Kentucky. So, I got up there ahead of him. And he came in and this was just the beginning of the concentration and the organization of twenty training camps for young men—twenty-five hundred to each camp, two different camps up at Plattsburg Barracks. They were all over the country--these twenty training camps of twenty-five hundred men each, where they would have either a three months or a six months course-- I've forgotten which--as their sole training to be an officer. Of course, all sorts of political pressures were being brought to bear--tremendous pressures were brought to bear to get into a training camp--and everybody was taking a shot at Governors Island and I was there alone--General Bell hadn't come yet. Finally he came up from Cynthiana, I believe it was, in Kentucky and he was going to the Rockefeller Hospital, a sort of experimental hospital there. They'd given him a delightful suite there and he was going to be treated for his flu., So he called his staff together and told them he had to go off on a trip--he didn't say he was sick--and during his absence Lieutenant [Captain] Marshall would represent him and anything Lieutenant [Captain] Marshall said was his order--that he would communicate with Lieutenant [Captain] Marshall and I would transmit his orders, so that whatever instructions I gave were General Bell's instructions and they were all to follow it. So he went off and left me with a staff of about fifteen old colonels at the head of all the various departments and I was the Lieutenant [Captain] and all the pressure of the war was coming on. The Governors Island ferryboat would be jammed with fellows coming over there and trying to get--from J. P. Morgan's office (I remember I had his stenographer) and he was shocked that he could not be immediately tended to because he was from the J. P. Morgan office. Taft was a professor, vice president or professor at Yale. I've forgotten which. Anyway, I think one of his sons, it must have been Robert Taft, later a senator, came in and I treated them all absolutely alike. And, of course,

they couldn't accept that but it went that way. They tried every way under Heaven to find out where General Bell was and they finally communicated with Washington and I told them at Washington that I was doing as General Bell instructed and there we stood. It was really quite an interesting performance I know I kept three telephones going all the time. It was just about as hectic as anything I ever saw and we finally--had an interesting difficulty with the staff, these old colonels, expectant quartermaster generals to

(Sgt: Heffner: We are about to run out, General.)

Well, that's enough.

Tape 6M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

April 5, 1957

RECORDED INTERVIEW ON TAPE
BY GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
April 5, 1957, at Pinehurst, North Carolina

(in answer to questions by Dr. Forrest C. Pogue. Sgt. Heffner ran the machine.)

ORDERED TO FRANCE

Q. 1. General Bell seems to have been a very fine person. Any comments about your service with him?

A. General Bell -- my first contact with him, as I have explained, was at Leavenworth where I really did not know him personally but he took some action in connection with my affairs. Then later on in the Philippines, when I was left in command of the larger portion of troops -I say "in command," it was all done indirectly of course. Now when I came back from the Philippines and he made me his aide in order to retain my services in connection with the two training camps for the West Coast, I came to know him very much better. But when I was first made his aide I was not with him at all until the close of the camp at Fort Douglas, Utah, which was in the early fall.

General Bell was a very remarkable character. As a fighter, I don't think he had many equals. He held the Medal of Honor and should have been awarded it on several occasions. He was attacked by many older officers, particularly when he won preferment and promotion over their heads, but actually he was so far ahead of them in ability that there was no question about it. Fortunately, he came into the service under the present General Macarthur’s father , General Arthur MacArthur, who admired him greatly and who recommended him for promotions, first as general officer in the Volunteers and then as a general officer in the Regular Army when he was in his early forties (that is, General Bell). As I say, he was a superb fighter. And in time he came to tell me, through my questioning of a number of performances which were always referred to as being foolish, crazy things, though actually they were very, very clever as well as tremendously courageous. He won his first great fame through the command of a regiment which was organized in the Philippines by General Bell and the men were selected from the National Guard volunteers and it was a superb regiment of all selected men, admirably suited for the sort of campaign that developed. I had a great admiration for General Bell's fighting qualities

and his aggressive leadership. I don't think he was a success as chief of staff. He tried to handle things too much by personal associations, by letters. He was having a hard battle with General Ainsworth which was the preliminary to the final battle which took place between General Wood and General Ainsworth. All of General Bell's efforts to modernize the Army were being ruthlessly attacked by those who were opposed to anything of that sort, largely because they didn't want to do it themselves personally.

When I met General Bell he had already been Chief of Staff, he had been in command in the Philippines, and he had returned from the Philippines and had been given the command out in the West Coast with his headquarters at San Francisco. His trouble, if I could so characterize it at this time, was that he was too apt to engage in lengthy speeches. He made a very successful one on one occasion at the request of Secretary of War Taft -- to take his (Taft's) place on a train trip they were going on when Taft had to make a speech at some point and General Bell went out and made a top line speech. The trouble was that started him in making speeches and he overdid it very badly, but nobody could tell him so. When I became his aide -- I was getting pretty well along in years for that sort of duty -- with some hesitation, but nevertheless with a firm intention, I made it plain that I thought he was making a great mistake in making these speeches. Mrs. Bell was shocked that I, a comparative unknown, should dare make such a criticism of General Bell. But I was convinced that that was the trouble and thought that it was my duty to tell him, and if he didn't like that he could relieve me as an aide because I wasn't after that kind of job. But we got along. Mrs. Bell didn't like me at all at first and afterwards we became devoted friends.

In our San Francisco association, it was the opening moves that finally led up to the declaration of war and we were in San Francisco when Wilson made his famous speech, whereupon General Bell was ordered to the East Coast to replace General Wood who was relieved of command of the then Eastern Department and assigned to the command of a former fraction of it with headquarters at Charleston, South Carolina. I have already described, I think, my arrival in Governors Island and General Bell's placing me in a pretty strenuous position while he went off to the hospital. I remember then I would go up every other day to the hospital to see him. I was quite a long drive and took quite a long time. And the visit there always took time because he was intensely interested in what was going on and I tried to tell him

exactly what it was and particularly to tell him the displeasure of his senior staff officers with the fact that I was doing several things.

One thing at this time was very interesting. His other aide had taken all of the supply estimates for these training camps of twenty-five hundred candidates each and boiled it down until he had it on the basis of hundred men -- everything down to the sheets of paper you had to have pads, pencils, mattresses, pillows, kitchen stoves, everything was included in it. Ordnance, rifles, uniforms-- nothing was left out. Well, it was really a very valuable work. And when we came into this Eastern Department, we were quite certain that the thing wasn't heading up right because there were so many complaints coming in right away about the lack of this - and the lack of that and when we went to ask the staff about it, these older staff officers, these senior colonels, they just turned us down as not knowing anything about the thing. So I had the aide with the list visit each camp, see what they had and then telegraph me what was lacking and they could calculate on this business of what was needed for a hundred men. We found the lacks were very, very serious. The first one which required immediate attention was that there were not enough blankets, not enough mattresses, and not enough pillows for the candidates that arrived up at Plattsburg where there were two camps of twenty-five hundred each and which lacked all of these things to keep a man warm. He had no pillow on his bunk, many of the bunks had no mattresses, and they all I lacked the necessary number of blankets. Well by multiplying it out on this list we had, he could telegraph me exactly how many to send. Then we began to experience the first knowledge of what the war shortages were really going to be which started in this very small way. We found, we couldn't get the blankets. First the Quartermaster didn't have them and, next, the shops in New York didn't have them and we were getting mattresses and blankets and pillows from as far west as Chicago in order to provide for this camp -- first camp -- at Plattsburg. There were camps all scattered about the country. Maybe they were all similarly short, but we didn't know it at the time. So these telegrams would come in with great frequency, about an hour apart really, telling of these new lacks and this particularly serious lacks which affected their health in that they couldn't keep warm and would stir up a terrific reaction.

I found that trying to get these things I wasn't making much headway with the staff and I directed that everything be sent by express and that raised a racket right away

because that would be very expensive. Well I didn't think the expense was going to mean so much with these men freezing up there. The reaction -- the public reaction -- was going to be very severe. The men would probably all get colds and things of that sort, and pneumonia. So I would direct these things be sent by express and then we couldn't buy them around New York. I had them buying them out in Chicago. And I, as a matter of fact, personally sent out here to locate where we could buy blankets, where we could buy mattresses and buy pillows and things of that sort. And then I would send a note over to the Quartermaster, this old colonel, to buy these and ship them by express. Finally he came over to see me and told me that this was very expensive, he knew what General Bell's orders were but he wanted to bring to my attention what I was letting the government in for. And I tried to make clear to him what he was letting the government in for if he didn't have the proper things there for those men. And finally he said to me, "You must understand that we have been here, I, myself, for several years, and we originally supplied these camps with what we thought was necessary. Now you come in with definite amounts of all sorts of things and about every hour you have a new amount. So how can you possibly believe you are right?" Well, I pulled him out this list, which was based on 100 units, and told him that the other aide had the other end of the list and he was visiting each post. Well he had never seen such a thing and of course it was a gold mine of information and he asked if he could borrow it. I said, "Well, you can take it over there and type it and then send me back my copy. But that's where this is coming from and we know what we are talking about. Well that made quite a change in him right away because he saw that we had something he didn't have. He was very much reassured and went ahead from that time on filling the orders that came in over my desk.

You see I had to give the orders in General Bell's name. I tried to tell him a little of this when I went to the hospital and he got excited and proposed all sorts of peculiarities to the thing which we couldn't manage. I just didn't answer those and when the time came around, went ahead the way we were doing until we got out of our jam. We had to do this with camps around near Washington and down in the South and all over the Eastern Department.

This was my introduction to the office there and along with that as I have already referred to, came the terrific pressure to be accepted in these camps and everybody who was anybody in a sense was trying to get in and each of them seemed to feel that political pressure

was necessary and I was trying to demonstrate that it wasn't necessary. We would go at these things just on the face value and without any reaction to pressures. I found myself then up against ex-President -- Mr. Taft, for example, and one of his constituents maybe it was his son Richard -- I think it was this son -- and others particularly from the wealthy of New York, J.P. Morgan and Co. and offices of that power, all seemed to think they could get what they wanted right away just by stating their desire. I stood this off, I guess I probably stood it off, better than General Bell because I didn't know them and they didn't know me. And I could go right ahead. But it was a very, very strenuous procedure. As I say I was using three phones at the time and I was being seen by everyone that came to the Island so it was exceedingly hectic and I had to learn how to do business quickly. I had had this in San Francisco just before we left. As a matter of fact I had gone ahead on my own and had rented office buildings across the street from us because I could see right away what was coming and I put a lot of reserve officers on duty there and we got started for the flood that was about to break.

Now I would like to recite one some little thing that happened that always gave me much pleasure afterwards. Before I left San Francisco, I very hurriedly dictated a number of letters to various people around headquarters thanking them for courtesies for whatever it was they had rendered for me, and I did it in about an hour in the late, afternoon, and then I remembered the telephone operator. She had been very efficient and when I called to get anybody anywhere in San Francisco, she would locate them in the barber shop or wherever it might be. So I dictated a letter to her and told her that I had never experienced such high efficiency from a telephone operator. I had never seen her. Didn't lay eyes on her then. I dictated this letter to her and signed it and then sent it down that afternoon and then I went home. Well, a West Coast rain came up that night and it was raining very hard. And I was out at Fort Mason at the foot of Van Nessr Avenue and there was a knock at the door and I went to the door and here was this little woman, I guess she was about 45 or 50, and she was wrapped up in a raincoat. And it was a terrible night out, very hard driving rain, and I brought her inside and I discovered that she was the telephone operator and she said she had been there, I don't know how many years, let us say twenty-five, and that was the first time anybody had ever thanked her for what she had done. So she came out in the rain to thank me. That made quite an impression on me and it controlled a great many thanks to people like that in future years in my dealings.

However, when the future years began to come around after the First World War was over, General Pershing and myself were in San Francisco and staying with the commanding general out at Fort Mason just next door to where I had been living on this other occasion. The commanding general's wife, incidentally, he had married rather late in his career, was a great friend of my sister's back in Pennsylvania, so that threw us together in this momentary time we were there -- which incidentally was at the time of the death of President Harding -- he died in San Francisco you will recall at the Palace Hotel and I was involved in that very heavily -- the arrangements. So I told at the table this story of the telephone operator which had occurred at the outbreak of the First World War which was now over. The General's wife was very much interested in it and she said, "Let's go up and call on her." So she and I walked up. I had not seen the woman since that night -- had never heard of her since that night. We found these two elderly women at the telephone switchboard and, of course, this particular one was very much gratified to have the commanding general's wife call on her and to see me again. But she told me they were in a bad way. There was a new lieutenant in the Signal Corps that had just come on duty and he was going to get rid of all the women and that meant that she and her old friend were going to lose their jobs -- she after some twenty odd years. Well the commanding general's wife was much excited so we went right back to the house and we found the others still at the table -- General Pershing and the general talking there. She told this story to the commanding general who immediately issued an order through his aide that these women should never be discharged except with his personal approval and that was to be by voice and not by paper. So then we advent back up again and saw them again and assured them that their jobs were secure. That was the end of the story so far as I was concerned. I never heard of her afterwards. But it was always a very satisfying memory - that little incident.

However, I left San Francisco that morning after the call on the telephone operator [here he is referring to the 1916 departure] and went directly to Governors Island. General Bell as I said came up from Kentucky and just paused long enough to arrange that I should exercise command in his name and then went to this hospital, though no one knew where he had gone -- they thought he was off on a trip -- but actually he was developing a case of flu. I have already described what was going on.

GENERAL MARSHALL AND WORLD WAR I.

Q. 1a. How did you come to be picked for the first contingent which went to France?

A. The next thing of excitement that occurred was that General Pershing arrived, headed for Europe. I found out that he had asked for my services -- he did not do it personally but his Chief of Staff did -- his new Chief of Staff, General Harbord -- but when General Pershing found that I was with General Bell he had them to drop the request and, therefore, I didn't go, though I didn't know it at that time.

Q. 1b. What was your impression of General Pershing on your first meeting with him?

A. General Pershing arrived in civilian clothes and straw hat. We put him on a ferryboat at Governors Island at a secluded dock and sent him over to the *Baltic* which he boarded for his trip to Europe.

A. 1a. Then I received a telegram that my services were requested by General Sibert, the man who had built the Gatun Dam, the man whose camp I had been required to inspect out into Del Monte, California. He had asked for me to go and I was to report to him. Actually I didn't find him where they told me to report to him and he came in on a train later. He had paused long enough to get married, which had mixed up the appointments, and as I had the only desk around the neighborhood he made my desk, my services, the headquarters for troops just coming in to go to Europe in the first convoy which was to be the First Division. They had called on the training camp I think each camp was to send two hundred candidates, let's say -- I don't know whether it was twenty-five or two hundred, but anyway it was a very small number, and these were to be the needed second lieutenants for this first unit which had very low officer strength and we wanted to go with full war strength, and all of these lieutenants were directed to report to me at Governors Island. So these fine looking young men -- the pick of about 2% of twenty-five hundred from each selection -- and they were perfectly splendid looking men. I remember the first ten that came in -- every one of them had gotten married the minute they got the note and they came to New York and reported to my desk and I gave them directions as to when to report back to me because their unit was not sailing yet -- and I was going to sail with it -which gave them two or three days of liberty in New York with their brides. Of the ten I lost track of two. The other eight, every one was killed in the First Division. I might say they all had their brides with them when they came to Governors Island.

I was only able to find about three hours of clear time too to New York and my

purchases and actions there have always -- I don't know whether you will say interested me or has been a satisfaction to me. I first went to Jaeger's store and bought a Jaeger blanket which I still have which took me through France very warm. It was soft -- like silk almost. I bought three suits of Jaeger underwear which almost bankrupt me and two suits of Jaeger pajamas. Both the underwear had a very peculiar history because it began to shrink because of very bad washing in France, and finally it would always get to the point unless they put a big V down there in the shoulders, I would have my chin on my knee cap. These things finally got so shrunk that I finally had to give them up -- couldn't wear them any longer. But it enabled me to go entirely through the First World War without a cold. And I think I was about the only one out of two million who didn't cough every morning with a cold.

Q. Ic. Were there any incidents of interest on your trip over in June 1917?

A. We got on board the *Tenadores* and I was in the same stateroom as Lesley McNair for whom the old War College site was named and who was killed by a bomb in France and who was wounded on a reconnaissance in Africa before that -- and who I had put in command of all the ground troops in the United States -- their training and organization with General Mark Clark as his assistant. Also there was General Frank McCoy whom I got on a more intimate basis of acquaintance with at that time. He had just come out of Mexico as attaché and General Pershing had sent for him. So he was on this boat, going over to join General Pershing who was a ship or two ahead of us.

The men we found had been given their arms on going to the train. They were about twenty per cent of the original regiment. The rest of the regiment had been taken to form new regiments. So all but twenty per cent of these regiments were recruits and it was quite a messed-up affair when they arrived in Hoboken. They had no knowledge of how to drill, no knowledge of how to handle their rifles, and they were eighty per cent of the strength of the companies. Together with the fact that all the men loading the ships seemed to be bull-necked Germans, it wasn't a very encouraging outlook as we loaded at night-there and into the next morning, and finally got underway on this "secret" departure. We were taken up the Hudson and anchored right off the Grant Monument and were visited by excursion boats the two days we remained there.

Finally we started out and I felt the ship moving. So I thought I would get up and see

this affair. It was certainly historic -- our troops going to Europe. And I got out on deck and it was about half past four in the morning or thereabouts. Anyway, it was just dimly light. We got down the river and anchored apparently. Anyway we stopped opposite Governors Island. And we had to wait there -- I discovered they were waiting because the chain that was being put across the harbor to check the submarine entrance was either being unfastened or fastened -- I don't remember which. But I know something occurred there that I never forgot, for it was about as significant an indication of our complete state of unpreparedness that I have ever seen. I was standing up under the bridge and they had mounted a three-inch gun on a pedestal mount on the foreword part of the deck and these trim-looking naval files under a naval noncom were rigging up the gun. And having dealt with this multitude of recruits of this regiment as we had and their complete ignorance of their weapons or anything, I thought to myself well, thank goodness there is one thing that's organized -- the Navy. Just then the captain called down to this yeoman, or whatever he was, in charge of this detail and said to him in a very strong voice -- he said -- "Have you your ammunition?" and this fellow in a rather offended tone of voice said, "No sir, we haven't any ammunition." Well, I thought, "Well, My God, even the naval part isn't organized here and we are starting off to Europe." It was altogether a terrible exhibition of our paucity of means with which to go to war.

It caused General Pershing, aside from the fact that the men were hard to handle in their lack of training and all, it made a terrific impression on the French command when they saw these recruits in the First Division because they had been told that the 1st Division was a seasoned division of regular soldiers. Well, you would have to go around with a microscope to find a regular soldier in the First Division. So that the impression that they all got of what General Pershing would have to offer them was colored by this terrific showing of unpreparedness of the troops of the First Division. We were given as we sailed -- in fact we didn't get to open the things until we had gone to sea or at least gone down the harbor -- we discovered that we had units on paper that we had never seen or never heard of. I remember the trench mortar units -- the 37 mm units -- and several others we had never heard of them. Here they were on paper, but there were no weapons and there was no unit. And we were organizing on the ocean. We had no knowledge of whether we had any

of these weapons on board and actually we didn't. It was certainly a demonstration of complete and utter unpreparedness such as I had never dreamt of in my life.

I had found out in the records that the first expedition going to the Philippines before the fall of Manila only had 150 rounds per man and were going seven thousand miles from home, when the battlefield allowance -- on the wagon trains and other things and on the soldier and all -- was something like 600 rounds. And here they were going to the Philippines with 150. Now I have just recited the exhibition that we had to give in the 1st Division in going to France. And I repeat again that this cost General Pershing a great deal because it shook French confidence terribly as they thought that was the American Army and nothing we could tell them made any impression. We described how we were getting these officers in this six months course and starting new camps all the time with thee officer camps. That made no impression on them. They couldn't conceive of an officer with six months' training. And some of these only had three months' training. Altogether anybody who went through that first affair got a dose of unpreparedness such as he would never forget. I didn't realize then I was going to have one after another and several when I was in responsible position for all this affair and yet I would have to find some way to crawl out of the difficulties.

Q. 2b. Could you give a description of St. Nazaire at this time?

A. The same thing went on when we got to France. When we landed -- by a fortunate coincidence I was the second man ashore. I was just behind General Sibert on our first expedition when we landed at St. Nazaire. And when we finally got permission to go ashore that evening, several of the officers, and walk about the town. It was very depressing. They had just gotten the news of the terrible losses on the Somme when the Germans had thrown back this offensive -- that developed afterwards they had learned all about it before it started. And every woman seemed to be in mourning. And everyone seemed to be on the verge of tears. And the one thing we noticed most of all. There was no enthusiasm at all over our arrival. The Canadians had come and were going to settle the war in a month or two and nothing happened. Now the Americans had come and were going to settle the war right off, and nothing happened. The whole thing was a very depressing affair. And the surroundings, everything about it, our first taste of the effect of the war particularly on the rear areas left a lasting impression on my mind and a deep sympathy for the French and, I think, an understanding such as other officers in high

staff positions -- that had not gone through that affair -- did not comprehend, and were rather intolerant of the French in some of their peculiarities -- which were not peculiarities to the French but they were to us. And I might say that everything in the way of the large war measures were a peculiarity to us.

As long as I am on the trail going to France I might continue with that. On the ship, of course, the submarine war was at its worst. I think they were sinking a hundred thousand or million tons a month, something like that, I think it was a million tons. And the ocean was just full of German submarines and they didn't have the proper protective measures at that time. So we had a perilous trip. We had a cruiser leading us, the *Kearsarge,* and two others as the wings of the convoy. Finally one night the ships opened fire on a supposed approaching torpedo which had everybody very much stirred up. I wrote in the War Diary about this. And then I wrote in the War Diary the next day that they determined it was a porpoise and not a torpedo. Then I found that this had been radioed home from the ships and had stirred up a grand to do in the United States. So when we pulled into St. Nazaire the place was full of rumors from the United States side on what had happened to us and what was happening to the other convoys. And one of them right after that was struck by a torpedo which had troops on it and that, of course, stirred up a grand to-do. Fortunately, they didn't have any major troop sinkings during the war, though they did have great sinkings of the cargo boats. I think that was the principal happening of the ship going over.

One thing was we were trying to study up what we were in for and we found that there were practically no textbooks of any kind on this trench warfare that we could get our hands to. Finally one Englishman on board -- I think he was an attaché -- he had something they had printed at the last minute and everybody wanted that at once. It was entirely on trench warfare which later became the great argument between the French and General Pershing because he didn't want to specialize in trench warfare. He wanted to get into the warfare of maneuver. And the French felt, of course, that he -- not knowing anything about the situation on the front was hazarding something that there was no chance of putting into effect. The same thing came up in regard to target practice. They had only short range target practice and I had to arrange the target ranges for this purpose and there were no long-range target fields

that I could get my hands on. They didn't have big reservations like we do. They had a much more economical and, I thought, fine arrangement whereby you could take over an area for maneuvers by certain advice and arrangement through the political set-up.

Q. 2a. Were things rather confused at St. Nazaire and at Gondrecourt at this time?

A. When we got to St. Nazaire, as I say, there was a state of considerable confusion. But the first thing that happened to us was that they began to taking men away from the First Division because General Pershing's staff had gone over there with fifty men, and I understood that they said in the United States that that was all he needed. But he had to get men for all the various things and setting up offices and the only place he could get them was the First Division. The only place he could get additional officers was the First Division. Now I am very hazy on the figures. But they told him, I think at first, that forty officers would be sufficient and I think that the GHQ down at Chaumont was something like two thousand officers or maybe more. And there were similar other groups at other places scattered over France. And now they were trying to start out with forty, so they took them from the First Division until the First Division was literally stripped of all officers. And they took the men. They were doing port service in England and all up and down the coast of France. And the strength of the First Division was getting lower and lower all the time.

Q. 2c. Were you in Paris for the Bastille Day parade in 1917?

A. I went up to Paris in time to arrive for the Bastille Day parade. I remember that General McCoy -- Frank McCoy -- got me my first Sam Browne belt which I wore, for many years - longer than I should have -- out of sentiment. And I finally put this on for the Bastille Day parade. We were only in Paris for a few days when we started out by motorcar for Gondrecourt south of Bar-le-Duc. I have forgotten now how far north of Chaumont, which later became the Headquarters, and that was north of Langres which became the great school headquarters.

Q. 3. Colonel Marshall was everywhere in these early days. He got many ideas from the French. The 18th French Division was located nearby. Please describe your efforts to get the first units into shape for battle.

A. I became very much involved with all these things at the start. And I was also

involved in locating the first four divisions to arrive in France. I was just given the job of locating them and seeing what they needed. So I had to figure out what was required in the way of mess halls and bunkhouses and headquarters and hospital buildings and everything of that sort. Nobody advised me. They didn't have time. They just told me to do it. One of my old friends, a student officer from Leavenworth, John Palmer, who was one of the fine intellectuals of the Army was G-3 at that time. And he just sent me a telegram that they could give me no advice; so just go ahead and do what I thought was wise. So I had a pretty large order for a young officer there and I proceeded to undertake it in as large away as I could. The only trouble was I got everything fixed up for these four divisions and I didn't realize that nobody had fixed up anything for the First Division. So my own division was behind all the others in getting the necessary things. And they had to do greater work, for themselves. And the training program was intense and that made it very hard to conduct the work. I know they ate in the rain and mud for a month or two under miserable conditions because they didn't have anything even to put a shelter up for a roof in which to serve the food. Kitchens were out in the weather and the men were out in the weather as to their billets which were largely in barns.

Well we had all of this to learn. I got a pretty heavy dose of it because I was not only G-3, and then for a time acting chief of staff of the First Division, but I was dealing with this French division whose headquarters was quartered with us and it was trying to take up our training in trench warfare when we hadn't even been trained in squads left and squads right and we were trying to get organized in the way of supply and things of that sort. We had two automobiles, I think, for the entire division and they came from the Marine Corps. This regiments, the Fifth Marines, came in with us and was attached to the First Division at the start. So, of course, the lost the two open Cadillacs -- (chuckles) -- and it was a long time before the First Division got any motor cars at all. And it made it very difficult because the telephones we had to use -- the French phones -- and of course they were overloaded right away and they were not built for any such service as we inflicted on them or any such service tirades as they heard. We called it the “pas fini” service because that's about all we used to get over the phone. Altogether these various affairs were very instructive and very trying.

The trouble was the GHQ, never having dealt with anything like this before, never having dealt with a mobile division in such a way -- except when it was camped

down in Texas, imposed demands on us that we couldn't possibly meet.

I remember on one occasion General Pershing was suddenly coming up with Joffre for a review of the division and the secretary of the General Staff, who happened to be General McCoy (who was a colonel then), called me up and said General Pershing and Marshal Joffre would be there at eight o'clock in the morning and to have a review of the division. And General Pershing sent word he wanted the division to pass in the shortest possible time. Well the division at that time was scattered over a strip of the country about thirty miles long and about twenty miles wide. There were no motor vehicles of any kind. Two units I found -- one of them was a Marine unit -- had been marching all day to get back to their billets before dark. And I managed to catch them on the road at the end of the march and they had to march all night to get back to the place for this review. I made a guess at that. I didn't have time to go out and look at one, and I had to get orders to all of these various units by horseback, anyway we could get out to them, and this telephone service which was abominable, so as to get them all started back, all started in, and they had to march all night. A great many of them had been down at this exercise, whatever it was, and they were in the process of marching home, as the Marines were so they were very much exhausted. But they had to start right back. And during the night they got back to this place that I had selected by guesswork. And I got out there and found that it was on a hilltop but the ground was so soggy that you went up to your ankles at every step and at some parts you couldn’t get over. Along with this I had General Pershing's instructions that this was to be a maneuver in the shortest possible time. So I arranged the division so that the preliminary review took place in one formation with the reviewing officers at one place, and the march-by took place with the reviewing officers at another place. This made it possible for the division to move into review formations from where it was standing without marching around at all. And with a large body of troops that saved a lot. We didn't have the artillery with us then. It was training in the south of France. But we did have a lot of horse vehicles -- all the machine guns were hauled by mules, all the 37 mms. -- and there were a number of horse transports involved in the thing and all the wagon trains we had to get into it. I fixed it so that after presenting the division and going down the front of it, if he wished to which he did, that all I had to do then if I moved the reviewing party to another spot, was to have the

division perform what was in effect squads left and march by in review in column of squads in mass formation. That didn't take very long. Well, it took quite awhile with this large body of troops. I think there were about eighteen thousand, twenty thousand I guess. The only thing missing was the artillery. General Pershing was stunned with the rapidity of the affair because they just marched right by and the thing was over. He turned to me and said "What is this?" I said, "That's the end of the review, General." General Sibert didn't answer him because he didn't know. I didn't have time to consult him on any of these things and besides he was having a very hard time with General Pershing, which later led to his relief. General Pershing said, "How could they march by this fast?" I said, "Well, they were stationed in position up there and they executed 'squads left' and came down here. The machine gun carts were all in the rear of them and could turn that way and there was no other way to do it. And that was the shortest way that the review could be managed and those were the instructions that I got from the secretary of the General Staff." Well, General Pershing was in a thoroughly evil humor then. He couldn't do much to me because I had merely done what they said and he was taking it out on General Sibert.

He came back in a few days again on short notice to see an exercise in trench warfare where they used the short range bombs -- not the offensive bombs and so you can throw them and still if you could dodge behind the trenches, you could get out of the way. Roosevelt's [young Teddy] battalion had just been down there and performed such an operation which they had worked out themselves -- which was the custom for that sort of thing -- and he was the first one to do it -- and from quite a distance off and I called him up by telephone if he could get his men down there and do this for General Pershing. It meant they had to march all night. His enthusiasm was very great. Archie was in this too. So he and Archie and their outfit came down -- this battalion -- to put on again this exercise in trench warfare. I am telling this because it had quite an interesting sequel to it. I'll have to be, forgiven for the very personal phase of the thing because if affected me personally very much. It was a triumph to have anybody really to do this because as a rule these things, like a trained chorus, took a week or more to organize for and here we had only during the night and the night was spent in marching. Theodore got down there with His troops. General Pershing came in on the train. General Sibert was late in getting to the train, so I received General Pershing at the train and General Pershing was furious that General

Sibert wasn't there and I didn't know what to say. And General Sibert gave me hell for going down to the train ahead of him so altogether I was in very bad odor for trying to do my best under the circumstances. So we went out to this place where the exercises were to be conducted -- there was a french system out there which the French had dug for us -- they called it Washington Center. Roosevelt was trained on that and the men were familiar with it. So he was ready to go through this exercise and quite thrilled that he was to put this on for General Pershing and he had gotten his men all thrilled. He knew how to stir up morale all right and he had done it very well this time. So when General Pershing got out there he had his chief of staff and he had several new staff officers who later occupied very important positions there who had just arrived and this was their first visit to anything of this kind and their first exhibition of anything like this trench affair. And the rest of this I might get some of the details wrong, descriptive terms which played quite a part in it but I will do the best I can. The men went through the exercises. There was a lot of shooting, of course, a lot of dashing around from trench to trench, a lot of grenade throwing and general hullaballoo and then it was all over.

And then General Pershing said "Assemble the officers." So they assembled the officers and he turned to General Sibert and said "Conduct the critique." Well General Sibert had not had a chance to see the exercise and he started to say two or three things and it didn't go fast enough for General Pershing so he directed a young officer who was in charge of the exercise with Roosevelt to give some of the critique and he made a pretty good stab at it but it still wasn't satisfactory to General Pershing. He just gave everybody hell and he was very severe with General Sibert -- very severe -- in front of all the officers -- and among other things he said that we didn't show any signs much of training -- we had not justified the time we had had here -- and we didn't show an awareness of the things and he said you have changed the names of things. You call a dump, which was a supply thing for general ammunition, you have given a new name for dump and you have given new names for two other things -- I've forgotten what they were -- and generally just scarified us. He didn't give General Sibert a chance to talk at all. Our Chief of Staff, who had succeeded me, was a permanent colonel and he had just arrived and he was rather deaf and he hadn't heard all this. And when General Pershing dismissed General Sibert in a sense with a word and turned to the Chief of Staff and began questioning him, he wasn’t quite aware of what had happened. He hadn't heard at all. He hadn't been there but about

two days. He didn't know what the devil was going on and he got pushed out of the way in a hurry. So I decided it was about time for me to make my sacrifice play. While this sounds like much of a personal thing for me to put in here -- I do it with apologies --this is the only way I can tell it -- but I heard of it many, many times from various officers in the division. I went up and started to talk to General Pershing who dismissed the Chief of Staff rather contemptuously and was going off. And I came up to intervene -- to interceded, as it were, and to explain some of the things and he didn't want to talk to me. He shrugged his shoulders and turned away from me. And I put my hand on his arm and practically forced him to talk. I said, "General Pershing there's something to be said here and I think I should say it because I've been here longer." And he stopped and said, "What have you got to say?" Well I said, "To start with we have never received anything from your Headquarters. When I was down there two months ago, as a matter of fact, three months ago I think, I was told about this Platoon Chiefs' Manual which was coming up. It's never come out yet."He turned to one of these officers and said, "What about that, So and So?" And So and So said. "Well, general, we've had troubles with the French printers. You know they are very difficult to deal with." General Pershing turned to me and said, "You know we have our troubles." I said, "Yes, I know you do, General, I know you do. But ours are immediate and every day and have to be solved before night. Now we never have gotten your Platoon Manual. We have made the best we can of this thing. The only thing you've gotten out was to change the names of the dump and everything and now you are criticizing us for using the names you changed." And he turned to the Chief of Staff and said, "How about that, So and So?" And So and So said, "I'll look into it." I said, "You don't have to look into it .It's right here in orders. It's a fact; it's here. That's the only thing we've gotten from you and now we are being harassed for that. We've had a very hard time -- we've worked very, very hard. The men have had no advantages of any kind and they don't expect any. But," I said, "they ought to get a fair deal at any rate." I was just mad all over. I thought I had gotten in it up to my neck -- I might as well not try to float but to splash a little bit. I've forgotten all that I said, but I had a rather inspired moment. And the others were horrified and General Pershing walked away from me by saying, "Well, you must appreciate the troubles we have," and I said, "Yes," again, "General, but we have them every day and many a day and we have to solve everyone of them by night." And then I left and everybody bade me farewell. I had to be relieved They all

came to me really very seriously. General Sibert was very regretful that I had done this and some of my bosom friends came up to me and said, of course, I was finished and would be fired right off. I said, "All I can see is that I may get troop duty instead of staff duty and certainly that would be a great success."

General Pershing never mentioned this thing to me until years afterwards and then he recalled it and his comment on me was that I was pretty hot. Well, as a matter of fact, it made quite an impression on me because instead of ruining me he sent for me quite frequently and when he would come to the division he would get me off away from the others and talk to me about the condition of affairs, particularly when he thought the Germans were going to attack us up near Cantigny in order to administer a damaging blow to American morale. So far as I could see it helped me rather than harmed me but it gave me a key to General Pershing's character which I found held good all the way through. I have never seen a man who could listen to as much criticism, as long as it was constructive criticism, and wasn't just being irritable or something of that sort. You could talk to him like you were discussing somebody in the next county and yet you were talking about him personally. It might be about a social thing -- certainly about an official thing. You could say what you pleased as long as it was straight, constructive criticism. And he did not hold it against you for an instant. I never saw another commander that I could do that with. Their sensitivity clouded them up so it just wouldn't work. I have seen some I could be very frank with, but I never could be frank to the degree that I could with General Pershing. I know the members of Congress were so astonished when he was having his hearings -- that I sat next to him with General Fox Conner on the other side -- that I could interrupt him and talk to him and tell him about something and he could turn around and tell them. He had no hesitation at all of receiving suggestions or advice from me or others about him. And it was one of his great strengths that he could listen to those things. You might get irritated because he didn't do it right away. He always seemed to be very sluggish in finally taking action. But it would appear afterwards that he was just about right as to the timing. The fact that you could talk to him with such frankness meant everything in the world in getting along in such a difficult situation. Now the remarkable part of this was I was a comparative stranger to him because he never called me in to be his aide until after the fighting was over. He called me in to GHQ just about the time of the Soissons fight and put me in the Operations

Section under General Fox Conner. General Eltinge sat in a good bit -- he was Deputy Chief of Staff. That was my introduction to GHQ. I left that and went back to the 1st Army and became Chief of Operations of the Army and later Chief of Staff of the 8th Army Corps, and then General Pershing's aide. I've digressed considerably here but I guess it's all right. That, in a way, is the way w started in France.

The soldiers were immediately inflamed against the YMCA. The poor YMCA couldn't get the people -- they had to have a great deal -- and it had to be sent from the States in large measure. And it seized whoever it could get in France. I remember the son of the Ambassador was there and they drew on him to help them there in their YMCA huts and it immediately stirred up great criticism because they thought he ought to be in the ranks. They were utterly unreasonable about this. But that's the way soldiers go. I found exactly the same thing later on in the Second World War and I found the same thing when I came in as Secretary of Defense in the Korean War. They are very quick to get worked up to something that they think is not quite as it should be or that is to their disadvantage in particular of course. This was very pronounced over there with the YMCA. It had undertaken the contract to do all the various things and was given a certain allowance of tonnage which I think was something like -- I think it was 130 tons a day -- and it was cut down to 30 tons very shortly after that. But its obligations were not cut down at all. To show you how these things went -- the Red Cross ran a couple of plays which were very good. The Salvation Army put on one play only -- beautifully put on -- cost them quite a lot of money. And I think the YMCA had to put on 260 or 620, I've forgotten which, and was responsible for all of them and had this reduced tonnage and everything to battle with. It was for the reason of the feelings stirred up by these various organizations -- the Red Cross, the Knights of Columbus, the Salvation Army -- one or two others I believe -- that General Pershing made these recommendations which was followed that there would be only one organization in a case of this kind and this would be the Red Cross. Well I was interested to find when I came into the presidency of the Red Cross to find exactly the same reaction against the Red Cross that there had been against the YMCA and for exactly the same reason, because they had undertaken all the obligations and, of course, they had all kinds of difficulties in carrying them out. So they were turned on. And I found when I became President of the Red Cross I had quite a battle with the reporters who were all violently against the Red Cross,

particularly if they had been service men -- and it was unjustified in the extreme. But it was exactly the same reason that had turned them on the YMCA and favored the Red Cross in the First World War and the Salvation Army and the Knights of Columbus -- they were all the favored fellows. Whoever is put in that position is bound to catch a very bad reaction, Quartermaster generally gets it, Commissary sometimes gets it, the Staff at Headquarters always gets it. That's one reason I constantly changed the staff officers and brought staff officers from outside from overseas into the Pentagon and sent the others a third of the time out to the other staffs in the field.

I think I've given a fairly good account of our arrival over there in France and some of the conditions with which we had to contend. I went up for my first experience in a battle with the Foreign Legion of the Moroccan Division and I saw them in their fight just west of Verdun -- the western Verdun defense. It was the time of the great attacks in August -- August 20th and 21st, I think. The artillery preparation was five days long beforehand which was considered the greatest artillery preparation in the history of warfare at that time and the greatest concentration of guns and I was with the headquarters of a Moroccan division. During its advance later on I managed to get away from headquarters and to follow it up and to have a most interesting day in following through after the fighting in which it received its third citation which gave it the Medaille Militaire. It was the first division to receive that, as I recall, that in the history of the French army, I may be off about this.

I am going to jump way back now to a note I see I haven't touched on to the training camp at Fort Douglas, Utah. I was taken away from the camp at Monterey and set out to the fort.

ORDERED TO FRANCE

SECOND SIDE

I am now going back to the questions on the period I was with General Bell and the training camps of that period.

Q. 3. What were your reactions then and later to the Plattsburg experiment?

A.I think Plattsburg had two or three sides to it. One was the political significance

when the President, as it were, was opposed to all preparations in order to preserve a neutral front and General Wood's and Theodore Roosevelt's actions in order to stir up preparations. Of course, Plattsburg was the answer to this. Of its kind, it was inspirational and had a great effect on the men that were in it -- affected all their later lives -- as a matter of fact. It did a wonderful job in a very brief time. It was all we had to reach for. Under the circumstances, a very, very fine job was done.

As to its effects, it rose up later to make things very difficult for me in preparation for World War II. It was the best we could do for World War I under the circumstances -- with the President's attitude -- with no money from Congress -- with the general staff cut down to 16, I believe -- that was the pressure of Chairman of the Military Committee was to get everybody who had any experience in Washington out of Washington -- to get rid of the staff. We would run the war without any staff, of course. The fact that you had two or three thousand on the same staff later on was no proof you should have had more than sixteen at that time. These were terrible things that were done because of political twists. And I suppose they always will be done. So I had quite a difficult time at the start of World War II because I was determined that we would train our officers thoroughly. Presumably we were going to have time to do it and I intended to do it. Of course, we started off with a great shortage. Until the first reserve officers had had about a year's experience they were not successful really as teachers of an intense course of training. They didn't know assuredly enough themselves. Fine men and all, but not enough of that. So it was quite a period before we had practically anybody to conduct this training because the Regular Army was now scattered so thinly that people weren't available. I was opposed to the inception of the draft as early as it went into effect -- violently in favor of it -- but I wanted the thing to be approached in a little better ordered way. I was told that politically it was essential to go right ahead with it at top speed otherwise I would lose it. The trouble with that was we didn't have instructors and I remember finding the now head of the Federal Reserve Board -- one time President of the Stock Exchange and then President of the Stock Exchange -- who had been drafted in one of these earliest drafts -- and I found him being instructed by a corporal who had only been a corporal a month and who had been in the Army thirteen years and never even made the grade of corporal. Well, of course, his instruction was an absurdity so far as the quality of the man he was trying to instruct. And that was our trouble all around. Now

the pressure was terrific to increase the size of the training Camps -- the early training camps -- particularly because of what we had done in the first World War and the fact that Australia was doing it again at the present time. The whole staff combined were violently opposed to this because we didn't have the instructor material and we wanted to make a much slower start and work up to it. And the others maintained that it was not time for that and public opinion demanded it and I had a very difficult fight. And when Mr. Stimson became Secretary of War, before he came to his first office, I went to Long Island to see him and that was the first thing he talked to me about and he was interrupted twice during the talk by telephone messages from previous Plattsburg Camp men. Grenville Clark being one of the leaders who wanted him to change things instantly the minute he got into position as Secretary of War. When he came down to Washington he was still of that temper and the new Undersecretary of War was a Plattsburg graduate and was now a judge and has since died in an airplane crash. The whole set-up then was to restore the Plattsburg movement immediately and in quantity. Everybody in the staff was opposed to it because we knew perfectly well we didn't have the people to conduct the training and I was determined that we were going to do this thoroughly and it had to be thoroughly for the kind of war we were going to fight. We had to turn out trained divisions that could fight their first battle -- not a learning battle -- but a battle to the death -which they later did with great triumph at the time of Patton's and the 1st Army's moves in Northern France and the Army that moved up about May 14th in Italy, with these new divisions, the first of the new divisions to get in the war. I'll talk about them more later on because something has been overlooked and I think was a very wonderful exhibition.

So I had a very difficult time. Here was the new Secretary of War, a man I greatly respected, who had asked me to go with him to the Philippines in order to make me a Brigadier General of Philippine Scouts -- constabulary or something of that sort -- and I declined to go -- I wanted to get away from staff duty. I had the greatest respect for him and yet he was obsessed with this -- he was a Plattsburg man and there weren't any questions about the great benefit of the camps at the end of the First World War. But this was a totally different situation and I was determined that we were not going to get into that. This was going to be a thoroughly done thing and we succeeded, but we had to go very slowly. I had difficulties in my own staff where I tried to give a little so the thread wouldn't break. They didn't want to give a dern inch. And I

would have to make a slight concession, as I say, in order to keep the thread from breaking -- but they were violently opposed to it. There wasn't anybody on the staff in favor of this and they were travelling all over the country because we had gotten into a minor mobilization right away when we tried to bring five divisions of the Army -- the only existing divisions -- together and they varied from about 60 percent complete (one) down to about 10 percent complete. They were just little sketchy things scattered all over, the country. You would find one company belonging to a division out in Seattle or thereabouts and the other companies here in the East and altogether it was an almost ridiculous setup for an Army. That's what I had to dig it out of to get ready to organize this Army for the Second World War. So I was determined not to be pushed into this, but it was a very difficult thing with both the Secretary and Undersecretary -- splendid men, both of them -- ex-Plattsburg men and strongly in favor of it and the ex-Plattsburg leaders - Grenville Clark and the others -- holding up Australia to us as an example. Well, I won't go into what happened to Australia, but we had a very difficult time. Fortunately, I had an absolutely united staff on this. They were all together -- very fine men -- we were doing the best we could. It finally got to a showdown and this was one of the few times -- I think it was the only time -- I think there was only one other time -- I did this -- but it looked like it was a lost cause. And I told the Secretary that if that was the case I would resign as Chief of Staff and he could get somebody else. And I think I got a little sarcastic and said you get a Plattsburg man and run it to your own satisfaction. Well he didn't want to have that happen. And I didn't want that to happen either and we finally got compromised around and began to get these classes started. Next thing we didn't have the textbooks. I explained once, I think, how I managed to get that done by holding Leavenworth instructors over for a period and putting them into the preparation of -- I think it was fifty-two textbooks -- and doing the same with a certain number that I held down at the War College of the ex-instructors and when I suppressed the school in its ordinary routine. But one way or another we were getting this thing out of the kinks. But it was a very difficult time and a very tortuous time and one in which I was treading on very delicate ground -didn't have the confidence of the President -- I don't mean I lacked his entire confidence, but he didn't know me. He had made me on the recommendations of other people and now with all of this coming up and they were coming to see him -- even one of my -- well I better not get into names here -- very high government official -- who was seeing the President and they told me this -- he

was having great influence on him -- he has very, very high position in the country and I think I did a very wise thing, but it was a difficult thing to do. I made his acquaintance and I won him over, not by arguing about that at all. I did not even mention it. I won his respect. He thought I knew what I was doing and he was advising the President to follow my advice and he remained my supporter for many years. All of this was the struggle which was the back kick on a very fine thing -- the Plattsburg camps. Our great struggle I say was to find instructors. Everybody was on a job. A tremendous expansion was underway and that was coming much faster than I wanted it and as I say I couldn't slow it down because they told me I would find the selective service act -- the draft act, as they called it -- revoked if in any way I delayed its procedure. The divisions were organized way ahead of the rate I wanted them organized.

Q. 4. Any comments on the Army of the 1916 period and its preparation for warfare?

A. Most of all these occurred in 1916. That was when I was having some of my greatest problems -my most instructive problems -- and my most difficult problems and my broadest experience preliminary to the actual going to France.

5. Q. Any comment on the tour at Governors Island?

A. I have no particular comment on Governors Island except for my own experiences there which I have already described.

Q. 6. When did you first begin to feel that war with Germany was inevitable?

A. When it comes to the question whether war with Germany was inevitable, I didn't get into that. I was so busy with the Army itself and the national defense you might call it that I didn't cogitate much over the political significance of things and whatever momentary opinion I had at the time I couldn't put into words at the present time. But I was so intense on the thing I was doing that I wasn't going off and trying to advise the President and the American public how to handle their international diplomatic troubles. I knew if they went to Europe what they had to have and I was prepared to try to give that to the best of my ability.

Q. 7. Did you feel that we should have given up neutrality earlier?

A. These various questions here, 5, 6, and 7, on the neutrality and when we should have first gone to war, I won't go into at all because I didn't have in my own mind very strong stands in regard to them. I did have a very strong stand in regard to Mr. Wilson's neutrality program. Neutrality, yes, if that's what he wanted. But to prevent us from making any measures

at al I to get ready was terrible. He didn't have any comprehension of what a pathetic -- that isn't the real word -- it goes way beyond pathetic -- situation we were involved in, and only time can cure that. And if you have lost the time you can never get it back. My only observations in regard to that is that we could have gone ahead and done these things and still have remained neutral. But we would have been treated with greater respect.

Q. 8. In the 1939-41 period did you have the feeling that you were seeing 1915-16 all over again?

A. In 1939-1941 I saw very much the reflection of the things of ‘15-‘16 all over again. In fact in some ways very little occurred that didn't seem to me was a repetition, but what disturbed me most of all was to find the Army, the War Department, and the country in the same shape again -- the same shape again. And I was getting rather hardened to coming in when everything had gone to pot and there was nothing to get your hands on and darned if I didn't find the same thing when I came into the Korean War. There wasn't anything. We had a terrible time getting ourselves together.

On the heading , World War I, question I and sub-question as to my first contingent to France and General Pershing and his first, appearance and points of interest on the trip over I have already referred to all that. The American landing at St. Nazaire -- I've covered that. I have answered the question of being in Paris, not for the 4th of July parade -- but for the Bastille Day parade I think. I have also described St. Nazaire at that time.

Question 3 I’ve pretty largely answered.

Q. 4. American units moved into the line near Luneville at Sommervilliers in November 1917.Shortly thereafter they suffered their first casualties. Colonel Marshall was directed to report on the attack. He also attended the funeral of the three men near Bathelemont. Any comment on this?

A. I was starting out to inspect the American battalions that were included in French regiments in the line in that Luneville sector and I was leaving at four in the morning. The French division commander was very sensitive to having any American interference possible with his control and he didn't want me to go out. When he found I was going out that morning he had my car stopped at his headquarters and I had to wait until he came out. And then he told me "les premiers Americains sont tugs." The first Americans have been killed. And that was the

first notice we had of the deaths of these men and the capture of 14, although that hadn't yet been reported. So we went out and he went, of course, to the brigade commander's headquarters and that was a loss of time which I didn't like, but that was the formality and they always went through it and then he went from there to the French regimental commander's headquarters in which these battalions were scattered. And that was a loss of time. However, just as we were leaving there the adjutant of the regiment, a captain, ran after us down the field and said there had been a raid. They had proof positive that there had been a raid, because the Germans had announced the capture of North Americans, north of the Rhine-Marne Canal, so we knew we had been raided. But at that time they didn't know it. And we went on up and came to the headquarters of the battalion commander, which was in a stone quarry as I recall -- and he didn't know there had been a raid then. There had been a heavy artillery bombardment, but he wasn't aware of the fact there had been a raid. He didn't go forward with me incidentally. I didn't ask him to and he didn't say anything about it -- he just didn't go. So I started forward with Jean Hugo, who was my interpreter and liaison officer, and a very fine fellow, and the French general. I had to go the way he went. But we went up this communications trench, which was splattered with fire, all the way up, beautiful target shooting, and then we got into this deep front line trench. In those days the front line trenches were very deep and the principal dugouts were under the frontline parapets. Later on, that was changed, of course. The principal line was in the rear of this first line. Then it was not only in the first line but under the parapet of the first line -- large dugouts that would hold 15-20 men. We met a French officer who had been assigned to this battalion which had just gone in the night before and the French had left a few officers there to help them. And he told us there had been a raid and there had been Americans killed and he thought Americans captured but he didn't know. The battalion commander was still under the impression that there hadn't been a raid and we told him to go on back and tell the battalion commander. Then we went forward till we came to a place where the trench had caved in and I remember climbing up on top of the trench. Everything was very quiet. No Man's Land was about a half mile wide there and I got up on top and here down below me, just a little to my right front, was the blasted gap in the wire which was about sixty yards wide there. The white tape to guide the raiding party right through the wire leading up to the front trench -- here was the scene of the raid -no question about it now. We had a hard time to get up to the part of the trench

which this tape came in and where the defenders had been surprised. And we went down into this dugout -- where there was quite a bit of blood about -- where some had been killed or wounded -- and then we came up and found the dead on the ground and the wounded had gone back. There were quite a few wounded -- I saw quite a few -- it was something like fourteen captured and eighteen wounded -- or some thing of that sort. Most of the wounded had been wounded by the artillery bombardment. And I went back with the General and we met some of the wounded and he questioned them quite a bit. And then Jean Hugo whispered to me that the General was trying to find whether the Americans showed fight. So I interrupted him and said, "General, I understand you are trying to find whether the-" Americans showed fight or not. I don't think there is any necessity for your questioning that -- they had been surprised and they probably put up a-disordered fight. Most of them were trapped in a dugout. But I don't think that is the thing to investigate. I think it would be very much more to the point if you look into the fact that you forbade the Americans to go beyond the wire in any reconnaissance and now they are surprised by the assault right through the wire. I think General Pershing is going to be very much interested in that reaction of a French commander to American troops." This went on -- I mention it here because it went on to quite a serious matter later on as I will explain.

The French commander was getting very stiff and I was getting very anxious to get back. I went first to the triage or first line hospital and there I found these wounded men being treated. But the principal thing I noticed was a large typewriter of a size that would take a big form. And the principal sergeant had this form in the typewriter and was typing away and when I looked to see what it was, it was what was called the sick and wounded report. He had gotten through, I think, one name and maybe two. It was a very lengthy thing and it might be as carefully done as your description for your doctor or your situation in connection with pneumonia or something of that sort. I could see from the number of wounded he had and the progress that he had made on this thing it was going to take him about all day long to complete that form. So I said, "What the hell are you going to do if you have a battle with a thousand casualties? This is absurd." I said, "Just drop that for the present and get to work on these men." So he was very uncertain about doing this thing that I was so freely ordering. But I bluffed him out of it and then took his typewriter and there I wrote the report that's on file regarding the raid. I met right after that, still on the field, a colonel of the Surgeon-General's department -- over in

France making an inspection. And of course, as this was the only place where there were men in the field, he came there. And, he was very anxious to come up there to the hospital where the first wounded were in. I told him then that the first thing was that he might change that sick and wounded report so there was some possibility of getting it out if there were any more than fifty wounded men in a day. It was a ridiculous thing, they way it was now and I had forbidden the man to finish it until he went about his regular duties. And he did do that. I think he changed it after he got home. It was an absurdity the way it was arranged. It was all very well for an investigation after the war, but it wasn't at all a practical proposition if you really got into a first class action. To go on with this thing -- I might as well finish it up while I'm at it. When I got back to Headquarters I wanted to go and see the corps commander and the idea of a captain (I don't think I was yet a major) going to see the corps commander was unheard of. But I was representing the division commander who was 100 or more kilometers away so my rank didn't cut any figure with me as far as I could see. My job was to represent him and his interests and his interests were very heavily involved here. It was our first American action and we had been surprised. And prisoners had been taken. And the Germans were advertising it. And we had our first dead and we had our collection of wounded. So I had written my first report of the affair on the typewriter of the sergeant I had displaced from getting the sick and wounded report out and now I wanted to do another one for General Sibert in explaining the situation in where they had been forbidden from going beyond the wire in making a reconnaissance and then were surprised through the wire with this blast of a Bangalore torpedo and the rush of the men.

The division commander (here he means the French division commander) sent for me and asked me -- said he understood that I was going to see the corps commander and I wanted to know what I was going there for. And I told him exactly. Well, he said he would prefer that I restrain myself and not do that. He said, "You are a very young officer and this is a very serious matter." I said, "That's the reason I am going there. It is a very serious matter and I am representing the division commander. And I have got to consider him and his rank and his position and the fact that this is the first unit and the first engagement. Just then the corps Chief of Staff, I think, arrived. He was very much exercised when he found out what I was going to do and he begged me not to embarrass the corps commander at this particular moment. Well, I said, "I'm going to report it to General Sibert and he will report it, of course, to General Pershing."

Meanwhile, a message had come in from General Pershing's headquarters, wanting a report direct from me. Of course, they were still in the business of trying to command minor units. And I explained that would have to go ahead and report this to General Sibert and I was going to say this because it is a very, very serious matter and I don't have to be a general to see that. I said I wish you would tell your corps commander so he can interest himself in it right away. Because the order still stands and General Pershing, I know, will want to know about it right away and General Sibert must know about it right away. And we had quite a scene there. I reported this to General Sibert and then I reported it to General Pershing.

Then they arranged the funeral of those three men and I have always been sorry since that they didn't allow them to remain buried right there because that was very historic. And this division commander that I had been arguing with and had been so strict with me made a very beautiful talk at their grave which is in this little town -- I think -- of Bathelemont. It was in the rain, mud, and the town was just a crossroad and a manure pile. That's about what it amounted to-- and a haystack or two around. The French sent up a battalion of infantry, a troop of cavalry (I don't think they had their horses though-- not certainly at the funeral), some artillery, some engineers, some signal corps. They had every unit of this first corps as I recall present and they made it quite a significant occasion. And the first Americans were buried there. And I took the French division commander to go into a dugout with Jean Hugo and had him to repeat his remarks at the grave and Jean Hugo wrote them down. And they are on record in the War Department now. And when I was questioned the other day from France as to what would be the proper inscription on a monument they were putting up there, I suggested the best thing they could do was this paragraph out of this speech. I think they adopted that. It was their own division commander's speech. The division 'commander was transferred to a mission to Greece immediately and he disappeared from the scene at that time. I was very much gratified when I went to a church service in Paris --I have forgotten for what -- it was of military significance and a number of French commanders were there to walk with me to the church -- this was when I was Secretary of State and this particular general [Bordeaux] had come up from the provinces to attend the service and came up and spoke to me and was very cordial and very generous in his comment. When I came over later to attend the United Nations, he communicated with me again. He has since died.

I had another thing that taught me quite a lesson there. We had no transportation and the French had to lend us trucks -- or Lorries as the British called them. I don't know what the French called them -- I've forgotten that, but they loaned us the trucks and we didn't have enough. The 1st Battalion had about enough for their battalion headquarters and in this battalion that was coming up next was also included the regimental headquarters. It was going to require some delicate shuffling to be able to haul them up. So I had to get into a discussion with the French staff about loading of these trucks -- what we should put in them. They would come up with this relief and the additional unit of the Headquarters. And they would go back with the troops that had had their first experience in the trenches. Well we agreed on something in principle (en principe) and there I learned my lesson which served me well in after dealings, particularly with the French units in the Meuse-Argonne battle and other places. En principe, in my mind, applied to one thing only; to the French it applied to everything. The result was that all the machine gun units were grounded and not loaded on the trucks and didn't get off to Gondrecourt and were left up there without any transportation. We were short in the first place and this thing occurred and I discovered it all hinged on the translation of the full meaning of en principe. So after that whenever a Frenchman brought up something and would summarize by saying en principe, So and So, I would stop him right there and say now you write that out -you write out exactly what you mean. And they all got to laughing at me later on. When I had several French corps -- three or four French corps -- in the 1st Army -- and they would send back their chief of staff or somebody to make arrangements and he would come to the usual French expression -- en principe -- and I would say, "wait a minute, wait a minute -- take a pencil and write out exactly what you are talking about." So I never had any more accidents of that sort and it was a very valuable lesson.

It also brought up another thing which shows how difficult it is for armies of different nations to work together with full harmony though it’s to their best efforts to do so and that even was the occasion with the British when we thought spoke the same tongue. But we discovered afterwards that the meaning we gave a word was not all the same in many instances and we had to be very careful in what we said. The only place I ever got this right was over in China because when the Communists, met with the

Nationalists and I sat in as the middle party they used my translation -- of my interpreter -- as the guiding rein in this thing and the thing was translated according to that. It was safer to translate the English to Chinese -- together these two -- than it was to use either one of the Communists or Nationalist Chinese record of what was said. And they always wanted my English one in order that together they could translate that so that the significance of each term could be fully understood. I started to refer back to something that occurred of that nature and I think it was in connection with the British but my memory has played me false and I have forgotten it already.

Q. 5. Bullard took command of the 1st Division in December 1917. In January 1918 the Division took over the Ansauville sector of the line. Frank Parker and B.B. Buck commanded the brigades. Col. Fuqua was Chief of Staff. Colonel Marshall was G-3. Division headquarters was at Mesnil-la-Tour between St. Mihiel and Pont-a-Mousson. Seicheprey was on the right and a lake oft the right.

A. General Sibert was relieved and General Bullard sent up to take command. In your question five or statement five, you say Colonel Fuqua was Chief of Staff. He was not Chief of Staff -- he did not become Chief of Staff -- until practically the end of the Meuse-Argonne battle and under me before that in the G-3 section of the staff, looking after the troop movements and thing of that sort.

A very interesting thing took place in my career here. I learnt afterwards that General Bullard when he came to the Division, he had been rather topped off. I had met him before and he had been temporarily in command of a brigade before which I was dealing with when I was acting Chief of Staff, and he complimented me on the way I was doing it, I remember. So when he came up from wherever he was to become the new commander of the division, I learned much later, almost at the end of the war as a matter of fact, the intention was to make me Chief of Staff. Campbell King, a very dear friend of mine was adjutant -- who had been temporarily at Chaumont with the General Staff. And he had come up there and gone back to his original post as adjutant of the 1st Division.

When General Bullard came to the division, we were infuriated by the misunderstanding of our situation, which culminated with the relief of General Sibert at GHQ. These fellows at GHQ were almost all my close friends and associates at

Leavenworth and most of them had been student officers under me at Leavenworth. And they were some of my dear friends, but we were wholly out of sympathy with each other and I felt that they didn't understand what they were doing at all. They had become very severe and they didn't know what they were being severe about. I would explain it just that way. General Pershing was severe, so they modeled their attitude on him. I was so outraged by this and I talked a great deal and I made a great mistake which held -- I learned the lesson then I never forgot afterwards. But when General Bullard came to the division, all of us were airing our views and being very vitriolic. Because it was very difficult what we were trying to do -- it was almost impossible -- and we were bitter. What I did was I demonstrated to General Bullard that I had no business being made Chief of Staff in that state of mind and he didn't make me Chief of Staff. He made Campbell King Chief of Staff who was a much more moderate person and didn't get "het up" to the extent I did. I learnt my lesson. Nobody ever told me that but I could see perfectly well what it was. And I agreed with it thoroughly. And I never made the mistake, I don't think again. And I often commented on how in the world I ever kept my temper through all the vicissitudes which I had to go through political and otherwise. And this was the lesson that I got right there and I never forgot it. I think I delayed myself a great deal. I think I would have been Chief of Staff of the division and I would very quickly have been made Brigadier General. As a matter of fact, I wasn't recommended for a Brigadier General until in the Meuse-Argonne battle. And while it was approved by the Secretary of War, General March never sent it to the Senate for confirmation.

You mention Seicheprey of this description on 5 and that was quite a difficult time, because it was down in a hollow and very difficult to defend. We had to build up the trenches, weaving these sticks together in order to hold up the dirt wall, to screen us from the view of Mont Sec on which now is a very beautiful monument and observation stations all over the battlefield, of which I am somewhat in charge as Chairman of the Battle Monuments Commission.

Q. 5a. Any comments on Generals Sibert and Bullard as commanders?

A. I don't care to make any comments about General Bullard and General Sibert.

Q. 5b. Would you give a description of the sector into which the 1st Division went?

A. The best I can see about this section is that we took over a very large section

because our division was about twice the size of the French division and the whole sector was under observation. It was dominated by these heights on the other side and particularly by Mont Sec.

Q. 5c. What was the situation with French troops which you relieved? (Many of these units had low morale didn't they?)

A. I didn't see so much of the French troops that were relieved as they went out very quickly. They were there for a rest and were very much opposed to our stirring up the sector and making it active in a battle way. We were very proud of it and we were very foolish. Though as a matter of fact, I suppose, with new troops, it was rather important that they get that much experience to make them battle worthy.

The French morale at that time was all right. It had suffered of course by the Verdun fighting and the terrible losses they had there -- by the reversal along the Somme -- they had suffered very much from that. But the great disaster was impending which came on March 21, 1918, shortly just as we were moving from that sector.

Q. 5d. Were you actually called G-3 at this time?

A. I think I was actually called G-3 at this time. We made up the proposals of how the staff should be formed and I don't remember whether we proposed G-3. I think that was proposed down at Chaumont. Incidentally that 1, 2, and 3 that you had in the division then, I organized without knowing anything about this thing in the Philippines with this force that I was dropped into a sort of peculiar command of. I didn't have a G-2 much. I had a man who did something like that, but I specifically had a G-l and specifically a G-3 though I didn't call them that. And it worked like a machine. They were very excellent officers. I know the main thing I used to insist upon after we got through the tactical deployments was to see that the troops went into bivouac without halting, that they shouldn't be waiting on the road to find out where they were going to camp, but all should be decided ahead of them and they should come up and be shown where to wheel into line and stack arms and bivouac, which this impromptu staff that I had designed -- I had organized it accidentally you might say -- always did.

Q. 6. In April 1918 the Division was attacked by the Germans, but the enemy was beaten back. In the middle of the month the 1st Division went to Montdidier to aid in meeting the German offensive in that area. Colonel Marshall reported to General Debeney, another writer

calls this Dubonnet--which is right? In May the Division attacked Cantigny and took heavy casualties. Bullard praised the plans drawn up for the action.

A. “Debeney” is the correct name for General Debeney and I knew him very well because is son was with the French division that had the same headquarters we did. And he and I became very close together. He had one arm shot off and I knew his father for that reason. He commanded the 1st French Army and I thought he was a very fine man. And I met him again when we all moved to the west to fill in -- he was given the job to command. The British 5th Army was destroyed and the Germans almost broke through. The end of the point of that thing was Montdidier. So I saw General Debeney very often and he was always very nice to me. So far as I could tell, I always thought he was a very fine Army commander. At least about the Americans he knew something about them and whether he admired them or not, he knew about them and could act very intelligently about his handling of them. That came out later when we were in the middle of a counterattack at the end of the German great attack.

Q. 6a. Bullard in June recommended that Colonel Marshall be promoted, but the War Department said it was opposed to policy regarding line officers detailed on staff duty.

A. The recommendation went through that I be promoted. I had already been advanced on Christmas Day to Lieutenant Colonel, but when the recommendation came up that I be made colonel they had already gotten out a rule at GHQ, Washington, that you couldn’t promote these men on staff duty until they had served a certain line. Of course, that had been made up for staffs in the U.S. and not at all for the staffs over there in Europe, and there weren't very many over there. We were mixed up in the fighting right and left, as you can tell by my descriptions and yet we were barred from promotion. I came into circumstances somewhat similar to that in the next World War and I knew perfectly well what lines of action to try to take in order to correct it. I was finding very rapid promotions over here in the new divisions being assembled and the big training camps and over in Africa they were only promoting the men who had been very special in action or wounded. This restriction on my promotion continued until the time of the Meuse-Argonne battle almost half a year later.

Q. 7. Frye mentions that on July 4, 1918, you attended a party at French corps headquarters and made a speech in French (this was reported by Hagood).

A. The speech in 7 which you refer to when I was first sent into the region where the

1st Division was coming up and I was ordered to provide arrangements for the reception of the four divisions that were coming later. One was the 2nd Division, one was the 42nd division I've forgotten the other two, but they were all to be scattered around that region. I came into Neufchateau. I was the first American officer to come there. Neufchateau is probably identified better by being southwest a short distance from Domremy Jeanne d'Arc's home. Well, anyway, when I came into town there was very great excitement and the prefect had a luncheon for me that was very hurriedly organized -- but it was a very delicious luncheon. All the schools let out. And they were jammed with people around this place where we were having lunch. And the sergeant who drove the Marine Cadillac I had, he was at the table with me, he and I were called out and I was introduced by a very bombastic speech in French (I said bombastic -- a very enthusiastic speech -- in French) which I couldn't understand but very little of. And then I was introduced and under the spur of the moment -- under the pressure of the moment -- I made a speech which was received with tremendous cheers and great enthusiasm and as far as we could figure out, there wasn't a verb in it. But it went all right. I was always amused at myself when I got involved in this affair there at this time. I've already forgotten the name of the place.

But I might mention something about Domremy. I had to go by Domremy very frequently in my trips back and forth through this region and of course it always appealed to me because of its historic significance. But what made quite an impression on me was there seemed to be so little change in the town. As far as I could see it was the some old town it had always been and Jeanne d'Arc's home -- it looked like just all the rest of them. It didn't look like something that had been kept in repairs through the years and everything else was new in the village. There didn't seem to be anything new and they all looked about alike. And while I was standing in the church next to Jeanne d'Arc's house and looking at this groined ceiling I commented to my interpreter whose name was Crocker, well known Crocker family up in Massachusetts, paper mill people and he had been at the Sorbonne and was drafted as an interpreter and was very good -- had him with me. And I asked him what he thought the age of that church was. And his reply was very significant to me. It conveyed years in a way I had never heard before. He looked at it a long time and said, "I think this church was built about as long before Jeanne d'Arc as we are living after Jeanne d'Arc." Well that was one way to grasp it because Jeanne d'Arc was in the dim and distant past to me and I imagine to all the rest of us.

Q. 7a. At this time, Marshall moved to GHQ under Colonel Fox Conner. "Marshall went through Beauvais a disappointed and bitter man." He tried to get duty with troops but Bullard turned him down. He did agree, however, for him to go to GHQ. Any comment on this? Were you bitter?

A. The next part of 7 is a little bit out of place. It speaks of my bitterness in going through Beauvais-- disappointed in not getting duty with troops. I was ordered away from 1st Division just as it was going into the Soissons fight and just after we had gotten out of quite a fight in the Beauvais sector, as we called it, I think, south of Amiens and north of Beauvais. It seemed to be hopeless. There were very few graduates of the staff college and they were all older than I was. They were given divisions, but I wasn't given a division. I was jerked off to Europe before they organized these divisions. And when I was made acting Chief of Staff of the division I was a captain. And the temporary promotions had started in the United States but they hadn't reached to Europe so I didn't get in on that and these other fellows were made colonels and lieutenant colonels and chiefs of staff of divisions. I as still a captain, lingering over there with the First Division in France -- great opportunity to be with divisions and get into its experiences but it was developing into a great blockade of any promotion chances for me until I got this one Christmas. And then I found that there was an order which prevented me from being promoted at all until the Meuse-Argonne battle and they changed the order or I couldn’t have been promoted then, though I had been recommended by General Pershing to be a Brigadier General. I think I went in on the first recommendation for general's officers succeeding from the St. Mihiel battle on into the Meuse-Argonne battle.

They finally got an order out signed by the Chief of Staff at Chaumont that under no circumstance would I be detailed away from the General Staff. Well that was the final blow. They had me pinched then. I suffered all the way from lack of promotion in my early days. I had to do a great deal of work as an aide because if I wasn't an aide I was merely a lieutenant in a company. That lasted for pretty nearly fifteen years. They couldn't give me these things they wanted to, because I didn't have the rank to take them. So I would always, have to act in the general's name as a lieutenant and then finally, when I became a captain, it was just when we started to begin the concentration in the First World War and we moved on to Governors Island. I think I got my captaincy at Governors Island. I'm not certain. But it affected my entire career

in getting started because I was held back all the time and having to be an aide all the time purely for the reason the General could use my services as an aide by having me act in his name. I never was an aide as a young officer.

Q. 8. Colonel Marshall now came into closer contact with General Pershing. He had first met Pershing at Bell's headquarters in New York in 1917. He next saw him during some training exercises in France. Pershing was strong in his criticisms of the men and Colonel Marshall said he was expecting too much of the men. Pershing later came to discuss plans for the attack on Cantigny in 1918. He had a long discussion with Marshall. Are these statements correct?

A. You got question 8 down here about General Pershing. I've told several things about General Pershing. I didn't say to him he was expecting too much of the men. I commented on the fact that he was ordering things from there in the evening that required a 20 mile march in the morning and during the night and some arrangements none of which could be made. They were losing track of the distance entirely around Chaumont and we had no motors.

I think I have told enough about this sort of thing of General Pershing at the present time.

Q. 9a. In his new job, Marshall was to work on plans for reducing the St. Mihiel salient. The 1st Division moved up to the Foret de Compiegne. The 1st and 2nd Divisions were put into the line near Soissons and took heavy losses. Foch became Supreme Commander in July 1918. A firm decision for an American attack was made at St. Mihiel on August 9th. 1st Army was being organized at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. Drum was Chief of Staff. Marshall and Walter Grant joined G-3. I notice that a number of the places were in the area where Patton's troops fought in World War II. Did you re-visit any of these places in 1944-45?

A. I did not visit any of these fields in ‘44 and ‘45.

Q. 9c. What was your view about the establishment of the Supreme Command in 1918? Did recollections of the tardiness in establishing that overall command affect your views in World War II?

A. I was not in a position to express myself about the Supreme Command and all that was concerned with it and what powers the British government would have to resign to the French and the same thing for our government. I know General Pershing was for unity of

command, but it is hard for me to tell when I knew it because I heard so much of it afterwards. Of course, there was tardiness in deciding on a supreme commander. Only a disaster would have brought it to a head because the governments themselves had to give up too much. That's an extraordinarily difficult thing to do and it was only through the actions of Churchill that we were able to get adjustments on everything at that time and also the fact that so much was to be expected from America at the start [here is talking about WW II] and also these early arguments with the British staff officers, which you see now reflected in some of their books, was when we had virtually no Army in trained existence and they had all the troops. But, of course, that changed decidedly till we had tremendous numbers of divisions, comparatively speaking, seventy-nine, I think in all, of ground divisions alone and very large numbers of special troops and special brigades and artillery and tanks and engineers and things of that sort -- and the Marines in addition, and a terrific air force in numbers. None of that was available for argument or pressure or anything. It was all problematical. Nobody had ever dreamt of Patton being able to go over Europe at the rate he did or our troops being able to go through the line as they did at St. Lo the way they finally fought" out in First Army and then virtually surrounded the Germans at the outbreak from the first European entry, the Normandy beachhead. The later moves of the First Army, which was the initial army to move in, were very spectacular but Patton was moving at such a rate the attention moved to him and he was himself, of course, very dramatic and that focused attention on him. But some of the First Army's performances there were magnificent, notably in making the Avranches Gap for Patton to go through, that was made by First Army then the counter attack that Hitler ordered himself –I’ve forgot, The Cantain or something like that [Mortain] -counterattack, which Bradley chose in a sense to ignore to fight off while he was going ahead with his operations. Which he did until they finally surrounded completely quite a section of the German Army and I think that's where General Eisenhower tells afterwards of seeing a large area where you could step from body to body. [He means the Falaise Gap]. All those things were done by First Army. And then their eventual move out of the sector and wheel to the left and final battles up on the Belgian border and into the Hindenburg line.

I might tell one thing about General Patton. South of Bar-le-Duc I guess about 30 miles was a small town called Gondrecourt. That's where I first went to and was the seat of First Division schools and Corps Schools afterwards -- officer schools. And I lived with a very

interesting landlady -- she was a very amusing woman -- ran a wonderful mess for me and I had three other fellows in it, one of which was Jean Hugo. We had a very relaxing time in that mess. It saved me from the terrific strain we were going through in our other situations, at that time. So Mme. Jouatte became very much endeared to me and I to her, I think. I stayed there six months and had a little, tiny room with a sort of Napoleonic looking bed and she looked after me in every way she could. And when I left there she kept in touch with me all the time though I didn't see her again. And she wrote to me -- first used to write me each season, winter, summer, fall and spring. Then she got so she would write twice a year. Her boy had been a prisoner in the woods that I had gone through with the Foreign [French] Legion when they recaptured it. I brought some of the things back from that woods, machine guns and things which I gave to her which she treasured highly. Then this next war came and of course she couldn't write to me after that because she was in the occupied zone. And finally Patton's troops drove through there and into the vicinity of Metz. So I sent him a message and told him that I thought Gondrecourt was in his rear zone -- that is the zone he would be responsible for, and that if he got down there on one of his inspections to look up one of my dear friends -- Madame Jouatte, 2 Rue Saussi -- and the next I heard of it, he sent me the photographs and a description by a staff officer. Patton arrived there with five thousand armored troops, two revolvers on, a whole truckload of supplies for Madame Jouatte. The town turned out in fear and trembling -- the mayor and town council came to him trembling and Patton growled at them in his best rough French "Where is Madame Jouatte?" Well, they had never heard of Madame Jouatte. And he turned over to her a whole truckload of supplies, enough to last her family a long, long time and made quite an impression in Gondrecourt of the importance of Madame Jouatte.

I came along while I was Secretary of State and was at the United Nations and one weekend I went to Metz and went over the northern most Meuse-Argonne battlefields and came on down through Tours and Gondrecourt. I had my aide go ahead of me [George and Walters and Carter all agree to this] in another car and find out if Madame Jouatte was there but not tell her that I was coming. And when I got there he told me she had moved and that she was at, such a place in the main square of the town. (I'll take a milkshake) So we drove there and Mrs. Marshall didn't get out of the car and I told her to stay in a

second. I wanted to go up and surprise Madame Jouatte. But the square was pretty full of people going to church. The church bells were ringing, it was a peaceful Sunday. But the fact of these two limousines there in the courtyard attracted all their attention. When I got out of there, they all stopped and stared. And Madame Jouatte's curiosity had been aroused. She came out of her doorway in an old wrapper and carpet slippers. She wasn't a very dressy old lady anyway and she looked pretty slack in these clothes. But she was unchanged otherwise. And she came out and I had crossed about half the distance when she looked up and recognized me. And she dashed at me and threw her arms around my neck and kissed me on both cheeks. So I embraced her and I kissed her and we had a great scene out there with all the people in the square cheering. And then Mrs. Marshall got out and came out and went into the house and we had gotten some things for her at Nancy which Mrs. Marshall gave her , and a present of something, I have forgotten what ,of a waiter or tray or some things to go. I don't remember what it was. But anyway her excitement was intense and it was a very joyful occasion and I got great satisfaction of it and Mrs. Marshall got particular satisfaction out of it. And as we were driving off -- we had to hurry to get back to Paris -- Mrs. Marshall began peeling out of her only fur coat. When we had gotten down the street about a block, I said what you are doing. And she said, "I am going to give this to Madame Jouatte.” I said, “No you are not. (Laughs) I don't have enough money to buy you another. You'll have to keep that." And I wouldn't let her give it to Madame Jouatte. I was sorry afterwards I didn't, but the fact was I didn't have enough money to do that. I went through the war when my responsibilities ran up to eight and a half million to ten million troops and nine fighting sectors -- my salary was $10,000 a year. I spent all my savings. That didn't meet my bills and I had a very, very hard time all the time I was Chief of Staff. And then when I was Secretary of State all I got was $15,000 a year.

TAPE 7M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

April 11, 1957

RECORDED INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
AT PINEHURST, NC - April II, 1957

Questions by Forrest C. Pogue. Machine run by Sgt. William Heffner.

Q. 10a. Please describe the planning for St. Mihiel.

A. The decision for St. Mihiel operation was actually made by Foch who was the Supreme Commander at that time. As I recall he specified three operations that he wanted carried out first. This was his beginning of the offensive following the Soissons fight which stopped the German advance. That occurred July 18-21 of that summer. For the first time the German Army started to the rear. And this was the army of the German Crown Prince. I don't remember where the attack was to be on the English front. But I remember exactly where it was to be on the French front. I know they all referred to communications. And on the American front it was the St. Mihiel operation because the Germans held the point which consisted really of the town of St. Mihiel and the high ground which came down the Meuse River from the north of St. Mihiel. If that was obliterated then the communications to Paris by railroad were free all along, parallel to the entire front. I am sorry I don't remember where the French operations were to be or the British operations were to be, but they were all carried out.

Just how the St. Mihiel was to be carried out, just where the attack was to be launched was another matter and that was for General Pershing's decision. The whole thing was how you would do this thing in order to free the railroad. I was put to work on this and I have always been rather embarrassed by the fact that I submitted a number of different plans -- none of them you might say conclusive. The trouble was that I was first given the problem of how to do this with so many divisions. I've forgotten how many. We will say seven. Of course, that's one thing, working it out with seven divisions. Then they changed this and added two more which altered the possibilities for operations decidedly. Then it was changed again. It was changed four times to finally this large number of divisions came up -- I've even forgotten how many it was now -- which determined the final operation, particularly the fact that we were to attack from both flanks instead of from just

one.

That was the lead up from the American point of view of the St. Mihiel operation and considering the troops in many cases were pretty raw and the army headquarters was brand new -- that's a very complicated institution, incidentally, I think they did very well.

(I see on the next page in paragraph 10, the answer to several of the doubtful points I have just mentioned. One was the indication where the British and French offensives were to be and another was the number of divisions that were participating in the St. Mihiel operation itself. There was some comment there on the troop movement. As a matter of fact the original concentration was not such an unusual thing. It was a big concentration but it had to be carried out at night, of course, which made it a congested affair. The really big concentration occurred later on before the end of the battle and out of its rear area and over to the left for the line up of the Meuse-Argonne. That was a terrific problem of logistics and it had to be met many ways and we managed to carry it out successfully. I had Walter Grant to assist me through this).

I have already mentioned the planning of the St. Mihiel. I came into that battle first on the basis of planning and then Walter Grant and I were called up from Chaumont by General Drum to check on plans that had already been made by his permanent G-3 (I was not a G-3 at that time) for the concentration. We checked over all their orders and plans and they were perfectly sound. Then they (the permanent G-3 and G-5 I think, which was the head of the training staff) were withdrawn without any explanation being made and I was put in charge of the St. Mihiel operation so far as the staff was concerned. I didn't know at all where the others had gone and I didn't ask any questions. I was too busy. So from that time on with Walter Grant to assist me I was busy with the conduct of the St. Mihiel operation. And it went off pretty well. It went off very well as a matter of fact. I think we could have gone a little farther at the end if the corps commanders had followed out their orders. The order provided that when they got to the line rigidly specified specifically outlined and there was any opportunity to go forward, they should send forward battalions with some artillery and reconnaissance units and push ahead as fast as they could. They didn't do this. In one division this was proposed and that was, done by Douglas MacArthur, who was chief of staff of the Forty-second Division. And he wanted

to push right on at that time. The trouble was none of the others had gathered themselves and General Drum and the Army commander thought they should leave well enough alone. Undoubtedly if they had pushed on, they would have gone much closer to Metz at the first lunge. However, they already had authority to organize a battalion or regiment in the division and push ahead with that, but they didn't do that. Of course, it was their first big battle and there was always much confusion and there was always much uncertainty as to what the exact conditions were which is to be carefully considered when you are trying to judge whether you did this just right or not. You didn't have a Stonewall Jackson who had been experienced in many fights already.

Q. 10b. Please describe the task which confronted you in regard to the Meuse-Argonne fight. How did you go about your planning? Who helped you? What were special problems which arose?

A. The complications now began. I had been concerned now with the full battle. Now suddenly I was called over to Headquarters, which was across the street, and they outlined the Meuse-Argonne. That's the first time I have ever heard of it -- and that's what the other fellows on the staff had been working on -- the plan for the deployment for the Meuse-Argonne and the initial plan for the battle. I was told to concentrate the troops and I was given the line-up they were to have in the battle. That was my first intimation of the Meuse-Argonne battle. I went back over to look into this thing and there had been no warning at all. Here I suddenly found the list of the divisions that were to be in the battle, what lineup they were to have, and my job was to get them into battle, which involved not just an ordinary concentration because most of these divisions had to come out from-receive and support positions in the Meuse-Argonne battle which was still going on and added to that had to go perpendicular to the direction of troops in rear areas of the. St. Mihiel. In other words they had to go the west while the St. Mihiel troops were all headed due north. That meant a cross-cut office and special army and corps troops, artillery, tanks, engineers, signal, troops, and every of that sort had to be located and drawn out of the battle to move over to the Meuse-Argonne front. A great many of these were French and, we had a great deal of trouble with them because they were tired. They were tied then they got there from fighting and now they were very tired from the St Mihiel thing and now we

were starting off to move them to a new battle. We had quite a hard time moving them. We had a hard time finding them in the first place in the general confusion of the hundreds of thousands of troops involved here and they didn't move very promptly, as was to be expected from very tired, heavily used troops.

However, we got this movement started. At first it had to be handled in extreme detail to prevent complete confusion on the Meuse-Argonne front. Walter Grant was of great help to me in this. That was the most difficult troop movement I ever imagined. And we had some trucks or busses that the French had given us, enough to carry the foot troops, of one division. Our complication there was, our trucks moved at one speed, machine gun carts moved at another speed and the tanks moved at another speed. And it was a very difficult thing with only one or two roads going around the point and up to the north and going entirely at night, to get this in such a fashion that they could manage without confusion.

I remember with some amusement an incident that occurred there in the office. The Chief of Staff of a division -- it was the First Division, incidentally -- came in to consult with me about the order they had received and also to answer some questions as to what other they might do. What was going on there-was that the advance in the battle had been of such an extent that there was a possibility of the division cutting across the sallent in the valley, of the Cure. But we did not know how clear that was none of us had ever been through the place, but it would be a tremendous saving in the movement of the machine gun carts, the movement of the artillery and the movement of the trucks if they could get through. We were discussing this and I was changing the orders around in a fashion to do it the way he thought they might be able to do it in the First Division. He was able to tell me where the troops were at that moment in the battle because they had played a leading part in that battle and had moved a great deal and now it was a question of just exactly where they were located and how they could be turned into the valley of the Cure.

At the same time there was an old friend of mine, a much older officer -- he had been a student officer when I was an instructor at Leavenworth -- that is to say he was an old friend of mine. He had just landed in France and he had the good luck to be sent up to that front to be the town major of the town of Bar-le-Duc. He sat there listening to this

Chief of Staff of the First Division and myself going over this and changing the orders around to meet just what the Chief of Staff of the division thought could be done and then he hurried back to rejoin the division with his newly modified orders largely at his suggestion. After he had left the room this newly arrived officer in France, this coming town major of Bar-le-Duc, this old friend of mine, said, "May I make a comment?" I said, "Certainly, you can make a comment. Why shouldn't you make a comment?" He said, "You might be offended." I said, "No, I won't be offended. I might be relaxed by it." “Well," he said, "I want just to observe that if orders are issued they are supposed to be obeyed and not to be discussed and changed." Well, as the orders he had worked with had probably never exceeded a regiment and probably most of his life had been a battalion or a company, we were now talking about hundreds of thousands of troops -- general confusion over the roads-- another big battle pending -- and it was rather absurd, or to be expected, comment. I was always sort of amused by this because he was a rather pedantic sort of fellow. If we had done that we would have wrecked ourselves about every twenty minutes. However, that was the way we were getting started in this troop movement into the Meuse-Argonne. I was interested in having illuminated signs made at some of the great crossroads so that the marches at night could be better coordinated.

I started to talk about the trucks which were a very important part. There were enough trucks for the foot troops or at least the two infantry brigades of the divisions. Of course the machine gun carts were free of that. They would have to go on another column. The 37 mm guns and trench mortar outfits and of course, the horses of the artillery, and all the trains. Well it was a very, very complicated affair and these trucks were invaluable, to us. But they were controlled by Foch's headquarters by a major who was in charge of all of them. So we would run these truck drivers through with the whole foot troops of a division and then have to bring them back. Well the trouble was these fellows were desperately in need of rest because they had been up in the center there on the French front, moving desperately to get the troops around on these offensives that were being carried out and now they were in this thing day and night. They had two men on the driver's seat one would sleep while the other drove. Now the great question was where they could eat and we had great trouble getting them fed. We had some American staff officers, who didn't

understand this thing and didn't comprehend at all what was going on, that kicked about these Frenchmen coming in to get some food and we had to deal very drastically with them to make them wake up to the fact that we couldn't move our troops unless we fed these drivers. And also they had an hour or two to give them a place to sleep, although most of them could sleep in the trucks. Well this went on until some of the trucks were taken away from us and called back to the French. We had only enough for about a brigade and a half. So they were put at the disposal of this division which was to start its move and the division commander wanted to move a complete brigade. He had the trucks for a complete brigade but he also had the trucks-for about half a brigade. And as he liked to move a brigade at a time, he didn't use these trucks. So promptly the French reclaimed them. So we just lost seat places for about four or five thousand men -- I guess more than that. Well that was a calamity and the division commander came in about that time and he told me -- he was a very fine officer and I liked him very much but he didn't understand this business. It was brand new to him and he made a fateful decision. When he came in and told me he wanted to move his division as a unit, so he wouldn't split this brigade and he wouldn't be able to move those trucks until the first brigade of trucks came back. Well I informed him that we had lost all those trucks and if General Pershing ever heard that he would never forgive him. And he had done a very, very serious thing. He was completely flabbergasted, and very much concerned and frightened but he showed complete lack of acquaintance with how these things turn out in a great affair of this character and he would try to do it like it was done on a piece of paper or a map. Well we had all sorts of things like that going on. When we got through with the affair we had to go up in the French Army there and have them take the troops in the last phase of this concentration and then these French troops had to come back. And the concentration finally got into shape roughly on time. Unfortunately, just the day before the battle there was a raid by the Germans and they captured some French prisoners who were put in front of the Americans in the advanced trenches and some of the Americans too, I think. I was terribly distressed over this because it meant to me the Germans would know we were coming in the attack. When I spoke to General Drum about it, he said, "We are not certain about this," and he called up General Craig who was my predecessor as Chief of Staff and who was then Chief of Staff of the 1st

Corps. And he called him by his first name -- Malin -- and he said, "How about that -- how about those prisoners from the raid on the First Corps front." And Malin replied, "There weren't any prisoners taken." And I remember Drum saying, "Malin, you are a joy forever," and he turned to me and said, "There weren't any prisoners." "Well, I said, "Drum, how do you know that?" And he said, "Well he just told me." I said, "How does he know it?" Well, they told him." I said, "How do any of them know it except the first leading battalion and they know whether they lost prisoners or not until late tonight." I had been with troops for pretty nearly a year then and I knew what a great difficulty it was getting any information from the advanced platoons back to the regimental headquarters. Once it got to regimental headquarters it could very quickly be telephone or telegraphed back. And the minute it got back there to the division, to the corps, to the army was all a very quick procedure. But getting it from that front trench back, to the regimental headquarters was a long, long affair. And sometimes it would take all day before you got your correct information. Sure enough there were prisoners taken and it's presumed that the Germans had some intimation that the attack was coming. However, it didn't do any great harm except that we didn't go as far as we thought we should go.

These men advanced very well at the start. Then they got into these dugouts; and they got after souvenirs. They went into the dugout for a German in a sense and then they stayed for a souvenir and the whole advance lost its momentum and the Germans very quickly readjusted themselves and put up a vicious defense from there on. As a matter of fact if the troops could, have been kept together and have gone straight ahead, they probably could have gone as for that first day as we made in the first month, because we fought a very desperate battle with the Germans after that halt or loss of momentum.

I think your comment there about this troop movement that they refer to as being one of those recognized at the time and their judgment has stood through the years as the most, magnificent staff operation in the war referred to the Meuse-Argonne concentration and not to the St. Mihiel, because the St. Mihiel was not so complicated.

Going back to the planning for St. Mihiel, [Meuse-Argonne] I never saw the plans for the tactical deployment until the fight had started because I was entirely absorbed in the concentration of troops, getting the army lined up for the fight. I knew the positions, they

should be in and my job was to get them into those positions. After that I saw for the first time the plan for the battle which was then underway and a few days later the Chief of Operations of the Army was relieved and I was put in his place. That came just at the time there was an order to send some divisions to Belgium and to replace other troops that were going to Italy where there had been a necessity for troops. But it was very hard to get these troops out and on their way up to Belgium to join the Army up there.

At this time, in the early part of the battle, most of our special units were French, but during the battle the newly arriving American troops came in so that we could replace a great many of the French units by American units. I am talking about engineer units and special artillery units and tank units and things of that sort. Once we got into the battle, the great problem was to resume the advance. The division on the left, the division next to the Meuse-Argonne forest, got into trouble and the First Division had to be hurried out of support position and carried up to the front. They had to travel more or less off the road over these deep trenches, and, with the machine gun carts and all, it was a very difficult thing to do. No Man's Land was some kilometers in width and it was a morass that didn't look like there was a space ten yards square that hadn't been struck by a great shell. It was a morass. There was no trace of the roads left at all except the Route National and there was some trace there, but on the retirement of a German attack the Italians had blown up the road so successfully that we had a terrible time getting around the crater.

So it was the crossing of No Man`s Land and getting the artillery across that was so very, difficult and so very important. One commander who had previously lost his regiment for something a long time back and now had it again -- he didn't have the light regiment this time -- he had a 155 mm regiment and these heavy guns. And he hastened up on his initiative, crossed No Man's Land, and the weight of these guns completely wiped out this very poorly ballasted trail that we had made across No Man's Land and set the affair back, about a day and a half, which was a great tragedy at the time as we were trying to get light artillery across and supporting troops across. There were the confusions you would expect in newly engaged divisions, in a newly organized Army, in a mixed Army of French and Americans -- the French very, very tired, and the Americans very, very cocky. We worked it out, finally got well settled, but we had a very desperate battle on the left of

the Army up towards the town of Extremont. There the First Division suffered terrific casualties. They had already suffered very heavy casualties at Soissons and now they took an awful beating because they had advanced and continued to advance for quite a distance when they were being shot at from the rear across the valley towards the Meuse-Argonne forest. Then occurred the effort to release the Lost Battalion. And that could only be done by getting in behind the Germans which was finally managed and relief brought to those hard pressed troops which has gained great fame by their predicament. We finally came up against what you might call the northern line and there we got ready for the great attack which led up to Sedan. I've forgotten how many divisions took off in that, but we tried to get them rested a little bit. In order to do that, we had to hold the other divisions in line when they were just tired to death. But there was no other way to manage it. And it was very necessary to go and see the division commanders and see the regimental commanders. In some of them, the regiments had lost all organization and they were groups of men, but they had to hold on and they fought on so that these partially rested divis could go forward in the final attack on November 1st, I think it was, which led up to the heights finally above, Sedan.

Q. 10c. Was the Meuse-Argonne planning task one of the toughest you ever had?

A. You asked the question if Meuse-Argonne planning was the toughest. Well I wasn't in the initial planning. I was only in the planning day by day though we tried to make it cover a week's prospects at least. Though it was so very difficult to do, with these tired divisions and the constant changes in the battle at the front due to the necessary withdrawal of French troops and the induction of brand new American units of the smaller type -- not of the divisional type. However, we managed to get the November 1st attack off, though as I say, before it, was the great problem to hold these tired, exhausted, heavily suffering troops in line long enough to line up to the other troops, partially rested, to have an organized attack. And it was a great relief, great joy to all of us, when the center of the attack carried to the heights of Bathelemont -- I think, I don't know, whether that was the big ridge in the center of the attack or not. I know they said Foch was very, much delighted when word came in of their capture. Then the fight went up towards the Sedan front and they almost stopped fighting the Germans then and it became a battle between the First Division and the Forty-second Division who had the right-of-way and who got to the place first. I think they are still fighting that.

I would go up to the battle front and it was very hard to get up there on account of the traffic. And then after you got across No Man's Land the only way you could do was to get on a horse and go up there that way. I did that and I did that with General Drum, who was Chief of Staff of the [First] Army, and of course we had a great deal of our debating while we were riding. I remember one night we were coming from Verdun. We had started the battle on that wing and we wanted to go across until we struck the famous *Sacra Via,* which was the great road which supplied the French Army during the battle of Verdun. We wanted to get back to Souilly, the Army headquarters. We were so busy talking that the chauffeur went by this point [he had changed to automobile now]. I came to by recognizing some other point way to the west, so we turned around and went all the way back almost to the vicinity of Verdun and started again and began talking again, and again we talked by the turnoff and the man went by that and went way over to the west again and we had to come back. And we didn't hit it until the third time. And we got home about two in the morning.

The great trouble here was keeping the various organizations -- along the front really aware of what was happening along other portions of the front. Because each one thought he was the only one who was having this desperate situation, when as a matter of fact, everyone was having, it pretty much and we were now getting into some French troops over towards Verdun where we had both Americans and French. The Germans had hard luck on this front. They had had an Italian division, several Italian divisions as I recall, Austrian divisions, on that front. [He obviously meant to say Austrian in view of next sentence]. They were a little bit leery about them and, as you recall, the Austrians surrendered first. And so they kept some Germans there to stiffen up the Austrian front which was to the east and northeast of Verdun. Nothing happened on that front at all so they withdrew the German divisions that were stiffening up the Austrians and the next day we attacked on that front and the Austrians pretty largely folded up and let us make a considerable advance.

I remember there was a corps of French troops, Moroccan divisions, including the Foreign Legion, etc., and the Chief of Staff of this corps had been the Chief of Staff of the Moroccan division with the Foreign Legion when I witnessed the battle of Verdun the

previous August. He came in to see about a change of orders, just understanding of the orders that was going on his corps up near the Verdun front. And he made the remark to me, "I never saw anything like this. It's change, change, change." I said, "Are you talking about the American staff?" And he said "Yes" and I said, "I heard you myself say when you were with the Moroccan division that the French staff changed, changed, changed. It was a *guerre de papier* and a *guerre de changement* and now you are accusing us of it." And he laughed and said, "Yes, that's about true, but I think you make a better job of changing and I don't mean you change better, but you make a better job of changing frequently than even the French did." I know he was so astonished to find me -- I was a captain when I went through the fight with the Foreign Legion -- and now here just a year later I was Chief of Operations of an army that had almost a million men in it. Such procedure such as that was unknown to the French Army.

Q. 11. An often told study is that of the conflict between I and V Corps concerning the capture of Sedan. In the absence of Drum, Marshall and Conner drafted a memorandum to General Dickman and General Summerall relative to the occupation of Sedan. It said that I Corps should go in. Drum later added, "Boundaries will not be considered binding." Summerall ordered the 1st Division to march to Sedan. They marched across the I Corps area and into an area held by the French. A patrol took General MacArthur prisoner. The French exploded. Liggett also exploded, but had to calm General Dickman "beside whose purple wrath Liggett's rage was no more than a spat of temper." Any comment on this episode?

A. You asked for comments on the famous episode of the 1st Division and the 42d Division and General Summerall and General Dickman and the French. Theodore Roosevelt [Jr.] got in front of his old regiment -- I think it was the 16th [26th] Infantry and pushed on as hard as he could. He had to walk with a staff because he had this knee that had been shot up and I had gotten him back for command of the thing and he was held to be absent without leave from his unit he was assigned to in the south of France. But he was going with his old regiment and making a fine job of leadership. And all of this got complicated up on the front and when he went through the French line, they were lying down and he barged on through to head for Sedan and they rushed up and protested that it

was their sector. "Well" he said, "you aren't advancing." And he went right along. And when they discovered he was Theodore Roosevelt, then they all stood up and cheered him and he went on ahead.

The fight between Summerall and Dickman was very intense and it went back to all sorts of jealousies. The real factors in the case were largely ignored and it kept on in a senseless way for almost the rest of their services. The addition of the words -- "boundaries are not to be considered binding" -- I didn't put it in. But boundaries couldn't be considered binding to carry out what we told them to do," which was the center corps to support the corps on its left which was the I Corps and you couldn't get over there and support that corps without crossing your boundary on your left to do it. Drum thought it was sensible to put it in and we put it in. But that was always used as the arguments on the Sommerall side and I don't know how the Dickman crowd called that. But the thing was rather senseless. And it started off with a jealousy they were jealous of General Summerall's great reputation which he had made in the hard fighting. And the whole thing to my mind was out of place. The thing was we were succeeding weren't there to fight each other. There's going to be all sorts of turbulence on the battlefield and this thing was carried back to old animosities. I didn't have much patience with it, but I wasn't the one receiving the animosity--of course, the French exploded because they were standing still and these other troops went through them. I have told you the episode of Roosevelt. The 42nd Division troops that had gotten almost to the heights of Sedan, of course, they got mad. Well, I can understand that in a way. But nevertheless, all of them could get together to do something rather than shoot at each other, which they almost did.

The fellow that released General MacArthur, that is who identified him was Hjalmer Erickson who was in command of a brigade in the First Division and he was out on the road there and he identified him and released him. Of course, there was all kinds of confusion all over the place. The main thing was that General MacArthur was up there trying to press the attack and got the thing ahead when this thing occurred.

Q. 12a. Marshall was requested for regimental command in late September 1918 but, the request was turned down. He became Chief of Operations of First Army and Pershing proposed that Marshall be a brigadier general, but promotions were frozen by the

Armistice. Marshall became Chief of Staff of VIII Corps. Are the above details about assignments and promotions accurate?

A. In paragraph 12, the details about the assignments are correct.

Q. 12b. Could you describe the Victory Parade in Paris? (There is a photograph of you on a white horse approaching the Arc de Triomphe -- a little way behind Pershing and two or three other officers).

A. Well, as to the Victory Parade, I don't know quite how to describe that. It was a magnificent affair, and of course, it was a magnificent occasion. It was the first passage of the Arc de Triomphe since the Franco-Prussian War and, therefore, a very historical occasion. The most beautiful effect of the parade was when we turned up towards the Rue Royale -- I guess -- turned up towards the Madeleine and behind the great pillars of the Madeleine they had dropped red velvet curtains and it gave a wonderful effect. I remember the photograph you refer to.

Q. 13. In March 1919, Gen. Drum, Marshall and Willey Howell went on a lecture tour. Stimson saw Marshall for the first time at Langres and was impressed by his speech. Any comments on meeting with Stimson?

A. Stimson, a fellow named Murphy, and two other very prominent men, who had temporary commissions, had a mess to themselves. I have forgotten for the moment who the other two are. Oh, yes, one was later was then a partner in J. P. Morgan and Co. and died rather young later on. I have forgotten his name. Stimson and I went horseback riding and he talked at the mess about these things. And he talked a great deal on the horse about it. Later on, I saw Stimson before this, I guess I saw him later when he was sent back home to be promoted from Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel and put in charge of one of the new regiments. He didn't get back in time for the final blows.

Of course, my meeting with Stimson led to other things. When I was at Benning I remember I was playing tennis when I got a telegram in which he wanted me, to go to the Philippines with him. And while he didn't say it in the telegram, it was to be the prospective Brigadier General and head of the constabulary. I declined. I was trying to get away from staff jobs, although I was much complimented by his request.

Q. 13c. Any comments on performance at the Opera?

A. I think I've described the opera. [He did not describe the opera]

Q.13d. Were you in Paris during the Peace Conference?

A. I was not in Paris during the session of the Peace Conference.

Q. 13e. How well did you get to know France?

A. I came to know France pretty well in certain sectors, of course. I knew the people pretty well, particularly the country people -- peasantry -- I had lived with them. Various parts of the country I came to know exceedingly well. Northeast of Beauvais -- up towards, I have forgotten the name now -- and of course, around Nancy and Tours and that section of France, Luneville, later on the district of Beaune and, of course, around Paris and Chaumont and Langres.

I might tell of a very interesting affair that occurred at Langres where they had the staff school. They had to depend almost entirely on French and British instructors and there was some little jealousy there among them and there was a preference of one crowd for the British instructor and of another crowd for the French instructor. Largely those who spoke a little French favored the French instructor; the others favored the British instructor. Anyway, they were doing their best to get ahead without having their own talent for the purpose. I came in there as being the first-officer they had at the school to lecture at the school or anything who had been on the staff and during operations -- on the American side --and therefore I was brought back to talk and give my reactions which I tried to do particularly to prepare them for a lot of intense feeling which was really a misunderstanding and I thought if I could save them from a lot of that, I would do the most good. And that was the part that General Dickman, who was there, thanked me and Stimson and others liked the most. Anyway, the great German offensive broke loose March 21st and was going on at the time I lectured. The first day, the 21st, of course we just got the news of the affair and a little bit of the extent of the affair. You will recall the British Fifth Army was literally destroyed in this first part of this offensive and a great gap was made in the line. That's where General Debeney was moved from eastern France to command the new Army forming in the gap in the vicinity of -- well, I've forgotten that -- it was the peak of the great salient of the western front. The second day the thing was getting very much hotter, we could tell that. The German advances were far greater than

had been customary in trench warfare. They generally made very, very short advances. On the third day they made deep advances and we felt it at Langres because an order came in relieving a British instructor to return immediately to his unit. I was called in by the officer in charge of the school, who later became Chief of Staff of the AEF, MacAndrew, and asked to take over his job. They didn't talk to the First Division or anything or at least I didn't know what they did, but at least that's the way it came to me. So this man tried to tell me in half an hour what his whole course was. And I was to take over his course and teach that. So I went back from that and I had no more than gotten in the classroom than another direction came to me to come back to General MacAndrew's office and here were two more British officers and was directed to takeover their two courses. So I retired with them and they occupied about an hour or hour and a half explaining their whole courses to me. I had this first man's course. Now I had two more. And damned if before I got through with them, a fourth man was relieved and I got his course. So I had four Britishers courses that I had to take there in a period of about three and a half hours. I came out so befuddled with data and everything and I was trying to take over a Britisher's appreciation of this thing and technique of theirs, that it was altogether a very hard thing. However, that's the way it was. And that night at dinner, which I had with with General MacAndrew and General (oh, it was a brigadier more or less in charge of instruction, I will remember his name later), we talked this over quite a bit and General MacAndrew was very much concerned about it. And the next thing that happened was that next morning at breakfast an order came in for me to return to the First Division immediately and a car would meet me north of Chaumont near Domremy. And about a half an hour later, or less than that, because I got out as fast as I could, I left for the First Division. And I got up there and found it was just getting ready to leave for the scene of the battle where the British Fifth Army had been driven out, and very badly handled. I remained with the First Division then until towards the middle of July that summer. We moved immediately, going south of Paris motoring. The troop trains were going south of Paris, too, and the motor trains were going south of Paris, too, because there was too much confusion north of Paris in supplying the French Army and everything to meet this great German offensive.

I know we spent the night at Fontainebleau and I was very much taken back by

the fact that we ate at the famous hotel there, outdoors, very charming, but we sat at the same table four of us, that Mrs. Marshall and I had sat at not so long previously, made quite a moving reaction for me. Then the next morning we started again up the trail. We were now west of Paris and we finally came into these assembly areas as they called them. I learned q great deal about troop movements during this procedure because it was a tremendous affair and I thought perfectly beautifully done by the French in their handling of the railroads. The trains would come through, it seemed to me, at ten minute intervals and I would have to be at the train when it came in because I didn't know who was on it, maybe part of a French division or part of an American division. And if it was an American division I had to catch the fellow and give him his orders as to where he was to march after he detrained. So we had a very hectic time there grabbing these trains as they came in. And if they were French they went on off. And, as I recall, there were two or three French divisions, moving through there at the same time, and the [American] First Division, and they were doing it without confusion and it was really a great demonstration of the highest form of troop management and particularly as this was being done very hastily.

So we got up near a place called Gisors and in the First Division, that was its center of concentration and where we had our headquarters, and we stayed there several days in training and in open warfare. General Pershing was rather irritated by the French commander moving in and taking charge of the training and we always had those ifficulties. And the only way to do was just to make the best you could of the affair. Of course, General Pershing and his staff were interested in a policy being established and not allowed to grow out of these affairs and the French were intense on having American troops assigned to French divisions. So it had to be watched very carefully. So we had several big exercises there and we had some regimental demonstrations there and the French were there all over the place -- rather super critical. There was plenty to criticize, plenty to criticize. But these men they were looking at and all in such a particular way did the most magnificent fighting later on and I think the majority of them became casualties. Because I recall the First Division which had an organizational strength of twenty-five thousand, I think, had a casualty rate of twenty-six thousand. And most of these normally

would come out of the infantry because the artillery didn't have anything like the casualties of the infantry had because they were further back as a rule. So the infantry casualties were very, very heavy. In one fight there of the four colonels one was killed; of the four lieutenant colonels all were wounded and I think one or two killed. Of the majors, there were three to each regiment, there were four regiments, which made twelve majors, every one was killed or wounded. They took a terrific amount of casualties but they went right straight ahead and it was determining -- that and the Second Division really did the determining stroke, which stopped the advance of the German Army. Now that's a rather strong thing to say because the French were putting up a fine fight everywhere. The Third Division had gotten dragged into it there at Chateau-Thierry and had done a fine job there, got very little credit for it because the Marines were referred to by name in one of the radios and that turned all the publicity on them, whereas the Third Division at the crossing of the bridge and all at Chateau-Thierry did a magnificent job and stopped the Germans. All this was a very exciting procedure and, as I say a very interesting one.

When we came north from Fontainebleau, we ran into a new army of the French -- not exactly, it was a group of armies. I reported there and we found out where the First Division was to go, and that was over at Gisors. And we got straightened out of that affair but we learned a great deal about how they were handling these troops -- it was very instructive to see, and a tremendous battle problem to handle without confusion. The railroad part I have already described. The marching part came next and I became heavily involved in that when the movement of the First Division occurred from Gisors north to Froisy which is north of Beauvais.

And when we moved north there, I think we moved with three or four French divisions, and you had to be very particular about how you went about this thing. And there were some roads you weren't allowed to put certain units on. I remember there were a lot of the lighter metalled roads that they didn't want the 155s on and, as I recall, our regiment of 155s went right on this road-and just broke right through it all over. They got up there but they did terrible damage on the way up. It was all in the spirit of getting to the battle and getting up as soon as they could. When we got up near Froisy and turned to our right, it was a very interesting thing to see because the front was marked by observation

balloons in any number right along. And as we went over from Froisy to where the First Division was going to commence its deployment, I found us in the middle of the deployment of the French Aerial Division. The only one they had. And that reminded you a little bit of the Crusaders of old when each fellow had his tent and his shield and coat of arms out in front, because his little tent fly covered his pursuit plane and he was there. It was the French Aerial Division with the great fighters of the French Army, and the air was just full of these planes coming in and going out and they had a terrible job on their hands. I came to know most of them quite well and they were always anxious to get confirmation when they shot down a plane and as a great deal of the shooting was over the First Division they always had to come to the First Division observers on the ground to get confirmation of the fall of the German plane. And I am not ashamed to say that I told our people to be very liberal, because the easier they could get confirmation over us, the more they would fight over us, which was the case. Some of the things that came out later -- the great French aces were there and we came to know them well because they always came into my section when they were trying to get a confirmation of a victory and I was always very careful to treat them in the most complimentary fashion.

I remember one of the most famous ones. As the fighting died down a little bit, abated a little bit, we were finally allowed, two of us, to go off to Beauvais to get a meal. I was desperately tired and I hadn't any real rest for weeks and weeks and General Bullard sent us off in order to get a good meal and get a change. We were living underground entirely and that is pretty depressing, in an old wine cellar that was very deep, in which I tried to take Mrs. Marshall in when I was over there visiting it from the meeting of the United Nations and she wouldn't go at all. She wouldn't believe we ever lived down there. That was a palace in those days because it was safe. Anyway, we went to the hotel in Beauvais and this leading ace was at the table with a very beautiful girl. Of course, he was the great attraction to the women. He was the great hero and they should have made a lot of him because he was risking his life every day and in every way and this girl was awfully good looking. And he came over and spoke to me and he met the others at the table. There were two generals--and one became Chief of Staff of the Army and one became Corps Commander and they were not at all loathe to meet him. But the funny part of it was, and

the reason I tell you is, we got away about two weeks later and went into Beauvais for a meal. And this time he was there with his fiancée and her mother. And the fiancée was anything but good looking. But he was very courteous to her that was an arranged marriage of course. She was going to marry the hero. I don't know what became of the pretty girl he had two weeks previously. When he looked at us, he winked at us but didn't come over.

Now I had better look here and see what you have down for me next.

We learned a great deal about fighting up at this time. It was a continuous affair terrifically heavy artillery bombardment. The night was just hideous. I used to try to sleep upstairs in this chateau but they drove me down when they began hitting the building with these 8-inch shells which sounded like the end of the world. So I found more composed rest down in this deep wine cellar that I have already referred to. Then we had a very difficult situation. We had the first mustard gas attack and that was a vicious thing. The brigade commander had directed the regimental commander at this town -- he sent word up to him to evacuate the town and go out into the fields and woods. Well, it was raining hard and shells were breaking all over the place. So this fellow preferred his dugout. Of course, the worst thing you can do with mustard gas is to get in a wet dugout. That just permeates the whole business. They were ordering him out and he wasn't going. So I was sent up the brigade commander didn't go -- from Division Headquarters with orders to relieve him. And that isn't very pleasant. Well I had a hard time getting up there because I got shelled out about a dozen times and the trouble was that when I would lie on the ground, I would lie in mud or something and also I was very much afraid of lying down in a mustard gas shell hole which would have ruined me. When I finally got into town -- that was a bad trip through the town -- because of the blasting of the buildings -- it was under very heavy artillery fire -- I've forgotten the estimate of the number of shells in there, it was something appalling. I finally got down to the dugout of the commander of the regiment and I went right down in it and I met him there and he had had a gas mask on for about ten hours and that's a very exhausting thing and they all looked very exhausted. And, of course, I came up to order them to do what they didn't want to do. And I was explaining to him that he didn't have much choice, that if he didn't choose to do it, I was directed to relieve him. And we were discussing that when a shell hit outside right close to us and just shook-us

like jelly. And down the steps came a fellow, rather fat, fat-faced, jolly looking, but he wasn't looking jolly then, although he did have a grin at the time and he came down sitting, right down these steps and landed at the bottom. And his dugout had been blown up and he had been blown out of it and found himself outside on the ground. Anyway, I was struggling with this man to make him understand that if he didn't, do this I had to relieve him. And unfortunately I can't tell what happened except they had an awful battle about it and I had a very, very --- (end of side one).

SIDE 2

I think that's enough on the First Division fighting up there. I've described the degree of the casualties and all. We had to extend and take over another French division's front, so we had a two French division front because we were much larger than a French division at the time of the great German offensive. And we had quite exciting times then. I remember Roosevelt was worried about the French retiring on his right and he put on a little precipitous counterattack right into the French zone. I know that Debeney had directed that not a foot of ground be given up. And they had a meeting, I had gone to all the previous meetings but General Bullard went to this one and he was congratulated because Debeney told him that the American division was the only one that carried out his orders. And it stood pat.

I remember I had them organize all the men with the trains, drivers, everything of that sort, Signal Corps men that were not in actual use, and we made up two scratch battalions and one was put in charge of the adjutant and one was put in charge of the judge advocate. And the adjutant and the judge advocate came up to my office and my assistant was giving them their instructions. And out of the window -- this valley was right in front of us and, there was a railroad running down the valley. And they wanted to know specifically just what their orders were exactly. He took them to-the window and said, "You see the valley there?" “Yes.” “And you see the railroad along there?" "Yes." "Well," he said, "you are to die east of the railroad. And that's all the order you need." Well there was a little bit of a shock of a twist to it, but it was a fact. That's what we wanted them to do. If they were going to die, die east of the railroad. We couldn't give up any more ground.

I've already commented on the Opera. I was not in Paris during the meeting of the Peace Conference.

Q. 13e. How well did you get to know France?

A. I've described how well I knew France.

Q. 13f. How good was your knowledge of French at this time?

A. My knowledge of French as to Military French, I knew pretty well. And I learnt most of it, it seemed to me, in a day when I had to represent the 1st Division when they were talking of organizing a counterattack in this desperate situation during the German offensive and apparently the First Division was largely going to make it alone. And I was ins1sting that if the First went forward, there had to be a French division on either flank. And we had quite a great tussle there. And I had to understand. I couldn't fail to understand because the whole affair of the First Division depended on it. It seemed that when I came out of there I have never been more tired and I learnt more French under the pressure at that time than I had in previous months. My military French was pretty good. I found the casual French-speaker was untrustworthy on military French because I knew more about the exact meaning and terminology than he did. Salon French I didn't know at all.

Q. 13g. How many of the outstanding French, leaders did you meet during the war (Foch, Joffre, Weygand, Nivelle, Clemenceau, Briand or others?).

A. I knew Joffre fairly well; Weygand quite, well; Nivelle not at all until after the war; Clemenceau very well because when he first came to the division in August 1917 he was not prime minister. He was about to be prime minister and he knew it [he came to power in November 1917]. He insisted that the Americans must get into the action right away they must shed blood. He made an impassioned speech there. Well, General Sibert couldn't do this. This was General Pershing's decision. This was very difficult for General Sibert. But I was present during this interview and did some of the talking in connection with it because we were not at all trained for action -- just really recruits yet -- and yet the situation was desperate. Later on I came to know [Clemenceau] him in a better way. I had gone out one afternoon with a French liaison officer, the son of the great art dealer and afterwards ran the great art store that was on the Rue Royale and on Fifth Avenue in New

York -- Seligman -- and we were sitting on the hillside. It was a sunny afternoon and we had visited a number of batteries and a number of other positions up on the front. And I notice these heavy explosions here and there of trench mortar bombs and they were scattered about a great deal. And we sat there and watched it for awhile and I asked Seligman what it meant, the indiscriminate firing like that. He looked at it for awhile and he said, "I tell you what I think they are doing. I think they are registering preparatory to shooting. They are registering." So we sat there longer and-watched just what they did and charted ourselves every place that they struck. Then we went back to the front again and went along and talked to the regimental commanders to see what data they had. They had some but they had not noticed this thing much, because we had an overall view of it all from this high hill. Well, we came to the conclusion that there was one place not for from Seicheprey -- this-valley of Seicheprey there -- where the line stuck out quite a ways right on the edge of the woods that seemed to be the center of the registration. So I prepared an order that the platoon commander in that section there should vacate that advanced position at dusk and should not occupy it till daylight and that certain artillery units should be prepared to fire on that area at night in case of a French [German] general bombardment. Sure enough just at dawn the next morning the Germans attacked. Well, it was too bad that one platoon commander was too uncomfortable outside -- it was cold -that he took his command back in and met the raiders head on. And he lost; I think it was ten prisoners. The other platoon commanders carried out the orders absolutely. And they just shot up these raiders and we captured German prisoners. And it is seldom ever that a raid is stopped because you don't know when it is going to happen and they concentrate all their forward artillery and everything and then pull it and there you are in the dark. But in this case they were ready for them and they shot them up very badly and took German prisoners which is quite unusual under the circumstances and defeated the raid entirely except for the loss of these few men by this platoon commander disobeying his orders and coming back into position at dawn which is exactly the time the raid is carried out. Of course, he was killed, so you couldn't say very much about it.

Clemenceau was now prime minister. Well this was a great astonishment to the French, because as I say in a raid you are almost doomed to surprise. Here's a whole front of hundreds of miles and some one point they pick out for a raid. You don't know that

because they used all the efforts of secrecy they possibly could. And here the Americans had met the first raid and won really a victory. We had captured their flame fighters. We had captured -- I think they had brought up even a gun -- 47 mm gun or something like that. We captured a lot of them. We took a number of prisoners. We killed a great many and it was altogether an American victory.

Well that was so unexpected and quite contrary to French assumptions about our troops-- they had seen so many untrained troops -- that Clemenceau himself came from Paris and came right up there and I escorted him. And he came up and he was giving Croix des Guerre. And he was an old man and in doubtful health. But fortunately he had on rubber overshoes. And he gave these Croix des Guerre, but there was one fellow he didn't get. And as we were coming out -- it was rather difficult because we had to walk beside the trucks and there was only a foot width of path beside the trucks -- this fellow came loping down the road and he was yelling, "Wait for me, wait for me." And he caught up. He was about six feet two and gangling and of course, covered with mud. And he had been through the raid and had done rather a good stunt. He had taken several prisoners and Clemenceau had the medal for him. We had the name. And he was just yelling and yelling. Clemenceau understood a little English. And when the fellow came up, we stood there beside the trucks, having a very hard time finding any place to stand. And Clemenceau put this on him and shook his hand and said, "You called and you were late this morning. But yesterday was what counted and you weren't late yesterday, and congratulated him. It was very interesting that the Prime Minister should come from Paris the next morning and give these Croix des Guerre because it was quite a contrast to what they had expected of Americans because of the number of untrained troops they had met. And untrained troops over there got into terrible situations invariably. [Heffner -- Wasn't he called the Tiger? Yeah.] And I saw him after that a number of times.

Didn't I mention the men I knew -- Generals? (No sir). Did I mention my knowledge of French? (Yes sir). Of those French generals you mention, I knew Joffre well, fairly well. I should say Foch -- I knew Joffre also. Weygand I came to know pretty well. Nivelle, I never saw. Clemenceau I've just-described. Briadd, I didn't know at all. There were several French corps commanders that I knew very intimately. I am sorry I can't remember their

names now -- one of them was a famous fighter. And I knew some of the brigadiers very well I know when I received the Croix de Guerre in the Plaza at Metz, poor old, who's the French general, the French general was tried afterwards and imprisoned, I was very fond of him, came to know him very, very well. (Heffner -- Petain). Yeah, Petain. He entertained us all at lunch at the German commander's villa there. The German commander had a long room, covered with deer heads and boar heads and everything of that sort and--we all assembled there. And the two brigade commanders of the Moroccan division-- it had brigades -- the others only had three regiments. The two brigade commanders were there and I knew them quite well from my experiences up there with them at Verdun and meeting them later on when they had terrific casualties on the British Fifth Army front. They came up and greeted me and we were delighted to see each other and we embraced and kissed and went through all the procedures of a French welcome. One fellow stood with his arm around me and I had my arm around him and we were having quite a time -- we had had a lot to drink -- and Petain came up and said, "I'm very glad to see you on such intimate terms with my fighting generals." I told him where I had been with them and that I valued their friendship. I valued their recognition very, very much and we had quite a time. Petain was talking there. Then General Pershing came up and interrupted and said, "General Petain, I want you to meet Colonel Marshall." And, Petain said, "I already know him well -- (had seen him a number of times) -- I already know him well. I just saw him on very friendly terms with two of my fighting brigadiers here." "Well," General Pershing said, '"I want you to know him well because I asked him today, while were out of the Plaza to be my aide. His Army Corps that he is Chief of Staff of is being demobilized and he will now come and join me as my, aide." So Petain congratulated me then, and I came to see him quite often just as I did Foch. I wasn't on intimate terms at all with Foch though I travelled with him quite a bit in this country and saw him quite often with General Pershing. He was rather resentful if I said anything when I was with General Pershing. Nobody below the grade of a full general would say anything in front of Foch in the French Army and I was talking up there with very much lower rank to General Pershing when he was in conversation with Marshal Foch.

Q. 13h. Did you meet any of the outstanding British leaders during the war?

A. I didn't meet many of the British leaders. I met a great many afterwards formally at dinners. I met almost every Army commander and I met Sir Douglas Haig, of course. I think I met all their Army commanders. In fact, I sat one night at a dinner the Parliament gave with three of the British Army commanders. I don't remember the names any too well. They could be recalled to me very quickly. I knew more of the British liaison officers -- colonels.

General Pershing as top commander operated very largely through his operational staff that was General Fox Conner who was head of the G-3 organization so far as fighting was concerned. And he would make a temporary headquarters at the front. And, of course, for quite a long time, he commanded the First Army before it was split up into two armies. And then he commanded the group of armies. But he would either live on his train or otherwise get disposed on the battle front in order to be near the fighting and continue to command. And every now and then he would have to go off to Paris when some momentous meeting would occur.

Q. 13i. Did you have occasion to see President Wilson or to meet Franklin Roosevelt?

A. I had no occasion to see President Wilson.

Q. 14. How did Pershing operate as top American commander? What is your estimate of him as a leader?

A. General Pershing as a leader always dominated any gathering where he was. He was a tremendous driver, if necessary, a very kindly likeable man on off duty status, but very stern on a duty basis.

Q. 15. Any comments on the chief American, British, and French military leaders of the war?

A. I watched more in World War II about the effect of commanders. General Pershing had several staff officers, one in particular, that did a certain amount of his planning and they were very, oh, rather the German type of man. (Turn it off). To straighten myself out -- one or two of his officers, and some trying to copy his style, without his talents or without his prestige, were very severe and their requirements for the troops were unduly difficult, I thought. And no complaint was tolerated. Well, I think this did a great deal, of harm, allowing a man with that state of mind, that personality, to be in

a commanding position, a central position, I should put it. And I was very careful to watch out for that in World War II. If I found I was running into an officer that was sort of harassing everybody, I either relieved him or tamed him down right away, because it was very important that the High Command be understanding -- be understanding. What the High Command had to do, and which unfrequently they were loathe to do, was to see if his generals did their job and not the junior officers and not at all the men. The hard thing was to make them handle the upper crust. That was embarrassing and the War Department, I thought, always failed in its handling of its corps commanders and high officers. If they acted up and did something, there was never any reprimand, as far as I know, private or otherwise. I would write to the fellow in the frankest possible way and tell him exactly what was wrong with him and I would tell him that this letter was only seen by my stenographer who could be trusted and it would not be put in the files. But I wanted him to understand exactly how I felt and if it occurred again I would relieve him. And that happened oh, -- I wrote three or four letters like that to the highest -- very high-- commanders and as long as it was quiet, you might say, if you were in the regiment, as long as you didn't tell your wife and the adjutant, you could do most anything and they would accept it. What they couldn't tolerate was the thing being discussed around. So, I found most of the men that I had dealt with very harshly, very arbitrarily I would say, became my very close friends afterwards.

Q. 21. What lessons did you learn in France that were to influence your actions in World War II?

A. Well, you asked me to recite the lessons I learned from the French that influenced me. Why, it was a continuous series of lessons. Most of them, what to do and quite a number what not to do. I learned the technique of high command, the technique of logistics, the technique of a great many of those things and I saw troops under various conditions. I saw their regard for them in many ways that were an education to me and I saw so many of the things they did wouldn't have worked with American troops at all. That was all very, very helpful and I would find myself leaning on that knowledge in dealing with things in World War II. The big thing I learned in World War II was the urgent necessity of frequent visits. Well, as I used a plane all the time and about every other

week, I would go on the road before we got into the general war. I would visit most of the places in the United States with fair frequency. I know when I went out to Fort Sill the first time; I find that that was the first time the Chief of Staff had ever been there in the history of the place. I was there time after time, but I could move quickly and I could act quickly. And I was abreast of what was going on all over the place. I could sense their reactions and I could see how they felt urgently about this or that which we at Headquarters did not feel so much and I would come to an understanding in their way and I could correct things almost instantly, particularly after Congress -- without my request -- placed first $25 million and then $100 million at my disposal with no accounting required. Most of this, however, was used for underwriting you might say. When something came up we thought we ought to do, it would take months to go through ordinary channels to get it through the hearings in Congress and the Budget and everything of that sort. But with this money I could put up the first $10 million, let us say, or the first $20 million and get the work all started right away and then when the appropriations got through we would get that refunded from the funds allotted for that purpose.

I couldn't recite the lessons. They were just without number. I had the observation of a number of high commanders. I saw General Summerall who was really the iron man. He was the nearest approach to the Jackson type that I saw in the war. And he was a wonder to watch when the fighting was on as a leader. His influence on the men was tremendous. And my admiration for him was very, very great. I thought as Chief of Staff he was a failure because he didn't fit into that and he was sort of suspicious of this or that and he had people that were exciting his suspicions you might say.

He and I got along very intimately throughout though he was antagonistic at the last toward General Pershing and General Pershing was antagonistic towards him. And it was all the fault of their followers. But as a commander he was superb. I never saw anything to beat him on the battlefield. I remember once he took the British division commander around. This man was going to relieve him. And Summerall took him on an inspection trip. And when he got through walking around and talking like a cathedral, as he did, with his cane, and shells breaking all over the place, this Britisher, who was accustomed to pretty hard fighting, came back. He said he had had enough of that he never

wanted to make another inspection with General Summerall. General Summerall was really unconscious of any feeling of fear. Somebody called his attention one day in the fighting off at Exermont, that where they were the shells were just skipping their heads and coming back in just showers. "Well," he said, "you mustn't feel that way about it. Every shell that comes here is one less over our devoted infantry."

Q. 22. I understand that General Pershing wanted to go on to Berlin. What was your own view?

A. At the time of General Pershing's problem of maybe going on to Berlin one of the great, troubles was there wasn't the transport. The horses were all gone largely. And when they started the march into Germany, I had to unhorse brigade after brigade of artillery and leave them on the foot near the railheads and take their horses for the units that were, going into Germany. We were very hard put in those respects and if the battle had been carried on into Berlin, I don't know how it would have folded up. Of course, there was this to be said: The Germans needed to be licked well - to be licked well -- so they would not get back as really they did, marching, back ostensibly in triumph which was, of course, all hocus-pocus.

Q. 23. Did your failure to go to Berlin influence your views in regard to the unconditional, surrender formula in World War II?

A. As to the surrender terms, no.

Q. 24. Did you go into Germany during the occupation period?

A. Yes, I was in Germany during the occupation period.

Q. 25. Frazier Hunt, one of Genera MacArthur's biographers, says that General MacArthur went over General Pershing's head on 1918 to prevent Pershing from breaking up the 42nd Division. He said that thereafter Pershing and his close friends did everything they could against MacArthur. He says that Pershing influenced Conner and that Conner influenced you. Any comment?

A. Well, Frazier Hunt knows a lot more than I do [note of asperity]. I don't recall enough of this incident about the Forty-second Division to comment. But that was going on with practically every division always with very deep feelings on the part of the divisional people. And I just don't recall what happened there. It didn't make enough

impression on me. But as for General Pershing influencing General Conner on account of this and General Conner influencing me on account of that, that's nonsense.

Most of these troubles of that kind came from the staff. I saw that so many times. And I am happy to say that the staff I had around me never tried anything of that kind. And if I would lose my temper privately there about somebody in the field, General Hull in particular, and others would tame me down and persuade me not to send any message, or anything of that sort and I would cool off and decide in the end it was very much better not to do it, although I felt t the way they were handling the thing was very much out of place. I always felt that General Stilwell had a very hard time in China because he talked in front of his staff and his staff reflected his coloration and that antagonized the British and, of course, antagonized the generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek].

I would say this in regard to all this being written about my being hostile to General MacArthur. In the first place, it is damn nonsense. I did everything in the world I could for him. With the Assistant Secretary of War, who I had a letter from yesterday and have forgotten his name today (chuckles), now the Chairman of the Chase National Bank, McCloy. With McCloy we worked terribly hard and it was a hard job to do to have MacArthur put in command in Japan. Because the Navy wanted to control that and they put up quite a battle to get it. But we managed to control for MacArthur. All these things were too much feeling expressed by the staff. And a lot of that comes from the general talking in front of his staff. I don't think I ever said an adverse word about General MacArthur in front of the staff though he-was very difficult -- very, very difficult at times -- particularly when he was on a political procedure basis. I don't ever recall saying a word in front on the staff. And I do recall suppressing them. I wrote his citation for the Medal of Honor to see that he got it. And I will tell this now. The British, the New Zealanders, and Australians knew nothing about his getting out of the Philippines and we didn't dare leak it any way and it had to be a success before we could really decide about it. And they had proposed a certain man to be commander there, an American. I am not going into that, who he was, but anyway they had proposed a certain man. I didn't answer because I was waiting to work this thing out of getting General MacArthur out of Corregidor. But when MacArthur landed in that desert country of Central Australia and we got the word -- I got the word --

confidentially, privately, that same morning early, before my breakfast as I recall. I called up by telephone the Prime Minister of Australia and the Prime Minister of New Zealand. Because what I did was I released a news thing immediately when the word of his landing in Australia came and saying that he was coming back to take command of the troops in that region - be the Allied commander. Well, as a matter of fact, there was no agreement for him to be the Allied commander by the Australians or the New Zealanders. They had proposed another man because they didn't know MacArthur was coming out. And, as I recall, before breakfast, I called both of them up -- got them on the phone -- and explained why I had made this news release that he would be the Allied commander, because he would be our proposal for it, and I wanted to release it instantly so that the Japanese couldn't say that he had deserted his command. And, the same thing was in connection with the award of the Medal of Honor. I wanted to do anything I could to prevent them saying anything about his leaving Corregidor with his troops all out there in this perilous position. I thought a Medal of Honor would be helpful so I communicated with him -- his chief of staff, Sutherland – and as I recall Sutherland came back to me and asked me to draft it. And I drafted the citation for MacArthur's Medal of Honor. And I remember Mr. Stimson paid me a compliment. He didn't know I had done it at first. And he said -- to do a little personal bragging for which I must be pardoned he said, "Well this is very well done" when I said I did it. And he took it right to the President. And the President OKed it. All these things were staff stuff. And if the commander himself was of a suspicious nature and MacArthur was very much so -- he thought we were playing him down the river all the time, which we were not at all, it made it very, very difficult. It was very hard at first because we could give him literally nothing. We weren't in quality production. We didn't have hardly anything to send to Europe we had a campaign going on in Africa and we just couldn't give him anything. And Sutherland would come over -- his chief of staff -- and see me, to see what they might get and I was forced into the embarrassing position of really giving him nothing. It wasn't until August before Pearl Harbor that we began to get anything in any quantity and then we immediately started to send these things to the Philippines -- (Heffner -- 1941) -- 1941 -- what we could do we did do. It was a very trying thing for him because he just had nothing he just had nothing. And another thing was that I

found out during the course of affairs that the initial air men that we sent in were not up to standard at all. And I picked out the man he was very fond of and did great things out there --Mac -- Mac something or other --I've forgotten his name. And he was the first very good one he got and he was splendid.

Q. 26. Did you ever share the view that the United States troops won the war for Britain and France? (Some people say that we didn't win the war, but merely made it possible for Britain and France to dictate the peace).

A. No, I never shared the view that the United States troops won the war for the British and the French. [He is talking about World War II in his answer]. They won the war for the French all right. But the British endured -- fought alone with great heroism and great persistence and endured terrible hardships and terrible casualties and I tried to make that plain in my final report and I think if you will consult that you will find that I do that and pay a tribute to the Russians, which was not just a paper tribute, it was a fact. Their fighting was a tremendous, tremendous factor in the eventual victory. We came in time. Our arrival was determining but the great fight was made before we were even ready. We were the victims of unpreparedness. We were not on the too late and too little basis because I went in for enough stuff so that we really had it when it began to come. And I remember I was being severely criticized by certain congressmen who were starting on the economy hunt because I had too much of this and too much of that. And I had a committee call me up -- a friend on the committee asked that. -- I didn't want to go up myself on my own initiative -- I went up on this request to answer this specific charge. Well, I said that delighted my soul. That was the first time I knew of in American history where American troops in the field had too much of anything. And that I was very, very happy that was responsible. And they shut up then and didn't make any more criticisms.

Q. 9a. I notice that a number of these places were in the area where Patton's troops fought in World War II. Did you re-visit any of these places in 1944-45?

A. I didn't visit those places in 1944 and 1945. I was at Verdun. I was in the air over those fronts. In fact my most perilous flight was with Bradley from Verdun up to that place up in Holland which was only about five minutes flight from the German lines and I have forgotten the name of it. It was Montgomery's headquarters. I went over many of them, visited divisions

from Switzerland clear up to Holland just before the battle of the Bulge.

Q. What was your view about the establishment of the Supreme Command in 1918?

A. I had no particular views about the Supreme Commander in 1918. I thought they should have a Supreme Commander. How they were going to compose their various difficulties, I don't know. Fortunately, General Pershing who didn't have much in the way of troops ready at that time came out in a very generous disposition. But it is very difficult, very, very difficult, to manage a thing like this, and without Churchill and his tremendous influence with the British Parliament, we would have had a very hard time during the war and later on.

The Supreme Commander at the start was not a very good thing. I was opposed to our taking it right at the start and they didn't take it while I was Secretary of War [Chief of Staff]. I thought it hadn't been clarified enough, the fellow didn't have enough power and he would just be the goat as it were. Poor old Montgomery took it and I thought did very well in gradually getting the thing worked out. It was quite awhile on the side of having an American.

Q. 27. Colonel Marshall returned to the United States in 1919 on the Leviathan as Pershing's aide. There was a parade down 5th Avenue and a reception in Washington at the Willard Hotel. Marshall went with Pershing in October 1919 to Brandreth in upstate New York; for a brief rest. Any comments on the welcome which Pershing received on his return?

A. There were a number of triumphal parades, first in Paris, which I think I have referred to. Then one in London, where I know I had a devil of a horse. The Inspector General picked the horse out because of his appearance and he was a bad actor and he, couldn't manage him and I took it over from him and I had a terrible ride. And he went over backwards in that small Admiralty Arch, I think they call it, and broke a bone in my hand. I got one hand under him as he came down but I was able to finish. But I was a very grateful person when I got by the reviewing stand and then went in the stand and sat in the rear row. General Pershing and the King and Queen were in the front row with all the great leaders -- that is all of the citizen leaders because all the troop leaders were in the parade.

Then again I was in the parade in New York and then the final parade in Washington. A crowd is a funny thing and yet very natural. Here was this great parade. We cured the defect of the New York parade which was too much strung out, and massed the troops in Washington so that they came by in masses and of course the parade took about a third as

long and was much more impressive. But the people were most impressed of all by one mule licking the soup that was coming out of the back of a rolling kitchen. I think that took more attention than anything else in the parade. (Heffner: Wasn't there a parade in Philadelphia?) Not a great parade in Philadelphia, it was a smaller parade.

The trip up to the Brandreth, Fox Conner's family's camp, was very, very agreeable. We stayed up there about a month. I would stay up until nearly midnight every night going over the congressional hearings with General Pershing in preparation for his hearing. Then, I sat with him during his hearing.

Q. 28a. Do you have any recollections of the fight over the Versailles treaty and the League of Nations?

A. I have a recollection over the fight over the Versailles treaty and I myself had no stand in it. My view of the thing, of course, was they could have compromised it and still had the main effect of the treaty by very slight modifications. I thought that the President was too rigid and the others were too bitter and his rigidity didn't go very well with their bitterness. I heard the debate one day, one morning, but that was all.

Q. 28b. What were your views on the League of Nations in 1919-20?

A. I wouldn't express any views on the League of Nations because I was not a deep student of it at the time. The general idea of it appealed to me.

Q. Did your views change later?

A. My ideas crystallized later on when it became a matter of deep concern to me, in my business.

Q. 28d. What was your general impression of President Wilson?

A. I won't express any views about Mr. Wilson. I was too far from him. I knew his secretary of state. There were two of them that I knew. Lansing was one of them-- fell out with him. Then the other one I have forgotten, a New Yorker. I knew his family better than I did him. I knew some of the others. I knew Mr. Hoover, who didn't say anything at all, so I couldn't know him at all. In fact when he was secretary of commerce I traveled with him on the Harding funeral train. He used to sit in the observation car for hours and he very rarely said anything at all.

Q. 29a. Can you give me the background of the Pershing - March feud?

A. I had rather not go into the Pershing - March feud. They had it out and I'm not an umpire on such things. I leave that to the columnists.

Q. 29b. What was involved in the fight over the organization of the War Department?

A. I don't know that there was any particular thing involved in the fight over the reorganization of the War Department. One wanted it one way and the other wanted it the other way and the men already in positions wanted it more or less the original way and the men General Pershing was going to put in the main positions wanted it the other way. And it was worked out the other way. That's all there was to that.

Q. 29c. What was your role in this fight?

A. My role in the fight was largely keeping in touch with the various ones of General Pershing probable staff and making certain that I didn't get tied up in some of these staff jobs that, I didn't want.

I would prefer that you do not pass on anything to the young man that's writing up about the March - Pershing feud. I don't want to figure in that in a star position. There are too damn many feuds. History is the more important thing. I thought that General March was a great administrator and a very arbitrary, tactless man. I think his greatest error was having around him a number of men that copied his type. He needed exactly the opposite type as his principal functionaries, it seemed to me.

Q. 30a. Major Marshall accompanied General Pershing to V.M.I. in 1920. Any comment on this trip to V.M. I?

A. The trip with General Pershing up to the V.M.I. was very interesting and delighted him up there. I had insisted on his going there because he had gone to West Point and there were so many V.M.I. men in lead positions in the Army -- not so much as in the second World War but in that world war.

I might pause to say that in the Second World War, at one time, we had the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the General Staff and I don't know how many division commanders and corps commanders and things of that sort. When the Deputy Chief of Staff was made Deputy Chief of Staff I didn't even know he was a V.M.I. man. When the Secretary of the General Frank McCarthy came in, I didn't bring him there

at all. Another officer brought him in as an intelligence reserve officer and he was brought down to be an assistant secretary by a certain other officer and, I didn't know anything about him until after he became secretary. The thing got so numerous there with V.M.I. men that I called for the President of the Alumni Association and requested him personally for them not to make any point of it all because no one would believe that it hadn't been done on purpose by me because I was a V.M.I. man and actually it was not that at all. Way early in the game when we had Army-Navy board, we had one meeting at which three out of the four Army fellows were all V.M.I. men. I didn't know it at the time. I knew I was, of course. And as we were leaving the meeting, the Chief of the Air Corps commented on the fact that it was rather unusual that three out of the four should be from the V.M.I. That was the first time I knew it. I was very anxious for the Alumni to have nothing to say about this in the way of tooting it up because I would be the sufferer for that for everyone would believe I did it purely because of my V.M.I. affiliation. As a matter of fact I didn't know a one of these men at the time they were made and I didn't bring any of them in the War Department or near the Deputy Chief of Staff job or Secretary of the General Staff's job.

The trip up to Lexington, as I say, was very interesting. The thing I mostly remember was trying to find a certain place where the corps deployed in the battle of New Market and I was not making very much headway about it. I had forgotten entirely where the place was and was looking for a hill slope when actually it does not look like a hill slope when you get to it. And I asked this old, gaunt, bearded farmer who was back raking in the barnyard if he knew anything about the circumstances of the battle. And he said, "Yes, he seed the Corps march right by on the hill there." He was a very young man. "Well" I said, "I had General Pershing out there-- the Commander in Chief in France -- and we were trying to find the actual battle site." And he didn't offer any other information. And I repeated again, "I have General Pershing out there in the car -- the Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces and he is going to the V.M.I. and I am trying to show him the battlefields." And he didn't say anything and I looked at him and he said, "I heard you the first time." That's all we got out of him.

Q. 30b. Do you regard yourself as a Virginian?

A. Regarding myself as a Virginian, this is by general reference. I didn't do it.

My family were Kentucky. And I myself was the only member of the family born up north and I was born in Pennsylvania. And then I went about my business and that's about the end of that. I married two Virginians, very ardent Virginians, and I went to school in a very ardent, historical Virginia section school, and I have many, many, many friends that are Virginians. I might say also that I pay taxes in Virginia and I know all about that.

Q. 31. Marshall worked on some say wrote all of the report of First Army and of G-3. In 1921, Pershing became Chief of Staff and reorganized the General Staff.

A. The report of First Army and of G-3 was written by Drum and revised by me to suit General Pershing's criticisms of the original report. It took quite a long time to do it because there were many compromises involved. All the maps and everything with the First Army draft were prepared at Leavenworth under Drum's supervision.

Q. 31b. In 1923 -- Pershing accompanied by Marshall went on a tour of CMTC camps. They were the official military escort for the Harding funeral train on its return from California.

A. In 1923 where you say that General Pershing and I were the official escort for the Harding funeral, that's not so at all. His train, that took his party up to Alaska or took them up to where they embarked for Alaska and brought him back to California where he died at the Palace Hotel at San Francisco, was used for the trip and his own staff and own people and others brought on at the time -- the Attorney General who afterwards had a hard, time being tried -- and others that came to join him at San Francisco. The car that General Pershing travelled in was hitched on the train and that's the way General Pershing and I came into it.

Q. 32h. How did Pershing operate? (Was he a "driver"?)

A. I have commented on General Pershing and his method of doing business and the proposition of working with him. I haven't mentioned his friends like Dawes and others that he was very intimate with, particularly Dawes who I came to know very intimately myself. But I don't think to explain there is anything for me to give other than I have given to explain, how General Pershing worked. I might accentuate the fact that he was very delightful, very delightful, to go along with when we weren't working. He was almost boyish in his reactions and we would have a very pleasant time. The minute we came to

work he was very serious minded you might say almost implacable executive.

Q. 32b. The General has been described as representing a Regular Army attitude of disliking the "civilians" and of feeling that civilians were the natural enemies of the Army. One book, which I read not long ago, said that it was not until you came along that the Army began to shift its views and understand that the Army must understand civilian thinking. Any comment?

A. I don't know about the citizen soldier. I was deeply interested in it and John Palmer, General John Palmer, was immersed in it and wrote a book about it, and he was a very deep friend of mine. And I had him made an aide to General Pershing, so he could bring that special knowledge of his to General Pershing's attention. Altogether we were in a period there where it, was rather formative of the new Army organization and it was very important that the citizen soldier aspect be most carefully considered. And it was, and we made I think, considerable progress in it. The trouble was there were those who were little-minded that understood much about the main thing and they just cherished their own grief and their own prejudices and that was soon both sides. And you just got to work against that all the time.

Q. 32d. Did General Pershing have any hope of becoming a candidate for President in 1920?

A. I think early in General Pershing's period of return from France some of his friends deluded him into this Presidential aspect. I know one group came up from Tennessee and I sent them back home. He was away at the time. And he was furious with me. I didn't even consult him. I knew pretty well what the general reactions were and I thought it was a shame that he might in some way cut down his prestige by being involved in that sort of thing. Less it was almost by acclamation.

Q. 32e. Were you acquainted with General Wood's efforts to be President?

A. I was somewhat acquainted, at a distance, with General Wood's efforts. He was very highly regarded by many.

Q. 32f. What was the impact of General Pershing on the U.S. Army? Did he raise the soldierly standards of the Army by his insistence on discipline?

A: I think he and Pershing did raise the standards of the Army by his insistence

on types of discipline. Very naturally he would. And he was a very imposing and impressive man.

Q. 32g. I have read statement that you absorbed from General Pershing his insistence on "spit and polish" and strong discipline - is this true?

A. I don't think I learned from him the spit and polish part. I knew how to do that long before I ever saw him. It has a decided place and is pretty much evidence of the general state of discipline of the command. The point is when it's overdone, of course, it's harmful as anything is as a rule that is harmful and that would be particularly harmful it took away a lot of time from the other training. The trouble with the other training is that not a tremendous number had the imagination and everything to make it interesting to intrigue the soldier and it was very difficult to do, it because it required so much of movement, so much of territory, so much of expense, all of which, a matter of fact, they leaned against in time of peace.

When I was called in by General Craig and made Deputy Chief of Staff, I used to go over all the papers. He would sit in and just listen in the Secretary of the General. Staff and others would bring up for various decisions. And we would spend more damn time over the right to run a road or run a sewer line and something else across a reservation than we would on all the basis for training for the summer camps. The minute you got into training of that sort you were pushed out by the money factor pretty quickly and you had to have so much ground. You had to do so much maneuvering to get it done. And unless they were all intent on that instead of being distracted by these other things, it was very difficult to handle it. I was intent on it and I made myself very unpopular.

Q. 32m. Any other comments on General Pershing or on your service with him?

A. I have given enough incidents on General Pershing I think. I don't care to go into any more of these things. I think I've done enough on that. And I'm not writing a history of General Pershing.

Why I would say that the severe cut in the Army's strength was a tragic affair. I remember General. Pershing coming back from Europe and writing me a letter which I just happened to find when they were debating all these affairs he outset of World War II preparations that he had come back-to-find that the total strength there considering was 110,000.

Well, we had had 180,000 before the war began and now it was down now to 110,000 actually it came out to 118,000, but what was more all the teamsters and men around the hospitals and any things of that sort who had been civilians before now were taken out of the soldierly ranks. And the next thing was they began to draw the soldiers from the special units in the ground troops in order to provide the men for the Air Corps. They wanted the Air Corps increased in a certain way. They had boards to investigate it. The Congress did. And then they accepted the Board report and then they drew the men from the ground troops. So finally we just had nobody. You couldn't even train a battalion you had no communications people, you didn't have your special platoons. I think at one stage there we had one horse as the transportation for the battalion commander. The orderly had to get off the horse apparently and walk about that time. I have forgotten just how bad it was, but it was pretty bad. When the Headquarters Company was supposed to be, I think, 318 men, it had gotten down to about 18. You couldn't train; you didn't have any normal facilities except for the individual soldier. That's about the only thing you could get at. And it was a very tragic thing, because the knowledge of command and control of such units was disappearing from Army. And I had a very severe battle over this when I first started in as Deputy Chief of Staff and later as Chief of Staff. This denuding of the Army always occurs. I have suffered from it myself. I walked into it in the First World War with the First Division when we had nothing. I walked into it in the Second World War when I come in as Chief of Staff. And I walked into the some effect exactly when I came into the Korean affair. And I'm an expert on what a dire situation it is. And it seems to be the democratic way of doing it. They will spend billions as a result of the war and they won't spend a million or two to prevent the war. That's just about what it amounts to.

I thought the disintegration in ’46 and ‘47 was the most amazing thing. I was out of the country most of the time in China and I didn't realize how complete it was till I went over as Secretary of Defense and I just found literally nothing and you have to start clear back and begin all over again. And, of course, all the money that was involved in that, all the lives that were lost in that, all the bad feelings and confusions that were built up out of that came into it. However, the minute you come in again, they are having a battle now, of course, of too much. Well you have to be very carful about that and see that it’s done very carefully.

My feeling now is-- I'll say it -- my feeling now is that, the mistake they make is by trying to add a few or trying to trim a few, trimming the appropriation by paring this down a little and paring that down a little. My reaction now -- I don't want to go into it now, in a sense, but I will put this much into the record. My reaction now is what they should do what is lacking is a study of how to find an attitude of preparedness that is not going to beggar the taxpayer and that is going to be able to be maintained in time of peace, through a long peace and, of course, that goes back inevitably to compulsory service. That is one of the incidents only, but it is one of the inevitable incidents in that. But about 15 per cent of the public which is articulate -- certain fellows fighting about the enrollment in college, although the big universities have come in correctly on this and other things like that and political things in Congress. They go right back exactly to the same thing they had in 1898, the some thing in 1914, and in 1917 -- the some thing they had in the second World War and the same thing they had in the Korean affair. There is literally no change at all. I know when I left the General Staff as Chief of Staff I talked to the staff. We were differing. I thought at the time it was the finest staff I had ever seen so far as the quality of men were concerned and their understanding of their war duties, but I don't think there was a single one on that staff – [the tape ran out here --768. He had something like this on November 20 in which he said they didn't understand they would have the same problems again. (THIS WAS THE LAST THING HE DICTATED).

TAPES 8M and 12M
SIDE 2 OF TAPE 12M IS A DUPICATE OF TAPE 8M

INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

PINEHURST, NC

December 7, 1956

RECORDED INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
AT PINEHURST, NC - December 7, 1956

Answers to questions by Forrest C. Pogue. Sgt. Heffner ran the recoding machine and was present throughout the interview.

Q. 1. What were the basic weaknesses of the National Guard and how did you attempt to eliminate them?

A. As to the basic weaknesses: There were some of these that could not be eliminated as they were inherent in the basic laws governing the National Guard. The principal trouble was the very short training period for the men and as a few hours once a week would not suffice to replace basic training which required us in the regular service on a 12 hour day, very strenuous work, many months—six or more—in getting men ready for the war. It is only possible in a National Guard organization to get the men but once a week except for the two weeks in the summer. I did find it possible as an extra effort, beside the law, to get the Illinois National Guard for longer periods. But the lack of training which resulted in the two hours a week was the, or rather constituted the, basic weakness of the National Guard system which you could not cure unless you had a longer period of training. And that was one reason why I was so anxious to see compulsory military training installed because I wanted to see it reach the point where—you couldn't—the man would have to enlist in the National Guard after he's finished this six months

compulsory training in order to clear himself from further service. He would be on a reserve basis and as soon as the ranks of the National Guard were filled with these men that had had six months basic training the opportunities for the development of a highly disciplined organization were all present.

The next difficulty was the question of officers. The amount of training they had before they got their commissions, which in most instances was very little. It was not possible to send them to schools in the numbers that would meet the requirements of the National Guard and it was also quite evident that the very men we wanted most couldn't spare that time—they were too successful in business or the law or medicine or whatever their practice was. So it resulted in a very complete lack of thoroughness in the training of the officers. This again was one of the reasons that I thought that as a by-product of the compulsory military training, we would get a totally different result because we could commission officers only from those who had this compulsory training. So your control of the National Guard would be in the hands of the men who had been basically trained—which was entirely absent.

As I recall the divisions we first called in—in the National Guard—we required them to have seven weeks of this basic training, preliminary training, as it were. And they went on through that and passed to their other work with great complaint from commanders who felt that that was time wasted, that seven weeks was entirely too long. After we really took over these divisions, largely with a change of command, we had to do this training all over again, for the established forces that we controlled, we were then having almost a year's basic training of the individuals before we put them into the ranks. Later it was six months of very strenuous work—very strenuous days and nights—all of which was missing—is missing—in the normal National

Guard training. Only a high degree of discipline, as developed by this intensive training, makes it possible to meet the demands of the modern battlefield, which requires a very high state of discipline. And there is no time to get it after you are in there. And this individual training doesn't come as readily on a divisional basis as it does on the individual basis of training the man as an individual and then assigning him to a larger unit.

Now another thing, in connection with the officers was, it was very hard to get a correct judgment of their efficiency, their qualifications, because here you stepped into the realm of politics, just as you did in the commissioning of officers in a great many of the states, and in their handling of the men and all, it was very difficult, short of a war basis, to have men discipline their neighbors during the peacetime training in a manner that is required in order to get a strict compliance with the orders that are so necessary to build up a satisfying state of discipline. In the main—the weakness was—the complaint, lack of time, to basically train the individuals in the Guard, the political influences involved in the officer corps, and the lack of method of firmly establishing the qualifications of the candidates for promotion or commission.

Q. 2. Mr. Frye in his biography of you mentions efforts you made to improve the performance of the Illinois National Guard. He mentions, in particular, special maneuvers which you sponsored. Will you discuss your efforts while there?

A. In relation to Mr. Frye's mention and his biography of me, he speaks of a special training procedure I followed in New York—in Illinois—I can't very well go in to that because it's a very lengthy proposition and it would take quite some time. I will have to reserve this to talk to you later.

Q. 3. Did you meet considerable opposition from National Guard officers and their friends in Congress in your efforts to improve the National Guard?

A. I confined myself in my efforts in the training of the National Guard in dealing with the Illinois National Guard. I took things as they were—and the rules and regulations as they were—and they responded very, very well. I would say, they responded with goodwill to the procedure, whatever the lacks were.

Q. 4. Did we eliminate the former weaknesses in the reorganization of the National Guard which was made after 1945?

A. I am not sufficiently familiar now with the reorganization of the National Guard after 1945. But what little I do know of it, I think it didn't correct these basic weaknesses.

Q. 5. What changes, if any, are still needed?

A. No answer given here. He answers this after question 6. See page 5.

Q. 6. Do you feel that the National Guard is the answer to the need for a Citizen Army?

A. I feel the National Guard is part and parcel of our system and we will always have it with us. Whether it's the complete provision of trained forces or not, I do not know. But if we must depend on that, we have a long ways to go in fitting these men for the strain of modern fighting. We have to remember now that where heretofore we've had years to get ready for a war, the next time we will have no time at all. Because whoever makes an issue of war will be prepared to try to get the best of us from the very start because that would be our weakest moment for a large trained force. The only way I can see under present conditions to improve on this short of

Universal Military Training would be to have a very few troops take their turn—we'll say a five year period—of being very highly trained and giving a great deal of time—in order to be ready for immediate employment and then being relieved from that pressure by another group of divisions, which would be determined largely by the amount of transport that could be readily made available. We would know right off that we couldn't transport a large number of troops abroad and if our military police remains the same, that is to keep the fighting out of the western world, as we have in the past, it would be limited at the start to the divisions to which we could find transportation. And at the same time others that would remain at home and gradually establish themselves in efficiency during the period they were available as home guards, as it were.

Q. 5. What changes, if any, are still needed?

A. I'm not sufficiently familiar with the law now. But I would say as far as I know nothing has been done to cure the greatest weakness which is the time element and the quality of the man that is commissioned. The only remedy to this that I know of is compulsory military training where the graduate of the six months course, of whatever months may be the term, can be assigned to the National Guard, for the ranks, for a period of say three years and meanwhile would be a reserve for the ranks of the National Guard after that period. I know of no other way to get a solid basis of training in the ranks of the National Guard. When you look back and realize how long it took us to get these divisions ready for service—I think the average, I'm guessing, was about 20 months—I know some divisions were 22 months getting ready to go abroad. Well if we become involved in first-line fighting in the first week of the war, a system of that sort is not tolerable.

Q. 7. Mr. Frye mentions efforts by General John M. Palmer, you and others just after the war in an effort to get Congress to establish a citizen army instead of a small professional army, such as General March wanted. Can you give some background?

A. As to 7 my work with General Palmer and others in an effort to get Congress to establish a citizen army instead of small professional army that General March wanted, I think I will have to talk to you about this at some length.

Q. 8. What were the weaknesses in the Reserve program as you found it in 1939?

A. As to the Reserve program, its principal weakness was an effort had been made to get as large a reserve of officers as possible. And that was quite contrary to my conception. I felt that we ought to have a small reserve, very well sustained and trained. With the funds available for this large mass of officers, we couldn't possibly do that. I thought it was very much more to the point to start off with a modest number who had been given first class opportunities for their training instead of as it was so little money available that the government could do very little for the individual officer.

Q. 9. What steps did you take to strengthen this program?

A. What steps did I take to strengthen this program? Well almost immediately on my becoming Chief of Staff we were moving into a situation that demanded the assignment of a great many reserve officers to active duty and there we had to put them in before they had completed any additional training, which wasn't so good, but was the best that could be done under the circumstances. There was no period for a new preparation arrangement for the training of reservists because we were into the thing—into mobilization—almost immediately on my

appointment as Chief of Staff. Prior to that the funds available for the training of reserves, as I already indicated, were so limited that very little could be done for the individual so the standard of training of the officer was very small. The regular component of the ground army again was so small that there was almost no place to assign these men for professional experience. Somebody hazarded the statement, I recall, that all the noncommissioned officers of the regular Army in this country could find reserve seats in the Yankee stadium. That may be correct or incorrect, I don't know, but there were very few of them. And of coursed the numbers to be increased were tremendous. However, I feel very sharply that we tried to get numbers rather than training which I thought was a cardinal mistake.

Q. 10. "In the mid-Thirties the Navy was permitted, by a cautious increase in appropriations, to start on a new shipbuilding program which by that time was acutely needed. The Army was less favored, presumably because there was a continuing public confidence shared by the White House and Congress alike, that the Navy could safely bed thought of … as the only really necessary line of defense for the time being."

Was this due mainly to the President's pro-Navy feeling, do you think? Or was the Navy more successful in selling its viewpoint to the President and Congress? Or was it as the result of the same type of public reaction we have now in regard to the Air Force which prefers the program which takes the smallest number of men.

A. This attitude towards the Navy set up in time of peace may be partially due to the President's pro-Navy feelings, but the main point was that the Navy was dealing in something you had to have years of construction preliminary to making an effective result. The feeling was that you could make a ground army very quickly, but you couldn't build a battleship in a week—it was a

matter of years. As a matter of fact the same thing held with the Air—that you had to have a lot of extra training for the Air—well the hardest thing in the world to train is a ground army of infantry and artillery. In fact, I never saw it perfectly trained except during the latter part of the war. Because everything you do is under extraordinary difficult circumstances, which is not the case with the others. For example, in the Navy, I think it was the ship custom that everybody should take a bath, time prevailing, before going into action and put on clean underwear. The probability was he'd had a night's sleep in his regular bunk. With the Army it was quite the other way around. The probability before a battle was that he had been in a series of marches—some of them possible forced marches. He had been pushed to the verge of exhaustion. He was wet—because it always seems to rain in such times—and muddy and he had to sleep in those clothes. He had no chance to get a change of garments on the eve of action or a long time after that, and yet the moment when his high courage was necessary was as a rule at dawn when he woke up half-frozen to deal with an enemy he couldn't see and his machine guns and artillery, as a rule, couldn't see except through the eyes of a single observer. And another thing the artillery which had to furnish such close support was out of sight and he might never see the guns that were supporting him, all of which required a very high state of training, higher than that of any other force that I know of. Most of the training in the Navy you had a specific duty to perform, a specific place to perform that duty and you went as I have explained in a prepared state to do that. That was not at all the case with the Army. It was exactly the opposite and the chances were nine out of ten, certainly with the artillery, you never saw your enemy and you never saw the place in which you fired until dawn came the morning of the battle. All this required very high training in order that it might be carried out with precision and efficiency. Then there was another very, I think, a specific reason why it was much easier to obtain funds for the Navy than

for the Army and for the Air than for the ground army. The Navy was highly photogenic. A column of battleships, supporting cruisers, and scurrying destroyers was a very spectacular thing. There is nothing spectacular about a ground army set-up. As a matter of fact the better it's done, the less there is to see, which made it very, very hard to deal with men who were being educated constantly to admire the tremendous, the impressive sight of those great ships plunging through the waves and stirring up quite a wake behind them. This, I think, presented one of the great difficulties of the thing because a member of Congress didn't see the ground armies in action very well. He was taken out to see part of thing and all. But the time that really counted was the night—the marches up to the final night—the fatigues and discomforts and hardships of that night—and where you were when morning came, when you got ready for the first effort. The airship is very spectacular. The air force and the ships are very spectacular. But again this is the nearest approach to pushbutton warfare, just as it is with the Navy, but there is nothing pushbutton at all about practically anything in the ground army. I think part of our trouble in this goes back to our days of our ancestors being experts with the rifle, and the rifle being on the conventional deer prongs over the fireplace. Every man in those days—certainly every man on the frontier—was an expert handler of a gun. He knew how to track. He knew how to screen himself and he knew how to shoot with precision. Now practically all of that vanished and the major portion of the boys we got were city boys. I know when we went into the First World War, I went over with the first unit and there was such talk about that they were trained marksmen and trained woodsmen. Well most of them hadn't seen a weapon except in a shooting gallery and had never been in the woods in their life, other than the park, which made it a very difficult change. Now the farmer boy in a sense was better prepared. He probably moved more

slowly and deliberately, but he knew the open country. And his difficulty came in handling himself with the crowds to which he was utterly unaccustomed.

Q. 11. "The money finally obtained for educational orders (which were designed by the Ordnance Department of the Army not to supply weapons but to pave the way to eventual mass production) is seen to have been grotesquely small on almost any basis of comparison." Any comment on this.

A. As to the money involved in educational orders, the amounts were small but they should be screened for percentages against the total appropriation available and the needs of the ground army at this time. The army needed everything. At this time it was dealing with a 40 year old rifle—I think it is 40 years—and had to be rearmed. Its artillery had to be rearmed. I was much criticized for continuing the 57 and 75 -mm guns. I did that because we had no ammunition for the new 105 guns we had very few of these and it would take a long time to get them. Meanwhile we had to have some artillery. So the only way was to use the 75 and the large accumulation of ammunition which was left over from the first war. Those were facts and we had to have something. And that entered into most all of these things—there was such a limited amount of money available. We had the 105; we had the new automatic rifle and we had the new machine guns. The poorest product gotten out by the Ordnance at this time and I don't know whose fault it was—it was the first thing that reached the troops—was the 37 mm cannon as antitank gun—I say 37, maybe it was 47, I don't recall. This was archaic when it was issued to the troops. Yet it was the last ordnance product. We had had very great difficulty with the Ordnance department in the past, but I think that had been largely washed out by the operations of the General Staff coming in as to what models should be manufactured.

Another great difficulty I found with the Ordnance, and I got into this by an early visit to the Ordnance almost immediately after I was made deputy Chief of Staff. I went to them, the chief of Ordnance and his assistant chiefs of ordnance and asked them to tell me all the thing they needed, all the things they lacked and there I found for example that while the big industries retooled almost completely every three years or more, they had some machines in those arsenals that had been there fifty years and there was no money to get any replacements of any kind. And so there was so much required that only a very little bit could be apportioned to educational orders. It was a very fine thing to have the educational orders, but by Gosh, we had to have something actual that we could use immediately. [Sgt. Heffner – I think that 37 mm was referred to as a one pounder] Where I said 75 mm antitank gun it was 37 mm [Sgt. Heffner, One pounder, I think it was]

TURN IT OFF

Q. 12 and 13 have been merged with a later question.

Q. 14. Would you discuss the whole program of developing new weapons and techniques, noting your role in this effort?

Q. 15. Were there specific weapons or pieces of equipment in which you took an especially close interest?

A. The system for developing new weapons. This was guided in the main from the chief of the branch—Chief of Artillery, Chief of Infantry, and so forth. Also there were specific boards that existed, notable one for infantry at Benning, one for artillery at Bragg, and several others. There

were sections in the staff in the War Department that were busily engaged on any new prospect that came up. My reactions and actions were motivated largely by a general survey of the whole set-up or lack of pieces in that set-up and the proposals of officers. It's inherent in an Army, a large organization with a control like that of the War Department—General Staff and chiefs of branches—that it should be conservative and when a man comes up with a new idea, unless he handles himself very carefully, he merely stirs up opposition. In the first place, a great many new things are proposed, a great many out of Congress, a great many by outsiders, and a great many by individual Army officers. Only a few of these practical propositions and yet you have to clear the air of all the impractical ones, each one of which is somebody's favorite son. I tried to make it a point to see the proponents—a proponent—of any one of these matters. I remember one in which an officer was in rather bad odor, it seemed, by his feelings about the artillery and the fact that they were not forward looking and there was a great lack in the training, particularly of the artillery that was being mounted in the tanks. As I say the feeling against him was rather strong. When I heard this I sent for him and I had him lay out for me all of his thoughts on the subject, his arguments, and I told him at the time about half his trouble was that his presentation wasn't a coordinated affair but was a highly prejudiced and almost semi-insulting procedure. I thought he had good ideas. As a matter of fact I made use of them, particularly about the techniques of employing the artillery installed in tanks. But he had successfully antagonized practically the whole staff by getting out of temper with them all. It required a little more subtlety than that, because they were in a firm position and he was not. I saw any number of these men and I will come to one of the most notable cases later, in regard to the jeep. I made it quite a point to see the foreign representatives of any of the new tools that we were building, like tanks for example and other things of that nature, to find out what the other fellow was doing—

who was fighting and using them on the battlefield. This was notable the case in relation to the settlement of quantity production of tanks, as to what model it should be as between the British conception and our conception. Well I heard all of our arguments and then I got a couple of Britishers in, just as myself alone, and told them to talk very frankly to me and tell me how they saw this thing. And I got their point of view from them. But, in short, it was this, as it seemed to me afterwards, and it worked out well too. As to mobility, speed, handling and matters of that sort the American tank was incomparable and the British was very poor. We had used these procedures in connection with the harvest field, notably one man out west of the Mississippi River, who had great numbers of tractors and things of that sort. I know we brought him in and almost lost the value of his use because there got to be a Congressional movement behind him and of course that just clouds the whole issue. I was trying to get that part—trying to get it from the British. I remember, for example, that there came a time when the British wanted fifteen of the earliest form of heavy bombers. I am just trying to think of the name that we called them. Anyway, I'll remember the name in a minute—a very common one—the reason they wanted them was—their people down on the river in the slums were being heavily bombed and Mr. Churchill in particular said they needed encouragement and the only encouragement they could get was if we were bombing the enemy as heavily as they were being bombed in the slums of London. But the trouble was that the German bombers working on England were taking off just across the Channel. Our bombers, working on Berlin, had to fly a long distance and the only thing we had that would reach there—the British had nothing that would reach Berlin—were this particular kind of bomber, whose name I've forgotten at the moment. So they wanted this bomber to get something to Berlin so that they could tell these people they were bombing Berlin. At that time there was a law which made it imperative that anything that was turned over to the

British or the French had to be approved by me personally as Chief of Staff of army equipment. It was quite clearly to my mind an unconstitutional law, because the President of Commander-in-Chief and for a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief to be able to tell him what he can do or can't do is kind of ridiculous. However, that's the way the law read and it hadn't been tested out. So it fell to me to operate under the terms of this law. Well, I was very careful about it. I tried not to crowd the issue at all and I thought it was imperative that Congress feel that they could trust me and then I could get them to do things that otherwise they would oppose. Well this was one of them and it was the only time I recall that I did something that there was a certain amount of duplicity in it. Actually what I was doing was very right, and I didn't realize how right, and I could have given that reason most effectively, but it wasn't until we turned over these bombers to England that from an Englishman I found out what the trouble was. Our fellows were reporting back that they turned these, reluctantly, very reluctantly turned these bombers over to the British and they were not being used. In fact, they were standing out in the field and the grass growing up around the tires. I sent for a Britisher and I asked him to explain this thing to me very frankly and I wouldn't quote him and he told me very quickly what the point was. He said they couldn't use these bombers. Their defensive arrangements were lacking. They had no tail guns for one thing, which was the most serious thing which would mean that they would all get shot down. There were two or three other things about it and I accepted their version because I was familiar with the manufacture of these things. I had been out to the plant and gone over them while they were turned out and I could see exactly what they were talking about. Our fellows were arguing about all these things, but here were the British who had a familiarity with battlefield conditions that we didn't possess. It was like the tank procedure. The mobility of machinery and all was superb because we'd had this comparable experience with tractors and all

that thing out in the great wheat fields out in the West, but when it came to the question of using these planes—tanks—when it came to the battlefield equipment of the tanks, they were not arranged so they could be fought with efficiency. And I got my line-up from the British, so in the general arguments I decided in favor of the Americans in everything that had to do with the mobility propulsion of the tanks and I decided for the British on what they felt were the necessities of the interior arrangements of the tanks for fighting purposes. The same happened with these planes. When I looked into it I discovered that the British found they couldn't use them because they were so vulnerable. Their defensive equipment was utterly lacking and we then began sending each tank [plane] through the modification section at the plant up at Seattle and I went there several times to see what they doing about it. So we had to modify every one of these planes before they were workable. Now I could have much better have said that we gave those fifteen planes to have an efficiency test. Whereas what I did say was something like that but not a positive statement such as it developed could readily be made in the case of these tanks. This sort of thing occurred time and again. When it got into the ammunition, machine guns, in particular, we were short in every way on ammunition, small arms, antitank and Congress was criticizing the Chief of Ordnance very heavily for insisting on a very conservative procedure. Because the British were planning similar orders in this country and doing the work very quickly. The Ordnance people told me that they would get in trouble and that was being too hurriedly done. Well it developed it was being too hurriedly done. The guns froze as it were at high altitudes in the planes and couldn't be fired at all. And where they were using British ammunition, though manufactured in this country, they had to turn back and we had to issue some of our cherished small allotments that we had available for the few planes that we then had. When you get into these arguments of that nature—and they get into a political complex—it is

extraordinarily difficult to handle the thing because when they are pushing for something like that, logic flies out of the window and you are up against a political procedure. In all of which it seems to be the general attitude that the War Department is always stupid and everybody else is brilliant. I must say that this used to make me tired.

We were making an intensive study in antitank defense, both as to weapons and as to the method of employment and following this up very carefully in the field of the large maneuvers that we were running. We found in our early Army-Navy joint operations for landings that there was a complete lack of comprehension on both sides as to how to go about it. I remember seeing a letter of the commander of the fleet saying they had gone through his one exercise in which I might say practically everything went wrong, but it was a great lesson to all of us, they couldn't do it again because it interfered with their training. Well, it's rather absurd when you look at the training to see the hundreds and hundreds of landing operations that they had to support—and how very few battle actions at sea there were.

I remember visiting the Air Corp's first efforts at having larger guns in the planes and they had installed a 75 mm in this plane and were trying to work out how they could use it. This sort of thing I was after all the time, but there were so many different facets to the procedure when it came to the work of the planes in support of ground operations that it was very easy to say that the great trouble was there were almost no planes available for use in these demonstrations for the operations in support of troops. We had so few that we had to take almost all of them away from the Air Corps training to do this other thing which put a very grave difficulty in our way and set up very positive postures on both sides of the fence.

You refer to Colonel Borden and weapons for jungle warfare. I took this up to see what I could do to increase the support of the ground troops and to lessen the casualty rates in the way of heavier gunfire. They were then fighting north of Guadalcanal above Russell Island and on beyond that. I have forgotten the names of the places at the present time. And I got Borden in and told him to figure out what could be done with existing things. We couldn't go at something that took a year to produce. It had to be something that he could get it in shape in a month or even less and I remember some of the things that he did do. One of the principal ones was to take the amount of antiaircraft ammunition for the 80 mm gun—I think it was 80 mm—and by shaving it down and get it so it would fit a trench mortar we had. That gave us heavy artillery fire close up to the front line in the jungle and, therefore, was very valuable. There were a number of things of like nature that he worked up. Then I would send him over, wherever it was, later it was to Italy I remember—then it was to the Pacific and he'd have these things all displayed. And I had them bring in the principal officers and I had them bring in the sergeants and they could indicate what they wanted right there. He'd take the order and that would be shipped the next day from San Francisco. And we followed that up with great length. First it was something that could be done quickly, like just shaving down the side of a shell and the next was having it available so that the man looked at it and said, "I will take that" and then the order would go to San Francisco to put that on the boat and send it out there. We carried this to a great extent in Italy. The high commanders there—the field marshals and all—came down to inspect and pick out what they thought might be usable.

The various items that are mentioned by you here in that main paragraph of yours, I recall, I don't know just what to say about them, but they were being pushed in every way possible.

When I sent a man like Borden over to the Ordnance Proving Grounds, I gave him a priority procedure that they would have to accept. Mr. Stimson got interested in this and he had a man doing the same thing later.

Q. 14. Would you discuss the whole program of developing new weapons and techniques, noting your role in this effort?

A. I pretty much answered this question, right then.

Q. 15. Were there specific weapons or pieces of equipment in which you took an especially close interest?

A. There were a number of weapons in which I had a direct interest. I don't know how to separate them apart at this moment.

Q. 16. There has been a great deal of debate over the credit for the jeep. Is there anything you want to say on that?

A. The best witness in this is General Bedell Smith. He was then Secretary of the General Staff. During a conference I was having a number of generals, he came into my office, which was his privilege, and interrupted to say that there was a man in his office who had just come in, who'd invented a small vehicle that he (Smith) thought was excellent but he had been unable to get any favorable observers from the Quartermaster Corps, from the field artillery, regarding which he had been very hopeful, and from the Air Corps. So they had sent him from Judge Patterson's office down to my office and he came in to Smith. He was pretty irate, I guess, he was an Irishman, and he wanted to give one of these small motors as a sample and have us test it. Smith took about three minutes to state this and I said, "Well, what do you think of it?" He said, "I

think it's good." "Well, I said, do it." The conversation was just about that long. "Well," he said, "it isn't that simple. We couldn't get along unless we had about fifteen of them." So I said, "How much will it cost," and he gave me the estimated cost. I said, "Do you think you can find the money?" And he said he thought he could. And then I said—"You do it." And he went back and then he came back in about four or five minutes later and interrupted us again. And I said, "What's the trouble now Smith?" Well he said, "I should have said it before and I say it now , that's the first damn time we have been able to get anything for this fellow in this whole War Department, and I think it is worthy of special comment."

That was the jeep. First thing I heard of it after that was at the tests at the Quartermaster field depot near Baltimore [Holabird]. It was called by some other name and there were a lot of photographs in the rotogravure section of the paper. And on inquiry I discovered that was this jeep and these were manufacturing it. Well Smith handled the distribution. I remember, he sent five, I think, to Fort Knox to the Tank Corps and the Chief of the Tank Corps replied that he could give the reply without the test. And Smith told him well he would have to have the test that I ordered it. As I recall the incident, two weeks later he asked for 38,000. From that time on the requests for the jeep just mounted and mounted. The Artillery wanted some, Quartermaster of course wanted some. All these people who had turned it down all wanted some. That was the jeep as I recall it, but Smith can confirm this.

Q. 17. The Ordnance Department has been sharply criticized for its conservative attitude in the pre-war period and the early years of the war. Was this due to lack of funds mainly or to a certain innate conservatism?

A. The Ordnance was conservative, too conservative, I would say, but at the same time it had to insist on a certain precision that the line officers objected to as too prolonged. But the reason for this showed up crystal clear when we were dealing with machine guns for the antiaircraft and we had to use machine guns that were being built in various arsenals around the country for the British, who accepted a very much lower standard than the Ordnance insisted upon, and they found everyone of those froze at high altitudes and couldn't be used. And then, as I said before, they came back and called on us for some of our small reserve.

Well, the Chief of Ordnance was being very heavily criticized by everybody interested in this matter in Congress. As a matter of fact, he was absolutely right and you had to do this thing with a great deal of care and a great deal of examination and tests, all of which were thrown to the wind when they wanted something badly and they were arguing to get it regardless of what the conditions were.

Another thing was the archaic machinery they had. I remember when I was—I think I've told this already—investigating as Deputy Chief of Staff the set-up of the Ordnance to try to find out personally what they wanted, I discovered they had some machines that had been in there for fifty years. In other words, they whole set-up needed revamping. One reason was the extreme lack of funds. There was just almost nothing in the Army appropriations that permitted you to go ahead on anything.

Q. 18. Do you have any comments on the development of the General Staff?

A. As to the development of the General Staff in connection with General March and General Pershing, I think the estimates—the statements in the preceding paragraph are reasonable correct.

I found in going into all the papers afterwards and in some of the actions which occurred at the time in which I saw General March personally that he was a master administrator, an executive, with a great weakness of antagonizing everybody and, in particular, having men about him, one in particular, who were very curt, and almost rude, in their procedure. They operated too much like General March. They needed someone of exactly opposite characteristics as Secretary of the General Staff and in other posts. I admired General March very much in his basic procedure, but I thought he almost ruined himself by his bitterness in his procedure which stuck with him to the last. The one point about the General Staff that has to be remembered is that while they had the power of selection there very high that the selections abroad were much more effective than the selections of individuals on this side. Whether that was due to the fact that they were close to the combat and all that sort of thing, but nevertheless that was the case.

Q. 19. What are your views on the work of Secretary Baker?

A. As to Mr. Baker, I'll say that he was the greatest American—or I will put it, the greatest mind—that I came into contact with in my lifetime. I never saw Mr. Wilson, so I can't comment on that. But I had a number of conversations—intimate conversations—with Mr. Baker and I admired him beyond any other man that I have ever known. He rode a very difficult horse there between General Pershing and General March and did it extraordinarily well. He was the most penetrating observer of Army facts and fancies, as it were, and we couldn't have had a better man as Secretary of War. And, of course, when he made a presentation his handling of the English language was superb.

Q. 20. What are your views on the disagreement between Generals March and Pershing?

A. I have nothing more to add about the disagreement between General March and General Pershing. I don't know how much was General Pershing's fault because I didn't join him until the feud had well built up. But I thought on General March's part he might have been much more moderate in his procedure. However, I think they were both at fault, because it was essential that they get together and they didn't. What saved the situation was Newton Baker.

Q. 21. Do you recall when you first became worried about Germany and Japan?

A. As nearly as I can recall my first intimate worry about Germany and Japan was when I was in the Philippines in 19… I want to correct the beginnings of my answer to 21. Frankly I don't recall just when I became worried.

Q. 22. Do you recall your reaction to President Roosevelt's Chicago speech in 1937 in which he spoke of a quarantine against aggressors?

A. I had a very distant reaction to Mr. Roosevelt's speech in 1937. In fact, I don't recall analyzing it at all.

Q. 23. Where do you think the western powers made their great error in the Thirties: (1) allowing the Germans to reoccupy the Rhineland, (2) allowing the Germans to rearm; (3) failing to rearm speedily enough after (1) and (2) happened; I4) some other factor?

A. I don't care to answer that.

Q. 24. Do you feel that Chamberlain could have afforded to try a showdown with Hitler at Munich?

A. I don't know enough about all the details to answer that.

Q. 25. Do you have any comments on General Wood's America First movement and on the activities of some his associates? Did they hurt our rearmament effort?

A. I don't care to answer 25.

Q. 26. How damaging to the armed forces was the munitions inquiry of the mid-thirties?

A. All I know about the munitions inquiry is that we weren't able to use any of the free money, as it were, which Hugh Johnson had proposed that we should use, for the immediate manufacture by heavy industries and of a lot of heavy armament.

Q. 27. Did Lindbergh's report that the Germans could not be beaten in the air seriously affect military thinking in this country in the late Thirties and early Forties?

A. As to Lindbergh's report, I don't think that was fatal in anyway. It was very informative. I knew Lindbergh—talked with him. I remember driving home from a dinner at General Arnold's one night and I heard so much of that sort of thing, it didn't make a profound impression on me. As a matter of fact, one very distinguished citizen still in the forefront as it were, came to me in about 1939 I think—no 1941—and advised me very strongly not to ask these large sums of money from Congress because we couldn't possibly go into the war; we didn't have a chance of defeating the Germans and getting into the Western Europe. And it was all a tremendous waste of money and a very serious involvement.

Q. 28. Was Roosevelt playing with fire when he talked tough to the Germans after 1937 without making adequate provision for the armed forces?

A. Well, I can't answer that. Everybody has to be the judge.

END OF SIDE 1

BEGINNING OF SIDE 2 – TAPE 12 (Side 2 of Tape 12 is a duplicate of Tape 8 which was on a small piece of tape.)

Q. 29. General Marshall agreed with Secretary Hull of the need of keeping the State Department acquainted with Army and Navy plans. Admiral Leahy considered this unnecessary. Was this liaison with the State Department every worked out satisfactorily?

A. Reference to the State Department. I do not recall any machinery set up for liaison with the State Department. I recall very intimate relations with them and frequent visits of Mr. Stimson on Mr. Hull.

Q. 30. Please discuss these early efforts to provide for hemisphere defense.

A. Hemisphere defense. I'm sorry but I can't recall much of this.

Q. 31. Before you took the position of Chief of Staff, you took a trip to Brazil. What was the main purpose of the trip and its significance?

A. He says question 33 [it should be 31]. Trip to Brazil. As I understood it, I received very brief instructions for the trip. General Monteiro was going to attend a review of the Italian army in Italy and in order to suppress these intimacies I was sent to Brazil on a goodwill tour and my actions were merely to be goodwill actions. But I was particularly involved in going down south at that very prominent town—something do Sol—[he means Rio Grande do Sol] I've forgotten the name right now, which had a very heavy German population. In fact, the mayor was a German and when I went there he excused himself on grounds of being sick. I had a rather

interesting trip as a matter of fact. Just short of this southern town was a small place whose name I've forgotten. I stopped off there and the Mayor or rather the Governor or rather the *interventor*, I think that they called him, asked me if I would review a parade on Sunday and I said, "Well, certainly I would." They had a parade of all the school children. All the boys wear uniforms and the girls all wore pleated skirts and middie blouses. It was a very impressive parade. But what I was particularly interested in was a group in the middle of the parade in sort of ornate work clothes, overalls, with pink piping. There were some little boys, ranging in years from four to twelve, I believe, an agricultural unit and each one had his tool, maybe a hoe, or a rake, or pulling something through the street. When I asked the host what it was, I found he was intensely interested in this and it actually was a home for homeless children. I've forgotten the word for that, when the father and mother are unidentified. So he asked me to go out there after the review. Well, I was giving a dinner that night or going to one and they lasted forever and the parade was very late but nevertheless he and I went out there. And we arrived just at the time the first truck showed up. But everything was immaculate—the most beautifully run place. I was profoundly impressed. I was much amused too because one boy they left there and didn't take him to town and he was in charge of the latrines. And they told me to speak to him and ask him some questions and they would bet me that they could name his reply, whatever the question was. I don't recall whether I put up any money or not, anyway I asked him some question—very ordinary one—and his reply was "Getulio Vargas" which was the name of the President. They said whatever you said to him—good morning or good night—he would say "Getulio Vargas." I always remember that. (He was the one that just recently died as he made a comeback as president.)

Well, anyway, I sent General Ridgway (who was then a major) to get up early the next morning and buy some candy for these children so each child would get a pound. He had a hard time finding any kind of candy, particularly that early hour in the morning, but he found it, and he went out there and gave it to the children and got back just in time to get on the plane with me and go down to something do Sol. That created such excitement (this candy) for this place that never had a gift before that it got into the papers about an hour and a half before we reached—whatever it is do Sol and they didn't have time to get up a parade in the ordinary way, so they gave it to me and then asked me if I would review a parade the next day. When I came in I got a regular Lindbergh reception. They had the roofs of the houses, all the balconies and streets full of children, all of them throwing confetti. They just bought up all the confetti in town in that hour and a half they had to get ready and put on quite a show. And then asked me to review the parade the next day. And it was a beautiful parade. It made quite an impression and made a tremendous hit in the papers. With the result that I got back up to Rio de Negre and was asked not come into town but to get on a plane and go right out to—I think it's called Minas Geraes—it's up in the mountains where they have some mines or iron ore of some kind. When we went up there they put me in a closed car with a squadron of cavalry on both sides and in front and behind so that nobody could possibly see me. It wasn't intentional. They were honoring me, but they were defeating entirely the—what I might be able to do and we ran into this assembly of citizens, and particularly young people and fortunately early in the game ran into a spread of troops. So I stopped the car and got out and reviewed these troops and then I didn't get back in and I walked about three miles through this congregation of people, particularly school children on the curbing, and they said there were some tremendous number of children there, I've forgotten what it was but I couldn't believe it was as many as they said. But they gave me a

tremendous reception nevertheless. They had me go out to the mines and the next day presented me with large nuggets of gold and some other things of that nature. Then I came back to Rio and they had a sort of send off for me. Then when I got up to the northern—the first big port on the bulge of Brazil, Recife—they had another tremendous affair there of children. I don't know how many there were but they said there were 45,000. Anyway the principal occurrence—which was unknown to me at the time—my orderly went ashore and went up and stood on the courthouse steps and met a girl and they tried to get married before I got back to the boat.

Q. 30. See page 20.

Hemisphere defenses I have nothing that I can think of to say in regard to this except it was a consideration and we had to keep them working at it particularly in the bulge of Brazil which was opposite that large city in West Africa.

Q. 31. See page 20.

A. I've already described my trip to Brazil.

Q. 32. "On May 21, 1940, the Chief of Staff was given an unsigned memorandum, presumably from the Secretary General Staff, reading: 'In view of the present world conditions it is believed that this country should take immediate steps to acquire British and French possessions in the Atlantic.' This early suggestion of a measure ultimately achieved by the destroyer for bases deals brought no recorded action, but the memorandum bears the notation 'Chief of Staff has seen'." Would you like to give some background on your part in this whole proposal and the final destroyer-bases transaction?

A. I do not recall just what happened in this affair.

Q. "May 22, Major Matthew Ridgway submitted a memorandum on National Strategic Decisions to the Chief of Staff. He said in view of the danger of dispersing U. S. troops to all danger points, it was well to decide on the area of first importance. His proposal boiled down to hemispheric defense, possible protective occupation of European possessions in the western Hemisphere, and defense of U. S. overseas possessions east of the 180th meridian. This accepted the possible loss of Wake, Guam and the Philippines. On the next day the Chief of Staff reported having shown this memorandum to the President, Admiral Stark, and Under Secretary Welles. They were in general agreement, specifically Mr. Welles. They felt we must not become involved with Japan, must not concern ourselves beyond the 180th meridian and must concentrate on the South American situation. Any comment on this phase of the war?

A. I have no comment. My recollection is too dim.

Q. 34. June 17, 1940, General Marshall told a staff conference that we might suddenly find Japan and Russia appear as a team operating to hold our ships in the Pacific. If the French Navy goes to Germany and Italy, we may have a serious situation in the South Atlantic in a few weeks. Are we not forced into a question of reframing our naval policy, that is (into) purely defensive action in the Pacific with a main effort on the Atlantic side? There is the possibility of raids. He said it would seem we should mobilize the National Guard. He added: "Should not Hawaii have some big bombers?...It is possible that our opponents in the Pacific would be four-fifths of the way to Hawaii before we knew that they had moved…" Is that about your first statement of the idea that we should concentrate on the Atlantic first?

A. I have no comment on most of this. I will say that in regard to Hawaii we were always worried because they did not have enough planes, bombers of the long range to set up an

adequate reconnaissance. All through this period I find as my mind begins to revive memories, it is almost impossible to realize now how little we possessed, particularly in the air. It think it's best explained by something I mentioned to you before—that we had fifteen Flying Fortresses (this was the name I was trying to catch a little while ago—planes) we had fifteen Flying Fortresses and we didn't have enough money to service them, to maintain them—fifteen. One of my last acts before I retired as Chief of Staff was to cooperate with some of the authorities in the approval of condemning twenty-five hundred Flying Fortresses and stacking them out in Arizona. That was quite a contrast between the fifteen we could not support and twenty-five we were going to get rid of.

Q. 35. Did you fear Russian action or merely a threat which would keep up immobile?

A. I don't recall enough of this to give a positive answer.

Q. 36. Any general comments on the developments of this period?

A. I have already said that I thought we were worried about Hawaii because they didn't have enough long range bombers to provide adequate reconnaissance.

Q. 37. "One of the important strategy papers of the 1940 period was that submitted by General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President on June 27. (This was a revision of a paper submitted on June 22d and changed to meet the President's wishes)." Any comment on this paper?

A. I have no comment. I've forgotten the terms of the paper.

Q. 38. "Senator McCarthy and others have attacked you and President Roosevelt for engaging in a conspiracy with Great Britain because Admiral Ghormley, General Emmons, and General Strong were sent to London in July 1940 to discuss defense plans with the British. I gather that this idea was suggested by the British to the President and that at first it was largely a Navy show." Do you wish to add some background on this mission?

A. I have nothing to add to 38.

Q. 39. Would it be accurate to say that this orientation toward the west became so strong that it was difficult for us to shift toward the Pacific later on? In other words was our later policy based in part on this earlier psychological trend toward Europe? Or is it simpler and more accurate merely to say that our interest in 1940 was in keeping Great Britain in the war, just as 1942-44 it was to our interest to help Great Britain keep Russia in the war and to cooperate with Russia in inflicting the maximum damage on Germany?

A. Your summary of the simpler statement in regard to this is the more nearly accurate I believe.

Q. 40. In October 1940 Admiral Stark and General Marshall opposed Mr. Churchill's suggestion for sending U. S. forces to Singapore. General Marshall felt that this was as unfavorable a moment as could be chosen for provoking trouble. He also favored the withdrawal of the Marine garrison from Shanghai since he felt that it could not escape attack. He confessed that his views were probably at variance with those of Secretary Stimson? Did you have any discussion with Mr. Stimson on this later? Were you in disagreement?

A. I don't recall any discussion.

Q. 41. "On November 4, 1940, Admiral Stark drew up a paper for the Secretary of Navy on strategy. On November 12, he put it in a more definite form. Among the plans was Plan "DOG" which said that in case of war a strong offensive should be carried on in the Atlantic, and defensive action in the Pacific." It is suggested that the impetus for Plan Dog came from a Naval War College study, and that initially it was the Navy and not the Army which talked of hitting the European enemy first in case of war. Did your own 1942 strategy grow out of this earlier naval strategy or did you develop it from the realities of the situation you found after Pearl Harbor?

A. I don't recall the circumstances.

Q. 42. In the light of the emphasis on making the main effort in the Atlantic, why did the President insist on strengthening the fleet at Pearl Harbor? The Navy people now say that they opposed this action. Admiral Richardson is supposed to have been shifted from his command in the Pacific before the end of his normal tour there because of his strong opposition to basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor. (All of this shifting of the fleet has been used by opponents of the Presidents to charge him with a deliberate attempt to attract a Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.)

A. I cannot answer 42.

Q. 43. "On January 1941 the ABC conversations with Great Britain began. The idea for them apparently came from suggestions by Admiral Stark in which General Marshall acquiesced." Do you have any comments on the origins of these conversations and on their value to later military preparations?

A. I don't recall on what basis we got together. They proved very important on one point and that was unity of command, and you will find the statement I made which is the basis for this decision given in full in the book on *Roosevelt and Hopkins*.

Q. 44. "A momentous White House conference was held by the President with chief members of his cabinet and the Army and Navy on November 14, 1938. The President's whole emphasis was on airplanes."

Was it at this meeting where you disagreed with the President and several people told you they were sorry that you weren't going to be around any longer?

A. As nearly as I can remember this was the meeting.

Q. 45. "There new arose in various quarters, as a result of Axis threats, a desire to correct all the lacks at the same time, despite the slender resources of new money which had to be divided among so many projects. It is not surprising that so sharp a turn of attitude as that of the White House in mid-November 1938 produced confusion; the significant thing is that there was at least a bold step forward on the road of rearming. It was not a sure one, partly because of the basic conflict between the Army's tenacious desires to attain a balanced force, which professional training recognized as essential, and the President's insistence upon air additions first of all. It must be recognized that even to get a balanced forced for modern war there had to be an immense addition to its existing air element. The President concentrated on that vital point; the Army emphasized its own and equally sound objective—even though the Air Corps on occasion felt that it was receiving from the Staff as a whole less support than had been ordered. A mid-January (1939) complaint was that 'appears that General Staff cooperation has just about died

out and the Air Corps is again going it alone.'… In fact on that very day, G-4 was trying to learn the responsibility for getting from the federal WPA funds the amount needed for Air Corps construction. Do you wish to comment on this?

A. There was a general confusion of views in this matter. The Air Corps was very determined—the air corps people were very determined—in their action in doing a great deal of talking with Congress. They had very poor representation in the War Department. The General Staff had very few air members which was largely the fault of the fact they hadn't for a long time taken the Leavenworth course. Some said it was because they didn't want to endanger their flying pay. Fortunately the leading people like Spaatz, Arnold and others of that caliber did go to Leavenworth. The law then wouldn't allow a man to go to the War College unless he had been to Leavenworth and wouldn't allow him to get on the General Staff unless he had been to the War College which resulted in a very meager representation of the Air on the General Staff, the fault of this variety of reasons. I had gone around and inspected the air and the manufacturers at great length with General [Andrews]—well the man was killed in Greenland (in Iceland) and he was at this time the commanding general of the GHQ Air Force. [Sgt. Heffner – Harmon?] No. So I became familiar while I was Deputy Chief of Staff of all these various points and was able to talk to most of these men and I became aware of where their troubles were and gradually aware of what I thought were the cause of those troubles. However I was never able to work them out fully until I became chief of staff myself. At that time I put General [Andrews] – blank above – as G-3 of the War Department General Staff.

END OF TAPE

TAPE 9M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

January 15, 1957

RECORDED INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
PINEHURST, N. C.
January 15, 1957

Questions by F. C. Pogue, Sgt. Wm. Heffner ran the recorder.

On September 20, 1941, General Marshall told his staff that he was going to the White House to a conference in which would be discussed a proposal to reduce the strength of the Army in order to make available more materiel for other purposes. He referred to a widely circulated news article which indicated that the trend of the war made participation one basically of Navy, Air and manufacturing with early need for ground forces lightly regarded. (This article was by Lippman. In 1947 he told Mark Watson that this view had been expressed in 1941 by the Navy, the Lend-Lease authorities, the British and the anti-Vichy French agents in Washington. The Navy was discouraging a large army overseas because of shipping problems.)

The Chief of Staff specified that WPD prepare a study along two lines (1) argument against a decrease and (2) discussion favoring actual increases in the Army for an all-out effort.

He took with him to the White House a memo by McCloy and Lovett on morale of the country, a memo listing forces needed for various bases and task forces, a memo on ultimate tonnage requirements to take troops overseas, a memo of need of 1200 men to protect bauxite in Dutch Guiana, an memo on need of men to protect Dakar, a memo on need of strengthening garrison in the Philippines. WPD said to reduce the Army at the present time would be disastrous and wouldn't aid our Allies.

All this didn't dissuade Mr. Roosevelt and on October 3d there was still talk of a reduction in the Army.

Q. 78. How serious was this proposal to cut the Army (this was after the extension of Selective Service)?

A. The proposal was very serious at the time. The opposition to a large army was very widespread and there was a feeling that such an army was passé, no longer needed and, therefore, the other proposals from the Navy and the Air demanded first action. I might say now that we found it very interesting to see how long it took to develop various phases of the Army and the Air and to the extent that I understood, of the Navy. It seemed to me, though I have not the exact records here to consult, that the lengthiest preparations was required for what was ordinarily supposed to be the simplest military set-up, that is, the regiment of infantry. When one stops to analyze the conditions it is not so extraordinary as it might seem. If it is in the air, the plane itself is a complicated machine which requires very prolonged and careful manufacture. The running of that plane requires very precise training, but even so, the instruments are right there, the push buttons and other means of control are fixed close at hand. The same thing might

be said about a great deal of Navy training. The men operate in certain places in battle. They are well known and they report to that place. The things they do are pre-determined and the conditions in which they do them is in almost violent contrast to the conditions in the ground army. When you are preparing an infantry regiment, which has seldom ever been properly prepared, you have to understand that in the first place a great many mechanisms are involved nowadays that are rather elaborate. Next that their use comes when the men who handle them are at their worst in a state of fatigue and discomfort from long marches, from mud, rain, dust, heat and then they have to operate as a rule at the time of real action in a place they have never seen before that they have probably occupied in the dark. They have to be in close cooperation with the artillery, may have never seen it then and never have seen it later because it comes in from far behind them. So that they have to be hooked up with something that personally they have never had contact with, never seen. That applies to a good many of their weapons. All these things have to be coordinated. And when the fighting starts on the infantry side, these various things have to be hitched up from the conditions of troops who have had prolonged marches and are very tired and are in an area they have never seen before and under conditions that are very difficult. Whereas in the Navy, a man can take a bath and put on clean underwear and go to his fixed battle station. In the infantry regiment, for example, he has no fixed place he can go to. It is all in a state of transition and change and he is probably extremely tired and probably hungry and also he is under heavy fire in most cases. He is also probably surrounded by very frightening casualties which are right there for him to see. All this disturbs the ordinary equilibrium of a man and requires a very high state of discipline and a higher state of technique in training. Therefore, it's a long and far cry from the days when the man took the rifle down

from the hooks above the fireplace and went to war. There he had used it many times. He was accustomed to independent action. He has accustomed to the woods. He was accustomed to danger. He was a good shot for the game he had to have in order to live and for action against the Indians who were always threatening him. All that had changed and now the average soldier had little or no rifle training. He was off the city streets. And yet he had to do his stuff, as it were, under very difficult and strange conditions. Therefore, this all means that the natural assumption was that it was a very simple matter to train the ground forces—infantry—and the others and a very complicated matter to train the other forces—the air and naval forces and all. That was not the case at all. They had something fixed to tie to. For instance, in our artillery, they required a high degree of training, but that was made easier, as it were, because of the fact that the men were tied to the gun and the gun prevented dispersal of their efforts and gave them something to hitch to during the action. All of this affected the public conceptions of what was needed. They knew the airplane was complicated. They knew that they were new. They had a very enlarged idea of what they could do, particularly because of the German effective use of the airplanes at the outbreak of war, where they demoralized all the forces of France, both military and civilian. This affected public opinion very decidedly. This made it very hard to get a plain logical reaction. Everybody was fighting for something. Each service wanted to get an increase. Each service wanted more money and we had the regrettable state of one service working against another. The British, for example, were very intense in their efforts in order to get more metal, to get more tanks from us, to get more weapons from us, and they opposed a lot of our proposals, particular my proposals. So we had the peculiar situation of the British and the Navy, as it were, to a certain extent the air, working together to prevent the ground forces from being organized. I

was very conscious of this and it required a good deal of self-restraint not to become unduly irritated by the business. All of it had a background, of course, of public misunderstanding. The airplane is very photogenic, the Navy is very photogenic, the airplane was a new weapon—very heavily advertised by the initial fighting in Europe and, as a result, it was not at all dramatic to ask for the force we needed in the ground army which were going to be compellingly required once the real fighting started. It was rather interesting when we landed in Normandy to find that the Germans got caught with most of their mechanized divisions up near the front. That was a very serious tragedy for them. They wanted plain infantry divisions. They had too much mechanized where they couldn't use them at all to their advantage. We didn't want mechanized divisions but to a minor extent at the start. We had to have infantry divisions and the call from our commanders was for infantry divisions. All of this was very slow in developing an understanding throughout the Army. But as it became evident if you wanted to get an air base, you used these ground troops. If you wanted to hold an airbase, you used these ground troops. And without them you were, in a sense, impotent. So the fight at this time—referred to in this question—was conducted without any real understanding of the question by the columnists, by the various writers, and certainly not by the public. And they all played to the dramatics you might say of the thing, which was the budding air force. Of course, we had to have an air force. But if we didn't have an army, and a ground army, we didn't have anything. Therefore, the fight was to maintain a ground army. And all the advice and pressure that we were getting was against the ground army, beginning with the British, who wanted the material that was going into the ground army and going through our Navy and through our air corps. I would find that a view of mine expressed in regard to these things was directly opposed by these forces and I would

finally find out in many cases just where the opposition was coming from and who was making it. I notified the British people, their representatives, confidentially once or twice that if they didn't stop this business I would have to come out and pillory them publicly. But that was about the last thing I wanted to do because it would be so much to the advantage of the Germans and so much to the harm of the international Allied accord. So this was a very serious affair and it remained serious until the real fighting began and the people's understanding of the situation grew to a proper appreciation of what was needed in a balanced force. We used too many general terms like that in discussing these matters. A "balanced force"—well that didn't mean anything to the average man. It meant little to a congressman and it was not at all convincing. You had to find some other way in order to explain it. I found these difficulties in dealing with the President. All his advice was coming in from the Navy who needed the steel and materiel of that nature, and needed men, too, and he was personally, of course, intimately familiar with the Navy and naturally very responsive to its requests or I might better say, demands. The air people had a plentiful backing from outside. We had certain columnists who could tell you exactly what to do and how to do it, with regard to the air. There were a great many phases of the matter they did not touch on, as a matter of fact that they did not understand at all. So I regarded this period as very serious and as very difficult to handle. I am sorry that I haven't a distinct recollection of my conversations in particular with the President. I had a number on these questions and this particular occasion, evidently, I had a very serious one. I can imagine just about what it was. I might say here that early in my association with the President I didn't understand that I must find a way to do the talking. Because he did all the talking and I just had to sit and listen to the President of the United States. Later on I found out a little bit better how to handle this, so that I

could get my points across. But at that time I was not sufficiently adept in dealing with a man who was as clever as Mr. Roosevelt was about holding the boards and putting over his ideas. In this situation he had all the pressures from the outside and against what I was putting forward practically none at all of my issues that I was bringing up and it required a great deal of wear and tear before I could make an understanding of this clear to his satisfaction. As I repeat again, I don't recall exactly what took place in this particular conversation. But I know I was in a prolonged fight, as it were, in order to bring about a proper understanding of what the question really was and the opposition was in these forces of our own and the British who wanted the metals, who wanted the tanks, who wanted the materiel. It was a very trying, maddening situation and it was very difficult for one to keep their temper and to find what was the proper approach to make in the varying circumstances of the case, particularly against the columnists who held the public attention—also the commentators I might say.

Q. 79. Can you recall high points of your discussion with Mr. Roosevelt on this?

A. I have answered practically everything in connection with that.

Q. 80. British and U. S. representatives met in Washington from January to March 1941. Would you discuss some of the background of these conversations?

A. Admiral Stark and I had long conversations on this subject and he conducted the conference. I didn't attend much of it. We were both rather disturbed that this might leak out and that would work against us particularly by those who were opposed to preparations of any kind, particularly from the Middle West. I felt with Admiral Stark that if we didn't have some

talks with the British we would start with no basis at all if war developed later on and at the time this conference was first established we needed to have some at least vague idea of what we could expect from the British—what sort of help they would want and what sort of help they would want from us—the latter was more important in the general situation probably than the first thing I mentioned. So from that point of view it was very important. I don't think these talks had anything to do with fastening on us the vital problem of war. It was merely a question of knowing what we might run into and what the conditions would be under which we met it. And all of these things the British told us largely were secret, so that we had an understanding of what it was. We were friendly to Great Britain, but how far that friendship would carry us. That was something else. That was for the President. We needed to know what sort of a response they would like and what sort of assistance they could give. Those things we didn't know at all and these talks gave us some small basis for that and I don't feel that in any way we committed the United States to take any specific military action unless we were attacked. The advantages of the talks were, they were done without regard to the President. That was managed that way so as not to involve our government in the talks at all, and as I recall he wasn't even supposed to know about it, it was just done on our conception in order to find out what we needed to know without in any way involving him in any commitments of any kind.

Q. 81. Some of the chief isolationists hold that by these conferences we gave up our neutrality and started on a policy deliberately intended to lead to war. They insist that from this time on the policy of the President and his advisers was to force Germany or Japan to strike the first blow. Will you comment on this accusation?

A. Not answered.

Q. 82. Did you feel that the conversations committed the United States to take any specific military action unless we were attacked?

A. They didn't commit us to any line of action. It was thoroughly understood that this was outside the direction of the commander-in-chief.

Q. 83. Did you or any other American commander ever contemplate preventive war action against any of the Axis members?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. 84. Do you feel that it was a mistake to engage in these conversations while we were officially neutral?

A. I felt it was necessary for us to know more about what the conditions were in case we became involved and the actions of the Germans were so hostile in general and we were so ill prepared that we needed every advantage we could get in case we were drawn into the war.

Q. 85. What was your own feeling in 1941 about the possibility of a German attack on Latin America? (It has been argued that there was never any chance that the Germans would hit at the western hemisphere and therefore no reason why the United States should have given any aid to the British or other enemies of Germany).

A. My feeling as to Latin America at that period of the war was that they had so many underground movements that the Panama Canal was threatened. I felt that they could suddenly

raise a sort of revolutionary attack. They had German reservists scattered around the country and we had already had examples of their having the complete set-up to seize a country without hardly any troops being involved. We were very fearful of the Panama Canal being struck from Colombia or one of these other South American countries. We felt that the movement across the South Atlantic from Dakar could be carried out by very few troops if along the Latin American side they were able to spring one of these arranged revolutionary performances that had been so successful in Scandinavian countries and elsewhere. For that reason we were very much concerned. They had the Germans in the country pretty well organized and they presented to us a threat to the Panama Canal which could not be ignored. That would be a very tragic matter if they got in there close enough at least to destroy the Canal, which by efficient bombing could be done without too much trouble. I didn't think any large troop movement would probably be involved.

Q. 86. Was there a general feeling in the spring of 1941 in the War Department that Germany would collapse rapidly in case of German attack? (It had been held that on this issue the War Department was more overawed by German strength than was the State Department).

A. I think this question has an error in it. I don't understand it and I will not try to answer it.

Q. 87. Would you give a little background on the Atlantic conference, the way in which you managed to preserve secrecy, some of the incidents of the meeting, and your views as to its effectiveness?

A. In the first place the meeting came as complete surprise. The Army members, that is the Air (General Arnold) and others, saving myself had no knowledge of it until we were well up the coast on the cruiser *Augusta*. Naturally, there was not much opportunity to plan for a specific meeting. To me the meeting was largely a get together for the first time, an opportunity to meet the British Chiefs of Staff, and to come to some understanding with them as to how they worked and what their principal problems were. We were in no position at that time to lay very heavy matters before them. I think the best answer to those who feel that we were planning the war in detail ahead of time would be the fact that we had so little basis for plans at the time of the meeting on the *Augusta*. So only the things that were almost self-evident could be discussed by us. The British would have liked to have gone much further. They were at this business every day, all day, on a very definite war-making basis. We were in the positions of mobilizing and equipping an Army. Just how this was to be handled on our side largely remained to be determined. Therefore, we were not prepared to give them any fixed advice or agreements, I should say, as to what was to be done. They wanted such things as early as they could get them of course. But we had to go through a great deal of get together on our own part with a solid understanding of just what the plans were that we were struggling to carry out. We had very weighty matters on our hands. The battle for the maintenance of the Army which we only won by a single vote was being fought out at this time. People don't even recall that today. It seems to be a very negligible matter. It meant the complete destruction—complete destruction—of the fabric of the Army that we had built. We would have been in a worse predicament than we were the year before. It would have set us back about a year and a half or two years and of course that would have been the greatest of tragedies. Rather than the actual war making plans we were in a

struggle for survival against the misunderstandings of our public and the failure of our Congress to resist the criticism and the magazines who played up the men to desert, according to the "OHIO" cry that *Life* utilized quite freely. We were in a very desperate situation to maintain the little we had and not have it entirely destroyed, because we had largely dismembered the Regular Army in order to permit the buildup of the new Army, because some of the increases were almost thousand per cent, and we had to take our few existing Regular organizations completely apart and parcel them out, some at the rate of about twenty men per the new organizations. Now this was all threatened and was only saved by one vote. So these matters were weighing on our wisdom and we were in a very desperate plight. The British would have liked to go ahead with fixed plans. We were in no condition whatsoever to go ahead at that time with fixed plans. I think the tragic situation that we were involved in should be much better understood when it is realized how complete would have been the destruction of our Army. Moreover we would have been in a worst predicament that we were in a year before. Because we had destroyed the organization of the Regular forces in order to give a nucleus for the new forces. Now all of that was to be wiped out and be far removed from that just literally destroyed for the time being. And the people don't understand that at all today. In fact that have entirely forgotten it entirely, how close a squeak it was, that we were saved by a single vote. It is hard to realize that such a thing could happen but it so very nearly happened that all our minds and concentration was centered on that trying to find some way of avoiding the issue.

It was rather striking the fact that we were able to go up to Argentia without it becoming public. Later on, we got to the first meeting at Casablanca that way. But the minute we began to enlarge on these meetings, began to take suites of people there, then the secrecy evaporated and

we found ourselves proclaimed by the Germans to the world as to just where we were going, notably Cairo, and the secrecy part of it dissolved. But here it was secret. And I know when General Arnold, who was representing the Air—I told him what was happening, what we were going to do after we were at sea. Up to that time, all he knew was that he was to take heavy clothes.

Q. 88. On this return from the Atlantic meeting to Washington, General Marshall asked members of his staff for expressions of opinion on British proposals. General Kibler found no cause for optimism as to British victory and criticized a tendency of the British to assign to the United States the protection of the British Empire. Allen denied that American strength was great enough to make an impression on military operations and felt that Germany should be engaged by our economic force. Wedemeyer saw a defeatist attitude in the British paper. Said we should not become an active belligerent until we had the means to achieve our national objectives. General Gerow felt that the U. S. would be of more assistance as a neutral able to supply munitions in large quantities. Any comments on these statements?

A. It was very difficult for us to understand the British. They have been through a terrible series of events. They were, in a sense, very poorly prepared, except in naval strength. I think the world "poorly" hardly describes it. I could not say "utterly unprepared" because they had made certain preparations. The Germans had made every preparation and they had made it, which is generally overlooked or forgotten, for war at a specific time. They were appropriating fabulous amounts of money, as it seemed to us then, but it was for a war at a specific time—not in an indefinite future which was what we were up against, not knowing whether we would

actually go to war with Germany, and certainly hoping that we would not. The observation of the various staff officers are rather typical of the time but I was more interested in Wedemeyer's expression as to the defeatist attitude of the British papers. There is no getting away from the fact that they were pessimistic. Equally there was no getting away from the fact that Mr. Churchill was the buoyant force in maintaining the Empire, together with the characteristic attitude of the British to hold out under very difficult circumstances. My own thoughts at the time were of the extreme difficulty I found in getting what seemed to me was a proper appreciation of the situation. There were many things in the British procedure of which our people were very critical. On the other hand issues had arisen which proved to me that we had a failure in many cases to understand the situation. For example, it will be remembered Congress had passed a law which restrained the President from making any allotments of materiel and so forth to Great Britain of a military nature without the approval of the Chief of Staff. The same applied to naval materiel and Admiral Stark. I think the law was entirely unconstitutional but there was not time then to work this out. It therefore fell upon us to do the best we could under the circumstances and it was often quite embarrassing. But things arose under these conditions which were somewhat illuminating. For example, as I recall, we turned over fifteen, I think it was, Flying Fortresses to the British for experimental purposes. I was a little ashamed of this because I felt that I was straining at the subject in order to get around the resolution of Congress. Actually when we got into it and did it, it soon became apparent we found that the important think was exactly that, to let them have planes for experimental purposes. And we should have done it much earlier. Because we found difficulties with the planes that the Air Corps had not perceived at all and they could hardly be used. I remember there was a complete absence of tail

gunners and some other things quite evident later on, but not at the moment. There were other things of similar nature—while they were related to this factor which involved me in the difficult business of deciding whether a certain thing should be done for the British or not—deciding with or against the President. And Mr. Stimson would become very much worried. He was intensely desirous of assisting the British and he would speak to me as a man of high honor, trying to find some way for me to do these things when I couldn't find it. And I felt it was important to be very strict in the matter, because I thought that the law was unconstitutional and I thought that the important thing was to get it revoked and the important thing, therefore, was to be very exacting in carrying it out and not try to evade it and defeat its purpose and in due time they did revoke it. But it was a very difficult situation, and it was under the conditions of that law that I had to approve the transfer to the British of large amounts of arms at the time of Dunkirk. I have forgotten the numbers now but that could easily be checked. As I recall, it was something like a million riffles and six hundred thousand machine guns and a large number of automatic rifles and some five or six hundred 75mm guns. I know the great problem of the rifles was that we only had about ten rounds of ammunition for each gun and we could not cut down on our ammunition in reserve that we had beyond that point, which was a very peculiar situation when the Chief of Staff of the Army can turn down the President and the Secretary of War—to my mind wholly unconstitutional. Nevertheless it had to be carried out until it was proven unconstitutional and I felt it incumbent on me to be extremely exacting in observing it. Because I thought in that way we would get an earlier repeal of the law which we did.

In these various situations I began to learn things about the British and their attitudes, their confusion about us and our confusion about ourselves and about them. The matter of the

Flying Fortress was very illuminating to me—that we could be so far off center on the matter and not realize it at all. We got into somewhat a similar thing on the questions of tanks. Our tanks were easily the most mobile, the most perfectly controlled, of all the tanks. But they were deficient, very decidedly, in their fighting qualities, in the arrangement of the tank so they could be fought with efficiency. So we had the British disapproving our model and ourselves being very contemptuous of theirs. When the issue was the British had it right on the fighting part and we had it right on the mobility of the tank and not until I got a prominent, informed Britisher in my office and told him, "Now just confidentially between you and me tell me what is wrong about the tank affair." And he told me what they say and I looked into it and found out about our side of it and we were both wrong and then it was comparatively easy to get the matter adjusted, doing it all behind the scenes. Well that was the case in so many things. We just didn't understand them and they certainly didn't understand us. And they had information as to the battle efficiency of things that we just refused to accept. And yet we were without experience in this matter. We did have experience in the mobility of tanks because we could do that without a battle but we didn't have any experience in the fighting of the tank, we had that quite wrong. So I tried to follow a scheme, very confidentially, getting certain Britishers to giving me their side behind the scenes, and then going on the other side and getting our side confidentially and then try to act in a very even way toward both sides. All these things affected the opinions of the various officers concerned. And many things that came up in Great Britain and their misfortunes, which were many at that time, caused very decided feelings to develop among some of our best informed officers, which was only natural. The main point was to control them in such a way that we eventually came out with a sound decision.

Q. 89. Aren't these reactions something of an answer to these who argue that the Army and Navy were plotting for war throughout 1941?

A. I think these reactions are somewhat of an answer to those who argue that the Army and Navy were plotting a war throughout 1941. The trouble with all of that is that there were those who felt politically that we must do nothing—that we must be utterly defenseless—or we were plotting war. Well that would have been suicidal. And the fact that we made ourselves capable of exerting military influence made the Germans very much more cautious in their procedure.

Q. 90. Did you ever agree with the idea that an air offensive would make a land invasion unnecessary? In retrospect are your views on this any different from what they were during the war?

A. I never had any idea that we could settle the question in Europe by purely air offensive and my views are the same today as they were then. And I think they will continue to be. You've got to get down and hold things. You can't treat them purely by air. A very good example of this was, I think, the war in Korea. We had complete air superiority, we had all the air. They had none, and yet we couldn't do anything until we got the troops to get down on the ground and move in and take these places. Its greatest mistake the air people make is talking about doing things by air alone. It just isn't done that way. You can destroy plants, you can destroy cities. There is a great deal of work of that kind that can be done, but that doesn't win. That aids you, if you do something else, but something else has got to go with the air offensive.

Q. 91. Omitted.

Q. 92. Was this neglect of Philippine defenses in the 1930s due largely to economy drives? Or was it because we were expecting to get out of the Islands?

A. I was not in the War Department at the time, but I imagine that was the case. Beyond that I can't answer this question.

Q. 93. Do you feel now that we might have been wise to have withdrawn from the Philippines in 1940?

A. It's very hard to answer this question. There were certain things starting to increase the defensive power of the Philippines but they had not yet gotten well underway and they would proceed very slowly. The quantity production of materiel had not yet developed. That refers to airplanes, ammunition, antiaircraft materiel, all things of that general nature which were so necessary in the Philippines. Until they began to be received in adequate supply, there was little that could be done. Now the question was whether we would find time to build up the defenses in the Philippines. There was General MacArthur's plan for raising a Philippine army that had been started. But it takes a long time to develop an army. It takes a great deal of time to develop the discipline and training of such an army. Which again proves time was lacking. The only successful development that we achieved was by doubling the size of the Philippine Scouts. The Philippine Scouts organization was a very fine, disciplined organization and it was a comparatively simple matter to double its size because it could absorb that many new men and maintain its disciplinary standards and very shortly its training standards. The whole question then was how long would they have in which to develop these things, the new organized force, the materiel requirements. It takes a long time to get materiel on the development line. The

quantity production basis and that was absolutely essential to the Philippines. As a matter of fact the quantity production in most of these things didn't really come until the last two months and then we shipped just as much as we could get out there. I remember they were unloading boats all night in Manila trying to get it out to the troops. Of course that didn't admit of getting this army trained. There was not time for that. You can't quantity production an army until you get one thoroughly disciplined, thoroughly trained and organized. If that had been developed, had there been time for that, there would have been a very stable base and the Japs would have had a very hard problem to solve, a hard nut to crack. The development of the supply thing was really tragic as regards Hawaii and as regards the Philippines because these things came into quantity production at the very last minute. And we started to get the materiel to them, some small amount we actually did get out, but a great deal was on shipboard in the process of being sent out. I remember the tragic result of a lot of fighter planes. This one group of fighter planes had gone through its training program complete, and I sent it down to the Louisiana maneuvers to give it two weeks, as I recall, of maneuvers with the ground troops which would be its main purpose in the Philippines before starting it off for Manila. Now they had to pack up part of the planes in order to ship them and they were on the Pacific when the war broke out and they landed in Australia, requiring a certain set-up preparation. There is one very small instrument which enables the pilot to fire the wing guns. I forget what you call it, but I certainly knew it then, because it had such fateful consequences for us. In opening the crates hurriedly, just starting up any base operations in Australia, they threw away these vital little solenoids, I think you call them, because they were nailed to side of the crates and therefore we had no way to fire the guns. And to get the guns to the Philippines, we had to fly them up halfway to the small

islands east of Sumatra I have forgotten their names now—up near, well they were Dutch Islands in the main. We could renew their gas there and they could get to Mindanao and we had the pilots to fly them. But we had no solenoids. And we tried to get them out to Australia. We sent them on plane after plane to try to get them out there. All the time these things had been thrown away while they were uncrating the planes in Australia very hurriedly by very crude work direction. So when these planes finally were equipped with solenoids and all ready to go, you could no longer land in the Dutch Islands and therefore they could not be shipped to the Philippines, which was a tremendous loss to General MacArthur. All these things were working against us. The same thing happened in Honolulu. We had to hold planes there for a long time because that was a long flight for planes in those days, waiting on delivery of more and waiting on favorable winds—because they were unfavorable—and the flight could not be made to Honolulu if the winds were the least bit unfavorable. All of this came into importance as we got along now. But the tragedy of it all was, to me, just as we got quantity production, our delivery possibilities were cut off. The ammunition was very serious, particularly for the Dutch, and we wanted to give them some ammunition, but we hadn't got any yet from our supply. But it came in, in about two or three weeks, but not in time. Not in time.

So the neglect of the Philippine defense was the matter of the fact that our country had never appropriated the money for the equipment and the materiel that was needed because it takes almost a year to get most of these things and a year and a half to two years to get the others after the act is once passed. And, of course, all that worked against us when it came to the question of the Philippines I recall very well when I was struggling to get larger appropriations from the Congress in order to get in orders of some size of materiel and things, an officer of great

distinction—I mean of very great distinction, who is highly respected today—coming to me and trying to persuade me not to ask any more money of Congress because it was useless. We couldn't get into France or Western Europe. The Germans had it and we never could get them out and the best thing we could do was to make ourselves safe here in America. Now when that comes from a very high ranking person in our country, one whose views are highly respected, you can see how hard it was to get these appropriations through. I ran into almost the same reaction regarding the appropriations in Korea. "Well," they said, "if you haven't gotten it now, you won't have time to get it. In other words, just don't try because you probably won't get it in time." However, we did get it in time, in both cases, although it was too late for the Philippine entirely.

Just what the decisions were regarding the Philippines before I became Chief of Staff, I don't know. And the events happened so rapidly when I did become Chief of Staff because we were then plunged into a situation where the war was started by the Germans and we had to get ready for whatever possibility that we ran into, that I didn't have any time to go into past history of these various affairs. The lack of antiaircraft guns was tragic and particularly for the naval anchorages and bases at Cavite and other places in the Philippines. They just didn't have them at all. So my action in many of the cases was because we just didn't have the materiel. It meant we had to take it away from something. I didn't dare take it away from Europe because if we lost in Europe we were sunk completely and we had to win that campaign.

There are too many *ifs* and *ands* and *buts* involved in this matter to give any definite reply. It was a matter of months until we got into quantity production; it was a matter of months

until we got the Philippine army organized. All these things were factors which had to do with the increased defenses of the Islands. And you couldn't tell way back just how that would work out.

Q. 94. Ten days before Pearl Harbor, General MacArthur wrote in such an optimistic vein as to bring from General Marshall the statement, "The Secretary of War and I were highly pleased to receive your report that your command is ready for any eventuality." How can the General's friends accuse you of failure to help him in the light of this?

A. I wouldn't undertake to answer this.

Q. 95. One general, once with General MacArthur, told me that he felt that General Marshall failed to tell Quezon all the facts about the lack of preparation because Quezon didn't want to spend any more money on defenses. My informant says that General Eisenhower upset General MacArthur by opposing this policy.

A. This question is a little indefinite. I don't recall my telling Quezon about the lack of preparation, because Quezon didn't want to spend more money on defenses. As a matter of fact he told me afterwards, that is, Quezon, that he was very anxious to do things there. I couldn't answer this.

Q. 96. Did the decision to make General MacArthur Far Eastern commander originate with you, with Mr. Stimson, the President or someone else?

A. I do not recall clearly how this matter of MacArthur's command in the Far East was established but as to the best of my recollection, I proposed he be put in command.

Q. 97. This seems to imply that someone at the White House was dealing with MacArthur and that you and the Secretary had to get your information from General MacArthur. Is this accurate or is the author of the official history misinterpreting the correspondence?

A. I do not recall enough about this to give an answer.

Q. 98. On November 26, 1941, at a staff conference in the office of the Chief of Staff, the notes indicate that the Chief of Staff reported that the President and the Secretary of State anticipated a possible assault on the Philippines. General Marshall said he did not see this as a probability because the hazards would be too great for the Japanese. Any comments? These notes were apparently never used in the Pearl Harbor inquiry. It seems to be an answer to the suggestions that you were aware for many days before the attack that Hawaii would likely be hit.

A. I have no comments to make because I do not recall the details discussed.

Q. 99. Difficulties between General Van Voorhis and the Commandant of the 15th Naval District in the Canal Zone became such that General Marshall wrote a sharp note to the Chief of Naval Operations, saying he thought they should arrive at some satisfactory basis for the defense of the Canal. General Andrews was finally sent down as commander of the Caribbean Defense Command and the Panama Canal Department. Any comment on the problem and on General Andrews' handling of the situation?

A. We were having constant difficulties over the command question which I was endeavoring to settle. I wanted the Navy to have overall command in the Alaskan district. And I proposed that, thinking that if we could get that settled, we could move down to Hawaii and

settle that in time and then go on to the Panama Canal and settle that. But the Navy was very loathe to accept my proposal about the Alaskan Theater and I suppose for the reason that they thought that would obligate them to accept my views as to Hawaii. My view as to Hawaii, although I had not expressed it as I recall at that time, was that the Navy should have the overall command. But when it came down to Panama, I thought the Army should have the command. But it never got around to my expression of that fact. However, after this trouble with Van Voorhis and some other details that do not come out in your presentation, I notified them that this thing had to be settled right away. And my dim recollection was that they removed the command they had there then and we began to get the matter somewhat straightened out and it was a very tragic affair. I was much concerned that it gain no publicity, because the public would have been highly aroused if they had found such a thing as that was hanging fire and various disagreements between the Army and the Navy.

TAPE 10M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

January 22, 1957

Q. 48. Even when the war began in Poland, the President was uneasy about the far-reaching effect of a state of emergency, because of the political opposition it might arouse, and conferred with General Marshall about an alternative to an executive order based on an emergency proclamation. This would indicate that the President proceeded with extreme caution in 1939 on preparedness matters even after war began in Europe. Did you feel that this was true?

A. This is a fact. He proceeded with great caution and it was very difficult to get action on the important military requirements of that day. I might here digress to state that I had early made up my mind that I, so far as possible, was going to operate as a member of a team, political and otherwise military. That while it would be difficult at times and would be strong pressures for me to appeal to the public, I thought it was far more important in the long run that I be well established as a member of the team and try to do my convincing within that team rather than to take action publicly contrary to the desires of the President and certain members of Congress. There was a certain group of senators at this time who were very intent on going ahead much more rapidly than the Administration was willing to do and their pressure on me at all times was very great. But I restrained my actions for the reason I foresaw that it was going to be very important for me to establish the fact that I would not run off to a public appeal but rather I would try my level best to deal within the team of which the President was the head.

I recall that during this period, particularly at the time of the Emergency Proclamation, the Attorney General was taking the lead. (He incidentally later became a member of the Supreme Court. He was the man who gained great prominence by his action while Governor of Michigan in connection with the sitdown strike. I can't recall his name now). But I got some action from him, which enlarged on the President's precise instructions to him and Mr. Roosevelt was rather resentful.

There are several things that happened here that are rather interesting. One refers to the Chiefs of Staff. It had proved almost impossible to arrange any setting with the Navy which would leave us with the Chief of the Air Corps. The Navy had its own air and was resentful of the Army's semi-independent air force. And the Army Air Force had a large number of young men in it who were going to Congress outside their authorized actions appealing to them. And they were getting great backing, because the Air Corps was a very photogenic affair and the actions of the German Air Corps were very spectacular in Europe though its great action in the invasion of France had not yet occurred.

Murphy was the attorney general's name I was trying to get. The secretary to the president [I believe we later established this was MacIntyre], who was a good friend of mine, called me over to look at the President's message which Murphy had drafted in connection with this emergency action. Mr. Roosevelt was reluctant to go the whole way in this emergency business and this was a much restricted line of action. In it he referred to the fact that these various portions of the armed force were being well led and mentioned me as Chief of Staff and Admiral King as head of the Navy. I got the secretary, he later died, to alter this and have him include General Arnold as Chief of the Air Corps. Of course, General Arnold was under me because the Air Corps was part of the Army and it would take Congressional legislation to

change. But when the President came out with this message in which he referred to his military leadership with myself as Chief of Staff and Admiral King as head of the Navy and General Arnold as head of the Air Corps—we had a separate air corps to all intents and purposes—and the matter was settled right then. Though the Air Corps remained under me, Arnold proceeded as a member of the Chiefs of Staff which had been opposed by the Navy.

The other matter was trying to increase the number of men. There was some current legislation that I have forgotten now which was coming into effect which would have given us a certain increase, but I was trying to go beyond that. They were unwilling to do so, because Mr. Roosevelt was very intent to hold this emergency action down. So while I got a slight increase in the affair I didn't at all get the general increase that I had hoped for. Mr. Roosevelt complained to Murphy about this draft because he said they were making it very embarrassing for him, Mr. Roosevelt, and moving into things they knew he was partially opposed to. I might say that trying to read into Mr. Roosevelt's mind what was going on was his feeling politically that the Middle West was so solidly against him that if he moved suddenly into a large military effort he would encounter such opposition from the Middle West that he wouldn't be able to manage the affair. This was later borne out by the fact that the *Ohio* movement—Over the Hill In Ohio [October]—took on such volume that it was only by one vote that the complete dissolution of the Army forces was avoided. So politically he was right and he was keeping very close touch on all the developments and the Middle West developments were very reluctant to anything that smacked of preparation for war. So you will find throughout this period, the President moving very carefully and in a very restrained manner. I would find myself before congressional committees, a few members of which, notably Senator [Cabot] Lodge, Senator Millard Tydings, and several others of that stripe, who wanted to go much faster and much

further, pressing me to do things which I would not do because I knew I would be going practically against the President's office.

I might say also that there was a factor that permeates all of this, particularly in the size of the Officer Candidate Schools, that is often lost sight of by those who just look at the figures and react from that. In 1918, 1917 rather, the officer candidate schools were started up without the authorization of Mr. Wilson. It was done largely on the enthusiastic backings of General Wood's friends in New York at the Plattsburg camps. Now that was a very brief period of instruction and that was all the officers got. Well, of course, that was a lot better than nothing. But by the standards we were going for into this new war, they were wholly unacceptable to us. But those who had figured decidedly in that Plattsburg movement now tried to take over and dictate exactly how we should do this thing. I remember their bringing up to Mr. Stimson once the fact that Australia was moving much more rapidly than we were in getting their officers schools started and commissioning young officers. Well later on we had a very difficult time with this Australian movement because of the poor training of the officers. We were determined that we should have well trained officers for a heavy fighting force. Mr. Grenville Clark who worked so hard in all these matters, Mr. Elihu Root, Jr. and Mr. Stimson were closely allied with them, Bill Donovan and all those men were pressing for action with which I was not at all in accord. And when Mr. Stimson came in as Secretary of War he was with them and his first action, the first thing he did when I went up to call on him, just before he formally accepted and came down to Washington, was to talk to them over the phone and to press me to move ahead in this very much more rapidly than I was, and which I was unwilling to do for the reasons I will give now. One thing that restrained me throughout this thing was we didn't have the instructors. We were so short of officers that we didn't have the men to train the others. One reason we were

slowed up on the volunteers and the draft act was that we had nobody to train these men if we got them in and we just couldn't risk going into this thing in a slipshod manner. I remember Martin, the ex young president of the New York Stock Exchange, was being trained as a private by a corporal who had been in the Army about ten years and had never gotten promoted from a private to a corporal, until this big change came and they had to put him in as an instructor. Well, he was no good at all at that and yet he was training Martin who was a brilliant man and who is now head of the Federal Reserve. We had nobody else to use. I wanted to go ahead as fast as we were able to manage the thing; that was all ignored. They just wanted what I call numbers, the number racket, which I wouldn't accept at all. So we had a very hard time and particularly with Mr. Stimson at this time because he was against the way we were going. Everybody in the War Department was a unit in this matter. We were opposed to these large training camps they wanted to have because we had no instructors. And we couldn't tear what little we did have all to pieces in order to produce a half-baked organization. And this is a very difficult thing to do. And we were in Dutch with the Secretary of War right from the start on that. And it got to a very, very difficult point.

I did something at one stage which I think is very reprehensible on the part of a government official, the more so when he is a military official which is a long, enduring status. It came to a certain point in this matter where the pressure and the advice of the Secretary of War was coming entirely from New York. Judge Patterson had come down. He was a training camp man, but this thing was not in his bailiwick He was on the supply side but he moved into this. Bill Donovan was into this. A member of the *New York Times* publishing house, a reserve general was in it. They finally got to the point where they were going to put this over. I then told Mr. Stimson, "Very well, Mr. Stimson, I have done my best and I have the entire staff with

me. They all see this thing alike to avoid this dilemma. Now it has arisen and it is going to take form apparently. I tell you now that I resign the day you do it." As I say I think this a rather reprehensible attitude for a member of the government at a time like this, particularly when it is a military member, when he is a career man, but nothing else could stop the thing. So I decided I would just take that stand. If they were going to do it—and I considered it a colossal mistake—they would do it without me. But behind this all was the President's unwillingness to go rapidly at this particular time.

Q. 49. On September 5, 1939, General Marshall said the President had authorized the expansion of the Army to National Defense strength that is to 280,000. But two days later, apparently doubting that he would get this much, the Chief of Staff argued for an immediate increase to 250,000 Regular Army and 320,000 National Guard. However, he got less than this from the President: 227,000 for the Regular Army and 235,000 for the National Guard. (The National Defense Act of 1920 assumed a Regular Army of 280,000 and a National Guard of 420,000).

Critics of the President picture him as trying after 1937 to get this country into war with Germany. Evidence like the above indicates that he was quite slow to arm. It may be, as his opponents say, that he was merely delaying until he was sure of re-election in 1940. Or it may be that he actually hoped we could stay out until the fall of France shocked him out of that belief. Do you have any comment on this?

A. Well, that is true. You must say Mr. Roosevelt's reluctance was because the country wasn't ready, the Middle West wasn't ready, and would oppose it violently. On my side, the technical military side was the fact we didn't have the people. We didn't have the instructors at all to handle these people and train them properly. You see the Regular Army was very small, when

the war broke out in Europe, exceedingly small and it was going to be very hard to find the people to do the training. And the reserve training at that time was not sufficiently crystallized to use them at the start. It was quite a while before they were available to give satisfactory service in a training capacity.

I don't know that the President's action in any way involved a consideration that he was waiting for the fall of France. It shocked the world in disbelief. No one at that time thought France was going to fall. And it came as a great shock when the invasion of France occurred and the tanks went through on the French side and went into hiding in the forest and then came out and executed their real slaughters after that. That all came as a great surprise. I know it did to the President because I talked to him about it and he was consulting me as to what to expect from this sort action which came as a great surprise to him as well as it did to the world.

Q. 50. The Army in 1939-40 was sometimes criticized for not asking for all it needed. General Marshall was aware of the needs, but he avoided going over the heads of his superiors to Congress. I have heard so-called military experts say that you and your staff failed to show sufficient imagination concerning needs. Others have said that the Army played politics on the matter in order to play up to the President. Do you want to add any comment on this?

A. I don't think that is quite right. People have forgotten today what a difficult time we had raising an Army, how bitter was the opposition to raising it, how strong was the influence of the Middle West. And we began to get the Army of some sized in 1941 and it was almost dissolved and only saved by one single vote. And yet I find many intelligent men today who don't recall that at all. And yet it was a historic, almost fatal, point in our military history of the war. We had to move very cautiously. If I had ignored public opinion, if I had ignored the reaction of

Congress, we would literally have gotten nowhere, because everybody in the positions of authority knew what we needed. They were unwilling to go ahead. They were unwilling to give it support. I had to be very careful, I felt, and I still think, I have to be very careful not to create the feeling that I, leader of the military portion of affairs at that time, was trying to force the country into a lot of actions which it opposed. I was trying to get the Congress to do it and I was trying to get the public to do it. I was trying to have these ardent supporters of this action to take the field, not against me. I understood what we needed for better than they did. But the public turned on me because I was pressing all these things. It would be very destructive.

I know apparently it will come up later in these discussions, but I was much criticized because I didn't take the lead in the Selective Service legislation. I very pointedly did not take the lead. I wanted it to come from others, it did come from Wadsworth and, I forgot who the other senator was who had been defeated and was going to retire in a few months. Then I could take the floor and do all the urging that was required in the case. But if I had led off with this urging, I would have defeated myself before I started and I was very conscious of that feeling. So if I could get civilians of great prominence to take the lead in urging these things then I could take up the cudgels and work it out. And that was very much the case, for example, in the Selective Service. No one had to tell me how much it was needed. I knew that years before, but the great question was how do you get it? Nobody had been able to get it except Mr. Wilson at the outbreak of the other war. Now it was being very violently opposed, again by the Middle West. The problem was how do we get this across. That was my reaction to it. To get it started by someone prominent in civil life. Then we could take it up and push it from that time out. It wasn't for me to establish a reputation because I asked for Selective Service. No one had to tell me it was needed. I knew that full well, many times better than the man in the street. You could

say the Army played politics in this period. That is a crude expression. Actually we had regard for politics. We had regard for the fact that the President did not feel assured he could get the backing of the people generally and the Middle West, in particular at the that time. We had to move with great caution.

I recall that when I was working on some of these things, in one case I talked to—I don't know how many Republican congressmen, enough to fill the private dining of the Army-Navy Club. And I talked with them in this issue where we only got one vote to save us. I talked to them from seven o'clock at night until two o'clock in the morning struggling with them. There I remember talking to one man who said: "That's all very well. You put the case very well, but I will be damned if I am going to go along with Mr. Roosevelt." My reply was, "You are going to let plain hatred of the personality dictate to you to do something that you realize is very harmful to the interests of the country." Of course, I did not say this publicly to anybody. I don't know that I have ever given out public expression to this meeting, but I had all the Republican congressmen in there and out of that I only got a few votes. As a matter of fact all those who did vote for it would have lost their places in Congress except for the fact the war came and everybody turned to. There was no question of it. I told them, "I realize if you vote for this thing now, (which was the prolongation of the draft act, retaining the National Guard in service—it wasn't the prolongation of the draft act— it was keeping those men in longer than stipulated period, entirely legal what was being done) I would personally do everything that I could in their campaign to support them and they could figure out how much effect that would be." They said it had no effect, that they would be defeated. A certain number of them said they would accept defeat as it was essential to the interest of the country; we will accept defeat, and I took notice of that so that I could go on the platform and use their names and explain

exactly what had happened. The war came along and then there was no necessity. People have forgotten entirely the hostility of that time. *Life* magazine played it up at great length, this OHIO movement (Over the Hill In October). It was very hard. Certain phases of democracy make it quite a struggle to raise any Army, probably should, I guess. But in the great tragedy the world was in at that time, it made it double hard. It kind of goes against the grain to find you are being criticized for being cautious in the way you handled this thing. I have no regrets. I think what I did was right. I think it was even more right as I look at it from the longer distance of the present time. I think those who would have plunged in would have wrecked the whole enterprise and delayed us until we were forced in under more serious circumstances. As it was when we were forced into the war we had the beginnings of a sizable Army.

Q. 51. Any comment on this matter of delay of personnel legislation?

A. I feel that, of course, there may have been excessive caution at that time by both the White House and the military. What we did was in accord with the White House. I did everything I could to stir the President's appreciation to the vastly critical military situation we had which we had to cure. And it was not a question of imagination; I had too much imagination around me. Members of the staff were terribly concerned and they spent their time trying to force me to take open action contrary to the Administration which I declined to do. And in the end that paid because all through I had the backing of the Administration in all these things and the backing of the conservative congress.

There is another factor that comes into all this. I was opposed to the too rapid reception of the men under the draft because we couldn't handle them. We did not have the instructors and if we did not do that part well we would submit ourselves to terrific criticism with the possibility

of losing control of the whole business because of the criticisms of the way we were doing it. Until the reservists became of age, you might say, until they were seasoned so that we could used them in the role of instructors for the very severe training camps we had—and that was at least a year—we had to move with a very careful appreciation of our limitations in instructors. I was under pressure because I did not do what Australia did. I was under pressure because we did not smear this up in order to keep it going. I was told the situation was grave and I should slur over this and slur over that and we heard that always. I feel we were right in what we did. I went beyond the staff in the size of the training camps and they had a terrible time getting appropriate instruction and I had to inspect these camps after time to make certain by superhuman effort they were curing it. It was all very difficult and we were determined to have well qualified officers which you could not get on short notice. Well-meaning reserve officers, and notably Clark and those fellows who did a superb job in 1917, exercised great pressure and they had the complete sympathy and support of the Secretary of War because he was of their tribe. He had gone to the Plattsburg camps and all that sort of thing. I just put it on the barrelhead. We had to do this thing right or I was not going to be involved in it.

We had almost the same experience with weapons. They wanted us to cut down the time of manufacturing. They wanted us to do like the British were doing in part in the matter of rifles, lowering the standards, the tolerances and things of that sort. The result was that these rifles which were fixed for British machine guns wouldn't work at high altitudes and we had to supply them out of our limited stock. But our Chief of Ordnance was being blistered because he wouldn't do them in this way and they said he was too conservative. Well you got all sorts, apparently anybody in the world. Maybe the Duke of Tasmania is doing it a little shorter than we were and he is right. But he's not right. He's all wrong.

Q. 52. In June 1940, General Marshall proposed increasing the Regular Army from 280,000 to 400,000 to avoid the necessity of mobilizing any part of the National Guard. Also suggested raising 120,000 men by the Civilian Volunteer Effort.

"That there was in this recommendation no suggestion of resorting, rather, to a draft of manpower, which could be obtained only by the passage of a selective service act, indicates how far from the Chief of Staff's mind at this time was the idea of making immediate use of the draft. In May 1940, Grenville Clark pushed preparedness. At a dinner of May 22d, attended by Stimson, Patterson, Elihu Root, Jr., Donovan, and many others, it was decided to urge the War Department to call for draft legislation. General Palmer called General Marshall on May 25. "General Marshall was fully informed of the President's unwillingness to espouse any such proposal at the time and hence was not free to do so himself." He did, however, instruct three officers to aid the Military Training Camps Association in drafting a bill. The impression was strong that General Marshall contemplated selective service legislation which would be effective only after a declaration of war. Mr. Clark and Colonel Julius Adler now called on the Chief of Staff urging him to give immediate backing to draft legislation. "This General Marshall flatly refused to do." Mr. Clark recalled that he was unwilling to break up trained units to find cadres, and that he was worried about the need of using intact units to defend South America. He also did not want to jeopardize appropriations then pending.

The selective service act "was designed and given its initial push, not by Army or Navy or White House, but by a mere handful of farsighted and energetic civilians."

This is from an official Army history written in 1949 and based heavily, in this case, on the recollections of Grenville Clark. Do you have any additional information to give?

A. I don't know what the official history referred to here, but I do know that we deliberately did not take the lead in working for the draft act, but I went all out in the argument for its passage after it had been introduced. I might say that I went through a very difficult period here and it was very hard to keep my temper. I was being dictated to and I mean dictated to. I was being sent for by a conference of this important New York fellow and this other important New York fellow and they would call me in—the New York fellows and dictate to me what I should do. I tried to listen politely, but I didn't do.

In connection with the training program, methodical training, comment is made on General McNair's part in the matter. I put this under McNair. General Clark was his executive, so as to have it closely observed in all its workings throughout the country. Not just under the War Department in a general way. I t was specifically under General McNair and he had a staff to do the inspecting and everything, that sort of thing. McNair was a very able officer, a conscientious officer and he had a good headquarters at the War College. And he is entitled to vast credit for the job he did in that. And General Clark played a very determining part in the matter. As a matter of fact, the method of raising these divisions, building them up, was largely worked out by General Clark. He would sit across the desk from me up in the Chief of Staff's office and we would work out the details. I selected General McNair personally for this. I selected him very hurriedly at an earlier date to get him control of Leavenworth which I thought was following a very antiquated attitude particularly in regard to the Air Corps. And I took general McNair away from his job with the new three regimental divisions which he was working on at San Antonio and brought him up to Leavenworth and put him in charge of the school there. I brought him up ahead of time in drafting the schedule before he became

superintendent. And then he came on and took charge later and Leavenworth became another place.

I might explain something that happened here in which I took some pride. Seemingly it was a small matter but it was a very large one. We had the drafts, I'm guessing as to numbers, of 152 manuals in accord with the then new concepts of training of this, that, and the other. It may have been 252 but I think it was 152. They had to be edited and worked out in full and published to the services. I remember so well in 1917 we didn't have anything and we had to borrow documents from the British and they had literally nothing. So I seized on Leavenworth and on the War College and I retained their instructors and I think at one or the other I retained part of the students. I am not certain about that. Anyway, I put them to work finishing all these manuals. Leavenworth had a great many to finish. I held them there for about four months after the class was graduated. I remember when I told the superintendent at Leavenworth that I wanted to hold them there to do this work; he gave me an estimate of a year and a half. I told him first I think three months. Later I changed it to four months and he said it could not be done. And I said, "You be very careful about that, to tell me this over the telephone, incidentally, that a thing can or cannot be done." He said, "No, it can't be done." I said, "I'm sorry then, you are relieved." So I relieved him and put somebody else in his place. Down at the War College, I think, we kept the student officers there. But anyway, we finished all these manuals so that we started with all of them finished, in the printer's hands, to issue to these new troops and new officers of this great Army we were reaming. We did it without mixing things up. We used the headquarters that were actually in existence, Leavenworth and the War College. Then afterwards the War College developed into the center of training of which McNair became the head. We took him from Leavenworth and we established another school there to which we

wanted to bring him ranking reserve officers to and others to get in touch with the general situation. I remember then to show what difficulties we had, we had no money for the school so I invited these various officers to come at their own expense, to leave their businesses and everything of that sort—they were all generally business men, New York particularly, Chicago, Detroit and so on—and take this course for three months so that they would learn what we were trying to do. Some achieved very important places in the Army then and later on. But we couldn't get a dime to pay their expenses and they had to pay their own, which limited us very decidedly in getting the men. However, it worked very well and it was a beginning. All these things had to be hewn out of new logs you might say and at your own expense because we didn't have the money to do it otherwise.

McNair seemed fated. Each time he went abroad he was struck. He went to Africa and was wounded there, fortunately not seriously but was wounded in the shoulder. Then went to Europe and was killed there by a bomb.

Q. 53. Will you comment on General McNair's personality and work? Had you known him well before 1939 and did you pick him for this training program?

A. Answered in Question 52.

Q. 54. In the fight to extend the selective service act in 1941, General Marshall was faced with considerable work with Congress. Part of his problem was taken up with the continuance of the National Guard in service beyond one year. For a time in the spring of 1941, he had plans made for letting them go home. There was some criticism that he waited until past mid-year before recommending that they be kept in service. He noted that there had been changes in the world situation in the meantime. Here is a case where some of your critics say that instead of taking a

firm stand, you used a political approach to the question. Do you feel that this is a legitimate criticism?

A. No, I do not. I doubt if any other procedure that than I followed could have been used. In other words, it was not a question at that moment of talking big. There was a deep animosity on the part of the Republicans towards Mr. Roosevelt and some few Democrats went along with the movement. And, of course, the parents played a very large part in the development of pressures on the Congress. The trouble was that we were undertaking very severe war measures and we were not at war. This situation changed instantly a few months later when we found ourselves at war. There was no trouble then and no doubt but there was great trouble at this time. It was a debate as though it were an ordinary Administration policy measure. The efforts we made were very pronounced. I think a little earlier I went on to describe taking the leading Republican critics in the House and talking to them until two in the morning at the Army and Navy Club. Those that I persuaded to vote in our favor did so stating that they knew this meant their defeat. Of course there was no time to measure their defeat because the outbreak of the war changed all that. But it was very rife at the moment and the man felt that he was giving away his position in Congress to go along with this unpopular measure which had been very heavily worked up in the Press and in the magazines. These boys were very fond of talking and the representatives of the magazines, particularly *Life*, would go from camp to camp. Of course a young man to be consulted, and results of consultation to be published, felt very much enlarged and important. And he talked freely and at length and of course was very vehement. All that made it quite hard to manage. Meantime, before the actual vote came in the last weeks, I had to go off with the President to Argentia in Newfoundland to the meeting with Mr. Churchill and his staff.

Q. 55. Did you have any talks with Mr. Truman at this time? Do you recall when you first met him?

A. I did not have any talks as I recall with Mr. Truman at this time. I don't even recall having met him at this time.

Q. 56. Officer Candidate Schools had been opened both as a means of getting new officers and as a quickener of trainee morale. The program was laid down in September 1940 but General Marshall and pushed through over the surprisingly strong objections of G-1, G-3, and Chief of Arms who felt that the Officers' Reserve Corps was already large enough to meet requirements for the visible future, and that additions to it would make officer eliminations unnecessarily difficult. General Marshall pointed to the high disciplinary value of training in the ranks, and to the certainty that commissioning from the ranks would increase the popularity of the Selective Service Act…Later General Marshall proposed that quotas be allotted to replacement training centers and to recruits of only four months' service instead of six. Did you ever have reason to regret your insistence on OCS?

A. No, I think it was very important. I think it proved highly satisfactory and made a great contribution to efficiency.

Q. 57. How do you rate the OCS officers of the war as contrasted to Reserve officers?

A. I think the officers in the lower grades who graduated from the candidate schools were better trained than the reserve officer who had never been to any such school. He lacked thoroughness and he lacked disciplinary training and instruction. Candidate schools produced a very high grade of discipline and of instruction.

Q. 58. It has been suggested in recent years that all officers should take some training in the ranks (it is assumed that cadet training certainly is similar to training in the ranks) before being commissioned. What is your view on this?

A. I think this is a very sound suggestion.

Q. 59. Did the idea of giving battlefield commissions originate with you? What was your reaction to the practice of giving direct commissions to experts in military government, finance, supply procurement and the like?

A. As nearly as I can recall the idea of battlefield commissions did originate with me. I felt that where very effective leadership was demonstrated on the battlefield, the quick recognition of that leadership was very important. If it was recognized at the time and became well known throughout the unit, it encouraged all the others to similar actions. Actually, I am not entirely certain of this, as I recall, we sent many of these men to officer training schools after they won their commissions on the battlefield.

My reaction to the giving of direct commissions to the experts in military government, finance, and supply department is that it should be conducted about the way we did it. Disciplinary training requirements are quite different from those of a combat graduate.

Q. 60. Before assuming the Chief of Staff's duties General Marshall made a tour of air stations and manufactories with General Andrews of the Air Corps learning much more of the air elements' needs than was commonly understood by ground officers. More receptive than his predecessors to the arguments of the Army aviators, General Marshall channeled the air spokesmen's abundant energies into programs that approximated aviation objectives and yet

were tolerable to the leaders of ground force opinion. Would you give some background material on this trip and on some of the things you learned from your tour?

A. I had not known General Andrews at all well and while I was head of the War Plans Division he called on me and said he was going around the country (he was then in command of the Tactical Division) and invited me to go with him and I accepted. As a matter of fact, there was some opposition to my going from the War Department. But I went ahead and took the trip and I found it tremendously informing. I went to all the various plants and met the heads of the plants, particularly their chief engineers, and I walked with one or the other through the plant while General Andrews was busy with the other fellow and learned a great deal about construction and the difficulties and problems. I got an insight into what went on. I think we went first to a plant in Seattle of which Johnson was the head and where B-17s were being made. We also went to all the principal air stations and at all of these I heard the comments of the officers. I heard their appeals to Andrews for better representation. I heard their appeals for things that they were being denied. I came to recognize a great many of the things as justified. When I got back to Washington, I looked into it and found out that they had almost no representation at all on the General Staff and I found the General Staff officers had little interest in the air, mostly antipathy, and it was quite marked. There were several things that came up you could take action on right away. For example, one of them was that when a man had three months or six months or whatever the special training was in connection with manufacture of aircraft they would almost immediately lose his services because he would buy his discharge and take a high paid position with some air manufacturing plant. I got the Chief of Staff to approve the proposition that before he took this special schooling he had to re-enlist for three years and sign an agreement not to purchase out until the finish of that three year period. However, when I finally became Deputy

Chief of Staff I found this had never been put into effect. I found everything in the staff was very hostile to the Air. I found the young Air officers were dealing with Congress and stirring up everything and there was a general muddle. They had something to complain about because they were not getting recognition, and the Ground Staff at that time had little understanding of the Air. I know when I started sending them around in planes, they didn't want to fly; they declined to fly in many cases. They said it hurt their insurance. I believe it did. I think I had no insurance at all for some years there for Mrs. Marshall because of my flying. So I couldn't very well force these fellows into fly at the expense of their families, if any accident occurred. Flying was not as secure then as it was later on. So we had quite an issue there in the staff. I wanted to send people out to various places, which with our limited mileage account, we could do by air. Not many of them wanted to go but it got later to the point that if a fellow didn't want to fly I relieved him from the War Department staff. I did it quietly and didn't get a fuss stirred up. But I just dispensed with his services on the War Department staff. So if you came in there, you flew. So we gradually got this thing worked out. I was trying my best to do it with as little publicity as possible which I think I succeeded in doing then. It was almost like when I became Secretary of Defense, there had been such an active battle between Air and the Navy and later between all the military services and the State Department. I healed them all up in about two weeks and it never got into the press though it had been all the press had been writing about heretofore. I won't go into details of how I did it. Maybe it will come up later. But this air thing now that you were talking about was very marked. The truth was, as far as I can figure out, behind the thing, was the fact that under the law you couldn't be on the General Staff unless you graduated from the War College. Under the law you couldn't go to the War College unless you graduated from Leavenworth and the air fellows did not want to go to Leavenworth. In the first

place it was hard work, but more particularly they were afraid of endangering their flight pay. And only a few went there—General Arnold, Tooey Spaatz, and fellows like that. So that only a limited number were qualified by law to serve on the General Staff and the result was there was almost no representation on the General Staff at all. Frank Andrews was one of the first ones that I got into a commanding position on the staff and I made him the G-3 of the staff. And he was the supervisor of the first mobilization of the Army which involved about 176 new units and he followed it all through and got in close touch with the ground forces. He flew everywhere in a fast combat plane and did a splendid job of it. I had him on the General Staff. And later on I sent him down to the Caribbean and got him in command down there and gave him the experience of handling all the other services under him and also contact with the Navy. And then incidentally I moved him out to Cairo where he would come in contact with the English as well as his own development command, and then I finally moved him to England. So he was the first one I was able, you might say, to graduate for his job through the various holdings. There, unfortunately, he flew to Iceland and wrecked his plane on a mountain in a rain storm.

I learned a great deal on this trip, a very great deal. I learned most of what was the matter with the staff in regard to the air and what the air was doing to make it worse. I tried to get this changed and as a matter of fact the high ranking ground officers on the staff were so hostile that it was rather difficult to do. And it was not until I became Deputy Chief of Staff that I got into a position where I could bring pressure to bear. Then later, when I became Chief of Staff, I had Frank Andrews as my G-3 and I will describe later what happened there. Well, I might tell it here. I was going to be made a major general and Chief of Staff. As Chief of Staff I would be a full general. I didn't want to have my promotion to major general occur after I was announced as becoming Chief of Staff. I wanted to be appointed before that. I wanted the Chief of Staff,

the assistant Secretary of War and Secretary of War, the men concerned with the promotion, to appoint me. So I got them all together in the Secretary's office, who was Woodring, Louis Johnson was assistant secretary, and General Craig was Chief of Staff. Craig was a very dear friend of mine and Mr. Johnson and Mr. Woodring were both well disposed toward me, very strongly disposed toward me, but without regard to each other and they were not aware of the fact Craig was friendly to me. I got them together and took up the question of promoting Frank Andrews to a brigadier general—he had just become a colonel at the end of his tour as major general in the command of the GHQ Air Force. That was the only thing I ever knew them to be a unit on. They were all together against him because the Air's working with Congress behind the scenes. I don't know that Frank Andrews did it himself or not but these young men did do it. They were a unit on that and that was the only thing I ever knew them to be a unit on. I stipulated that they just had to do it. I didn't want it done after I was Chief of Staff because that would put me in the position of strongly favoring the Air Corps—it would all come out and make a newspaper mess of it. And we had a very, very stormy session. Finally I just said you must do it. If you are going to make me Chief of Staff you have just got to do it. And they finally agreed to it and made Frank Andrews a brigadier general and he came in and became G-3 of the War Department, the first time an airman had handled such an appointment.

I learned a great deal about difficulties regarding the various factors in the manufacture of airplanes, the difficulties of arriving at an acceptable pattern, and I got very clear ideas of the varying opinions of these fellows. At that time, there was great enthusiasm in the Air Corps for large bombers, and there was very great opposition in the other parts of the Army to the large bombers. They said there were no fields for them. They couldn't use them in the Philippines; they couldn't use them in this place and that place because there were no fields for them, and

they were all opposed to them. I took a different view but I didn't express it then. But as soon as I became Chief of Staff I went ahead with their program for large bombers.

There were many other things that came to my attention during this trip. I got quite an interest in various personnel factors of the Air Corps. I came to one conclusion at that time, promotions had been slow all around. They had had temporary promotions which hadn't been successful because it created too many jealousies. I found there was a very lamentable situation there regarding promotions. There was great hostility by the ground officers against these promotions and the great question was how to solve this problem. It sort of fought itself two or three ways from the start. I had a hard time resolving the matter into an acceptable pattern. I had to be very careful what I did because the newspapers were looking for interesting items and they would have stirred up a mess in about a minute, because that would have been news. And everybody likes to read about a mess and that is the one thing I wanted to avoid because that doesn't help morale. That just damns morale. However, I was just starting out as Chief of Staff and I was going to have a very hard time.

I don't think there is anything else I can talk about in connection with this trip. I came to know Andrews very well and a number of others.

Q. 61. The public and Congress early began talking of autonomy or possible separation of the Air Corps from the Army. In March 1941, General Marshall issued a simple directive saying in effect that the Chief of the Air Corps would thereafter prepare for final action all papers, studies, memoranda, and all other particulars on purely Air Corps matters, except those pertaining to war plans and intelligence; and that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air would be responsible for coordination in air matters. Please discuss your difficulties in handling this demand for

autonomy. What problems did you have from air officers, from the Press, and from Congress in this matter?

A. So far as General Arnold was concerned and some of the other leading air men I had no difficulty. They differed some in the character of proposals. I had great difficulty from outside, so called experts on the air. I remember one man particularly who occupies quite a prominent position and has a great deal to say and he ran a column, I think. He had two plants fail under his management, but he knew all about handling a larger plant in the Army. I didn't accept that. As a matter of fact, our great difficulty at that time was that we didn't have sufficient trained senior officers in the Air Corps. To express it baldly we had a great number of antiquated pilots. We lacked trained men like Spaatz and others of that stripe and Arnold of course. The trained staff was missing. As I explained before, they had failed to go to Leavenworth at one time or another for various reasons and then hadn't qualified for this staff training and they just didn't have it. I had very great difficulty with them.

Now what I am going to say right now is NOT FOR RELEASE, but it's merely to explain my own feelings about it. (I had a great deal of trouble about this and I told Arnold one day I was sick and tired of his god-damned high-school staff and get somebody back there that knew how he operated. He himself was all loyalty. Spaatz was loyal and the other fellows they had immediately around them were loyal. The great problem was to construct a going staff. After these young men had gone abroad and had vast experience and had grown up to command the largest Air Force the world had ever seen that was quite another matter. They knew then of their own experiences, these things which they had not known at all before. I took Vandenberg as an aide for me over to England. I took Craig on another trip over to England. I had two to three airmen I took along with me when I only had two officers I took with me going to various

meetings with the British. I saw them at close range. I knew pretty much what they knew and what they lacked in broad vision. The great difficulty, of course, was popular press pressure. The self-appointed air experts who knew nothing, just the broad statement of having immediate Air Corps equality, knew almost nothing what the difficulties would be of trying to staff manage such a thing. When we got these temporary staffs in, they were mainly concerned about promotion. They would add up the number of Judge Advocates and other such side issue officers and try to work into them when already they had very advance promotions. But they weren't working on the broad proportion of the air. They were working on how it affected the individual).

General Arnold was loyal throughout and my constant companion. I flew pretty much everywhere with him in the U. S. and he flew pretty much everywhere with me abroad. When I got the thing fixed as I described before in this speech to Congress by Mr. Roosevelt in which Arnold automatically became a member of Chiefs of Staff, which I couldn't arrange before because the Navy wanted their Air in it and there was no way of compromising the situation.

There were very strong advocates for the Air Corps in Congress. There were very strong advocates for the Air Corps in the press. And the Air Corps had been very much the underdog in most of these things, which added to the effectiveness of these pressures. But we had to have something that would work. To my mind it was utterly out of the question to organize a separate Air Corps in the course of the war. Arnold felt the same way I did. We just didn't have the trained staffs to function them.

PART 2

Q. 62. Was the solution completely satisfactory?

A. The solution was not entirely satisfactory, but it was a good working solution and we got along very well with it after we rid ourselves of the outside pressures. I know up in Judge Patterson's office they took a strong position in all these matters because the Judge had been a member of the Plattsburg camp and those fellows were moving in on it. But I managed to handle the thing. I might tell one amusing incident. I don't know whether this should ever be written up or not. But there came down from Judge Patterson's office, which was for supplies—he was the undersecretary—and hadn't anything to do with tactics and organization, but he came down as a sort of representative of the Air Corps. And in this he changed the general organization of the Air Corps in the War Department and very notably its organization under me, and showed it to Mr. Stimson and Mr. Stimson signed it, and it came in to me. Well that virtually deposed me as any controlling point here. Well the main point was I wasn't even consulted. I wasn't even notified. But an office that didn't pertain to this thing took charge of it and did this thing and then it was sent to me signed by the Secretary of War. Well, I handled that the way I did a good many things. Instead of getting mad, I just filed it in my desk—didn't turn it out at all. Well I suppose almost a year afterwards, certainly six months afterwards, when Mr. Stimson and I were having quite a battle over something we didn't agree about, Mr. Stimson said to me, "I would like for you to stop and think that we have gone along with you on everything you've put up. I don't think you can find anything on which you haven't had my cordial support, I assure you." I didn't say anything, and he said, "Is there anything that hasn't had my cordial support of you as Chief of Staff?" Well I reached into my desk and got this document which he had signed which in effect was prepared by the undersecretary who had nothing to do with that part of the Army.

Mr. Roosevelt by an executive order put me in charge of operations over and above the Secretary of War and organization. "Well, Mr. Secretary, here is a pretty good answer, and this is about six months old" (maybe it was longer than that). And I gave him this and he read it and came down to his signature. "Well," he said, "what is this?" I said, "You signed it there, you ought to know." "Well," he said, "what is it doing there?" I said, "I filed it in my desk here." He said, "You filed it." I said, "Well, you didn't consult me about. That deposed me. You were just talking about how you supported me in all these things. It hadn't anything to do with Judge Patterson's responsibility. Yet he takes the initiative and he writes the thing and you sign it and I'm out and I am not even spoken to. So I just put it in my drawer. That's a good place to solve these difficult questions." Mr. Stimson said, "I never saw anything like that." And I said, "I've never heard anything like that either. But it didn't go any further than my drawer." "Well," he said, "just give it to me." I said, "Just hold on here. I have an executive order from the President that I have the question of organization in my sole control. Now, are you going to take this out and start it all over again?" He said, "No, I am going to give it to Judge Patterson and tell him to tear it up." But that shows the lengths to which they got to in this matter.

Q. 63. Do you feel that a separate Department of Air would have been feasible during the war?

A. Think I answered 63 in which I said I didn't think it was possible to have a separate Air Corps during the war and General Arnold was in complete agreement with me on this question.

Q. 64. Do you feel that the Army was wise in insisting in recent months on its own air force and on its program of developing a long-range missile program?

A. Answer omitted.

Q. 65. How seriously were we handicapped by shipments to the British and the French? The Chicago Tribune insists that but for the things sent to Britain we could have prevented the disaster at Pearl Harbor.

A. I don't recall any shortages except in patrol aircraft and some fighter aircraft that would have changed the situation at Pearl Harbor. We didn't have enough bombers to use as reconnaissance vessels to carry the reconnaissance around the complete circle and far out to sea.

Q. 66. Please discuss the arrangement by which surplus arms were transferred to the British after Dunkirk. Did this transfer hurt our training program?

A. At this time by a recent law of Congress anything of a military character that was to be given to Great Britain had to have the approval of the Chief of Staff. I think I referred to this to you before. I think the law was unconstitutional. I think the commander-in-chief was the one and they might forbid him. I was under the commander in chief. Nevertheless it was put up to me. Now at this time the problem was how essential was the partial rearmament of the British from our then available old war stocks to the defense of the United States. I took the position that any measure then to prevent the complete collapse of Great Britain was of importance to the United States, because it would put the war on a different front, very threatening to us, and would permit easy transfer to this side of the ocean and threaten the Panama Canal. Under that term, so explained, I arranged for, I think, about a million rifles and I have forgotten how many automatic rifles and machine guns of the First World War stock and I think five hundred 75 mm. guns to be transferred to the British. The tragedy of the matter was that when they issued these rifles they could only give them ten rounds of ammunition and they went to the people of Great Britain to defend their towns and all when a German invasion was very much threatened and it was

presumed to be inevitable. But we hadn't any ammunition in excess of that to give them. So we did give them ten rounds per gun. So they couldn't train for it, but they at least would have a rifle and they, at least, would have ten shots. Because they were stripped to nothing at this time and the only hope was that the civilians could arm themselves for a partial defense. This distribution of World War weapons didn't hurt our training program. Because there were enough left of the World War weapons for such training as we might want to use them for and we were beginning to get deliveries on modern weapons.

Q. 67. Isolationists say that with the passage of the Lend-Lease Act we, to all intents and purposes, declared war. Do you feel this is true?

A. In regard to Lend-Lease. I think the passage of the Lend-Lease Act plainly declared our intimate relationship with Great Britain and our friendship with them. It didn't necessarily indicate we were going to war with them, but it made it a probability better than a possibility.

Q. 68. Do you believe that Britain and Russia could have held out without Lend-Lease?

A. I don't know what the result would have been if we had not had Lend-Lease as to the British and Russians surviving. I think it would have been exceedingly difficult for Great Britain, maybe not quite so difficult for Russia, though they were seriously lacking in many, many things.

Q. 69. Did the Lend-Lease program interfere vitally with your military preparation program?

A. The Lend-Lease plan, at first, presented difficulties rather in the slowdown of the armament of our newly organized troops. But one which we felt at the time was plainly justified.

Q. 70. Do you feel that for the most part the Lend-Lease program was well handled?

A. As far as I know the Lend-Lease program was fairly well handled. Everybody could give you different reasons how the thing could be managed but I think they did it pretty well.

Q. 71. What changes would you suggest in such a program in case of another conflict?

A. I have no suggestions in regard to changes.

Q. 72. During the congressional hearings of the late 1940s, one or two witnesses indicated that the Army's efforts to prevent critical items from going to Russia were overridden by Mr. Hopkins. Any comment on this?

A. I don't remember just what the reaction was in these hearings in relation to giving items to Russia. Hopkins' job with the President was to represent the Russian interest. My job was to represent the American interest and I was opposed to any, what I called undue generosity which might endanger our security. I thought we gave too much at times and Hopkins thought we gave too little, which would always be the case.

Q. 73. Did you feel that the administration was over-generous with the Soviet government?

A. Have answered that question just now.

Q. 74. Did you feel that the administration failed to deal properly with Russian complaints?

A. I thought the Administration dealt very generously with the Russian complaints. The Russians demanded everything, criticized everything. The point was they were fighting and they were fighting hard. And we needed their fighting to keep the enemy engaged as much as possible. But their complaints were continuous and always have been. No matter how much you gave them, they didn't hesitate at all to complain bitterly about the whole thing.

Q. 75. Isolationists in November 1941 said that the Army was preparing an expeditionary force for duty in Africa. General Marshall affirmed categorically: "There is no foundation whatsoever for the allegation or rumor that we are preparing troops for a possible expedition to Africa or other critical area outside this hemisphere." Three weeks later, without preliminaries, certain newspapers printed an article questioning the accuracy of General Marshall's denial, and recording in some detail the Army's formulation of a program for American participation in the war on Germany. (This was *Chicago Tribune* and Washington Times-Herald release in December 1941). Did you ever get any idea of how these got into the hands of the newspapers?

A. I had no idea how the *Tribune* and *Times-Herald* gained access to the information they publicized.

Q. 76. Did the newspapers ever indicate privately any regret for having made these plans public on the eve of war?

A. I don't know of any regrets the papers expressed privately. It didn't come to my attention if they did.

Q. 77. Is there any way that a government agency can guard against release of papers by officials who feel that it is their duty to make public information which they feel the public should know? This was back of the feeding of information from secret files in State and Army to McCarthy, and back of present day leaks from the Defense Department.

A. I do not know how to answer this question. It is extremely difficult to go ahead with war plans under conditions which then existed. And yet we were fighting to prevent that sort of thing that was going on in Germany at that time. Surprise is one of the greatest factors of success in war. And we were being deprived of surprise all the way through. You would get before a

military committee of Congress and some representative there, hostile to the Administration, would ask you a question which it would be fatal to answer. More particularly if you refused to answer, you almost answered the question. So it was a very difficult matter there to meet these questions at that time under the circumstances. All one could do was the best they could.

TAPE 11M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

NOVEMBER 15, 1956

TAPE 11M

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL AT PINEHURST, N. C., November 15, 1956 by Forrest C. Pogue

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Q. 1. The Prime Minister has said that one of his greatest pangs of the war came because the U. S. Chief of Staff took a pedantic approach to the Eastern Mediterranean and refused to back him in his activities on Leros and other Islands of the area. He was also unhappy because Eisenhower, strongly backed by the U. S. chiefs of Staff, refused to divert forces from Italy for these activities. Do you feel, in retrospect, that the Prime Minister's request had any merit to it?

A. Regarding Mr. Churchill's feeling as to the Greek Islands and our attitude toward the Eastern Mediterranean and General Eisenhower's attitude. In the first place, as I think I told you yesterday, he acted in regard to these Greek Islands without any regard to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which was highly irregular. And it followed immediately on his recovery—his convalescence—from pneumonia and my action in proposing the Americans release the executive control in the Mediterranean. So to put it very frankly it was in poor taste to say the least and I am not very sympathetic to his feeling deeply about it. Later the question of the Isle of Rhodes came up in which we had to oppose him very strongly. In all these matters, it was very difficult, in dealing with the British Chiefs of Staff, to tell whether we were really dealing directly with Mr. Churchill or with their opinions. Their position, I think, was extraordinary difficult. Mr. Churchill was very intense when he got a certain idea and he did business with them every day—where sometime I didn't see the President for a month. So our trouble was to

know just when we were encountering Mr. Churchill's opinion or when it was the British Chiefs of Staff's opinion. Now in this Eastern Mediterranean question, he directed action there which, as I say, was highly irregular, because we were never consulted—which we had every right to be—and, therefore, he is without position when he feels we didn't back him up.

As to General Eisenhower's feeling about diverting forces from Italy for these activities and U. S. Chiefs of Staff backing him, this was the same thing. We were resisting constant efforts to diminish the set-up or time element for the cross-channel operation—I have forgotten the technical name for it—[Pogue:Overlord]—Overlord.

Q. 2. General Marshall soon recommended that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff take the position that a supreme commander be designated for all British-American operations against Germany. At the same time he did not wish to raise with the British the delicate problem of the eventual unification of the U. S. and British air commands until he had an agreement on the overall command. It has been suggested that this arrangement was brought forward by the U. S. planners in the hope that the way would be opened for your appointment to such an overall command. In this way Mr. Roosevelt's fears of losing your influence in Washington would be met. Is this an accurate statement?

A. Now turning to Chapter 11 Question 2. I don't know about the answer to 2. And in a way I have forgotten just what conversations took place in the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and with me with the planners and by me with the planners.

Q. 3. General Frederick Morgan was brought over here for several weeks in 1943 to inspect troops and visit American cities. It has been suggested that you intended to appoint him as your

chief of staff in case of your selection as commander of Overlord. Is this an accurate statement? If so, did you have in mind other members of your staff?

A. The suggestion about General Morgan is correct. I had in mind starting off with him, at least in the preliminary stage as Chief of Staff. Just what my actions would have been in the effort to get matters composed when I found that the principal British leader was violently—almost vindictively—opposed to him, I'm, not prepared to say.

Pogue: I believe you have answered part of these questions.

Ch. XII Q. 1. At one point in the discussions en route to Tehran, the discussion turned to occupation zones. The President drew in pencil his proposed line of demarcation. At the conclusion of the meeting, the President handed this to General Marshall who in turn gave it to General Handy. Was this line entirely of the President's making or was he reflecting military or diplomatic advice?

A..Reference to Tehran. I have forgotten the details regarding the occupation zones. I know we had rather lengthy discussions with the President. We found him very fixed in his position and as I recall McCloy played a leading part in this.

Pogue: You had nothing to do with drawing these lines?

No, I had nothing to do with the initial proposals for these lines. They came from London I believe. The feelings at the time were rather involved. McCloy wanted one thing, in which we backed him, and the President wanted quite another. And in the background was what would the French get? And on this phase the President was either rather sketchy or antagonistic.

I don't recall the President giving me a paper. I presume he did. And I don't recall the paper.

But in all these occupation zone matters—in the back of our heads—I say our, certainly in mine—was the prospect that we would be rather remote from Berlin at the time the Russians got there. Of course, it didn't work out that way. The rapid occupation of the Ruhr and also the evident desire of the Germans to surrender to the Allies completely changed the military set-up at the finish. (Incidentally, I might say that that conquest of the Ruhr and the fighting immediately following it was really a magnificent performance, because it was a running battle that General Bradley was conducting with the necessity at the same time of taking care of a moving German population. I remember their reporting to me at one place there were twenty thousand moving Germans in charge of one corporal who organized the entire affair, fed them, and managed everything, which was a typical American procedure. This corporal evidently had very fine judgment and was not seeking publicity. Did you find any record of that when you were working over there?

Pogue: Not that particular episode but I have seen enormous number of people coming back under practically no guard at all. I went through to the South of the Ruhr so I didn't get in on that part.

Do you want me to tell a story on that sort of thing?

Pogue: Yes, certainly.

After the battle in Tunisia and the surrender of the Italian-Rommel forces, I found myself visiting in an olive grove, where a battalion, I think, of the 34th Infantry was bivouacked following the battle and this was on a portion of the battleground and it happened to be Decoration Day. So they planned a ceremony for which they asked me to delay my departure in order that I might witness it. So a couple of hours later—in the late afternoon—I went to the division commander, General Ryder, out on a field where the troops were assembled. This ceremony was conducted by the chaplain. His remarks were largely a repetition of the order for that day, which was a historical reminder of how the Decoration Day affair was organized shortly after the Civil War. So his remarks were not very interesting. But more to the point was the fact that when it came to the singing, he distributed some books. But they had no leaders and he led and he was tone deaf. And they started to try to sing with him, but they quit. It was a very agonizingly pathetic performance. Added to which the men were in deep column, so that only a few were close enough to hear anything. Above all, they were facing the setting sun—it was square in their eyes—and it was not a cool day. Now I had issued an order against the advice of the Chief of Chaplains, Bishop Arnold, charging commanders with the same responsibility for the conduct of the chaplain as the regimental or battalion commander had for the training of his unit. We were not interested in the denominational matters of religious procedures but intensely interested in the effectiveness of the chaplain. Was he carrying his weight? Or was he more or less innocuous? Bishop Arnold was very doubtful about this, particularly as he was the presiding judge, in effect. However, I went ahead with it. So this particular chaplain in Tunisia came to my forcible attention on account of the miserable procedure. While the ceremony was going on I taxed General Ryder with this state of affairs.

He replied by saying that this was the battalion chaplain and that they had a perfectly splendid division chaplain. I replied that I wasn't talking about the division chaplain—I was talking about this battalion, which was his battalion, and that chaplain. He again tried to tell me about the division chaplain and I refused to hear.

At the end of the ceremony, I took over and faced the men away from the setting sun and had them sit down. And then gave them a talk describing what was going on with the American forces in the various portions of the world—trying to take the curse off part of this miscast ceremony. And when we got into the car to leave, General Ryder asked my permission to tell me about this division chaplain. Well, I said, "All right, you tell me, but don't forget this battalion chaplain." He said that the division chaplain drove up there in an open Cadillac at the time of the surrendering of the troops. And on the plain right out there by us were thousands of prisoners who had just surrendered themselves. They were moving in from every direction and, as a matter of fact, in some places the Germans were controlling the movements, just automatically taking control. Our fellows were busy fighting at some other point. This chaplain came up in his car and a German major attacked him on the failure of the Americans to organize this affair—leaving it to the Germans and was very, very caustic and exceedingly arrogant. The chaplain explained that they didn't have any experience in this and would probably do better the next time—implying in a gentle way that there would be a next time which went over the arrogant German's head and he held forth again, infuriating the corporal [driving] who was particularly irritated that the chaplain was so mild. But this time the chaplain pointed to the caduceus and he said do you know what these are? The German said he didn't know at all what they were but he did not see any relation to this situation. The chaplain said, "That means that I am a chaplain. I

have nothing to do with this affair at all." He said, "As a matter of fact, I came over here to plant one of you bastards." So the corporal cheered from the driver's seat. (Chuckle). Now when I returned to Algiers that night or the next morning—I have forgotten which—just in time to return with Mr. Churchill who was busy with a submarine flotilla, I told the story to Mr. Churchill and he was much amused. But the next day after the review of all the troops—the victory parade as it were—he said to me, "You have got that story wrong." I said, "Was General Ryder telling it to you?" He said, "Yes," and I said, "What was wrong with it?" He said, "You said 'bury' that bastard and he said 'plant' that bastard." He got the word right away—"plant" was very much better.

Pogue: He had a good ear for the proper language.

Oh, yes.

Pogue: I don't suppose there's been anyone in our time like him.

He's the great master for terminology, I guess you would put it.

Pogue: Wilson was our closest man to him in this country.

Yes, he was. But the trouble with Mr. Wilson, I would say, by comparison, was his very perfect English, but it didn't arouse you. Churchill's was calculated to put everybody on their feeling. The fact is that he defended England at its weakest point by his statements. He rallied the whole nation.

Pogue: Oh, it was magnificent, like that some chicken, some neck, you know—they are going to wring their necks.

Q. 2. Do you recall any serious debate about the matter of a race for Berlin or the occupation of Berlin? Was the President expressing his views only? Did you share the President's opposition to occupation of parts of Austria and any area of the Balkans? Did you favor the joint occupation of Berlin?

A. I don't recall in detail any such conversation. And it would seem to me now looking at it that the President was probably anticipating the surrender before the actual fall of Berlin. In that case, we would be pretty close without resistance. And it might be a race between the Soviets and ourselves.

Pogue: And in case we got there first we would take it?

Well, I didn't get that specifically one way or another.

Pogue: I think it is possible that that statement may be put down wrong in the record because it is contradictory the way it stands where on one hand, you know, you said he told you he wanted it to be shared by the four and then it says later, the United States should have it.

I don't recall the discussions regarding Austria and any area of the Balkans.

As to the joint occupation of Berlin, meaning, I presume, four-power occupation, I in effect, favored that, I would say, because it was, in effect, on our hands except as the French and there we had a battle because the Soviets were utterly contemptuous of the French and they still were, as a matter of fact, when I went to Moscow as Secretary of State and Bidault was very much insulted by the way they treated him—when he was actually my senior by time and rank because he was the Prime Minister, and in the seating and all they deferred to me.

Pogue: However, you shared to some extent to the President's fear of long time occupation because you knew of the public reaction.

Yes. We were worried about that all the time. And I was worried by something I referred to a great many times, to my staff, and which they didn't understand at all because they had never been through it, which was the change of public opinion, not only as to the time factor but as to attitudes. I had seen that so clearly marked in the Philippines where there was the most friendly relationships between our troops and the surrendering insurgents including Quezon but as soon as it passed more or less to a civilian control, it awakened all sorts of bitterness. The feelings that were dominating action in Europe, I felt certain, would be modified, just as Mr. Roosevelt's frequent reference to feeding the Germans for years from soup kitchens and giving them nothing else. And I might say, a good many of my embarrassments as Secretary of State flowed from the fact that we got into these things in this revengeful and vicious mood and now we were trying to get out of them, which made our negotiations as pertains to the Soviets very difficult—on our changing attitudes.

That was particularly the case in relation to Japan. As evidence of the bitterness and illogic of the feelings, one of our commanders, I have forgotten his name, but he was a very gallant fighter, was bitterly attacked, I think before Congress, certainly in the American Press, because he had a meal with a surrendering German. But things were just absurd, you know.

Pogue: I know it got so bad you had to send General Eisenhower a message saying be careful with this sort of thing.

They did not understand what was going on, you see.

Pogue: As I pointed out in the chapter in this book I helped to write on Yalta, Mr. Roosevelt and Churchill were captives to the extent of the feeling they had helped work up in order to get immunity against the Germans.

Yes, and you cannot do it. Same thing with de Gaulle. They worked up a great feeling about de Gaulle in England in which Eden played quite a part and now they had him on their hands and they couldn't unblock. That business about Japan was very striking. General Frank McCoy was chairman of that Russian-American committee they had. And he got Russian agreement on a lot of these things, but we changed our policy. Then we called on him to change it with them. Well, of course, it was quite a different matter then. Then they began to criticize General McCoy. When I came in as Secretary of State, he was under criticism. When I looked into the thing found if there was anyone to be criticized, it was the State Department. But it was the American changing feelings. Here they were violent against Japan and properly so. But they had got their regulations based on violence of feelings which is always bad, but now they had to change them around because they found the apparent enemy was going to be the Soviets and not Japan. In other words, she would not be a feared possible opponent.

Pogue: In Question 3. I have gone beyond 1943 to 1945 but it seemed a logical place to ask this.

Q. 3. Anticipating a later period, what is your recollection of the controversy relative to the responsibility for failure to get firm agreement for access through the Soviet zone to Berlin?

A. I don't recall about question 3. These things became so highly political at that time.

Pogue: General Clay finally said he supposed it was his responsibility that he should have looked into it?

Who?

Pogue: General Clay.

Of course, in a long period, a lot of these things, we weren't concerned with at all at the time and afterwards historically they become very important.

Pogue: And the danger is that people read back things into it that weren't there.

People would not be interested in reading it, but I think it would be very important in any book covering a war over a long period ever so often to resume the status of public opinion at the time. You take a lot of our negotiations. Well you can't negotiate without any strength at all. You don't walk up and slap a man in the faced if you haven't any way of protecting yourself. You may feel the thing, but you have to be very judicious about it. As you become strong, your attitude will become quite different.

That was very much the case in relation to the Soviets apropos of Korea. We just hand nothing there at one time. And we were speaking without backing. We couldn't get enough—MacArthur was having to put men into battle of Korean birth with only three or four weeks training. We were taking over a year to get a division and he was making those divisions in thirty days. Well, we were speaking from weakness and it had to be judged in that relationship. When we got, as the strength developed which was about 1952—not before that—real strength began to develop—then our attitude towards the Soviets could be very much more frankly stated

publicly and certainly privately—because we were acquiring great power, where before that we just had literally none in ’50 and ’51. By the time it got to ’53 and ’54 we were a very powerful country.

Pogue: That was the case, for example, with Neville Chamberlain and his appeasement policy. He just did not have any strength back at Munich, did he?

No they didn’t have anything. We tried not to appease, but just to go easy. (Chuckles). We didn’t attack. We were playing for time all the time. But there is a great difference in the way you talk if you have any wisdom at all when you have nothing and straight appeasement is unfortunate. But I think there should be brief resumes of the state of public opinion at various stages. You take the state of public opinion just at the time they almost legislated the army out of existence; they only saved it by one vote. I find that people have forgotten all about that—Mr. Roosevelt’s problem with the Middle West—the Bible Belt--and all those things. Very, very difficult. You couldn’t handle that at all the way you might have two years later.

Pogue: This was two to three months before Pearl Harbor.

Yes. That was the end of August. Pearl Harbor was the 7th of December. Just like Congress cutting me down—the Appropriations Committee—to fifty-seven planes for the next year. And I only asked for $11 millions for Alaska which was just to get shelter at Anchorage so that we could begin to defend the twelve hundred miles of the Aleutian Peninsula and all that country—everything being very expensive to do—and this was just $11 millions. And they cut all that out and that was just a few weeks before the fall of Paris.

Pogue: Well the fall of Paris is what woke people up here, wasn't it?

Yes. I might add here that just prior to that Hitler would do certain things and I would always take advantage of what he did to get something out of Congress. It was very difficult for a long time there to get beyond the budget control because the President was having a struggle with debt limits and matters of that kind and he returned from a fishing trip on the ill-fated *Houston* and landed in Miami. And earlier in the spring I had had the approval of the Budget Bureau for one sum of $28 millions, I think, a large portion of which was to be for the building up of the protection, equipment and all for the Western Coast against Japanese naval approach—I've forgotten—one was $18 millions and the other was for the remaining part of the $28 millions. I received word from Miami that he had approved the $28 million [means $18] but had cut the remaining portion of the $28 million and that I was to see Mr. Morgenthau, who was really controlling the growth of the Army and all, on account of the debt limit. When I went to see Mr. Morgenthau, I found he didn't want to talk to me about this remaining portion. I always think of $9 millions—I'll say 9 million but that wasn't it, apparently it was $10 millions—that had been eliminated by the President, wouldn't allow us go before the Congress with that, but he was now talking about the $18 million. Well, I was so shocked with that. These numbers were so minute, in a sense, and our needs were so vast and the time involved was so long, that is was just a puzzle in my mind how in the world we could hold out until we got any of these things. So in this case when Mr. Morgenthau apprised me of the real situation, I said a little along that line and he was very much affected. And he asked me if I could come the next morning when he had a free morning. Well, I went over the next morning and I outlined to him the whole situation and he was absolutely appalled when he visualized and grasped the enormity of the problem we had.

The terrific cost and the time which must be consumed before any of it could be realized. So he arranged to see the President after lunch and he and I went into lunch in the Treasury Department and he gave orders that we were not to be disturbed. Nevertheless, he was disturbed three times in connection with messages regarding the possible closing of the Stock Exchange. Then we went to see the President who it was quite evident was not desirous of seeing us. The conversation through most of the meeting, in fact all of it for a long time, was between the President and Mr. Morgenthau and he was getting very little chance to state his case. I rather assumed that the President was staging this rather drastic handling of Mr. Morgenthau for my benefit, because they were old friends and neighbors. The first thing that Mr. Morgenthau took up was the organizing of the civilian group which later developed into a very impressive organization. Knudsen was head of it at one time. Ed Stettinius was the first head of it and the President in reply to one phase of this said that that wasn't necessary at all. He said "I have Harry Hopkins in the Department of Commerce and I have you in the Treasury Department and you are handling most of the War Department matters in connection with finance and equipment"—and he mentioned somebody else—"and I am handling the rest, so there is no necessity for that."

Then Mr. Morgenthau got around to military aspects, military equipment, and the President was exceedingly short with him. Finally Mr. Morgenthau said, "Well, Mr. President, will you hear General Marshall?" And the President replied—I remember this most distinctly—"Well, I know exactly what he would say. There is no necessity for me hearing him at all."

Well, it was a desperate situation. I felt that he might be President but I had certain knowledge which I was sure he didn't possess or which he didn't grasp. And I thought the whole thing was catastrophic in its possibilities and this last cut just emphasized that point. So, recalling that a man has a great advantage, psychologically when he stands looking down on a fellow, I took advantage, in a sense, of the President's condition. So when he terminated the meeting I, not having had a chance to say anything, I walked over and stood looking down at him and said, "Mr. President, may I have three minutes?" And then in a complete change of mood and in a very gracious fashion, he said, "Of course, General Marshall of course. Sit down." No, he didn't say 'sit down.'

I said, "Now, first Mr. Morgenthau spoke to you about this civilian organization to represent all the civil side of these matters and you said that Hopkins would handle one part and Morgenthau one part and he himself was handling one part of it. I said with all frankness none of you are supermen and Mr. Morgenthau has no more chance of managing this thing than of flying. We just had lunch and he gave orders he was not be interrupted. He was interrupted three times by the matter of the closing of the Stock Exchange. He can't possibly grasp all these things. He was trying to get the straight of the enormity of our situation regarding military preparedness and he wasn't even allowed to do that." I said, "If you don't do something like that, and do it right away and really do it today, I don't know what is going to happen to this country." "Now," I said, "As to the military part, I just came here in the first place about a cut of something that had previously been approved by the Budget Bureau and turned down in the Congress, a very small sum of money. It seems to us large these days but it will eventually going to be considered a very small sum." I said, "I don't know quite how to express myself about this

to the President of the United States but I will say this—[this is said very forcefully] that you have got to do something and you've got to do it today." And I went out of the room with $79 billion. [?] And three weeks later we got $100 billion appropriation between the Navy and ourselves and $50 billions or something like that of the 100 billions.

Pogue: Billions or millions?

Billions. He was cutting me on 18 millions and we came out with billions. And we came back three weeks later—oh, incidentally he had spoken about Congress. I said," I know you can get them to accept it. They can't evade it." And I said," If you will allow me I can help in that and I will send over a draft of the message." I made a first draft of the message and I don't remember how much he changed it. He had a fashion of changing things because he had complete confidence in his extraordinary ability in that respect and he just wouldn't accept anything without changing it. Later on, he accepted the whole damn business that I gave him, in a way which really frightened me, because he always had a wider point of view, of necessity, than I did, and I was always loathe to accept this opportunity. That is what Mr. Truman always frightened me about. I could get him to approve anything, but I knew enough to know I didn't have the whole field.

Pogue: Mr. Truman had complete faith in you

He would just accept it and I was afraid of that because while I felt that way there were other facets of the affair that I might not understand. Anyway, three weeks later had occurred the fall of France and Morgenthau called me up and told me that the manufacturing industry now would bid on these things which they had refused to do before because they were completely

uncertain as to what the labor situation was going to be. The Administration had left them gasping about that and they wouldn't risk the stockholders' money. Now it was the country and they were perfectly willing to take hazards they wouldn't accept before at all. So, therefore, Mr. Morgenthau called me up and told me he could now place contracts for airplane engines which is what we lacked and so we drummed up a new appropriation which we got. I've forgotten, but we got pretty near $800 millions. I don't remember what the Navy got which included this great air increase in materiel.

Pogue: The big block had been broken even before the fall of France as a result of this conference.

Yes, this second one [appropriation] was just three weeks later. The President was furious. He didn't like this first one. This second went through—was passed right away. I don't remember any prolonged budge hearing on it. They were getting all restless by that time. He said, "I just sent a message to Congress just three weeks ago. What will they think of me?" "Well," I said, "Mr. President, the world has changed since three weeks ago. But what is more to the point, industry will accept contracts now that it didn't dare accept before. And I am certain you will have no trouble whatever." And then some fool (chuckle) came up with the statement that if they would let me handle it, I could put it right over and of course that just infuriated him. As a matter of fact that was true for this reason—in the first place they were certain I had no ulterior motive. In the next place, they had begun to trust my judgment. But most important of all was, if Republicans could assure their constituents that they were doing it on my suggestion, and not on Mr. Roosevelt's suggestion, they could go ahead and back the

thing. He had such enemies that otherwise members of Congress didn't dare, it seemed, to line up with him. And that was true of certain Democrats who were getting pretty bitter.

Pogue: Of course the election was coming up that fall and they wanted to stand clear of anything that would help him.

Well, anyway, that was the great breach in getting our money started. I always had a firm feeling, a tragic feeing, that if we could have done that in the fall of '39 we could have shortened the war by at least a year and probably much longer. We would have saved hundreds of billions and a hundred thousand casualties.

Pogue: Well, you might have avoided Pearl Harbor altogether because you would have had all kinds of warning systems and controls that you didn't have.

There was so much mismanagement on that, God knows whether it would have helped or not. Is this of any value to you?

Pogue: This is magnificent. You see this sort of thing is material we can't get out of the record because it's something you and the President knew and Harry Hopkins. You are the only one left on the American side who knows any of this story and the President did not put his down and Hopkins did not put all his down.

What Hopkins really did was quite remarkable. All those General Staff, Combined Chief of Staffs, U. S. Chief of Staffs' records are supposed to be highly confidential. Well, he had to make himself in a large measure, reporting to the President what was happening and then filed

the darn things in his file so he has them all available where in a sense they weren't supposed to be available to anyone.

Pogue: Yes, I know he had a copy for example of all those files of Potsdam and Yalta. You turned your copy over to us. I used your set in writing on my book.

Q. 4. What was your view as to the time we should occupy Germany? Did you feel that one or two years was enough?

A. I don't recall.

Pogue: In 1943 it would not have been ten years. You wouldn't have dreamed of ten years, would you?

Well, I don't know. If we were going to feed them out of soup kitchens all the time, it would take guarding them for a long time. I don't know what my feeling was.

Q. 5. Did you share the President's aversion to having any responsibility for France after the war?

A. I shared in a measure the President's fears about France. And it was stirred up to a large measure by de Gaulle.

Pogue: You had good friends though in France below his level.

Oh, yes, very good friends. He had already begun to do things you see—in relation to—who was that fellow they sent over to Asia, in that fighting in Indo-China [de Lattre]. De Lattre. I ran into de Lattre down in southern France when he had replaced Juin and I was much outraged

by him. Later we got into an impasse there when he gave de Gaulle's orders interfering with the conduct of the armies which were under command of Clark in Italy in that northwestern section there. He was attacking Devers—was it Devers?—[Truscott]—criticizing Truscott very much. He wasn't getting the proper amount of supplies and all, coming up the trail toward the Vosges, and the truth was there were no supplies to get. A division was supposed to have nine hundred tons a day, I think. And they were cut down. Patton was getting only three hundred tons and all action had ceased on the front because we couldn't get supplies to them, particularly gasoline. And on top of that de Lattre was making this a triumphant march and they were delaying in villages after villages and cities and they were not up to the place, you know, and he was very bitterly critical of Truscott in front of the French reporters. And this bird from Philadelphia who is now over in Formosa, who was Ambassador to Russia one time, ambassador to France [Biddle]. Oh, no, he is a Philadelphian. [Bullitt]. Bullitt. He was a major with him and was doing nothing but playing up—Bullitt—and bootlicking the French. And I just terminated the proceedings. Right in front of the French reporters and American reporters. I restrained myself by not blowing off his head. But I just stopped the thing right where it was and walked out.

So when they proposed him to have the ground command in NATO and I was in Paris with the United Nations, he came to see me to see if I was opposed to him because of the business down in northwest Italy where he had orders from de Gaulle, who had no right to give him any orders because he was interfering with command. I said, "No, de Lattre, I understood that. It was completely irregular and he had no authority to do that, but your position was quite difficult and I accepted that. But when it comes to the other thing—what you were guilty of when I first saw you in France, you have none of the qualities at all of an Allied commander. I

said that was the most outrageous business of yours. I restrained myself very, very carefully from tearing you down to the ground. Because what you did was a most culpable performance for a man who had any idea of how allied forces must get along. And in the next place you didn't have a leg to stand on. You celebrated all the way up the road. You were late on every damn thing (chuckle) and there wasn't anything to divide and you are critical of Truscott who is a fighter and not a talker." I said, "I am not going to oppose you on this at all because as a matter of fact that command doesn't amount to much right now. It will, but it doesn't right now. You are no man to command any allied thing because you are a politico." Actually he was a good fighter. He did a good job out there in Indo-China, where he died as a result of it. But that performance there was terrible, right in front of all these reporters. But fortunately, they didn't bring it up at all. I think they spared me because I was so outraged by it. I was outraged at my people. I was outraged at Devers for standing there—no Truscott—and letting it go on. I was outraged with him. I shouldn't have been because he was being attacked. Bullitt didn't say a damn word. He just stood there and smirked. God knows what he told the reporters. I was out with him right then. He was just a high rider.

Q. 6. Can you throw any light on the apparent contradictory statements noted above: one that the President favored joint occupation and secondly that he said the United States should have Berlin.

A. If he said we ought to have Berlin he was just talking. Of course we would have like to have Berlin.

Q. 7. Churchill is supposed to have said that had he been the Russians in 1943, he would have asked for Germany up to the Rhine. Do you feel that the boundaries, as drawn in 1943, were highly satisfactory under the circumstances?

A. Oh, those boundaries. I was so absorbed in the battle to get France some representation particularly in Berlin. We had to give up part of our holdings to France because the Russians wouldn't make any compromise on that at all.

Q. 8. After Marshall explained the case against going into Balkans, the President said that the Russians were only sixty miles from the Polish border and forty miles from Bessarabia and might shortly enter Poland. They might ask that the western Allies go up the Adriatic to the Danube to help defeat Germany. General Marshall said that he would have to be prepared to explain to the Russians the implications of such a move. If the Soviet forces got to the Bug River, the Western Allies could force the issue from England by throwing in air support. He doubted that any troops the Allies might send to the Balkans would have an appreciable influence on the situation. Was the President reflecting Churchill's arguments here? If so, it is rather evident that the stress was on helping a Russian advance rather than blocking Russia in the Balkans?

A. I don't know about question 8.

Q. 9. I gather from your point about that you felt the Russians would be upset by our movement into the Balkans. Don't you feel that any strong move by us in that area might have stimulated a push by them toward important cities of the west which we later occupied?

A. I don't know about question 9 either. So many of these things seem to go to some chance remark. You could well understand some fellow might turn away from the table and say, "God damn these Russians anyway." Well you might say that reflects complete opposition to the whole thing. We probably said somewhat similar things about the British at times and I know they did about us. But they are not the basis of historical evidence. They are part of the historical atmosphere of the times. For example, I was very much opposed to receiving decorations. I thought during the war for me to be receiving any decorations while our men were in the jungles of New Guinea or the islands in the Pacific especially or anywhere where there was heavy fighting, it wouldn't appear at all well for me to be [Tape stops here] receiving decorations, so I declined them.

SECOND SIDE

To repeat what I said at the end of the other reel, I wouldn't take any decorations after we got into the war which led to a good many difficulties. And I have declined to take many since because I wouldn't involve myself in getting the authority of Congress to approve it. I got one from Russia, I think on Harriman's insistence. I insisted I shouldn't get the decoration. But the night, the evening, almost the hour, of the landing in Normandy, they presented me this decoration at the Russian Embassy—Gromyko—I was much opposed to that. And this thing came up and came up. And I didn't want to be put in the position of taking any decoration like that while our men were fighting, particularly when they were in such devilish country. The pressure would be very considerable at times. One or two put it over by voting the decoration and coming up with it before I had a chance to control the thing. I relieved tow attaches because

I found they were conniving, though they all had instructions to oppose any proposition to give me a decoration. There, I had a particular reason because of Lend-Lease. When a country was pressing for Lend-Lease affairs and then gave me a decoration—that just wouldn't do at all. I found these attaches would get a decoration with me. So they had verbatim instructions on the matter and I found, as I recall, two who tried to evade and get a decoration and I relieved them.

Pogue: Frank McCarthy said you told him once that if you got honorary degrees and decorations, he was going to get thrown out.

I depended on him to stop these things too. It got you nowhere. I think I declined twenty or thirty. I haven't got any from Norway, Sweden, Holland or Belgium. They tried and tried to do it, but I was out of the country when they made their presentations and that congressional law permitting me to accept the decorations had lapsed. They came to me, particularly Holland and Belgium, a number of times to try to get me to accept one and I wouldn't do it.

Well, however, to show the part they played. They were after me to get some other decoration. I have forgotten what it was. There was quite a bit of pressure. And we were having a meeting of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, Potsdam, I think, and Leahy came by to make his departure for a holiday they had there. The President was going away, and others were going various places. And we were going to stay and work with the Soviet Chiefs of Staff. And I told Leahy—he was going to England—and I said, "Don't you accept any medal up there." To me it would be very embarrassing but it wouldn't be with him at all the way he was fixed. So I was just doing this as a joke. But Jack McCloy came in from somewhere and he say Leahy and he said they told him that I had said Leahy had gone to England to accept a decoration. And Leahy

had practically never spoken to me since—perfectly furious. Well, if I really say it, he had a right to be furious. He took it up and discussed it before the Chiefs of Staff and I couldn't explain what I said because of his impeccable position, I made this jocular reference. But McCloy came along and gets it as a statement and Leahy and I broke right there and it had very serious consequences.

Then I got involved in a decoration from Columbia University because I found that all the rest of the commanders were getting theirs the same day. I think even General Eisenhower. I am not certain. I know the others were all there. I know Nimitz was there. I would have declined that but that was afterwards when I was still trying to go along and not take anything. I had to compromise on one or two things. I comprised on Harvard at the time of my Marshall Plan statement. They had invited me and I had declined three or four times. And we decided suddenly that that was the date. We thought first one about two or three weeks earlier, they University of Wisconsin was the date. And then we went to the 15th of June, thinking Amherst would be the date. And then suddenly, the way things were unfolding in Europe and affairs over here, too politically, we landed on this Harvard date. They had asked me, I think three or four times and I declined. So I telegraphed them were they agreeable to still give me the thing, and that's the way we made the date.

Pogue: Oh, I see.

There were one or two others things in there. Amherst—I had promised McCloy that I would take a degree from Amherst. And when I went up there, he drove about thirty miles to meet me and he and the dean took me to the Dean's house, all for this date, and he promised me I

wouldn't have to make a speech or anything. And the ceremonies were outdoors. When we came, we went down the aisle between the students and mounted the stand. I say previously we sat at the dean's house. I think it was the dean. He was a classmate of McCloy's and they had a great deal of persiflage there, very amusing. And his wife served us Scotch, and I had three Scotches. I never drink Scotch. In fact I don't drink much of anything, but I sat there laughing with them and I drank these three Scotches. And suddenly the time for the ceremony came up and we went over and robed and went up there. I found myself sitting in the front seat. I sat down on the programs and the President sat next to me. Some kindly soul in the rear of me handed me the program. And I opened the program up—very impressive looking—there were only two speeches. There was one by the Secretary of State of the United States and I wasn't to make any speech at all—and I was sitting there with three Scotches aboard (Chuckles). That was the darnedest dilemma I ever got into. I turned around and got McCloy's eye and he just shriveled all up. They had broken faith with him, too. The President was to talk and I was to talk first. My God, my only hope I have is what I can think of while the fellow is making—what is the religious statement at the start [Pogue: Invocation]—the invocation. Well as a rule that fellow tries to settle everything you know. Well this one did it in one sentence (chuckles).

Pogue: You were hoping for a long one.

I got up and I had found out four hundred of this class that were all veterans. Quite unusual that they had gotten into the first class. So I just proceeded to talk to the veterans and apparently I made one of the best talks I have ever made with those three Scotches aboard. They printed it and circulated it all over the placed (Many chuckles). I never will forget my feelings. I

couldn't duck. It was a very formal thing. I had to be very careful what I said—Secretary of State. I was so damned mad at McCloy. I tell that because I had to accept a decoration to oblige McCloy.

Then they took me down to Brown. Down to Brown it was quite different. The President was a bachelor [widower?] and his engagement was announced that night. They had a benedict's dinner. I arrived during the dinner at his house and his daughter received me and the former lady General Staff officer, who kept all of the Chief of Staff records, Miss what's her name—she became a lieutenant colonel. She ran all of the records for the Chief of Staff. Incidentally she knows a lot about all of this. You ought to talk to her. She's over in CIA.

Pogue: Not Miss Nason?

Not Miss Nason. I would have taken her around the world with me except King would have gone crazy if he had a woman on these things. She knows a great deal about it and she would brief me before the meetings. And Arnold heard this and then Somervell. So she had to brief Arnold and she had to brief Somervell. She would bring us up to date on all these various things, particularly about the Combined Chiefs of Staff. She was very, very well informed and she handled all these records. I brought her in as a WAC, as a receptionist, without ever seeing her. I wanted to have some WAC near the office and pretty soon they came to me and said would I object to her briefing papers. They were getting pretty far behind and then later they came to me. Would I object if they made her a member of the General Staff because she was doing General Staff work all day, every day, and doing it surpassingly well? She has quite a leading spot over in the CIA. [He never did think of her name, but it was Florence Newsome].

At Brown, his daughter and I hadn't had any dinner. About nine o'clock his daughter said, "Where did you eat dinner?" I said, "Well, I didn't eat in the plane." And she said, "Where did you eat?" I said, "I haven't eaten." She said, "I don't know—I don't think there's a thing in the house." She came back and said, "Do you like ice cream?" I said, "I love it." Well this woman you see, this ex-WAC who had married a doctor, came in not knowing I was there, but knowing I was coming, came in with a cake he had made to prove she could something besides General Staff papers. She had made a delicious cake with almost liquid icing. So I just ate cake and ice cream. Well, when this bird came in from his benedict dinner—he was not exactly a surly person but he wasn't a very charming person—he met me and right away turned to his daughter and said, "I would like some ice cream." She said, "There isn't any." I had eaten it all up and he was a sore as a pup.

Well, when we got out on the stand the next day—Dulles' brother was there then—he got a degree too—he wanted to talk about his performance, instantly, in relation to the Italian treaty he hardly let me get into the place before he cut loose with that. And just after the President made a talk he turned to me and said, "Anything you want to say?" And I said, "No." And they were all trying to find out why I didn't say something.

Pogue: You had the ice cream.

There wasn't any doubt about what he meant. He was still sore about the ice cream. And I think he was sore anyway.

Pogue: I think the point you made a while ago about these little asides is most important, because I tried to argue that in the introduction to my book on SHAEF, that if you read nothing

but record, you'll likely think that these people were always trying to dig traps and to see if they could defeat their allies, when actually this is a natural outgrowth of irritation and all that. But you have to look at the broad points of agreement. Isn't that true?

I think I told you, didn't I, about Hull bringing in this paper of the planners, when they opposed this thing of the British and I got over there and found it was a quotation of ours?

Pogue: Portal caught you on it.

Yes. He was the one who did it. I didn't know why they were going about the thing. Hull said we think it is advisable. They were very suspicious of the British and anything which seemed to involve a semi-political background, you see.

Well, I know we were afraid about this supply thing of the Turks. We were just being hounded in every direction there. And the President would get into these things you know without realizing what it was doing to the makeup of the existing Army.

Pogue: It sounded good to him.

Wanted to give them something. God knows they had appropriated enough money. But he didn't realize on the money, you see, it takes a long time. I became Secretary of Defense about the 20th of September in 1950 and one $22 billion appropriation had become effective about the week before, and outside of food and pay and clothing, virtually nothing of that was delivered before the 1st of September [1951]. In fact I had ceased to be Secretary of Defense before that got through.

CH XIII Q. 2. Pre-conference papers in the War Department indicate that the American delegates feared that Russia might back Britain's efforts to shift the main effort toward the Balkans. On what was this based? (Actually the Russians gave no support to this, but instead backed OVERLORD down the line)

.A. I don't know anything about shifting that thing to the Balkans.

Pogue: Well, for some reason, in October and November, 1943, you will find in the Planners papers over and again this worry about the Russians going to shift and General Morgan who was over here at that time wired back and said we may lose Overlord entirely because Mr. Roosevelt seems interested in the Balkans. It must have just been a quick flare-up.

I think so. We were always scared to death of Mr. Roosevelt on the Balkans. Apparently he was with us, but we couldn't bet on it at all.

Q. 3. General Deane had strongly advised General Marshall and through him the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a more aggressive approach than had been taken at the Moscow Conference and had urged that specific requests be made of the Russians. Great publicity was given to this letter at the time the Yalta papers were published. Did it influence your actions to any great extent?

A. No, I don't recall about the pressure exerted by Deane's letter.

Pogue: this is another one of those things they read stuff into. It was the kind of letter that you wrote General Eisenhower later and you said, "Talk tough to the Russians." But the impression that enemies of yours tried to give was that you were warned and paid no attention to it, you see.

Well, it's like those things out in Hawaii and all—air and all warning—if I had taken those sort of things, I would have been so involved in warnings I would have done nothing anywhere.

Pogue: Like your statement about the over cautiousness of staff members.

You have to trust in the Lord that they are conservative. You are the fellow who has to be unconservative. I am critical of the commander that is ultraconservative, but it is quite essential that he gets a conservative staff. Maybe some of them off the record can suggest this or that. Now I say anybody, not anybody but a number that had special ideas. There was one fellow the whole artillery was after condemning him. I had him in and let him expose his whole plot to me and they were just practically excommunicating him. I had the air fellow in that was trying to advocate these things for France. I let him come to me and go over the whole thing and sent them all over there to France. [This, I think, was Colonel Bidwell on strategic airborne drop in 1944]. I saw all those people and then judged whether they had a real show or not. Anybody who opposed and is pretty voluble about it, particularly when it begins to leak out—the staff procedures—the staff is very critical about it.

In fact when I went into the War Plans Division, I found the War Department staff was wholly so antagonistic to the Air, you couldn't get a hearing on anything and things I took up, although it wasn't my job—I was just War Plans—that I took up with General Embick and General Craig, to have them do—and Craig would agree, but he had a hard time agreeing because I was new in the sense. I was junior to all of his assistant chiefs of staff and they were all bitterly antagonistic to the Air Corps, because they had slipped into Congress and gotten their

thing. They were bitterly antagonistic to any large bombers and even Embick who was very logical would sit there and tell how ridiculous the whole thing was to think you could have a large bomber—where it could land, where it could do this, where it could do that. Of course, if you followed all that up, they would just be screaming heebie jeebies now. I had gotten the air fellows on the thing—but the prejudice was very deep so that when I went in as deputy chief of staff, damn if I found they hadn't done any of those things yet. Now they had been complaining—I don't know what they were doing—about the fact that they are losing the personnel in the Air Corps and they are being bought up by private industry. Well, I found the Air Corps was just losing everybody. They had a course which took about a year and a fellow who had graduated from the course would be offered a large sum of money taken by one of the big air companies. They wanted all sorts of people. I required when a fellow took his course, he had to sign an agreement to re-enlist for three years—two or three, whatever it was—as he graduated. So he couldn't resign and wouldn't be purchasable. So we kept the man. In other words if we trained the man, if the man wanted to take the training, he had to do this or he wouldn't get the training. I just stopped it right off the bat. Now they are talking about a lot of elaborate things. Well you don't have to have a lot of elaborate things. You can stop it in a second. And then your counsel says you can't prevent them from buying out.

Q. 4. The President and General Marshall both felt that the problem of how to approach the Russians on the question of their entry into the war against Japan must be handled gingerly. The President told the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to discuss the question with the Russians. General Marshall felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff was also not the channel. It was agreed that the

matter would not be discussed unless the Russians brought it up. Did this question worry you very much in December 1943?

A. No, this question didn't worry me very much about the Russians there. Stalin stated what he wanted. And he did it.

Q. 5. What was your impression of Stalin at Tehran? Did he seem offensive in his manner of merely firm?

Pogue: Actually is a general question as to your overall impression of Stalin. This was the first time you saw him, at Tehran?

A. Yeah, he was a very [Something interrupted here and went to Question 6].

Q. 6. Sherwood says that there was a story to the effect that Stalin was told unofficially at Tehran that you would be appointed commander in chief. Do you know whether or not this was true?

A. I don't know whether he knew it or not. But he pressed for me all the time. And made it quite a point and I could take it or leave it as to whether it was just because he thought I was the man or whether he was trying to precipitate the Second Front. He was very insistent and took quite a part. He was insistent about the date. He was insistent about the operation in southern France and played quite a part in those things.

Q. 7. Do you recall discussing with Mr. Roosevelt the possibility of making concessions to Russia in Manchuria and Japan in return for Russian aid against Japan?

A. I don't recall any of that. I have a faint recollection but I am not even certain that I asked something about his, of the Chinese reactions, but I am not even certain about that.

Pogue: Can you give me a general description of your reaction to Stalin and what you thought about him?

I found the Generalissimo a very astute negotiator. He had a dry wit. He was agreeable and in regard to me he made sort of semi-affectionate gestures. When we were in opposition he would stand with his hand on my shoulders. He was arguing for an immediate Second Front. And he was explaining the way how to make a landing, using the Volga River or one of the Russian rivers as his example of how you do it. We recognized that the great effort then was to get us to do these things. And he was turning the hose on Churchill all the time and Mr. Roosevelt in a sense was helping him. He used to take a little delight in embarrassing Churchill. The Russians were very antagonistic to Brooke and at the birthday dinner, Stalin made some very acid, but amusing, remarks about Brooke, when he came to Moscow, which Brooke endeavored to reply to. Stalin was very free in his probing Churchill and did not follow this course at all with Mr. Roosevelt. Henry Hopkins in his speech at the dinner was very amusing—and I would say pungent—but his talk was largely addressed to Mr. Churchill and it was very amusing and very clever in his comments about the convenience of an unwritten constitution. He described the English procedure making use of that to their own advantage. Throughout all of this Stalin was very flattering. [Broke off to go to the bathroom].

When it came to the exact discussion of the military phases, Stalin was reasonable precise and as later evidenced, very sincere, because he carried out his agreements to the day. I am

referring now to the matter of moving his armies to Manchuria. I have in contrast to this Stalin in the political field where I met him as Secretary of State in Moscow in 1947. There has was completely evasive and would receive the most, almost brutal assaults as I felt I was making, without changing countenance—you might say a trifling reference to later on. I talked to him at one stretch for almost an hour in the effort to get him to admit what was the purpose of deliberately antagonizing the United States when they had stood in very high regard at the end of the war, more so than the British as a matter of fact. I proceeded to recite all the things they had done to arouse the antagonism of the citizens of the United States, certainly of its officials, and sought from him some reply as to the explanation. At that time I was hoping to succeed in getting their agreement as to the Austrian treaty which was practically complete at the time and very much in the form that it was finally adopted. As nearly as I can recall though I think this is a matter of record, his reply to most of this was well these are just opening skirmishes. You have to get by, go through that phase first, but my impression was I was getting nowhere. At dinner where he and I sat together, he was very agreeable and very informative. As a matter of fact I found Molotov the same in dinner table conversation, very interesting in his account of his own banishments from Russia. But his attitude completely changed the minute it was business.

So, in effect, Stalin personally is a very clever negotiator, a man who could lighten the serious part of the affair with rather dry retorts—the kind he turned on Churchill—and when it got into the field he didn't intend to do business with you, the political field, you got absolutely nowhere.

Pogue: Did you find him lacking in social graces or anything like that?

No. He was very nice in those things.

Pogue: You did not get the impression he was an illiterate peasant?

No, I was surprised to find seemingly none of our people had read his early history and I thought that was quite essential when you were dealing with a fellow who had done the things he did in the early days to get money for the Communist Party.

Pogue: Highwayman?

Oh yes, robbed banks and everything else.

Q. 8. Sherwood has detailed account of the factors resulting in the President's decision to keep you in Washington and to name Eisenhower as Supreme Commander. Do you have any details to add to the account you wrote Sherwood relative to the appointment?

Pogue: Let me explain a little on that one. You remember that Mrs. Marshall in *Together* has the bulk of your story and later Sherwood wrote you about the appointment of Eisenhower as Supreme Commander and he says you wrote him some of this material. All I am asking here is there anything you can think of you did not cover in those two accounts?

A. I don't remember. I can tell you very briefly I was determined that I should not embarrass the President one way or the other, that he must be able to deal in this matter with a perfectly free hand to whatever he felt was the best interests in the matter. Well, of course, I was pulled from many quarters and I wouldn't express myself on any of them and the thing never came to a head in any way until Hopkins came to me at Cairo and told me that the President was very much concerned because he felt he had to make a decision. The decision apparently had been

conclusive at Quebec, but it had all come up again and had been stirred around politically over here in this country, more in the Press rather. So I went to see the President, I think after luncheon, at his villa in Cairo, and as I recall he asked me after a great deal of beating around the bush just what I wanted to do. Evidently it was left up to me. Well having in mind all this business that had occurred in Washington and what Hopkins had told me, I just repeated again in as convincing language as I could that I wanted him to feel free to act in whatever way he felt was to the best interest of the country and to his satisfaction and not in any way to consider my feelings. I would cheerfully go whatever way he wanted me to go and I didn't express any desire one way or the other. Then he accepted that as the evident—then he evidently assumed that concluded the affair and that I would not command in Europe. Because he said, "Well, I didn't feel I could sleep at ease if you were out of Washington."

I might say in regard to this there was a great deal written and said, one way or another, a lot of it just silly. One time, notably led by a newspaper publisher in Tucson, who was supposed to have intimate contacts, who had known General Pershing intimately when he was sick out there, that the British were trying to kick me upstairs and get me out of the way from opposing them on the Chiefs of Staff affair. That was not true at all. That was not true. That was absurd. As a matter of fact Churchill, picking up the President's hesitation in confirming my appointment, had told Brooke he should have it. So Churchill was very much embarrassed in transferring it to Eisenhower. I was unaware of the fact that the Chiefs of Staff had gone to see the President opposing my transfer. I was unaware of the fact at the time that General Pershing had made a special written appeal to the President not to move me out of Washington.

These various factors, of course, aroused Mr. Roosevelt to a reconsideration of the decision that had already been made. Well, I was utterly sincere in the desire to avoid what had occurred so much in other wars—the embarrassment of the feelings of the individual rather than the good of the country.

Mr. Roosevelt gives very good expression of his feelings in regard to me in a very generous attitude in replying to General Pershing's letter. But most of this stuff was whipped up for publication purpose without any sound basis.

Pogue: They said at one time they were trying to get you out of the way so that Somervell could have your job for politics—so they could re-elect Roosevelt in 1944. Some of the same people that said you were in the way of Roosevelt's political ambitions said four or five years later that you were playing his game for him.

Perfectly ridiculous. Well there is not any consistency. As a matter of fact I had a letter less than a year ago from Justice—I guess it was Justice Douglas—maybe Mrs. Marshall took it, I don't know, I will ask her, otherwise Frank McCarthy will have it up there. Wrote and told me that his lips had been sealed, but the President had told him—which campaign it was, whether it was 1943 or the one before that, I don't know—he rather intended to put me up to President.

Q. 9. Were there ever any possibilities that any American besides you or General Eisenhower would be named for supreme command in Europe?

A. I had no idea of anybody else.

Q. 10. Had the President ever made any flat promise of the command in Europe to you?

A. He had never made any promise.

Q. 11. General Morgan once said that he supposed that it was probably a good thing that you didn't get the European Command. "I don't believe that he would have put up with Monty?"

A. Well, I think I would have. As a matter of fact I came pretty near to blowing off out of the turn as it was. I called on him at his headquarters up in Holland, I guess it was, and he was criticizing the fact that he had been relieved from command—from active command as he called it—and things had gone to pot with the Battle of the Bulge and all since then and I was under terrific urge to whittle him down. And then I thought now this is Eisenhower's business and not mine and I had better not meddle. Though it was very hard for me to restrain myself because I didn't think there was any logic in what he said but overwhelming egotism.

Pogue: Eisenhower was one of the few people, I think, who could have put up with him and got work out of him.

Well, he never came to see Eisenhower once.

Pogue: Treated him like a subordinate

Deliberately, then, when Eisenhower put him in that Bulge thing he turned around to get public opinion to back him in it. And Mr. Churchill and Alexander, prior to the Malta meeting, I think, wanted to put Alexander in the position of ground commander of the whole thing. All in criticism of Eisenhower's handling of the Bulge. And they approached me on the subject.

Pogue: You gave them a rough time, didn't you?

No, I didn't. I was pretty politic. I was very flat on the thing. That was hardly the time to be—see they had worked up a great feeling, because it was a complete surprise you see and they don't forgive commanders for surprises. It was an English G-2 who let them down. I worried about this thing. I had just gone along that front just before it happened. All the way up. I went to every division along that front all the way up. And then they ended up with calling on Monty. We talked over this long—twenty-two kilometers, I think or fifty-two, I've forgotten—with one division in it. Fifty-two was it. I knew that they had moved one particular division, from two to three months of rest, which was now over-strength, which was quite unusual for German divisions of that day, across the Rhine, but the conclusion of our intelligence was that it was over there to throw back any attack to cross the Ruhr River. Bradley felt they could cross the thing—he didn't say without difficulty, but didn't have any seeming doubts. I didn't see how he was going to do it myself. Here were these rested, over-strength divisions to meet him. Actually the division was over there for the battle of the Bulge.

Pogue: Bradley talks of his taking a calculated risk. I don't think he believed it was as serious as it was.

I don't think so either. I think they got soaked.

Q. 12. Do you feel in retrospect that it was probably better for the war effort that they President selected as he did?

A. I can't make any comment about myself in this thing at all.

Pogue: General Eisenhower did a fine job.

He was completely loyal.

Pogue: You were here to hold up his hands.

I think this. I don't think he appreciates—not that he ever depreciated—I don't think he appreciates the half of what I did to hold up his hands in respect to Congress and all—things I did innumerable things I did; particularly the dinners I would give to the Alibi Club to leaders of Congress and bring in this person and that person. I was all time building up his position, so that he could resist any attacks that would come with any misfortune. Old Senator what's his name from Texas, he just iterated and reiterated about the battle of Bulge. [Connolly]

I will take you in on one thing, I was rather proud of. I told you first about when I left for Brazil with that mission, Craig wanted to know what he could do for me. I wanted him to see that this one sentence was put into the appropriations about the engineers. In accordance with the regulations undertaking all the construction of fortifications and they said an airfield wasn't a fortification. I said, "You're just insisting that it has to have a parapet. That's nonsense, it is a fortification. In any event you can call it a fortification." Well, he didn't do a damn thing about it, it got into law and I had this dreadful time and that's where Somervell comes into the play. Another thing I wanted to do was to get the law passed, which they had been fooling around with a long time, to have lieutenant generals to command the corps area. It was very important—very important—because out in Chicago, for example, they had, I think, three commanders in less than a year. Well, it would take a man almost a year to know the Adjutant Generals and the National Guard all through and all those things you had to deal with. It wasn't a question of commanding these little Regular troops of little driblets around. And you had to take the senior

fellow and I wanted to be able to put your finger on the man you wanted and he would work like the devil instead of being interested in something besides the two cars and his wife's bathroom he wanted—at the end of his career he would be working on his particular job. I am not exaggerating about that car business and bathroom business. Their wives would be right on their backs and there wasn't anything else happening and they didn't have any time to learn their corps area and that was the situation. As I say I wanted to touch the fellow and his rank depended on his performance, because he lost the rank the minute he was relieved from that command. And Craig said he would do something about that he didn't do anything about it. So I had been back only three days when I announced I was going up on the Hill to see Senator—damn it, I keep forgetting his name [Connolly]—Connolly, who had thrown out the consideration of this thing by opposing it either on the floor or in the committee. I have forgotten which. It was being handled by the old Senator who brought in the Volstead Act—Sheppard—and he was the senior fellow and Connolly caused it to be pushed aside. And the other man was from Utah who was the man they used to object to everything. You couldn't have those things—have to have unanimous consent—he just objected right off the bat. So I was going up there and they came right in and said don't you do that. If you do that you are lost. And I said, "Well, my God, you can't do that sitting here." And I went on up there and my first appointment was with Senator Connolly and I decided I would enumerate all the objections I thought he would make and then I would proceed to destroy them. But, well he beat me to it, because he never—he told me to sit down and I sat down and he began talking before he sat down. And he just tore the Army to ribbons. And what he was attacking of course was all the generals who were around Washington—who were heads of bureaus and assistant chiefs and no

troops and lots of generals which you see around Washington, you see, and they were very prominent in those days. And I just puzzled my head what in the world to say because he was tearing the whole thing down and he was a very potent and powerful senator. And I was trying to figure this thing all the time he was talking and it was getting worse and worse and I couldn't get any line of departure. And he ended up by saying—young man—I said, "Thank you for that compliment, Senator,"—"young man you don't appreciate the historical significance of the grade of lieutenant general." Well, old boy you walked right into my lap that time. So the minute he stopped talking I said, "Senator what state are you from?" Well, he was just infuriated that I should ask him what state he was from and he said, "Why I am from Texas." And I said, "I thought you were." And he said, "Why did you ask me that?" "Well," I said, "the Southern Army, Jackson and Longstreet and those people had lieutenant generals right from the start and Lee was a full general and Bragg was a full general and they had a pretty successful Army. At least I think as a Texan you would agree to that." He just grunted. I said, "I asked you that because finally Lincoln made Grant a lieutenant general and from that instant on they just licked the Confederates right and left." "Well," he said. "I don't know about this thing" and I said, "Senator, you have such power" and he said, "I will not act." And I said, "Senator, you have already acted. With your prestige you have opposed the thing. What I am asking you to do is undo what you have done. And I think it is quite essential." And I told him two or three of the things I was interested in. And then I went to the fellow from Utah and I got to state my case first. He said, "Well, how about—how about that arsenal out in Utah" and he traded me right off the bat. (Guffaws). Well that settled it in about ten minutes. I agreed to the damn arsenal. I didn't know what it was or anything else. It was a logical storage place, you know, for that area.

His was just right off the bat. When they say I don't know anything about the workings of democracy, politically, I know so damn much more than the average fellow, but what's his name never stopped talking about that lieutenant generalcy. After I was secretary of state he still talked about it and still thought it was unconstitutional.

Well he never dropped it and he seemed to be convinced that it was unconstitutional.

And he took that long list we were making—and they made too many of them and they have too many of them now—and it stuck in his mind. He was licked and I said, "Senator, I am sorry about this, you are utterly sincere in opposing this thing as unconstitutional and I just don't see it at all." I said, "It is almost as bad as the President who took such violent objection to Brigadier Generals who cost twenty-five dollars a month and a thirty-five cent flag." (Chuckles) I used to hit Mr. Roosevelt with that. If it was a certain job, it didn't cost him anything. On a post—I don't know which it was or vice-versa—it was twenty-five dollars a month when I was made a Brigadier General. That was my profitable pay. I was on a post and I don't think I got the twenty-five. I used to take after Mr. Roosevelt on that and he would get so damn mad at me. I would feel out these things until I got some particular thing. My closest shave was with Connolly and not until he said I didn't understand the historical significance of the grade of lieutenant general did I nail him. And he admitted I had him, but he never admitted the thing was constitutional.

TAPE 12M and TAPE 19M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

November 21, 1956

RECORDED INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
AT PINEHURST, NC - November 21, 1956
By Forrest C. Pogue

Chapter 5

Q. 1. Churchill at TRIDENT suggested that the U. S. take the lead in preparing long-range plans to bring about the fall of Japan. They were already ready. Churchill thought that the attack on Japan might begin in 1945. He personally favored the entry of the Russians in the Far East conflict. The President agreed, predicting that the Soviet Union would join them forty-eight hours after the German surrender. Do you recall whether or not you agreed with these views in May 1943?

A. I do not recall my reaction in regard to the attack on Japan. I personally favored the entry of the Russians into the Far Eastern conflict because earlier in the game we were very fearful of the establishment of the Kwantung Army in power in Manchuria and the southern part of Korea. [Dr. Pogue: And in that you were joined by Admiral King, and Admiral Leahy, and even General MacArthur in the beginning.] Oh yes, he [MacArthur] very much so. I was fearful of the concentration of the Japanese troops in the south moving north from the south and particularly Central China and becoming established there in southern Manchuria and possibly in Korea but a short distance across from Japan. The Kwantung army had quite a reputation. As a matter of fact towards the last so much of it had been moved to southern Japan that it had nothing like the strength that we had feared theretofore. [Dr. Pogue: It had been sent up there originally to protect against Russia, is that right?] Oh yes, and had fought the Russians. They had quite a struggle up there on a divisional basis but neither the Russian people and the Japanese people

were ever informed. And that was one of the things we were always afraid of that they would get involved in some small thing and think they could ignore it and actually our people would take it as a complete war. That fear however came later when we were supposedly at peace and I was afraid the Russians would do something like they had always done with Japan and all where the people of neither one was informed of what was going on—and large forces of troops—and I believe over a division on the side fought up there in northern Manchuria. [Dr. Pogue: They actually had about as many troops up there as we had in being here in this country in 1941, didn't they?] Yes.

Q. 2. Were you motivated mostly by a desire to push operations in the Pacific or to call a halt to the continued nibbling procedure of the British?

A. I do not recall either of these reactions. But I was viewing the thing as I recall now in the light of what we needed and where, rather than in some secret reaction.

[Dr. Pogue: That mainly is the point I wanted. There are a lot of people that assumed that you just gave up the Pacific, you see, and that anything you said about the Pacific was merely to head off the British in the Mediterranean but you tried all along to try to keep something going in the Pacific.]

A..That was very hard. Particularly hard at Guadalcanal. We had almost no troops anywhere. We would just transfer war to Guadalcanal and it would cease entirely [he means effort here] in Europe. My struggle was to see that the main show went on and the later show was not washed out. But the Pacific people were Pacific and you might say they were not interested at all in the Atlantic. I had a rather interesting thing happen in regard to that. We had gradually, although I admit too slowly, gotten to the point where the presentation of the world picture was of great

importance to me and the principal staff. Because we had so many different theaters operating at once and along with that the stormy times with things at home. We had available artists of some talent and plenty of them, so we gradually formed the morning show on the basis of presentation by young men who were chosen for their ability to speak in an attractive manner. They got up at four o'clock in the morning and worked on the cables of the night which always poured in—particularly from the Pacific—at about that hour and were ready for the presentation at nine o'clock. They were chose, as I say, for their manner and their voice and weren't expected to know all about the details of the operation, except that the actual procedure was going on at the time. The charts were so made that all the divisions were represented on the charts—Japanese, Russians, British, Soviet—not Soviet but German—as long as those parties were in the war and one of the young men moved these when it was necessary to move them and the other conducted the presentation of the day, after which the G-2 people came forward with any special statements they wished to make. But the main one of the operations in the Far East and Europe and Africa came at nine o'clock.

Just prior to that hour about five minutes, this special forced came into my office no matter what I was doing or with whom I was talking and set up all the machinery and then they started at nine o'clock no matter what I was doing. Just went off like a theatrical thing. They became very expert at it and it was really a thrilling presentation. You saw the whole war up to the last minute, done in such a way it was easy, in a sense, to comprehend. Well, people would come back from MacArthur's command to see what could be done, and one of the Michigan, son of the famous Michigan senator—who was the political fellow that got drunk and ruined himself, his son was a senator and McCarthy beat him. [Dr. Pogue: It was Wisconsin, Lafollette] Wisconsin, Lafollette—one of the Lafollette's was on MacArthur's staff [Dr. Pogue: Phillip] and

he came back. I suppose for the trip and also to see what he could root up for General MacArthur, who was always in dire need of everything because he didn't get but very little and for a time got almost nothing. The only one that got less was Stilwell. They showed him around [Lafollette] and talked to him and familiarized himself with everything. He wanted to see me and I had the appointment made at half past eight, much earlier than I had appointments because I kept that time free for my own private thinking. So he was in there when this scene-setting began, without anything being said on my part while we were talking. And then the deputy chief of staff, Hull and the other principals came in. I think it made about ten in all. Lafollette's time was up and he got to go and I said would you like to see this? Oh yes, he would, so he sat down. Then he saw this presentation of the world picture and after it was finished he left. After the peace I saw him coming back from the Philippines, I think, and he asked me, he said, "Did you keep me back there purposely to see that?" Because it changed his whole state of mind the minute he saw the enormity of what was going on and what its requirements were and what the demands were. He began to see the picture in the light of the real circumstances. But I was always amused at his question. As a matter of fact, I did keep him for the purpose but I let it just fall into place without any particular move because if those fellows could see what the thing that they were talking about. And of course they always felt that they were forgotten. It always seemed so amusing in a sense, if such a thing as this can be amusing, when they complained all the time of being forgotten, and when they got their war going in the Philippines the army of Italy was complaining of being forgotten and Claire Luce was helping them through the Press and almost destroying morale.

[Dr. Pogue: Now did you use that same process to brief the press?]

No.

[Dr. Pogue: This was just for you and your staff?]

Oh, this was the whole picture, you see, of everything, the secret stuff and everything. That's the reason we only had ten people there. I don't think we had as many as ten. I think we had G-2 and one assistant, our operations man and I don't think we had the G-3 people. It was very small because it was everything. These young fellows became brilliant at it. Finally I got enough of them, while only one performed at a time, the other one checked and moved things. I got enough of them so I could relieve the fellow and send him around the world so that he'd get more of the local color. Though I didn't expect him to address himself to try to learn about the conditions there, he just took the things that happened and here it was he presented it. There was one who was very brilliant at it and he later he wanted to be an assistant instructor at the V. M. I, which he would have been admirably qualified for, and he fell in a trout stream and got caught in a rock and drowned just before the thing came up. It struck me as being so unnecessary.

[Dr. Pogue: Did you do something like this for the President, to keep him in touch with the Army picture?]

No, there was one other thing came in. Mr. Stimson wasn't in this either.

[Dr. Pogue: Oh.]

Jack McCloy, we just ran this secret stuff. I had a book that was kept up to date which was the messages in and the messages out—of course a very small percentage of them, I suppose not more than five per cent—but they were the vital messages, the vital ones that I sent out and all and it was very easy to read—it was a log book we called it. And for a while I sent it to Mr. Stimson and then discovered that Jack McCloy was looking at it and Mr. Stimson's secretaries were all looking at it and my most private documents were being passed all around so I

suppressed it and wouldn't give it to him anymore. Mr. Stimson didn't like that at all, but I just wasn't going to do it. He didn't control it and I stopped it. Every clerk he had was looking at these vital messages I was sending out all over the world.

[Dr. Pogue: I know General Eisenhower kept one like that and only he and General Smith saw it.]

Well, there wasn't anybody supposed to see this but me and the operations section. I might say as an interlude while I was over at General Eisenhower's headquarters outside of Paris there I saw a presentation of the situation by the principals, the head of the air and the head of this and the head of that, well they did it themselves and none of them were trained to present and turned their backs to you and look at this and that and you couldn't hear a damn thing. I came in and Smith said, "What did you think of it?" I said, "That's the rottenest performance I ever saw." We had a regular stage play going there. It was done by people whose voices and attitudes and all were adapted to that. They didn't have to know anything about it. [Dr. Pogue: I mean, you could have analyzed it. You wanted them to tell you.] The thing that was given was already analyzed, they just poured it out. Smith was perfectly furious with me. But the commanders, none of them knew how to talk, you see. They'd stand and face the chart, look at the map with their back to you. They hadn't rehearsed the thing at all. These fellows were rehearsed. They began at four every morning; they put on the show at nine o'clock. [Dr. Pogue: Well you were able to hit the main points and bring it to their attention better than anybody.] Well, that came all the way through. Of course this thing didn't get well established until fairly late in the game, for which I always felt critical of myself. It was done but done very poorly or almost not done at all. But the thing was I was familiar with all these things and if I didn't know them then I ought to be relieved as Chief of Staff, so when I began talking about it, all I had to do was to go from East to

West or West to East. [Dr. Pogue: But it's fabulous the stories they've told about your memory of those things. Even McCarthy when he's trying to build you up so he could hit you harder relates the story, I think in Italy, where supposedly you talked to forty or fifty reporters, addressed each man separately and answered his questions. Do you remember that at all?] That occurred, I think the one that was written up was written up in the Readers' Digest was out in Africa—at Algiers. You must understand I was bound to know what these things were. And it was very easy to keep the continuity. Then the whole thing was, could you talk. [Dr. Pogue: But a great many people can't.] I addressed myself as tersely as I could through the whole thing as was possible. You see, I'd been doing this with Congress all the time without any notes because I found that the minute you began to read you lost your audience. It was better to forget something. They would say, why didn't you talk about this or that? Well I had forgotten it. The point was I did get over the point I was talking about. I know that when we were with the Russians—well for instance I remember particularly at Iran, I guess it was, maybe it was the next conference, Yalta, I don't remember which one—anyway without any warning at all Churchill suggested right at the opening of the conference—Stalin read a paper of all their presentations as an introduction, it was all written, he read it and then it was translated. Well, of course, that was a long laborious process. So when he finished Churchill spoke up and said I suggest that we have Mr. Marshall—General Marshall—outline the situation from our side. Now I hadn't had any warning at all but I just started in and covered the whole thing. Well that was no effort because I was in it up to my neck. [Dr. Pogue: Well it impressed –well I remember talking to Portal and to some of the other British chiefs. They thought was one of the most unusual performances they ever saw.] I don't see how you could be in this thing and as I say the continuity wasn't difficult, because all you had to take was the progress of the war or the area of

the war and you were right on the bottom, all the way. And of course I was just soaked in it at the time. [Dr. Pogue: You lived with it all the time?] Yeah. Churchill would always reach to me on these things. At the time, I remember this proposing to Mr. Roosevelt that I do the thing, Stalin read his; and then I came on and did mine orally. What is correct orally or verbally? [Dr. Pogue: Orally.] What's the difference in meaning? [Dr. Pogue: Well orally is delivered in that sense; verbally you think of when you are saying that this is literally the way it was said in words. Actually neither is incorrect, either one can be used, but orally is preferred.]

Q, 3. Was the major factor in the President's shift the result of the victory of the Chennault group over Stilwell?

A. No answer. Skipped.

Q. 4. Was the Prime Minister's suggestion of the Sumatra operation anything more than an attempt to throw out ANAKIM?

A. [On tape he says Question 2, he means Question 4.] As to Question 2 on Sumatra, I don't know, or have no recollection of my reaction at the time.

Q. 5. What was your impression of Wavell as a commander?

A. [On tape he says question 4 – it should be question 5.]

As little as I knew about it from a long distance, he [Wavell] was a great commander. His difficult position that he found himself out in the Far East there when we made him the Supreme Commander— I was the one that proposed that and urged it in order to get a Supreme Commander and he was there. The distances made it almost impossible. But it was impossible to have the thing so messed up that nobody was in command anywhere. And it was on the

question of the unit command out there that Mr. Churchill and I came to a talk down when he was in his bed and I was walking around the bed. He sent for the British Chiefs of Staff and we reached an understanding. So it had a very important effect. And that meeting, when I was up in his bedroom there, flowed from the fact of my statement which you will find in Hopkins' book—before the Combined Chiefs of Staff—when I speak up at the end of the meeting and speak of Supreme Command or unit command. [Dr. Pogue: I think it Coalition command, isn't it?] I didn't use the word coalition but it's there—the complete statement. Harry Hopkins had filed it. [Dr. Pogue: I quoted it in my book when I discussed the forming of the Supreme Command because the Eisenhower thing flowed out of it.] Yeah. That was a very interesting thing and there is a whale of a lot to it if you want to go into deductions because we had reached no understanding with the Navy about the air. This question of air command was always snarled up because of the fact that you had all these air fellows on carriers. And the Navy at the same time didn't want the Army air to submerge their air. And so it was very difficult to get an understanding and we had none at the time. But when I made that statement trying to get the British Chief of Staff to agree to this—what is the word we used all the time—[Dr. Pogue: Combined Command] we didn't use combined, we didn't use unit—well whatever it was, we had a very ordinary term for it, I did that at the spur of the moment at the end of the meeting, and included in it were not only this appeal to the British but the inclusion of our naval agreement in regard to our air. Because I said that I hadn't consulted my own staff or the Navy in regard to this. But this was my feeling on the whole thing. Wavell was out there with this terrible messed up situation and MacArthur was a prisoner on Corregidor. So I made this statement and I read it afterwards and I was quite surprised at the English in it because I did better than usual. It was the end of the meeting, so when I finished I got up and started down the steps and Dill reached

me at the top of the steps. No, the first man to reach me was the old admiral who was the head of the naval board—which were pretty cut and dried fellows and more or less opposed to all of this and he embraced me to my complete astonishment. Dill met me and he embraced me. There were three men that met me—I've forgotten who the third one was but he was a very important person—as I was going down the steps. Because I put the whole thing up in one nut shell as it were. So then Hopkins heard of this and he suggested to Churchill that he get me in the next morning. I think I told you that didn't I? [Dr. Pogue: Yes sir. You went over to the White House where he was staying, didn't you?] Up in his bedroom. And he was opposed to it, he couldn't conceive of having a naval command under a possible army command because he said what would the army officer know about handling a ship? Well I said, "What the devil does a naval officer know about handling a tank" or an army officer at that particular time? We were not enlisting sailors or tank drivers or things. We were getting control. The President has it all and he doesn't know about any of it.

Q. Would you list that among one of five or one of ten crucial decisions of the war from your standpoint?

A. I would say one of three. I'm just guessing at three. It was basic to the whole control of the war. So far as our interior economy, you might call it, goes some of the things—the trouble we were having between the Air and the Navy. They didn't want to recognize Arnold as anything special but as just a piece of the Army because they had air and of course his was going to be on a very vast scale eventually. And I think I told you about modifying that speech of the President's and that was the end of the thing we had the Chiefs of Staff organization in that one sentence. Nobody ever seemed to recognize it, they'd take such God-awful guesses at things, coming out with these marvelous conclusions and then here is the thing right in front of you and

then none of them see it at all, you see. You have brought in so many things that writers have wondered or felt this and that and the other. And here is the organization of the three chiefs of staff in one sentence and not one of them has even seen it.

One of the—I'm jumping clear away from the subject, while it's on my mind I'd better get it out. One of the side issues I had to fool with, I became very much irritated, almost infuriated, over the fact that when we brought these National Guard divisions into the show—some of them, one of them in particular—began letting out concessions for various things at the big cantonments where they landed. Well, of course, they were going to be no more than a transient customer and I had to get permanent command for these things. Getting into that sort of thing, that wasn't going to work at all

And yet they were very insistent on it and I was very angry over it and I sort of lost my temper on this. I realized right away we had to get this post exchange system straightened up. So I took an officer that I'd had out of Vancouver Barracks, who was very, very unusual in handling a post exchange, which is a difficult thing to do in the old-fashioned exchange because you had a whole roster of cantankerous company commanders even fighting on reducing the price on rusty collar buttons. And the War Department had just gotten out a regulation, every time they found a rat in the place they put out a new regulation, so it was very hard to run the thing under the terms of the contract if you can express it that way and something had to be done right away. Because it was going to go into a colossal scale. Well, I understood that the head of this agency down there was—we fought for his name the other day you know, big civilian set-up—[Dr. Pogue: Williams?] No, no. It was the purchasing agent. [Dr. Pogue: Oh it was Donald Nelson.] Donald Nelson. Did I tell you this story? [Dr. Pogue: No.] I wanted to get Donald Nelson. I called up on the phone down there because he had been the purchasing agent for Sears,

Roebuck, and the man that answered said that he wasn't there but he himself would be very glad to help me. He was very anxious to accommodate—quite pronounced in his anxiety to do this. I told him I would have to wait until Donald Nelson came back. "Well," he said, "is it urgent?" I said, "Yes, it's pretty urgent." Well," he said, "won't you let me help you?" He said, "What is it? Tell me that." Well I asked a question, I said, "What were you occupied with prior to coming into Washington?" And, as I recall, I won't say it was collars but it was something about as remote from what I was after as that. I said well that won't do. "Well" he said, "please tell me what it is you are interested in." Well I said I wanted to get somebody to tell me how to go after the coordination of all of our army post exchanges. It was a matter of going into the millions. And I understood that Donald Nelson had been a purchasing agent for Sear Roebuck. "Well," he said, "I was the purchasing agent for the competing—what is the competing?—[Montgomery-Ward]. It may not have been—but something like that. "Well" I said "for goodness sake alright." "Well" he said, "what do you want?" I said, "I want to get a group of men up here who would be familiar with the purchasing procedures, with the personnel procedures, with the financial procedures and all that sort of thing to consider what kind of an order we can get out about all these exchanges, and unify the procedures, in a way to accommodate itself to the unusual conditions which had arisen." Well he sent me up there a very distinguished group of men. One was Harrison, I think, who afterwards became the head fellow in connection with the Signal Corps, and he was one of the head me in connection with the Wilson's Chairmanship of the Mobilization Committee. He sent me up, as I recall—I've got these mixed up undoubtedly, but as I recall—the personnel man of A & P, he sent me up some big man of the other store group, Safeways, he sent a series of men to cover all the various activities. They came up to see me and I brought in my captain from Vancouver who was going to be their guide and explained

to them what their problem was and how difficult it would be for them to put their expert knowledge into this thing because the controlling conditions were so entirely different from their procedure. Because I said you can't ignore the commanding officer. He must not be brushed aside. And yet the commanding officer is a transient customer. . He is the commander of the division of the corps that's going through there. There's a local commander of the post. But you can't ignore that commanding officer. Now the great trouble is how to set this thing up on a permanent basis and yet not ignore the command functions. And we had quite a long discussion all about that. Then I sent them to four of our largest cantonments and they took about a month and they came back with their proposals for the post exchange, the big purchasing agent from New York and all of them. It ran into the hundreds of millions before they got through with this business. After I got it started I dropped it and let it settle. I only came into it again, this fellow from over here in Hagerstown, whose father used to be head of the great harness and leather business and all and played a big part in the first World War, was under attack also. I just came back enough to insist that the second wave of attack in the landings should contain an echelon of the post exchange. Because if the men see this set up on the beach it would look like everything was in firm control. Of course that was difficult for him to do because he didn't have command of it. It was under the leadership of the commander of that operation. And they'd always tell me, Well, I can't command it. "Well," I said, "You see it's done or get out. I don't care how you do it."

And then I would check myself. I remember my great pleasure when I went into Italy and got up right behind the firing line and they brought a battalion out to go into the forward position as a picket. And before the men had gotten their pup tents up, one sergeant opened up the post exchange from two barrels which had been delivered to him and here was tobacco and

here was Coca-Cola and here was the various things you want right away and they sold them right over the barrel. As I told you, I think, I never allowed them to have any sales going on in rear until they'd begun up front, because I had participated in that myself in the first world war where they did the thing exactly backwards. [Dr. Pogue: You told me how you made them send the stuff out.] Yeah. I emptied the post exchange in about a minute and I didn't forget that. The trouble there was that General Pershing didn't know about any of these things. He didn't have a travelling emissary to look and observe and to report in to him. He sent it to investigate some crime you might say, but he didn't have somebody going around looking at all these things. There was a very rigid compliance with orders, but the trouble was the orders were all wrong. Those things irritated me, because they went right after me there and tried to stop me. [Dr. Pogue: I watched it both ways and I know that it worked. We had PX set up very soon on the beaches in Normandy and it was very fine because, as you say, people thought well it's alright and then I remember in Paris when the cigarettes from time to time got short, they couldn't have them in Paris unless they were up front.] I gave very rigid orders on that. [Dr. Pogue: Of course you'll remember that railway company began stealing them and there weren't cigarettes anywhere.]

We had quite a time there after the First World War because the soldiers turned on the YMCA so strongly that after the war the YMCA couldn't get any funds. They appealed to me—this head fellow they had—and I went into the thing. What I found was that the Quartermaster people in the shipping and all had mixed up or allowed to be mixed up the gift cigarettes with the purchased cigarettes that the YMCA had to sell. Mr. Stimson was very specific in requiring the sale of these things because it made it very difficult to go along with the British. We were giving away everything and they were forced to sell it. Soldiers bought a carton of cigarettes and found

in it that it was a gift cigarette. Well of course the YMCA got the full blast and it spread in every direction, the fact of selling the thing spread in every direction. They were required to do that. Then they went on to say what others were doing and the YMCA was not doing. The YMCA at one time was running, as I recall, one hundred sixty-four shows. But the Salvation Army got up one show and as I recall spent $16,000 on it and they made a very good show—almost a light opera. So everybody said look how the Salvation Army does it and how the YMCA doesn't do it. Well, as I say, the YMCA put on one hundred sixty-four as I recall or supervised them. And they got the dirty end of the deal very, very badly in all this. But the feeling against them was bitter. It was so bitter and there was such a confusion that General Pershing laid the foundation for the order that there would be only one activity—there wouldn't be Knights of Columbus, there wouldn't be Salvation Army—they all might be there but they not control any activity. Incidentally, the YMCA was promised, we'll say ninety tons a day and they were cut in half or a third right away for the lack of shipping, with no explanation at all. So when I got into this thing I told General Pershing that he ought to help these people out that they couldn't get any money. The feeling was so bitter. He didn't want to do it. He thought the YMCA was at fault. Well, I said I had gone all through it and they're not at fault at all, I said your own Army's at fault, your Quartermaster Department is at fault and all things like that. I wrote a speech for him to give at the big dinner in New York the YMCA gives once a year and have men from all over the world come in and I accepted for him to make the speech. He was perfectly furious with me when he found out what I had done. But he had to go up and make it and then they got some help, some leadership and some money. I know the fellow who was head—I keep thinking of the name Moffett but it wasn't Moffett, it was something like that—the head man and he promised me anytime he could do for me he would do it. So when I got my regiment out in China, I wanted

something done for my men there, we didn't have anything. The Navy was having a place set up at Chefoo and getting other things and they were buying the ground for them and putting on a fine thing. We were getting nothing at all. And I wrote to him and he had about a thousand reasons why he couldn't do it. And I had only one reason why by God he had to do it. We finally got a little improvement but not a great deal. I was furious about that. [Dr. Pogue: Was his name Mott?] Mott was the fellow. And I have saved their necks in this thing.

I would like to continue that by saying that when I went into the Red Cross I found the exact situation but this time the Red Cross got it. Because they were put in the same position, they were put in charge and then they had to bear all these conflicts. And they were so unpopular that one of my principal jobs as head of the Red Cross was to compose the Press and all favorably to the Red Cross or at least abate this enmity. And they would hardly believe me when I told them something of the First World War and they were doing the same thing now to the Red Cross because they'd gotten into this impossible position. [Dr. Pogue: I know that old time soldiers, they said I'll give anything to the Salvation Army but nothing to the YMCA.] It was wholly illogical, wholly illogical. The Salvation Army was fine but it was just doing one thing in one place, as I say—I don't know what their tonnage here was—but here was the YMCA with their contract to do all these various activities and all these various efforts and then getting their tonnage cut in half but no explanation from the Army to help them face the troops. I found exactly the same thing, just exactly—identical—if there is any other word to make it more specific I would use it, against the Red Cross in this war. The reporters were just vicious about it and I just pushed them aside and I said I have seen all this. You sicked it on the YMCA in the first war and now you are sicking it on these people in this war. Well I'm not going to have it. [Dr. Pogue: Well you tried to make that clear by saying everything will be sold, didn't you in this

war?] We wanted to sell it, we'd know. Of course in the First World War the YMCA couldn't afford to give it all. [Dr. Pogue: Yes.] They didn't have enough stuff.

In this case, Mr. Stimson was very insistent that we must sell it so as to be abreast to the British—do the same as the British. [Dr. Pogue: The great argument too in this war that came from many men was the fact that the Red Cross girls had status of officers and they would stay of course in officers' billets and the men always told awful tales about them. Except where they went up with their doughnuts near the front and then they liked them.] Well, I had two stepsons in the war. One stepson was very bitter against the WACS on the same basis. When we put the WACS in the field we put in—first we put in one company—well, there were a couple million soldiers and one girl had about one thousand suitors, and they all got sore except one. He [the stepson] was bitter against our sending them over to Europe. I had to send them there. Eisenhower was going to use the British WACS because he could get their services. Of course that [attitude] wore out as the thing went on. But it was illogical and unreasonable. And that was my own stepson. He just saw that side. You couldn't make a date with them. My God, I remember I heard Mrs. Hobby get off a gem. I was talking to an officer. He was one of those gradgrinds who not only gets at the things he is supposed to do but includes everything else that he can criticize at the same time, one that I didn't have much use for. He was not on anything connected with the WACS but when Mrs. Hobby was waiting there to talk to me next and he was talking to me and he came in and he said, "Do you know what I saw?" And I said, "How do you expect me to know what you saw?" He said, "I saw a WAC and a soldier going down the road hand in hand" and he turned to Mrs. Hobby and said "What do you think of that?" Mrs. Hobby said, "Well, they have been doing that for about one thousand years, haven't they?" Which I thought was a complete retort [chuckle], "doing that for about one thousand years."

Q. 6. Did you feel that Chiang Kai-shek's reactions were based on an antipathy to taking any action with Chinese troops or a desire to preserve his troops intact for later action against the Chinese Communists? Or was there a view that he had "bought" the Chennault view as opposed to Stilwell's?

A. I couldn't say as to Chiang's reaction except that he was bitter against the British, except one commander, Slim. And when you read Slim's story, you will find out why, because Slim took a great fancy to Li Sun, I think is the General's name. [Sun li-jen]. A fellow who was graduated from the V.M.I, because he found he worked with him, he was dependable and he would carry out the orders. But on the other hand Li Sun, if that is his name, and who did remarkably up in Manchuria [he means Burma], who conducted a march across the Himalayas that ranks with the great troop movements in history. He got involved with elephants and everything in the world to get through, but nobody paid any attention to it. They came out at that southern port in China. I haven't finished that sentence but I've forgotten what I was getting into. [Dr. Pogue: You were talking about that Slim got along with Chiang Kai-shek, only liked him because he liked this man.] Because Slim was a very dependable and reliable counselor in the fighting. [Dr. Pogue: But otherwise he was bitter against the British.] Yes. Madame told me in 1942 there is only one Britisher out there I'd trust and that is General Slim. But when you read Slim's write up you will see why that was because Slim took a great fancy to this one Chinese general who would go through with his contracts and not spill everything.

During this period referred to here in question six the Generalissimo was very bitter against the British and you might say he was bitter against the Combined Chiefs of Staff because he insisted on a certain phase of attack and certain shipping and we were in a terrible turmoil over that. The meeting at Cairo was almost devoted entirely to the question of twenty—I think it

was—LST's which were highly involved here. If we had been able to make fifty or more LST's in this country it would have almost changed the course of the war. I think I told you once that the first model I had to have built of wood at Fort Knox, Ky. [Dr. Pogue: The Navy wasn't interested in it.] The Navy wasn't interested.

Chapter 7

Q. 1. In retrospect, what is your reaction to the opposing claims of the Navy and MacArthur about control of operations in the Pacific?

A. On the matter of the respective attitudes of the Navy and MacArthur. The feeling was so bitter and the prejudice was so great the main thing was to get in agreement. Whichever side you could get agreement, that is the one you would take. Because you were in a war of personalities—a very vicious war.

Q. 2. Do you feel that MacArthur was right about his approach to Japan?

A. I thought MacArthur was right in what he was doing and I though Nimitz was right in what he was doing. The question was to get both of them to accept the coordination of the two efforts. [Dr. Pogue: Well, was Nimitz as difficult to bring to agreement as MacArthur?] No. But Nimitz was getting his orders from Washington. [Dr. Pogue: I assume Nimitz would be easier to work with personally than King, for example.] Oh, very much.

Q. 3. Does MacArthur's mention of possible political repercussions to his failure to take Rabaul contain a veiled threat? One of his most admiring biographers intimates that the General often had to use threats to get what was due him.

A. I don't know about this veiled threat in one of the two Marine divisions for whatever reasons. [Dr. Pogue: It seems odd that he should bring up political repercussions.] This admirer who says that it seems odd he should be forced to use political threats to get things. I think it was odd that a general should run in opposition to main control and that he should talk to the press the way he did.

Q. 4. In July Marshall told General MacArthur that to him the most feasible operations after *CARTWHEEL* would be to isolate Rabaul by seizing New Ireland, Manus Island, and Wewak. This drew fire from the Southwest Pacific commander who held that the hazards of attempting an operation against Wewak before the fall of Rabaul would make success doubtful. Is this another case where the commander on the ground was more cautious than Washington?

A. I don't think that was the case. There was so much dissension there, so much opposition. I will say this that Halsey seemed to be the easiest one to do business with, one way or the other. [Dr. Pogue: He just liked to fight.] Yes, and he was always in the business of trying to smooth out things instead of arouse things. [Dr. Pogue: In that sense—although he's often compared to General Patton—he was greatly different from him in that way.] Oh yes, very different. He was the same style fighter in a sense.

Q. 5. Had the State Department taken any stand on the Chinese Communists versus Chiang Kai-shek at this time?

A. I don't recall about the State Department. [Dr. Pogue: You see we're getting into that business that was raked over later that as early as 1943 you had a clique in the State Department that were attempting to build up the Communist against Chiang Kai-shek.] I don't know about that. I didn't know those fellows. [Dr. Pogue: You see Davies was over there with Stilwell.

Davies who was hammered so hard by McCarthy and the others was already over there. So later on, they put two and two together and got fifteen. This is part of that conspiracy charge which they lay against the State Department and then against you, you see.] I didn't know Davies at all. And these various feelings in here I didn't know much about until I got over to China later on. I knew there was great difficulty there. Stilwell would come in with recommendations and he was inclined towards the forces the Communists had because he thought they would fight. The Generalissimo was thinking more into the future—quite evidently—while Stilwell was having great difficulty getting his Chinese troops to fight. And they were very much underfed and poorly equipped because the airplane tonnage was going to gasoline and Chennault, and he still was getting very little. So he was having a hard time getting a fight out of his people He was always trying to get the Generalissimo to use these Communist troops. You see, they were supposed to have an army of three million men at that time. It wasn't a question of one or two communists. [Dr. Pogue: And they were well organized] Oh yes. [Dr. Pogue: To fight. And they were disciplined and they would fight Japanese.] I think every ten men or every squad had a fellow who was supposed to indoctrinate them. Well he might indoctrinate them but he kept the thing organized and made them do which was the important thing. He had the job of a corporal except that he worked on something that was given primary importance which was their indoctrination as Communists. [Dr. Pogue: It certainly is a libelous statement to suggest that General Stilwell was in any way pro-Communist.] Oh no, he would take anybody that would fight. I remember sending over a—proposing to sending somebody over there and he came back and said, "I'll take anybody that will fight." [Dr. Pogue: But you see when they got at their worst, they attacked Stilwell and they attacked Carlson, you remember the Marine who was also the "Gung-ho" man, both of who had that same viewpoint. These men would fight. They

weren't interested in the politics of it.] Exactly that. Stilwell replied that—I'll take anybody that will fight. I remember once we sent him word about one of these colored units—I think it was an air unit—and his reply was "I'll take anyone who'll fight." And that was the guiding thought with him entirely.

Q. 6. There are many people who now feel that we should have backed Chiang completely against the Chinese Communists at this time. What is your feeling?

A. This question six I've answered in effect. This intense Communistic thing I was not aware of really in detail until I got over there after the war. The fight then was developing on the basis of division of equipment that was left by the Japanese and particularly of the units that the Japanese had raised of Chinese troops which the Communists wanted completely disbanded and the Generalissimo continued.

Q. 7. Another view is that Chiang Kai-shek is concentrating on his postwar strength against the Chinese Communists at the expense of his gaining any prestige for his forces by letting them take part in campaigns actually hastened his later defeat. Do you have any comments on that?

A. It's very hard to answer that. The Generalissimo, who out of his own experience with the Communists—he had been taken captive by them once—had them continuously on his mind and they influenced every military decision that he made. Now whether you can say he was right or wrong, I wouldn't attempt to say. For instance, he had that young general, the Communist young general, who had taken him prisoner—as a matter of fact, who was a son of the former Manchurian warlord. [Dr. Pogue: Chang Hsueh-liang] I knew him very well. I never mentioned him or anything. They wanted me to intercede for him because they thought he could sway a great deal of influence up there in Manchuria. But I never would mention it anyway to the

Generalissimo because this fellow had taken him prisoner and I didn't think I ought to stick my finger into that pot at all. Madame asked me a question once about it and I didn't even answer her. [Dr. Pogue : That matter of face made a whole lot of difference, didn't it? Saving face?] Yes.

Q. 8. Would you like to make any general comment about the whole question of Chinese communism versus Chiang Kai-shek during the war?

A. I can't very well beyond what I said. [Dr. Pogue: Yes, you answered that.] I might say that the British were practically unfavorable to everything we were doing over there, particularly use of all that equipment there. They thought it was just a dead loss.

Q. 9. Why did the Americans oppose Sholto Douglas?

A. Who was Sholto Douglas? [Dr. Pogue: He was an airman who had been in the Mediterranean.] Oh yes, he was the one. Mr. Churchill tried very hard to have him put in command and I opposed it. And I opposed it to the point that I said I would take every American troop from under him if he was made in command. He didn't like Americans and was very frank in saying it. To me it was out of the question to have a man like that in supreme command where there were both forces involved. And Mr. Churchill said he wasn't sufficiently informed and they'd go back and go at this thing again and then it would come to me and I would again decline to accept this fellow. If they had him, they would have no American things under him. Finally Mr. Churchill, as I recall, said well, who did I suggest and I said Mountbatten. That's the way Mountbatten got his command out there. [Dr. Pogue: Well, I hadn't heard much of him before this, of course after the war he became [Douglas] the Air Commander in Europe and I think the head of the air staff but suddenly to find this opposition to him I didn't know what the

background was.] Well, he didn't like Americans and talked very plainly about it and it was just not thinkable that we would have him as Supreme Command. [Dr. Pogue: No.] I barely knew him.

Chapter XI

[Dr. Pogue : We skipped others that have nothing to do with the Far East.]

END OF TAPE

TAPE12 SIDE 2

(Second part of the interview of November 21, 1956 at Pinehurst with General Marshall.)

Army planners in the fall of 1943 concluded that the best possibility for ending the war against Japan in 1945 lay in the invasion of Hokkaido in early 1945 by way of Hawaii and the Aleutians. To do this, they felt that the scale of operations in the Central and Southwest Pacific must continue at the same pace as during the war with Germany while the offensive against Hokkaido was being launched. The Combined Planners, however, felt that there was no chance for defeating Japan by October 1943. They thought that an advance upon Formosa in the spring of 1945 held more promise. If this proved futile, an alternative operation against northern Sumatra in the late 1944 or early 1945 was better. In the U. S. Joint Planning Staff, the Air Force member said that more emphasis should be placed on the role of strategic air power. The Navy member complained that the destruction of the fleet as the primary objective necessary to victory had not been given its proper place. The Army member felt that the degree of success thus far against Japan indicated the need of a short term plan for operations against Japan on Germany's defeat with chief emphasis on an approach from the Pacific instead of from the Asiatic mainland. The

JSSC did not accept the idea of Hokkaido as the chief target for 1945 but said that they key to Japanese defeat lay in operations through the Central Pacific with supporting operations on either flank.

Chapter XI

Q. 1. In October 1943, which one of these views was nearest your own.

A. As to this question 1 – October 1943 – which one of these views was nearest your own, as nearly as I can recall I think the Army view although I'm not at all positive on that subject. I must say that during phases here I thought it was not possible in such a broad theater to plan so far in advance when so much depended on the success of certain of the local operations as to whether they should be continued, whether we should continue along that course. [Dr. Pogue: However as you said about the War Department, you were quite willing for them to consider various possibilities.] Oh yes, any possibility. [Dr. Pogue: I mean the State Department.] I didn't want to put any restriction in their thinking at all.

Q. 2. In the fall of 1943, Marshall pointed out that it was desirable for the high command in Washington to use the Foch system of pressing all subordinate commanders constantly in order to keep the enemy continually in retreat and to forestall delays or lags in operations. This unwillingness of Marshall to accept postponements and his eagerness to advance target dates were typical of this period of search for short cuts and faster results. Do you care to comment on this?

A. Question 2 as to the pressing of procedure: I have no particular comment to make except that I thought if you let the thing drift as it were, you would never get anywhere. The trouble inherent in all these things is everybody wanted things that we couldn't give them. And you had

to press them to accomplish the thing without all of the means that might later become available. Earlier in our discussions, there was a question of what I thought about Montgomery. Montgomery when he got into the fight was I think excellent but on the other hand if we had about three commanders like Montgomery we'd never made any fights because they never could have settled who was to get everything to do it. Montgomery required—he might say in favor of his troops—forces and supplies and everything in such number. But as a matter of fact we couldn't have conducted these campaigns if everybody had followed his procedure because there just wasn't enough to go round. And you'd have to make complete abandonment of things in theaters like the Pacific in order to comply. The Pacific, for instance, at the start got very, very little. Up in the Philippines, MacArthur got nothing. Out in Australia, there was very little sent out there for quite a long time. The Marines went into Guadalcanal—at my urging in a way—because if we lost that field there we were pushed way to the south in trying to move our troops in Australia and turned them north. And so we went ahead and made it with what we had, which was almost entire Marines. Later on in that fight we wanted to put in army divisions and we couldn't manage the thing with the Admiral in command there on that island off Australia. He had such a backup of tonnage that I send Arnold from Washington out to see that he had and to count the ships. And I dimly recall now, it was something like eighty-two ships standing idle in that harbor there. Of course we couldn't afford at that time—any time as a matter of fact—certainly not at that time—any use of tonnage on any such line as that. But we couldn't get the Army in; when they did go up there the Marines thought they'd been very long in coming. Collins and those fellows wanted to get up there. Patch, Collins and that crowd were all fighters and they had very good divisions, very good divisions. Later on we put a division in there that

was not so—not so—not at all so good and they made a mess of it up there on Russell Island or someplace like that. It made it very difficult for me because it was a National Guard division.

[Dr. Pogue: Isn't that the one the "Howling Mad" Smith got so mad about?] No, it was the 27th. [Dr. Pogue: Now which was the one General Harding had and he was finally relieved?] I've forgotten. [Dr. Pogue: He'd been an old friend of yours, hadn't he?] Oh yes, well he was a very young officer as far as I was concerned, but I was very fond of him and still am. But I had nothing to do whatever with his promotion, as a matter of fact, when McNair made him a major general and gave him this division he came in to call on me. He's been sent for by McNair and he came in to call on me and I said "Harding, this is going to be your downfall. McNair has explained to you the state of this division?" And he said, "Yes he had." "Well," I said, "this is going to be your downfall, you're going to have many friends and you're going to get relieved from command." And that's exactly what happened. [Dr. Pogue: That happened in that Ninetieth Division, I think, that went to Europe. I was told the commander liked everybody, everybody like him.] It reminds me of Mrs. Marshall was called upon to make a speech to a lot of women and she hadn't done anything like that and didn't want to do it and I said, " I think you've got to do something like that and this is a pretty appropriate occasion." "Well," she said, "what will I talk about?" And I said," You have a very happy way of landing on things that are of interest but I'll say one thing you might exploit this: That Mothers should look with care in the training period to a popular commander; chances are nine out of then he's going to get licked." And she made a very good speech on this subject and got these mothers much concerned about it. Which is pretty much true. The most famous case is that field out in the Philippines that the Japanese first shot down the planes on—Stotsenburg—where the airfield is. He was so desperately unpopular with his Nebraska regiment that the legislature was considering

a debate an action—a resolution—demanding of the War Department his relief. Just then war broke out on February 4, 1899 and by the evening of the third day he was the most popular commander in the thing and they just swore by him and then he was killed just about the time they got up to Camp Stotsenburg and the place was named after him. But they were just trying to get the legislature by resolution to demand of the war Department that he be relieved—and when the war started—and then they felt the discipline and they felt the command and control and they were just crazy about Stotsenburg. It was really very dramatic. [It certainly is.]

[General Marshall – Now here we have *BUCCANEER*.]

Matloff's – Chapter XIII

" . . . Marshall and the other U. S. Chiefs of Staff were not eternally wedded to *BUCCANEER,* but were firmly convinced that without such an amphibious operation in the Indian Ocean, Chiang would not commit his forces in Burma."

According to Admiral King, the President, after the plenary meeting on December 5th, called the Joint Chiefs of Staff in for consultation on the effects of breaking the understanding with Chiang. Leahy and Arnold finally agreed that it could be changed and Marshall, after thinking it over, gave in also. Only King remained obdurate and refused to concede since he felt that Chiang would consider that he had been double-crossed. The President did not then tell them his decision, but made it later in the day. He notified Churchill that he had decided to call off *BUCCANEER*. Apparently he had not told the Joint Chiefs of Staff as late as the morning of the next day, since they were discussing possible alternatives to *BUCCANEER.*

Q. 2. I have seen one statement which indicates that the Joint Chiefs of Staff didn't really care about *BUCCANEER* but that they wanted to pin the British down to something in the Pacific.

Another view is that the Joint Chiefs wanted *BUCCANEER* so much they were willing to take a later date for it. Which is accurate? [No answer.]

Q. 3. Admiral King's account on the cancellation of *BUCCANEER* differs somewhat from that of Sherwood's. Sherwood says "In an earlier chapter I have expressed my belief that there was only one occasion in the entire war when Roosevelt arbitrarily overruled the unanimous decision of his own Chiefs of Staff' there is, admittedly some question as to the accuracy of the belief but, if it is true, then the second conference at Cairo was certainly the one occasion. What is your recollection on this?

A. There was a great deal of argument about *BUCCANEER*. I'm sorry to admit that I don't remember the various courses of it at this time. I know the British were not in favor of it. Sorry I can't give you a clean cut reaction to that. [Dr. Pogue: Well, first and last, there were about twelve different operations out there that were planned. I remember Lord Portal when I talked to him in 1946 said it may be just a short time but too many things were taken up and he'd say if you brief me I'll tell you a little something about it but I can't remember the details.] I am so dim on my recollection of *BUCCANEER*, I can't remember.

Q. 4. Do you feel that it was a mistake to cancel the operation?

A. And I can't answer the fourth question. So much of these things were psychological rather than plain logical. [Dr. Pogue: But you don't recall whether or not you felt that Mr. Roosevelt was just arbitrarily overriding the Chiefs of Staff at that time?] No. But as a matter of fact in a sense he was overriding us on the China policy. The only thing was that I didn't make it a battle. There was no point to it. He was intent on doing these things with China. He was favorable to the Generalissimo because Chennault was working on him direct and Madame's brother, who

was president of the Executive Yuan and ambassador over here, was dealing with the President direct. And the President's reactions were so influenced from the outside that when Willkie went out there, Alsop and those fellows got a hold of Willkie. Of course I think Stilwell made nothing of the occasion but just allowed them to turn their guns on him. All these things came to the President, you see, and he was determined about China against British opposition because they didn't rank China as anything—as having any strength or force at all. You might way any importance to the future settlement of things.

The President was so intent about it that as far as the Chiefs of Staff were concerned or more particularly so far as I was concerned I didn't perpetuate the battle. I accepted the best of it. I told Sherwood—that fellow that wrote the book—don't question me on the China thing because I just stepped back and let nature in a sense take its course. Except that I wanted Stilwell to resign his command and let me give him another command. [Dr. Pogue: It would have been better for him if he had, wouldn't it?] Oh yes. The trouble was with all his ability, he dissipated that ability by his open criticism of the Generalissimo and allowing his staff to do the same thing, which is the worst thing you can do. One of them got back to me and started to tell me. I said, "I don't want to hear a word you have to say. You've already done all the harm you possibly can do. Now don't try to set up any more back here." I knew him very well and he was so shocked at my reaction. "Well," he said, "you don't favor this or something" and I said, "it isn't a question of favor, I don't approve at all of what you personally have done and I wouldn't have you on my staff." Of course staff cliques and staff talk all play a great part in all these things. But if you permit them to an open development and feed them grist for their mill, why you've got an awful mess on your hands. And that was the greatest mistake Stilwell did aside from his open criticism of the Generalissimo allowing his staff to mill around with all these

things. It was particularly critical there because he was a splendid fighting man, a splendid fighting man. Give Stilwell a fine corps and I think a fine army, but certainly a fine corps and he would have put up a magnificent performance. He knew the game, he was courageous to the limit, and he was adventurous, and yet he was calculating. It's too bad he had to be laboring with this kind of semi-diplomatic situation and being played off by a superb performer at the game, Chennault. Just imagine allowing a staff officer in the position that Alsop was in go to India and talk to the Indian Army adversely to Stilwell and everything and nothing done about it at all. Now there, I entered into it and I made a recommendation to the President. And then I discovered, dog-gone it, that he followed his usual custom, he didn't file that. He sent it back over. So it isn't in the record at the White House. He did that time and again. He wouldn't take the unfavorable thing and file it. He'd send it back to you so it would be on your side of the fence. [Dr. Pogue: Well he had for some reason—the Alsops are Republican and their father was a strong Republican but they got very close to the President before the war.] Very close. [Dr. Pogue: As youngsters, and he used to feed them stuff before Alsop was commissioned he fed them information he wanted in the papers.] I see.

Matloff's – Chapter XIII

[The Army and its chief spokesman, General Marshall, were sympathetic to the Chinese stand for several reasons. The relations between Chiang and Stilwell had reached a favorable point at this time, and the Generalissimo had displayed keener interest in the training of Chinese combat troops. Marshall urged that this apparent change of heart be encouraged since it showed that Chiang was now amenable to making use of the immense manpower of China, and "this constituted a milestone in the prosecution of the war in the East".

"It was the Chinese themselves who made Marshall's position as an advocate difficult. Chiang told Marshall he did not like the *CHAMPION* plan because it did not go as far as Mandalay and did not provide for simultaneous land and sea operations. Later he demanded that ten thousand tons a month be flown into China regardless of Burma requirements…Stilwell's account of Marshall's irritation is even more explicit: 'Now let me get this straight. You (Chinese) are talking about your rights in this matter. I thought there were American planes, and American personnel, and American materiel. I don't understand what you mean by saying we can or can't do thus and so."

Although Marshall was willing to agree to arming a Chinese army so long as it was to be done in the unspecified future, he opposed any further commitment of the U. S. combat troops to the CBI. He hoped that the United States was now on the verge of a 'transfer of power' in the Pacific, and this too would make the deployment of the U. S. combat ground forces to SEAC impracticable. Conversely, Marshall felt that unless *BUCCANEER*, the amphibious phase of *CHAMPION*, was carried out without delay, the reallocation of U. S. landing craft to the Pacific should be considered.]

What was the *CHAMPION* plan? [Dr. Pogue: It's something around Mandalay but not all the way up to it. It was one of those small operations. It was the land part of *BUCCANEER* really.] You give a quotation here, whose quotation is it? [Dr. Pogue: Stilwell's. It was his book, his diary.] He's saying that? [Dr. Pogue: He's saying that you said it.] That I said it.

SEAC? [Dr. Pogue: South East Asia Command. That's Mountbatten's command.]

Q. 1. Is this an accurate summary?

A. I think it is but I'm not entirely clear in my recollections.

Q. 2. Do you recall any factors responsible for Chiang Kai-shek's frequent shifts in his decision to favor or to oppose BUCCANEER?

A. I can't answer question 2. [Dr. Pogue: He obviously did not. That quotation is obviously something he wrote down, while you were talking, it's his recollection of what you said. And that's a very dangerous thing for a historian to do to quote that kind of a quotation as if it's precise. But what I'm wondering was whether that more or less presented your point of view there.]

Matloff – Chaper XVI

[Roosevelt had complicated the work of his planners by his offer to Chiang of the choice to go ahead with land operations in north Burma (*TARZAN*) in 1944 or of waiting until sufficient resources were available to mount an amphibious operation in the SEAC area. Chiang accepted the delay, asked for a billion dollar gold loan, the doubling of the air forces in China, and raising of the Hump lift to twenty thousand tons a month. The President now showed greater firmness. He asked for the use of the Yunnan forces in Burma. This Chiang was not willing to do.

In January 1944 the British dispensed with all SEAC amphibious operations during the dry season. Mountbatten and Stilwell both sent missions to Washington to present plans. Stilwell's decision caused some difficulty.

By the beginning of the 1944, Washington intelligence estimates frankly recognized that China had little desire to do any actual fighting, although it might engage in limited offensives to get a seat at the peace table. General Roberts felt that the only effective contribution from the China Theater would be in limited air support of the main effort in the Pacific. By the beginning of February China's role was considered to be less and less important.]

A. *TARZAN*? [Dr. Pogue: That's operations in North Burma.] What did it go towards?

[Dr. Pogue: Towards the China frontier. No, I'm wrong, it's just the opposite. It was an attempt to take those troops from Yunnan and push into Burma from the southwestern Chinese area. Stilwell had a force but he wanted to get some Chinese in there to help him. That billion dollar gold loan really raised trouble. Morgenthau got in on that.]

Chapter 16

Q. 1. What were your own views towards China's role at this time? When, if ever, did you become convinced that China was not necessary for winning the war?

A. I don't know how to answer that. [Dr. Pogue: You didn't get in on any of that business on the loan to China did you? That was handled entirely by the President.] I don't recall that I did. [Dr. Pogue: Well had you told Stilwell to send a mission along with Mountbatten's or] I suppose I did. I don't recall that. He came over himself once there but I don't think that was the time. [Dr. Pogue: Mountbatten got very angry about him sending a mission. He said he shouldn't have. I believe that you said well he was an American commander as well as being under Mountbatten] Of course that set up of Stilwell's was wholly illogical, he was serving about three masters and being undercut by his commander-in-chief, the President. [Dr. Pogue: You couldn't have worked out of much worse command situations, could you?] Oh, it was terrible. Chennault was just stirring it up you know all over the place.

Q. 2. Did you approve of Stilwell's mission?

A. None given.

Q. 3. Marshall's view on the role of the CBI was given in a message to Stilwell on May 26, 1944. He said that Japan should be defeated without undertaking a major campaign against her on the mainland of Asia if her defeat could be accomplished in that manner. Was this view generally accepted?

A. I'm not certain but I believe it was generally accepted.

Q. 4. Did you favor accepting the British offer of naval forces for use in the Pacific in 1944?

A. As to accepting the offer of the British forces for use in the Pacific, I had no particular reaction. King was very intent. [Dr. Pogue: He didn't want them, did he?] He didn't want them because he thought we would have to supply them. He made it quite embarrassing. [Dr. Pogue: the President just went over his head there, didn't he?] I think so.

Q. 5. In retrospect, what is your view of the two opposing strategies in the Pacific? Do you feel that the MacArthur supporters can fairly charge you with failing to support him?

A. I supported him through thick and thin on most of the questions. I don't recall this particular phase of the thing. But he had a great many prejudices and intense feelings. All of this was arrangeable if the two commanders wanted to get together. But their approaches, particularly on MacArthur's side, were so filled with deep prejudices that it was very hard to go about it, to get about it. I always felt that—who was that other Admiral? [Dr. Pogue: Nimitz] No, he wasn't the other admiral, who was the fighting admiral out there? [Dr. Pogue: Halsey] I always felt that if Halsey could have been given a more leading role that he could have gotten along with General MacArthur because he was very much wanted to. And even the simple procedure of taking the tie off the shirt was a move to produce general unanimity. Nimitz himself was not a quarrelsome man, but I think his staff was very much embittered because they were being

criticized continuously by MacArthur's outfit. [Dr. Pogue: Was that due entirely to the General's personality that he just wanted to run things?] Who? [Pogue: MacArthur] Yes, he wanted to run things. He just took a decided stand on anything like that that affected his command. There were no concessions on his part whatsoever. Well, the war, picked in a thing like that, is made up of concessions, and adjustable one way or the other. But Nimitz's staff had become feeling so bitter towards General MacArthur and MacArthur's staff so bitterly towards Nimitz that it was almost impossible to get them together on anything. They would come in to see me and I could find some of them notably desirous of reaching adjustments but the suspicion was just profound, [Dr. Pogue: He thought they were trying to take away some of his glory and vice versa] and looking towards the future all the time. The personal thing was getting into it deeply—the personal thing more on MacArthur's side and naval thing on Nimitz's side. [Dr. Pogue: Well, did they feel that you were handing over the victories to the Navy all the time?] Who? [Dr. Pogue: You personally.] Did who feel? [Dr. Pogue: Did MacArthur's people feel?] Well, apparently they do now, but apparently they didn't then. [Dr. Pogue: Because I see no evidence of it. It seems to me that you were continually] Well, I was fighting his battles from the start to the finish. As I say I even wrote his Medal of Honor decoration and all those things and saw that he was promoted and given these ranks when it was actually opposed by Mr. Stimson and the President. And—and—I—but particularly Jack McCloy got him the command in the end in Japan over tremendous objections of the Navy. Because he got no help from his side at all because it was all so acid and it wasn't helpful at all to adjustment or decisions. But we just had to battle at that and Jack McCloy really played the leading part and he and I led this fight to see that the Army obtained command with MacArthur in the lead. [Pogue: Well, the British didn't

want him particularly either, did they?] No. No, I don't know about that. I don't know whether they had an expression in regard to that particular thing or not. I shouldn't have said that.

I felt the way forces were deployed out there they could go right ahead. But there were adjustments to be made. I remember they sent a very good naval force to help MacArthur at Hollandia and then there was no use for it there and there was much talk about that but there was one time when they were coming across to help. The distances were very great and they probably couldn't go back and forth with facility but they could have mastered most of those difficulties if there had been a desire to do so. I found that Halsey when he was on that island—what was the last island he went to—up above Guadalcanal before you get to that place we never did take, we bypassed.[Dr. Pogue: Rabaul] Before you get to Rabaul. [Dr. Pogue: New Britain and New] Oh, New Britain is way to the west of that [Dr. Pogue: I can't remember] The big island there, they fought on the fringe of it for quite a while [Dr. Pogue: New Guinea] No, no, that's to the west. This is to the east, the southeast [Dr. Pogue: I can't think] A great big island. [Dr. Pogue: It just escapes me.] Halsey was worrying very much about MacArthur's reaction where he Halsey was to do something and his current situation got in the way of it and he thought that MacArthur would feel very badly about it. But he was concerned about getting the thing harmonized—which appealed to me.

[Dr. Pogue: Kinkaid apparently didn't get in on that like Halsey did] Well, he was very quiet. Kinkaid took orders. As a result of that he played a brilliant part, a brilliant part, in that battle in the Philippines, he's hardly mentioned. His destruction of that southern fleet coming up [Dr. Pogue: Yes] he had the antiquated force and it was a beautiful job and almost nothing is said about it. In all these things he was very closemouthed throughout and for that reason got along. [Dr. Pogue: Apparently Spruance had some trouble too.] I don't know about that.

You speak about MacArthur holding the service troops. A question of great importance. I wonder if it is not this. From the War Department end we ran into a very difficult situation. We, I think, quite naturally, assumed that the fighting forces particularly of the air in that theater, north of Australia, New Guinea and thereabouts, would tire out long before the fellows on the ground. I sent a general officer out there to look into certain things for me. I will mention the other matters later. But I wanted him to look around and see things that were not being reported to tell, not just what they were yelling about. He came back with a very important observation which bears on this reaction of MacArthur's towards the ground troops, support troops I guess you would call them. Contrary to our expectations, the wearing out process was occurring more rapidly with the ground forces of the Air Corps than of the fighting forces. For the reason that they had to work on the planes at night and they couldn't have any mosquito bar protection. And they had become so full of atabrine that for a while the pilots objected to using the planes because these fellows were so dopey they weren't certain they were putting the cotter pins in and things of that sort. And the men on the ground were just dopey with these terrible doses of atabrine they had to take because under electric lights they were working all night with mosquitoes just eating them up. And it became quite evident that they would have to be relieved first and sent back somewhere free of the insect pests to recuperate. They all had a form of malaria or overdose of atabrine, one of the two. Now we hadn't anticipated that at all and it just reversed things for us in our training of replacements back in the United States.

And incidentally, these young pilots, who were outnumbered badly for a long time by the Japanese Zero planes, and these young pilots were complaining about the planes they had which were heavier than the Zero planes and were being shot down by the Jap planes, and they were running on an exhausted basis. That was the principal thing I sent this general out to find out. I

said I want you to talk to the individual pilots and a number of them and the first thing you can tell them is if there is anything they'd like done to their planes such as trimming them of all the armor and everything on the plane, I will have it done. Anything they require about that plane that can be done it will be done. All they have to do is tell you. I want you to tell them that this is from me to them. We had stripped a plane over here to get the difference in weight but of course that took off all the armor. Well, so we had the data of what could be done. He came back and he was much amused because they were so intent on this until they went in to it all and he said they could have it and then it meant the removal of all this armor and all and then they turned it down. They didn't want to do it. Well, their clamor boiled down to one thing – they wanted girls. But we were completely reversed on the necessities of the ground in view of the working at night and the mosquito menace. In order to get at that affair out there which in Guadalcanal and other places had become very critical, I sent out a great expert on malaria. And I had to arm him with very careful instructions in order to get him to do anything.

I had a preliminary concentration of equipment, which we guessed would be needed, made in California at the port because we couldn't maintain the thing. For instance, the First Marine Division was out of action for over a year—for I think thirteen months. Well, we couldn't maintain an Army out there with the withdrawals on such a length as that but they were so loaded up with mosquito malaria thing, that they were down there, I think it was in New Zealand, I believe it was for thirteen months. We couldn't possibly supply troops at that rate. So this fellow found out that they didn't have this mosquito protection for the messes and this and that and the other. Of course, the decision as to what was to be shipped was left to the department commander. He notified the shore—notified the United States—of what he wanted. Well his people who were back at his headquarters and undoubtedly sitting in mosquito protected places

were demanding a great many things but not netting—not screening. Nothing of that sort. So we just had to put it on without their order, override a portion of that tonnage and send that out, and this fellow indicated where it must be used. And we gave instructions that it must be used in that way. But we had to control the shipping because on that side they were after the combat necessities and we were trying to cut down the malaria spread.

[Dr. Pogue: That's an interesting thing that I hadn't thought about. The fact that of course this man has protection, this one man, and yet he can affect the welfare of great numbers of people.] My Lord yes. [Dr. Pogue: That's why you had to have this constant group of people who weren't under those conditions checking on them.] I had to send men around the world all the time. [Dr. Pogue: They weren't always popularly received all the time, were they?] Well, yes, more than you'd think they'd be disliked. Because they got things for these fellows and I would tell them always if you can find anything that they want that they haven't got that we've got, give them that and let them know you're giving them that. They had very specific instructions to that all over the United States. I always had something I could give a division and if they didn't ask for it I'd say, "How about such and such." "Well, we haven't got a damn thing." "Well, do you want it?" "Yes." I'd write the telegram right on the wing of the plane and send it right off. I remember telling those fellows specifically about that. But I sent word to the pilots that I couldn't supply the girls. I could be sympathetic but I couldn't supply them. [Dr. Pogue: But you would not have considered tearing up any combat unit there at the last, would you, to supply] Hum [Dr. Pogue: I say, you never would consider tearing up a combat division] No. Well, I was confronted once with the necessity of turning up, I think it was two, when I took those fellows out of college [Dr. Pogue: Oh yes] Well, I was determined to get an Army at full strength and kept at that strength for all the fighting. That was the important thing to me, not the

number of divisions at all. Well, I was quite right about that, it made all the difference. Like the fighters, pilots and all flying out of England. We had to have replacements in such a way that the mess table was always full. If they failed to come in, the other man had to take their place to sit down and find half the table empty was a very depressing moral factor. Those things—those psychological reactions have got to be foreseen. I remember when we discovered that the Japanese had retreated from that island—I've even forgotten the name of the island in the Aleutians, which meant that nobody else was left because we'd defeated them at the tip of the Aleutians and now in having this final expedition to throw them out of this particular island—they'd retreated from that before our attack struck. I sent for Somervell right away. The minute we heard that, they same day, and I said, "Now you have to get a couple of transports right away, immediate sailing up to the Aleutians or Alaska, wherever these men will come into, and start the movement of troops from that command. You can't move so many of course as we can eventually withdraw but the movement was to be started and you ought to have two transports in it and instantly." Well, he said, "I haven't got any transports, everyone is scheduled for these other operations and I just can't do it." Well, I said, "Somervell, you've got to do it because if you don't do that instanter there is going to be set up a tremendous demand from these men to get out of the Aleutians and out of Alaska and it is going to come with an impact that will get political very, very quickly." He said, "I don't know where in the world I'm going to get it." "Well," I said "I certainly don't, but get them, by God. Get them and get them up there right away. If you can put them there tomorrow, I'd say get them there tomorrow." Well, of course, it took some time to move a transport up. Within three days the impact on that whole command was the fighting was over. They'd put up with terrific conditions there in the Aleutians, now they wanted to come home and they wanted to come home fast and I had a Congressional

committee on my hands the fourth day. When I got the—Somervell's transports up there that began to cut it down because the movement had started, that started, that took off the heat. Of course it couldn't get there for some days. Somervell couldn't see that. I wanted to get it started instantly. I wanted the orders to be gotten out in twenty-four hours but I couldn't beat the punch on it. The instant the fighting was over the reaction was come home. Not going to have any! We're all going home. And the next thing is the Committee of Congress.

[Dr. Pogue: Well, you'd run into that in the first war too?] Why, of course. It was just tremendous there. The trouble there was, you see, all the men that went home were sore about it because they'd just gotten over and they wanted to see France and the men that were up doing the fighting couldn't get back to the ports to get home so General Pershing was up against it in every way. They didn't look at it in that way but that was just the way and they did it. And, of course, it had a tremendous attack on General Pershing and his command. He was very unpopular, you know, when he came home. People have forgotten that in the long years that have elapsed. I knew this was going to happen right off. That is the reason I took fellows from the front lines at the end of the war, at the end of the German War, and had them moved out by plane and brought right into the United States. I was trying to offset that same reaction. The only trouble was there I had a beautifully worked out plane—it was a beauty—everything went wrong. As you said, maybe you thought I didn't want peace right away. We had to take it any way we could get it, but it was just the devil.

Q. 7. I know at the time of the Bulge, you made great efforts to get combat-fit men into the front lines. Were you ever satisfied with the degree to which your orders were carried out in this respect?

A. I was never satisfied as to the business with combat men. But that was excusable then because before we could get anything working well a desperate battle developed which everybody had to get into.

[Dr. Pogue: That finished it. That's all the questions I brought down here with me.]

Well, not that I want to get rid of you but I'm sort of glad, I'm getting a little tired.

[Dr. Pogue: That's the one thing I don't want to do and I wish you'd always let me know because some days you just tire more quickly than others.]

Well, I don't feel it really till afterwards. I don't know what happened to me yesterday, I went out for a long walk after you left. Right from the start I was having difficulties. I was completely all in when I got back. You exactly couldn't call it exhaustion but my

END OF TAPE

THIS IS THE LAST TIME DR. POGUE SAW GENERAL MARSHALL.

TAPE 13M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

February 4, 1957

RECORDED INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
AT PINEHURST, N. C. - February 4, 1957

(in answer to questions prepared by Forrest C. Pogue. The tape recorder was run by Sgt. William Heffner.)

Q. 1. What is your recollection of the case of ammunition shortage? How strong was the pressure on you to cut down on war production and demands for manpower? I am asking in regard to a statement by William Langer in The Undeclared War, page 738. They give the impression that your statement was made at the Atlantic Conference. Actually isn't it taken from a paper Wedemeyer and others drew up?

A. The latter is my recollection; it is not a definite statement by me at the Atlantic conference.

Q. 2. Did you feel during 1939-41 that Weygand could be trusted? Did you know him in World War I?

A. I don't recall just what my feeling was at the time. I thought that his statement or demand that at least 250,000 troops should be in Africa before he would make any move was a perfectly

reasonable demand because he felt otherwise it was doomed to defeat and would make conditions still harder for France and let alone for him personally.

Did I know him in World War I? Yes, I knew him, though our relationship was naturally very formal. He was Chief of Staff to Foch and I was a mere colonel and aide to General Pershing—after the war was over—but I knew him fairly well and admired him greatly.

Q. What was your reaction toward Petain during the Vichy period? Did you feel, as did Admiral Leahy, that he was doing the best he could to save France from complete destruction by Germany? Had you known him in World War I?

A. My reaction was practically that of Admiral Leahy. I knew Petain very intimately and I admired him greatly and he seemed to like me. This was at the end of World War I. I saw him a number of times during the conflict in World War I. I felt, as I have just said, with Admiral Leahy, that he was doing the best he could to save France from complete destruction.

Did I know him in World War II? No, I didn't meet him.

Q. What was your view towards negotiations with Admiral Darlan prior to the North African landings? Do you feel that Darlan acted in good faith with us?

A. I was pretty remote from these and I have no lively recollection of their course. I will say that I was as much surprised as anyone, that is, at the appearance in Africa at the time Eisenhower arrived there. I was inclined to feel that he acted in good faith. He was in the most difficult position, in a sense, on one side in France and on our side in Africa, to be judged by the French officials accordingly and their feelings were deeply prejudiced one way or another.

Q. 5. It has sometimes been suggested that Darlan was in North Africa by accident. Others say that he came there as a result of a prior deal. Do you have any information on this?

A. I always felt he was in North Africa by accident in regard to the health of his son. I know of no prior deal whatsoever. I know of the shocked surprise of General Clark on his arrival in Algiers and the surprise registered by General Eisenhower.

Q. 6. Langer in his Undeclared War says that Bullitt, George Fielding Eliot, Secretary Knox, and others tried to sell the President on an attack against Dakar in 1941 and that you opposed them. Do you have any comments on your efforts in this connection?

A. I don't know what influence Bullitt, George Fielding Eliot, and Secretary Knox had in relation to persuading the President to attack against Dakar. We had been considering it right along because it was the apex of the bulge of Africa toward Brazil and we were very much concerned about matters in Brazil in relation to the Panama Canal. But just what these men were doing I don't recall. Bullitt had his finger into everything that anybody would listen to.

Q. 7. You did not indicate an opinion during this period except to suggest, in August, hat it was high time for General Eisenhower to take command in the field. Did you have the feeling that Patton might have been right?

A. In relation to the background given for question 7 in the matter of operations by General Patton and by Field Marshal Montgomery and concerning General Eisenhower's move to Normandy with his headquarters, I can say this out of my recollection. We felt it was important for General Eisenhower to appear in closer control of the troops because of the buildup in the

press and otherwise in this country and apparently, as I recall, in Great Britain that General Eisenhower really wasn't in the show and Montgomery was the sole dominant figure.

So we thought for political reasons, it was important that General Eisenhower should get himself established in Normandy. He was reluctant, as I recall, to make the move then because his communications weren't built up sufficiently. That is a very elaborate outlay of requirements and when he first moved over to Normandy I think he was out of communication to a certain extent in the opening days of that move.

As to General Patton at this time and the matter of gasoline, I think General Eisenhower's actions were normal to command in that period of the war. Of course, he wanted more gasoline; of course, Montgomery wanted more gasoline and a larger freedom of action. That is just natural with commanders under these circumstances. What was going on was the First Army was making very rapid moves in a very positive manner and getting very little public credit for it in this country. The Third Army was getting far more credit because of Patton's dash and showmanship. General Hodges was very quiet and some very remarkable actions took place here for which General Hodges was entitled to the credit. All these things are pressed by the Press—twisted by various interests—so that it is quite hard to get at the actual facts of the case. Montgomery wanted to get free and to go ahead on his part. Patton wanted to get free—with the great temptation of running right up to the Rhine—and there was almost no gasoline. As a matter of fact the first gasoline fill-up, as you might say, occurred when the pipelines from the expedition out of the Mediterranean in the south of France were built up to supply the armies on our right and part of Patton's army. The operation that was so severely condemned by Mr.

Churchill, in which he described a very dubious prospect of success and which actually had a tremendous success far ahead of schedule.

The remainder of question 7 asks if I did not feel that Patton was right. I just don't know what you mean by that "right." I think Eisenhower's control of the operations at that time was correct. And that all the others were yelling as they naturally would yell. There is nothing remarkable about that except one was the supreme commander of the British force which at that time was very small and the other was a very high-powered dashing commander who had the Press at his beck and call—General Patton.

And in trying to judge what was the correct disposition of the available gasoline, one has to remember a great many subsidiary facts and prospects. For example, you can take the operation into the Bulge later on. If it was successful it was a grand thing. But it wasn't successful. It took a chance that could have been very fatal. You can sometimes win a great victory by a very dashing action. But often or most frequently the very dashing action exposes you to a very fatal result if it is not successful. And you hazard everything in that way. For example, the control of the British fleet in World War I. They could lose the war in one action of a few hours. They didn't dare risk that until the conditions were highly in their favor. But everyone wanted Jellicoe to commit the fleet immediately. It would have been very unwise, it seems to me. At the time it was committed that was the proper time all right. But nobody pays any attention to that. They want the dash in these dashing movements of Paton he was absolutely correct in what he was doing. And Eisenhower gave him a very free hand to do it in his sweep across France. But that is not always to case.

Q. 8. What is your recollection of the causes of the ammunition shortage? How strong was pressure on you to cut down on war production and demands for manpower?

A. I will have to back through all the papers in order to answer this. But my recollection is that the demands were at times totally at variance with the later strictures on the subject. For instance, the action in Normandy where the hedges played such a tremendous part was not easy artillery country at all. And the heavy ammunition had little purpose there. Later on as we came up towards the river Rhine—or the Ruhr River—and so on, the need for heavier artillery then became urgent. The command requests, as I recall, for heavier artillery, were very lukewarm about it as we came during the African campaign. They built up when the Germans put a railroad mount in the side of the Alban Hills at the Anzio operation. Then they immediately wanted heavier armament. Now in all these things it does take a long time to get these things when you go after them. I am probably answering one of the questions in advance here.

The pressure to reduce the requirements for heavier armament was continuous. We suffered throughout by the reaction that every success we won in the earlier operations was taken up in this country as the end of the war when it was far from it. When we took Sicily the war was over; if we took the lower part of Italy the war was over. On going before military committees you would get this idea and you would get it from the Press—from the people generally—each thing was a signal that the war was over. As I recall, when we went into Africa, that was the end of the war. And it was a long time before they came to recognize there was a lot of terrible, costly, hard fighting that would have to come before there was an end to the war. Now the kind of ammunition you needed varied entirely with the operations. Our requirements

for ammunition were built largely, almost entirely on the requests of field commanders so far as it could be. Of course one field commander couldn't be asking for heavy ammunition for an operation that was not going to be within his scope. But nevertheless the reactions were based very largely on the desires, prospects, held out by the field commanders. There was a pressure, as I say, continuously, to cut down on our ammunition demands, to get back as quickly as we could to normal requirements, to allow industry to take up civilian needs. Demands increased steadily right up to the end of the war. And we were subjected to very heavy criticism.

I remember the last was the bombs needed for Japan. Of course, the whole bomb estimates in that time were based on a very slender need. When these matters are taken up in the staff they begin at the lowest echelon and they figure out, naturally, they figure on a very conservative basis because they are not going to be caught short by the actual happenings. But by the time it comes up to the top in the operations sections and later through the deputy chief of staff and finally to me personally, there are any number of cut imposed—almost invariably cuts and not increases. Meanwhile, there are terrific pressures being brought to bear from every direction to cut these things down so that industry can get back to supplying civilian needs. That was very marked in the last years of the war. And the pressures and influences were very intense. And some of the things were outrageous in the light of the man who was making them—where his main interests were very much involved. In nothing could the stricture be sterner than if we didn't have enough. I can recall my answer to one question at one time before some committee of Congress when they were holding that we had too much ammunition and other supplies—I think it was in Italy. My reply to that was very accurate as to my own feelings. I said, considering the history we had had of military operations throughout the history of the

United States, I was overjoyed to find one case where we had too much of anything when every time it had been always too little and too late.

Taking the last part of question 8, the pressure on me, I think it could be described as terrific in the period of the war—to cut down, to cut down so that civilian production could be built up and we could get back to normal.

I have already said quite a bit about the pressures to reduce production estimates and in relation to artillery ammunition in particular. The struggle with ammunition that is small arms, machine guns, automatic, ammunition of the smaller calibers that occurred in Europe at this time were largely those of difficulties of transportation and the struggle to get the ammunition, once landed, across France to the front.

In all of this one must bear in mind that after a need for a certain type of artillery ammunition has come up—a special type, heavy ammunition for example, when no heavy ammunition has been used heretofore, unless the staff, the Pentagon staff, has foreseen all this long before the troop commanders, there is bound to be a long delay before it can be secured. I don't know how many months elapsed but I would say a year as a minimum. As these wants became apparent it is very difficult to meet them quickly. The process of having a great deal of ammunition stored up is rendered most difficult by the tremendous pressures to reduce production. When you are fighting a war under circumstances where there is a battle going on continuously to reduce production to permit civilian production to go ahead for civilian goods, you have a very complicated political situation involved in which the pressures are many and come from every direction.

Q. 9. Any comment on the nature of the problem of getting additional manpower?

A. This manpower shortage was another factor of supply that came very much under the guns at this time. There was urgent need, of course, for men on the farms. Industry wanted more men in connection with production. The Army wanted men and was being strongly opposed. And, of course, until the issue finally arose, like the Battle of the Bulge, the Army was under heavy pressure from all these other sources, which found many friends in Congress, to reduce its demands. Then it was very difficult to increase them because the men had to be trained and we wouldn't put men into the front over there under six months' training and for awhile for almost a year. Because that did more to conserve lives than anything else as well as to guarantee more certain success.

We reached in every way we could to find men at the time of this situation. Eisenhower did all he could. I remember his amalgamating the negro troops with the white troops in a small way but a very successful way, and very many other methods were taken, particularly back home and in the Panama Canal and other places of that nature to find more men if it was possible to do so. In all of these, notable in sending General Lear to Paris, it was sort of opposed abroad, that's not unnatural, they didn't want anybody to come along and be monkeying with their business as it were. I knew from old experience, particularly in the First World War, that the man who's fighting is looking to the front exclusively and he doesn't always have his strongest characters in the rear zones. So I was sending people over there to look for me long before General Lear and others went over, with General Eisenhower's agreement. It was quite essential to get the rear zone organized better with stronger characters because there again came up the question of when

General Eisenhower relieved a man from a combat command, that man could still be used for rear zone purposes, but naturally he wasn't the greatest driving power that as a rule you could find. From what I saw in 1918 and the difficulties that came to General Pershing afterwards and the attacks that were made on him in Congress afterwards, I felt that had to be watched very, very carefully and I moved accordingly. I think what I have just said is largely an answer to question 9.

Q. 10. What was your reaction to this placing of Montgomery over the American forces north of the Ardennes?

A. I accepted it at the time as a very natural reaction on General Eisenhower's part. Afterwards I came to regret it because Montgomery, I didn't think, played at all square on the deal. He made use of it politically and to the press to General Eisenhower's and particularly to General Bradley's disadvantage. He didn't function here as I think he should have. All through there had been difficulties because Montgomery had never attended a single conference in person. Eisenhower had to go to him, which was quite wrong. In this situation, he allowed to build up, maybe assisted in the building up, I don't know, a feeling that he was being put in charge there in the north because of his superior abilities. That was not so at all. It was a matter of communications, and then, of course, Bradley felt rather deeply about it. And that was unfortunate because his business was fighting and not "arguefying" in relation to command arrangements. He was thoroughly capable but I think the fact that a divided command was set up there was seemingly quite essential at the time it occurred.

Q. 11. Do you have any general comments on (a) Allied intelligence prior to the German attack, (b) basic weaknesses in the German plan, (c) the performance of the American soldier in the fact of a surprise attack (there are some commentators who think that this counterattack saw some of the finest American fighting of the war), and (d) the containing of the German penetration?

A. In relation to the Battle of the Bulge, I went through this district and along that front, I think, about three weeks before the battle. It was rather thinly held and the reason for that was explained. They were getting ready to launch an attack towards the Ruhr River and they needed all the men they could get for that. The problem was one of either suspending the idea of the attack they were then building up preparations for or stretching the already lightly held front against a very rugged territory, as they did. I was familiar with that territory because I had gone through it in 1919 following the First World War. I knew what it was like. And I had just gone through the front about three weeks, I believe, before the battle developed. We talked then about how lightly this was held and discussed that in the light of the thinly held front. I don't know just how you would comment on this.

There were those, I believe it was General Bradley, who felt that it was desirable for the Germans to attack there and get themselves involved so that a better job could be done in other directions. Actually, the battle of the Bulge resulted tremendously to the Germans' disadvantage and led to the victory later on. But you couldn't say that during the fighting because they would immediately react in the press to a built up defense to excuse the failure on their part.

The weakness in the German plan was—it was a deep plunge utilizing the really last well-trained and rested reserve they had, which was due to appear near Budapest to resist the

coming Russian attack. If it was successful, it was fine but it was a very hazardous procedure as it turned out to be. They made every conceivable preparation for it, in the way of planning, particularly as to the weather. The weather stations that they set up on an ice floe, I believe, in the Arctic, and over toward Greenland and other places in order to give them a fairly accurate estimate of what was going to happen at that particular period because they all recognized if the airpower we had got loose it would be ruinous to the German efforts.

I think that the statement is correct that some of the finest fighting of the war developed on the part of the American troops in the battle of the Bulge. It was very desperate fighting, and the show up of the divisions that we put in there after the fight developed was very positive proof that we had developed our men to the point where they could outmaneuver and outfight the best trained Germans that there were which they did in the battle of the Bulge. I am referring particularly to those divisions that were brought up from the camp in North Central France and others that were brought into this fight at that time.

I remember there was one comment by a retired Army officer who had a most prominent position in the past that the whole thing was being mismanaged—that no fighting at the tip of the Bulge was going on. Well, that was much commented upon in the Press. But to me that was the best example of a misconception of how you fight such a fight that I read, because naturally what you have got to watch is to see that the base does not spread and to let the point go out as far as it may in a sense. And as long as the salient becomes acute it becomes very hazardous, which is exactly what occurred in the battle of the Bulge. The fighting at the flanks of the Bulge, notably that on the north flank, was one of the best examples of American resisting, disciplinary training,

and fighting that we had during the war. Almost the nearest approach to it, if not the real approach to it, is in some of the fighting in the Anzio bridgehead.

Q. 12. The Malmedy massacre has been much discussed and became the subject of one of Senator McCarthy's first bitter attacks on the Army. He attempted to prove that Jewish officers in the American Army were allowed to force confessions out of the men responsible for the Malmedy killings. The total impression left on some people was that no killings took place. Did you ever check into the Army investigation into these matters? (I knew at least one of the investigators and he was not Jewish and he did not apply illegal methods in getting information).

A. As to the Malmedy massacre and the question of weather I ever checked into the investigation other than those matters, I did not. I thought that such investigation that was going on was sufficient to the purpose. And in a way, it had become political and when one of these matters becomes political, it is rather hopeless in a military way. This factor plays a great part in a lot of this. The minute you turn the political factor on this, why everything is right on one side and everything is wrong on the other. It's a very unfortunate thing, particularly in a democracy that such affairs as that build up and I thought it was very much to the credit of the British government that they did not have to undergo such a performance as we did. It seemed almost in many cases that the greater our success, the more severe later on were the criticisms of it.

Q. 13. The sharpest statement you sent to General Eisenhower during the war was over the failure of his headquarters to better anticipate civilian supply needs in Belgium and France in the winter of 1944-45. As a result of this failure, they asked to dip into Army stockpiles. Any comment on this? Was it largely an administrative matter?

A. As to civilian supply needs in Belgium and France, my recollection of the matter is somewhat limited naturally as I had so many irons in the fire at that time and I was turning to the Pacific. In order to shorten the time of distribution, the supply buildup in what you might call Army dumps was treated directly from the supplies coming into Antwerp. Instead of a great supply base being developed in Antwerp and then from there supplies sent to various Army dumps, to save time they omitted that as I recall and went directly through Antwerp to the Army dumps without the subdivision of supplies being made at Antwerp. Well, when the battle of the Bulge developed, that of course threw this whole cutoff procedure out of gear and made a very dangerous situation because they no longer could ship the supplies directly out the way they were and it posed a most difficult question. As is often the case, it looks easy to do a thing by a short cut but it proves almost calamitous if the enemy tends to his business.

Q. 14. Another pointed statement was sent in the summer of 1944 when you felt that General Smith and other members of Eisenhower's rear echelon were failing to keep you in touch with the developing military situation. Did you lose track of the battle for several days around the first of September 1944?

A. I don't recall this incident.

Q. 15. You were rather barbed in your remarks in January 1945 when a truck of the 28th Division containing codes was stolen. You felt that the "busting" of the corporal who left his truck to get some food and the relief of the signal officer was rather mild punishment for something which might have forced you to change the whole cryptographic set-up. Do you recall this incident?

A. I do recall that, and I did not think they understood what a terrific mess that was going to make for us in this country and I thought a better example should have been made in order to preclude any similar happening abroad.

Q. Another hot cable came in the summer or fall of 1945 when the circulation of Russian occupation money published from Treasury plates began to find itself into the hands of Army personnel and to be sent home in great quantities. Will you give some background on the matter of the plates?

A. I recall the confusion, but I don't recall the details. Sorry, I can't answer on this. I know there were certain plates that the Russians had of this money which caused us embarrassment.

Q. 17. After the failure of the Ardennes attack, Hitler opened a heavy attack in Alsace. General Eisenhower decided to pull back his troops from Strasbourg in order to shorten his line. De Gaulle became much worked up over this—on political grounds—and ordered French troops to hold fast. De Gaulle cabled both Churchill and Roosevelt protesting against Eisenhower's failure to hold the city. Churchill came to France on another matter, but it was widely believed that Eisenhower rescinded his order because of pressure from Churchill and Roosevelt. Did you draft Mr. Roosevelt's message saying that the matter was up to Eisenhower? Did you communicate with Eisenhower about this matter?

A. I have just a faint recollection of the details. Whether or not I drafted the message or not I do not recall. I know I drafted a good many in relation to De Gaulle because he was a very difficult person from every respect and from every point of view, I should say, as he proved for the French government later on.

Q. 18. After the encirclement of the Ruhr, you sent a cable to Eisenhower saying that Secretary Stimson wanted him to refrain from destroying the industrial potential of that area as much as possible. It was clear that he wished to have nothing to do with the Morgenthau idea of pastoralizing Germany. Do you have any comments on this incident?

A. My comment is that Mr. Stimson was very, very much upset over the proposition to pastoralize Germany which Mr. Morgenthau proposed. He was particularly outraged by the idea of destroying the Ruhr and making it no longer accessible to the Germans after the fighting was over. And his memorandum on the subject which is on file and maybe it is quoted in his book, is a very fine public document.

Q. 19. During the period, November – March, 1944-45, our troops suffered a great deal from trench foot. Both the German and British troops had less difficulty in this regard, because of their longer experience. It was some months before we had the problem under complete control. Do you recall efforts made by the War Department to deal with this problem?

A. I don't recall very much of this, but I have a faint recollection that the troops were not well enough trained in it. We found this very much the case in the troops we sent to Alaska, notably Attu and places like that. It is a laborious procedure and it is very hard to enforce it and, unless you have been at it quite some time, it is very difficult to have the troops take the necessary precautions. I have just faint recollections, as I say, of the difficulties we had at that time. I might say though that it is always very hard to act on these things from Washington, because quite naturally there is resentment of the Pentagon, we will say, coming in and telling you how to do your business. Of course, commanders don't like that and that was notably the case in the

Pacific. Our trouble was that the commander himself, as a rule, was so involved with considerations in front of him that he was apt to be slack in his follow-up on conditions in rear of him.

We had a somewhat similar battle in the Pacific over malaria, screening, etc. Now there we found the main trouble was that we gave the authority to the commander to have his people designate what was to be shifted from the base port at San Francisco and Los Angeles, for example, or Seattle. Naturally, the staff, the G-4, wanted ammunition, wanted fighting equipment, wanted that sort of stuff for the front, because they were under heavy pressure to provide it. But, as a matter of fact, what they needed more than anything else in a sense, at the time, was screening and things of that sort, which they were not shipping at all because they took up a lot of space. So I sent out one or two malarial experts out to the Pacific to investigate and I had to caution them very carefully how tactful they must be about it, but I had the screening banked up on the West Coast so it could be sent in a minute and we went ahead and sent it the minute their reports came in. There I felt fully authorized to proceed despite the fact the command did not because it was costing us dear. We had divisions, as I recall the First Marine Division was out of the line for over a year—thirteen months I think. We couldn't supply troops on any such basis as that. We had to take better care of them. Again they were all so busy with the fighting that what went on in rear didn't receive proper consideration. And the G-4 supply people, they were under pressure to provide munitions to provide this and that and the other for the combat fighting and they were very loathe to take up any of this available ship space for anything like netting, screening, and yet it was costing us many, many troops because they were all being stricken down by malaria.

One of the complications about that came up there in the Pacific which was very unusual but it threw us completely off base. We figured out on the replacement basis that the first people that would have to be replaced and fresh ones put in would be the aviation—the combat aviation—but we came to find the people that first needed replacement badly were the ground fellows that were working on the aviation. The trouble was they had to work all night and naturally they had to have glare lights and naturally the mosquitoes swarmed and under the conditions they couldn't wear any screening and they were so filled up with atabrine that they became unsteady. And I remember some pilots stating that they were unwilling to have these fellows work on their planes because they thought they were too uncertain and they would leave vital cotter pins out of place. But it came from the fact they had to work at night, as well as the day time, under bright lights and the mosquitoes just swarmed and they couldn't use screening and they were too full of atabrine which was a preventative. So the ground people were needing replacements before the air fighters.

Q. 20. The Anzio operation has been severely criticized. Wasn't it largely a British decision? Do you think it was as bad a decision as Mr. Truman suggested?

A. I do not recall the exact details of the procedure except that Mr. Churchill had had pneumonia after the Cairo Conference and as he recovered he had several conferences I think where he was at the resort where he used to use as his base for sketching—towards the interior from Casablanca. I have forgotten the name of it right now—quite a sizeable city—and he had meetings there. Just how much approval and detail we were drawn into I don't recall. But there was no meeting of the Chiefs of Staff—the Combined Chiefs of Staff—and the pressure was

very great on the commanders, notably General Wilson and others at that time regarding the Italian operation.

(Heffner—that wasn't the French Riviera? Marshall—what? Heffner—where Churchill did his painting? Marshall—No, no. It was over there in Morocco).

I didn't read Mr. Truman's criticism of Anzio. I thought it was the Salerno operation he was criticizing.

Q. 21. Were you involved in the decision to bomb Monte Cassino? Were the orders to fliers to spare cathedrals and historical monuments imposed on you by the President or did they originate with you?

A. I was not involved in the operation regarding the bombing of Cassino. As I recall, it was done at the request of the New Zealand troops who were going to make an attack. I don't recall where the order originated regarding the bombings near cathedrals and historical monuments.

Q. 22. Were you involved in high level discussions relative to our policy toward the Prime Minister's intervention in Greece in 1944-45? Weren't we afraid that he might get us involved militarily there?

A. We were very much afraid that Mr. Churchill's interest in matters near Athens and in Greece would finally get us involved in that fighting and we were keeping out of it in every way we possibly could.

Q. 23. Were you involved in discussions relative to the rival partisan groups in Yugoslavia or was this left up to the British almost completely?

A. I was not involved in the discussion relative to the rival partisan groups in Yugoslavia as far as I can recall. I think it was left up to the British to decide, but I am not certain as to this.

Q. 24. What were your reactions to Admiral Halsey's actions during the battle of Leyte Gulf? Did you feel that he jeopardized landing operations?

A. I would state no reaction Admiral Halsey's action during the battle of Leyte Gulf. We were too far removed from the cause and effect of those matters and I would not hazard a statement.

Q. 25. What were your reactions to the opposing views of British and American bombing commanders concerning area versus precision bombing? Did you take part in the decisions to use one or the other?

A. I was remotely concerned with the decision as to area bombing and precision bombing and our first demonstration of precision bombing was very effective. The whole matter became sort of twisted as it were when we got into bombing of ships in the Pacific when the precision bombing did not work so well as the ship itself could maneuver out of the way after the bomb had left the plane.

Q. 26. Were your comments invited by General Eisenhower and others in Europe during the argument over what is called the railroad or transportation bombing scheme in the spring of 1944? I suppose that you usually left these matters to General Arnold?

A. I don't recall just how I became involved in the railroad and transportation bombing scheme in the spring of 1944. I know when we were preparing for the landing in Normandy we insisted on knocking out every marshalling yard along the railroad and in doing this, of course, we

touched some of the villages which caused loss among the civilian population, and there was strong cabinet resistance to this on the part of the British, but we felt that the security of our move into Normandy—the safety of our soldiers—demanded that every marshalling yard be completely destroyed and that could not be done without in some places involving the civil population.

Q. 27. Were you concerned over the placing of supply headquarters in Paris in 1944? (General Eisenhower was much opposed to this move of General Lee's and I thought perhaps he was reflecting your views or those of General Somervell's).

A. I do not recall the argument over placing the supply headquarters in Paris.

Q. 28. In August 1944, a colonel in the Paris headquarters sent Secretary Morgenthau a copy of the proposed civil affairs directive to be issued by General Eisenhower when troops entered Germany. Morgenthau took it to the President and the result was a violent eruption followed by a strong cable to Eisenhower telling him to withdraw the directive. Do you recall the background of the situation?

A. I do not recall the incident.

Q. 29. Do you have any comments on the efforts to give aid to General Bor and his followers in Warsaw in August 1944 when the Russians stopped their advance and permitted the Germans to destroy many of the Polish underground fighters?

A. I cannot make any comments on the details of this because they are not clear enough in my mind at the present time.

Q. 30. Did you have any dealings with President Benes of Czechoslovakia during the war? Didn't his desire to keep the goodwill of the Russians make it difficult for us to give aid the Czechs in the closing days of the war?

A. I had some dealings with President Benes but largely as I recall with his son, who later committed suicide—or supposedly committed suicide—by jumping out the window of the bathroom of his house. [He has confused Benes with Masaryk]. He came to me and he was in great distress and his situation was tragic.

Q. 31. In March and early April 1945, there was considerable speculation in Intelligence circles about the possibility of the Germans creating a National Redoubt in Bavaria and Austria for a last stand against the Allies. Recent writers have blamed an exaggerated belief in the National Redoubt by the Americans for General Eisenhower's decision to stop at the Elbe. Do you recall whether or not there was any wide acceptance of this National Redoubt theory in Washington?

A. There was a general feeling in the Pentagon that the Germans would build up a last stand in Bavaria. Already one or two of their commanders, notably their air commander, the head fellow, were down there and we felt they would make a last desperate try to support themselves and prolong the war. Because, as Hitler had said, Germany would commit suicide and he was in the business of seeing that they did commit suicide, which was largely done particularly in Berlin and other places of that nature. I don't know how wide the acceptance was but I do know we felt that there was a strong possibility that a strong force would be built up in Bavaria and we must get there before they could spread it out into a well fortified force. That was one reason we wanted to get there as quickly as we could.

Q. 32. In the spring of 1945, we had considerable difficulty with the Russians in Europe in the effort to get proper coordination for purposes of bombing and for proper action in case of the meeting of Russian and Allied forces. These difficulties were partly responsible for Eisenhower's decision to stop on an easily recognizable line such as the Elbe. Any comments on these difficulties?

A. I can't answer that. It seems logical. That may have been one of the reasons because a firm boundary would be a great advantage and the Elbe certainly provided that.

Q. 33. In October 1944, military planners in Washington discussed the possibility of ending the war by the end of the year. While it seems doubtful that anyone believed that this was really possible, it was decided to make an all-out effort to end it. One result of the discussion was the decision to release the proximity fuze for use. How seriously was this chance taken by planners in the fall of 1944?

A. There was a feeling among the Chiefs of Staff and their immediate advisers that events might develop which would lead to a breakup of the war in the close of 1944 or the very early spring of 1945. This would refer quite definitely to the satellite states and their actions. If they began to break off that might precipitate the action. And we knew in a way—I don't recall just what details—that the commanders of the German Army, the old regular army, were in favor of surrendering. And the whole question was whether they got dominance in the matter or not. So to us, certainly to me, it was not a hopeless proposition that the fighting might be ended at the end of 1944.

Q. 34. Since the rough session Malta was held in private, I had to depend in my earlier writing on statements by Alanbrooke, Cunningham, and others, all of whom agreed that it was a warm session. What is your version of the episode?

A. The session at Malta was, as described, a very hot one. We had great difficulty in reaching a general decision. As I recall, the troubles at the time were these: Montgomery wanted certain troops and a lead in the control of the crossing of the Rhine. The troops had to largely come from the American forces because he did not have a great many. And he was very urgent that he be given complete control at the time. Eisenhower gave him practically everything he asked for. I think he gave him everything he asked for. But that did not satisfy him. It was quite evident that what was wanted was complete command. And prior to that the Prime Minister had approached me and in discussion, I think, with Mr. Roosevelt present at Malta, to put General Alexander in general command of all the ground troops. We were successful in resisting that but it was growing difficult and more difficult. It was getting to be quite a serious political matter—and it was a political matter. And we had a hard time beating it off. Our first conversation, as I recall, took place on the President's ship in the harbor at Malta. Now as we got up to these meetings, leading to the advance on the Rhine—the "closing on the Rhine" was the language used—to which Mr. Churchill took exception—it was a new term to me in a military way and I found out it had been lifted from the British, but it was a little bit too fancy. And it was advance on the Rhine what they were after and the eventual crossing of it, and we had a very, very difficult time. And I found out— I have a clear recollection of this—I found out that they had told General Smith, who had come down, that they were fearful of the effects of my talks with General Eisenhower—that I would prejudice him out of his position as Supreme Commander.

So I said, as I recall, at this meeting that when it come to that I would like them to take another view of it. I said I saw General Eisenhower very seldom. And Mr. Roosevelt hardly ever saw him. But he was under the guns from Mr. Churchill almost twice a day at times and very, very frequently all the time. And if there was anybody to be worried about the matter it was the American government in regard to Prime Minister Churchill's influence on General Eisenhower and they would have to take that from me. And General Bradley felt the same way I did. And we had this argument about the matter and they were trying to restrict this thing so Bradley couldn't advance to the Rhine—close on the Rhine as they said. There was a great deal of conversation as to what they meant. They were all afraid of Patton getting loose down there. Well, the end was Bradley got the Remagen Bridge and crossed the Rhine before the big operation took place and exploited it promptly and very efficiently. And then Patton, to exaggerate a little bit, got hold of a few boats and made another crossing to the south. So we had two crossings going on and getting well established in the operation of encircling the Ruhr district which later on we found we had cut off a very large number of troops. Meanwhile, Montgomery came up to the Rhine with everything that could be supplied him—with naval forces, he had everything—and he crossed the Rhine and went forward then. But the excitement had been somewhat taken out of it by the fortunate development of the Remagen Bridge and the quick way it had been realized by General Bradley.

I must say now though that all these matters there are the pressures from home to be understood. The pressures, particularly by the British Cabinet—the American Cabinet didn't get into this sort of thing—it was purely Mr. Roosevelt and the Chiefs of Staff, rather than the Cabinet. But, of course, public opinion got into it very largely and public opinion had to be

considered by us. And in Great Britain they were up against public opinion, notably because they had given the command to General Eisenhower and how by their Press had been led to believe that Montgomery had saved the situation, when it was nothing in the world but a very proper division at a certain stage of the fighting of the battle of the Bulge.

The dissension wasn't too much considering the conditions under which we had to operate. I think it was rather remarkable that we were able to do it with as little dissension as we did and with as much concession as we found on the part of the British. Because one must never forget…

(End of Side One.)

SIDE 2

I am going to repeat what I started to say in answer to question 94 [i.e. 34] as to the rough session at Malta. I have already explained that it was rough and I have explained what the great argument was at the time. And my comment to them about the fact that they were worrying over Bradley's contacts with General Eisenhower when we had much more reason to worry over Mr. Churchill's constant overseeing of what Eisenhower was doing which our President was not doing at all. Didn't have much opportunity to do it in the first place and he was very guarded that he didn't try to influence an Allied Commander, purely as President of the United States

I think I was concluding by saying that while these sessions of lively arguments came up—and they were lively and they were very frank—but we always came to a harmonious conclusion. We Americans must keep in mind that the British made tremendous concessions

that posed for them a very difficult situation regarding public opinion. They gave supreme command to General Eisenhower in Africa when we had very few troops there and they had the dominant armies. They gave the Supreme Command and reiterated it to General Eisenhower when General Montgomery's famous Eighth Army came up along the northern rim of Africa after its triumphant career from the initial flight near Alexandria to the final fights in Tunisia. The British public would undoubtedly demand for him supreme command. And yet the Prime Minister was able to manage that Eisenhower continued in supreme commander and was able to have this reiterated at the time the two armies came together. What was in North Africa on the western part of British troops of First Army and American troops that were just slowly collecting there—and I say slowing collecting—because it was a very slow business. Now here came the victorious Eighth Army, but in the face of that situation Mr. Churchill went ahead and saw that General Eisenhower was confirmed as Supreme Commander. He was outranked—one was a Field Marshal—and he was, I don't recall whether he was a General then. I think he was though, but he was not a five star general, I don't believe. That can be easily checked. And I thought it was very, very wonderful that Mr. Churchill was able to put across those arrangements because it must have been exceedingly trying to justify them to the British public and first to the British War Cabinet. So I think that we have a great deal to remember in relation to matters of that kind. Where Montgomery irritated and craved command and tried to get a hold of it, Mr. Churchill went straight ahead, I thought, in a very fine way. He had to represent Alexander's interest and Montgomery's interest, but he stood by his commitments and was able to put them by with his own public and his own political situation and he had many striking against him in Parliament at that time.

Q. 35. Would you discuss something of arrangements for entertainment at Yalta? Several accounts mention that you and others teased Admiral King because he was given the Tsarina's boudoir for his room.

A. I think I had the Tsarina's room. And his had been an open sort of veranda which they said was where Rasputin came up the ladder to see the Tsarina. However, we were both right there together and we didn't personally fight over who had the Tsarina's room. That was a secondary affair at this time.

As to entertainments, Mr. Roosevelt entertained at dinner—I don't recall in a big way—but he tried to have each of his suite for dinner with him which I though very unwise because he looked very, very tired. I remember he had some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (American) for dinner one night and he was quite late coming from his meeting with the Russians and the British, presumably, and looked very, very tired. And I thought it was most unwise that he had to put himself out for a gesture of that sort at that particular time.

As to the general entertainment, I was somewhat amused nearly as one could be with the political heights in which apparently I was king at Yalta—so far as the Republican attacks on me were concerned. As a matter of fact when they had the final dinner at Yalta, and it was organized by the Russians and the Americans submitted their guest lists, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff weren't even invited. The senior chairman, Leahy, was invited. The British Chiefs of Staff were in attendance, but the American Chiefs of Staff were left out. So that was the dominant position I occupied at that particular time. But to lead the debates in Congress one would have thought I was cock of the walk all the way through. And I remember that Mr. Byrnes was very critical of

the fact that the British Chiefs of Staff were present and King and I were not present at all. I don't recall the other entertainments that went on, but I know when Stalin came to a meeting or dinner he was accompanied by his guards who always stood at port arms with submachine guns.

Q. 36. Do you feel that Churchill's earlier concessions to Russian on the Baltic states and on Poland prejudiced his chances to get any favorable action out of Russia at Yalta?

A. I do not think so.

Q. 37. Do you feel that the earlier talks of Churchill with Stalin about special British interests in Greece and Yugoslavia and special Russian interests in Bulgaria and elsewhere in the Balkans prejudiced any Allied appeal to Stalin based on moral grounds?

A. I would not know how to answer that.

Q. 38. Did we give Russia anything at Yalta which she did not have or could not have taken?

A. I don't recall what we gave her at Yalta outside of the President's Chinese agreement with which I had nothing to do.

A. 39. In a chapter I wrote in a book on Yalta, I suggest that not only were American leaders aware in February 1945 of the possible need of Russian help in defeating the Japanese, but also of their continued help in the fight against Germany. I mentioned the fact that Eisenhower had only recently pressed you to make sure of Russian help for the spring attack on Germany and that General Smith at Malta spoke of the possibility that Russia might not take an active part in the war hereafter, leaving us with the main job of fighting the Germans. Was the German

situation in your mind at the time of the Yalta meeting? Had Eisenhower discussed with you at Marseille the need of Russian help against Germany?

A. [German situation] Well, it was very serious. They were being pressed continuously by the Russians and we were bending around and getting our way very largely on our portion of the front in Western Europe. It was the question of pressing them in a well-regulated strategy that was all-important at this particular time.

(Meeting with Eisenhower at Marseille). I don't recall his accentuating the need of Russian help against Germany. He had already communicated with us time after time asking us to press the Russians to hasten their attacks. What we needed was a clearing of the weather in order that the Russians might be able to handle the bad roads situation which confronted them in western Russia.

Q. 40. Did you get the impression that Leahy and King were strongly opposed to Russian help in the Pacific at the time of the Yalta conference?

A. I did not get the impression at all that Leahy and King were strongly opposed to Russian help in the Pacific at the time of the Yalta Conference. This was news to me when it came out in recent years.

Q. 41. Did you talk with President Roosevelt about the need of making concessions to Russia in order to get help against Japan?

A. I did not talk to the President about the need of making concessions to Russia in order to get help against Japan. Stalin had been very specific as to what he could do if we gave him the time

in which to do it. He discussed with me how long it would take to move the troops they would have to move through Siberia to get ready for the attack in cooperation with us against the Russians [he means Japanese]. He went into the days required, the character of the attack, as I recall, and actually he followed out the schedule that he talked over to the day, when the event finally developed in the opening of the war with Japan.

Q. 42. Did you feel the Russian demands excessive in view of their strength, sacrifices, and our notion that we might need help?

A. I wouldn't comment on this because it involved so many political factors.

Q. 43. Were you aware of Stalin's demands to the President in regard to the Far East during the Yalta meeting?

A. No, I was not aware of Stalin's demands—to the best of my recollection.

Q. 44. Were you impressed by General Groves' estimate as to the availability of at least one A bomb by August 1945—at the time of the Yalta meeting?

A. Yes, I guess I was impressed, though I don't recall my exact reactions until we got around to figuring the use of the bomb in connection with our prospective move into Japan.

Q. 45. Do you feel that Army briefing for the Yalta meeting was adequate? Did you make use of material furnished by the State Department?

A. I do not recall the material furnished by the State Department. I presume it was. And I did not feel that we had a dearth of material at that time. I was not called into the political conferences.

I might explain that the first meeting at Yalta, according to my recollection was, all the principals were present, meaning the President, the prime minister, Stalin, the British chiefs of staff, Russian equivalent formation and our formation, and I don't remember who else but it was a large circular table full and there were others sitting on the outskirts. Just who they were I don't recall now. I recall specifically that when the meeting got underway Stalin read a paper outlining the Russian situation in a military way—all was written and he read it through. Then when he put it down it was time for the Allies to proceed. And Mr. Churchill suggested to Mr. Roosevelt that I be called on to state the American side. Well, I had nothing in writing at all and had no intimation that this was coming. But I had done it before at Tehran—the situation at that time. And Mr. Churchill called on me again here at Yalta—the military set-up of the Allies. I went through the description of the set-up, which was a rather lengthy one. That completed my part in the conference aside from listening to discussions which continued on in a very general way.

Q. 46. Did you ever get the impression that Alger Hiss was exerting a great influence at the Yalta meeting? Is the view that he kept mainly to matters relating to the organization of the U. N.?

A. I think I met him together with three or four other state officials. Ed Stettinius made the introduction. I didn't recall Hiss at all nor did I see these other men after that meeting because

they went into the political business which Admiral Leahy attended. And we, Admiral King and myself, and the airman, who was acting in the place of General Arnold, proceeded with our own meetings with the Russian Chiefs of Staff.

Q. 47. Did you have the impression prior to Yalta that General MacArthur was opposed to Russian entry into the war in the Pacific?

A. I had no impression that General MacArthur was opposed to Russia entering the war. Quite the opposite.

Q. 48. Did you feel that we mistreated China by concessions to Russia at Yalta?

A. I expressed no feelings in the matter at all because I didn't learn of it until later. My own feeling was that it was going to present a very difficult situation for the President with Chiang Kai-shek.

Q. 49. It has sometimes been said that if General Arnold had gone to Yalta, he could have made the President listen to Air Force information which showed there was no need of Russian aid in defeating Japan. Did he mention any such information to you or did anyone mention this to you?

A. Omitted)

Q. 50. Were you aware of any widespread opposition to Russian participation in the war against Japan until April or May 1945?

A. I don't recall it.

Q. 51. General Courtney Whitney in his book on General MacArthur tells of a paper drawn up by senior intelligence officers in the Pentagon about April 1945. He says that they opposed bringing Russia into the war and wanted you to bring MacArthur back from the Pacific so he could tell Roosevelt this. This paper hasn't been found. Do you recall any such report?

A. I don't recall the paper that Whitney refers to.

Q. 52. What was your feeling about Roosevelt's health at Yalta? Did you get the impression that he was being pushed about because of ill health?

A. I thought Roosevelt looked very badly at Yalta. In fact, I was quite shocked by his looks. The more so, General Watson's appearance. I thought he never should have been allowed to come on the trip. I know when Mr. Roosevelt had us for dinner, just an informal dinner at the end of a day's conference with the Russians which we did not attend—the chiefs of staff, thought he was very tired and I thought the dinner should never have been had.

Q. 53. Did you oppose any of the President's actions at Yalta?

A. I was not asked to oppose any of Mr. Roosevelt's actions or approve them other than the military part which went right along in the way we had planned.

Q. 54. Any general comments on Yalta in retrospect?

A. I think Yalta has become so much a political factor, a political discussion that it would be almost impossible to get at the real reactions of the day and the time. I find in all these things when you go into history, the historical discussions, and they get into Congress and other things, they are so con-twisted that it is almost impossible to discuss them. And you find on the part of

officers very frequently, tragically, I think, too frequently, that their later states of mind don't accord with what they had in mind at the time. Apparently they are sort of "backed out" by the political recriminations and accusations. But this is to be expected though I think it was far too common except that we had a tremendous political war on. We had a Republican party that had been out of power for a long time. They had built up a great deal of feeling towards Mr. Roosevelt and there was some Democrat assistance to it, I believe. And they were trying in every way to find a basis for defeating him in case he ran again for re-election. So that you say all is fair in love and war, there was certainly plenty of the unfair in this war; however, much there may be in the matter of love. But in all these matters I find that the minute it gets into the political ring, it would be very difficult for the ordinary citizen to ever ferret out what would be the truth of the matter. The accusations are so numerous, so altogether remarkable at time, theat you can hardly believe what you read. But, of course, you have a large number who want to get in the public print. And you have others who feel very deeply and are quite prejudiced. And you have other historians who really try to get at the basic truths in the matter. Unless you diagnose which crowd you are dealing with, it is very hard. It is literally like the Civil War afterwards. You find that General Lee seldom did anything right—the other fellow could always have done something better, but actually General Lee dominated an army and led it in a magnificent manner. He had his troubles. Everybody in the world has his troubles. And he might have done something different, yes. But there was nobody else to take his place and put up his superb demonstration that he did. You might go into Grant's campaigns in the Wilderness—terrific losses that he suffered. I believe that the soldiers called him "The Butcher" at the end of the thing. But he became triumphant and he won and that was the great factor. The war was over.

Grant was triumphant. There you were. It was a long time before they began to dig up Confederates who felt they could have done better than General Lee. Well, I have not yet read of anyone who put up a logical argument to that effect. Of course, you are dealing all the time with a Monday quarterback. In many cases, most cases, he wouldn't have dared to do the things he talks about. But after it is all made clear and all is seen, he can tell you pretty well how it ought to have been done.

Dr. Pogue, I hope this record proves readable and understandable. It covers a wide ground of dissension and criticism, and I am just dictating out of hand as I read the questions. I think you ought to follow the system of noting down certain things you don't think you have gotten a satisfactory reply from me or you think my reply is rather bad judgment and keep all these summed up and when I get back to Leesburg then you can come down in person and we can discuss all those various matters.

Tape 14

Interview with General Marshall

February 11, 1957

TAPE 14M

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL BY FORREST C. POGUE AT PINEHURST, NORTH CAROLINA, FEBRUARY 11, 1957. Sgt. HEFFNER RAN THE MACHINE.

Q. 55. During the latter part of October 1944, Hopkins heard from General Marshall the amazing story of how someone, apparently in the Armed Forces, had imparted to Dewey the fact that the U. S. had broken the Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor. Later Hopkins told Roosevelt the action which General Marshall had taken in persuading Mr. Dewey not to make this fact public. The President was surprised at Marshall's action, but expressed no criticism of the action. Hopkins said that he never discovered who gave Governor Dewey this military information. (*Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins*) Will you discuss this incident and how you handled it?

A. In some way, the fact that we had this code— rather than codes— had leaked out to a few who had informed the Dewey regime, meaning Bell, I believe, whoever was his head man at the time in the management and publicity connected with the campaign. Of course, it was of tremendous importance to us to keep this code business quiet because if we lost it we lost the most valuable information we could possibly have gotten in regard to Japanese operations. It was the same code that they had had at the time of Pearl Harbor. At this particular time that I am referring to we learned that knowledge of the code was in the possession of somebody connected with the Dewey affair, we were chopping down the Japanese sea power, particularly their transports, cargo boats, with great rapidity in the process of rapidly bringing the China Sea into an area free of the Japanese shipping and forcing them into a consideration of even moving their head government over across the Straits.

Just how the code business leaked out I don't know but always somebody talks. It was very difficult to keep it absolutely quiet because each fellow who was at all in the upper reaches felt he had a right to know. I wouldn't have this put into your record papers, but I found in one case that Pa Watson at one time was taking the translation of the code that had been sent to the President and putting them in his waste basket. [Note by FCP—this was revealed in the Pearl Harbor testimony]. We were having a terrible time keeping this quiet because various offices in the War Department notably the Secretary of War and Assistant Secretary, Jack McCloy's office, had had the advantage of reading these translations of the code or rather particularly looking at my record book of the day's messages of every kind. When I found there was some loose talking by some of their office force, we stopped that wide distribution, particularly distribution of my operation book and just sent up particular papers for the Secretary's or McCloy's information. Incidentally, McCloy was the channel of information for the Secretary of War. Now we learnt, I have forgotten how, that Mr. Dewey not only had this information, but there was a plan to use it on his campaign. And he was en route at that time form point to point and I think in Oklahoma at the time I picked this up. I prepared a letter which is in the records in which I spoke for Admiral King and myself and asked Mr. Dewey to read the first paragraph and if he would not go along to what we were going to propose not to read any further in the letter. He wouldn't agree to that. I sent an officer to him—I think he had just been made a brigadier general not so long ago—and the officer came back and said that Mr. Dewey didn't feel he could make a commitment like that when he was in the middle of a campaign and the representative of the Republican party. So I modified it to the extent of agreeing to his showing it to one person—who I think was the Treasurer of New York—but he was on the political staff of Mr. Dewey—that can be checked upped very quickly. The agreement being it would not be divulged to

anybody else at all. As a matter of fact in the end this individual, whose name I don't get, talked to the *Life* magazine people after the war and disclosed the fact that we had the code and it destroyed the English code system. I know they had ten thousand people involved in one office there that had the machinery and all for rapidly deciphering these messages and that we largely destroyed and our code business was put out of business completely by this disclosure. So it was very serious matter. But it was particularly serious at the time I first mention because we were rapidly destroying—the Navy was in particular—and some of our aircraft and the Army were—all of the Japanese shipping in the China Sea and further north. And it was only a short time until we almost wiped it all out. Of course that was a tremendous asset and it was also a tremendous help to us because in the guidance to our other operations, particularly the naval and air operations which touched on the China Sea area. I have explained what the agreement was with Mr. Dewey and what the denouement was which played quite a part, when they began the Pearl Harbor investigation against me after the war was over. They dragged out in the open the fact of the code because Sen. Ferguson, I believe, anyway he was form Michigan, insisted that the public must know about this. Well, of course, it just raised the devil with what we had at that time in the way of secrecy about the code business. There was so much political performance going on at that time—and particularly against Mr. Roosevelt—which dragged me, of course, into a leading position in it—which was highly destructive in its results. In this business I wrote the letter to Admiral Dewey on my initiative and I showed it to King and I said if he didn't care to be mentioned in it and included with me. We would drop that out and I would take the full responsibility for the letter. But he assented to be included in it. We were trying to stop any possibility of this code being disclosed right in the middle of this campaign by the Air, Army, and Navy and the Navy itself under admiral Halsey in the China Sea area, which led, as the

record will show, to one of the most rapid destructions of the shipping of a nation that I think has ever occurred in warfare.

So we had a very hard time with this. We had a hard time in the War Department, keeping it quiet because if they knew its existence they all wanted to have it. You know that a secret only holds with two people. After that it becomes public property. It was furnished to the State Department for a long time. I don't remember how long that went on. But I know way early in the game in the first years before we actually got into war a new appointment of an Under Secretary of the State Department enthusiastically called me up on the telephone to tell me what interesting reading it was. Well, I suppressed the telephone call right there and I tried to suppress the whole matter under discussion. But we were unaccustomed to such business and there was great freedom of talk and I think it in that way, somehow or another, the whole matter leaked out and came into possession of Mr. Dewey's henchman and was going to be used as a threat against Roosevelt, I believe, to prove that he allowed the war to develop with his knowledge or with his assistance. In regard to the question that if General Arnold had been at Yalta, he would have been able to make the President listen to the Air Force intelligence which showed there was no need for the Russians' help—No answer.

Q. 56. American policy in 1944 was in favor of shifting the greater part of U. S. Forces from Italy to northwest Europe as soon as possible. By the time of Yalta, however, General Marshall had agreed to leave Fifth Army intact in Italy. Was this change due to a desire to satisfy the Prime Minister or to permit the Canadians to take their forces out of Italy or to some other consideration?

A. It was in part due to the necessity of transferring Canadian troops north in preparation for the landing at Flanders and in part due to the needs of that army in Italy, meaning the combinations of the various countries involved there for more air during this period.

Q. 57. Shipping shortages developed in 1944. British official historians claim this was due to the fact that control of shipping in the United States had come into the control of military authorities and that they permitted various commands to hoard ships. Many ships in the Pacific were not being used. This was shown in the latter part of 1944 when an outcry over the situation produced five million tons of shipping from the Pacific. Do you have any comment on this? Did you feel that the Navy tended to be wasteful about shipping? Or were the British unusually sensitive on this point?

A. In regard to this, I felt that in certain places the Navy procedure was wasteful of shipping but it generally came from local reasons. I remember I sent General Arnold out to the Pacific in the early days to the headquarters of the naval commander in that area and I forget the name of the large land space or island off Australia where the headquarters was established. I should have a map here, but I haven't. And I told him in particular while he was out there looking into the air set-up and all, which was being established firmly and increased in order to assist in the defense of Guadalcanal which was under heavy attack at that time, that he would personally count the shipping in the anchorage there, and as I recall he found eighty-two or ninety-two vessels that had accumulated there. The admiral was hesitant about sending them to Guadalcanal because they would get under bombing if they went into the tedious beach landings which were necessary and the result was he was holding this shipping up—all cargo laden—in the harbor there. Of course, we brought pressure to bear to have it cut down. The wastefulness occurred though the difficulty of landing at Guadalcanal and the vessels going up and then coming back without

discharging their load and then being held for another attempt at the same place, which is quite different from just the plain charge of being wasteful of shipping. Everybody had to be watched on this count because the tendency was if you had a ship to hold on to it. What we were after was a general distribution that could be let out as the necessity demanded. There was always this shortage clear almost to the end of the war. And it was always very difficult to handle, particularly as the Navy, the local commander, would naturally resent Army inspections going into this place and checking up on them and the accusation being made that they were wasteful of shipping. And they would probably turn around and say we were wasteful of shipping. So it was a two-sided affair and very, very difficult to handle. But on the back of that, of course, was the British pressure which was very real pressure and a justified pressure, but not always particularly tactful.

Q. 58. Field Marshal Wilson was appointed head of the British Joint Staff Mission to the United States in the spring of 1945 after the death of Field Marshal Dill. Did you ever have anything like the same close relations with Wilson that you did with Dill? Please contrast the qualities of the two men.

A. Wilson came over here very fully informed as to the relationship between Field Marshal Sir John Dill and myself, and I think he tried his best to develop the same relationship with me. I didn't help him too much. And for the reason that the relationship between Dill and myself covered a long period of time and a very intimate understanding of each other. And it took me time to feel out the real Wilson. And I was also a little sensitive about it because I thought that Wilson had possibly not held to his command situation in the Mediterranean quite the way Dill would have done it. In other words, he yielded to pressures coming largely from the Prime Minister which was also natural but to be guarded against.

Incidentally, they were quite two different characters. Dill was a most unusual man. He not only had remarkable character but he had even more remarkable courage in carrying out his duties. He had been chief of staff of the British Army and had after that come to this country. His opinions of affairs for quite awhile didn't jibe with those of Mr. Churchill and some of the others and that made it a rather delicate business, but he talked with extreme frankness. Now we have to be very careful about this and I don't know whether this should be anyway referred to outright in your record, but it finally reached the point where Mr. Roosevelt was always very sensitive about the reports on his own conduct of affairs. He didn't want a record of cabinet meetings. He didn't give us the messages he was sending half the time. He would communicate with Churchill, he would receive a message for Churchill and I would be wholly unaware of it though it directly affected the affairs of the Army and the Air and maybe the Navy. In this peculiar way I kept track of this matter. When a message would go from the President to Churchill addressed to My Naval Friend, who was Churchill, that would immediately go in the special distribution that was regulated by the affairs of the British officialdom so that everybody that should know that immediately got a copy of it and of course that would right away go to the [British] Chief of Staff and the senior of them. Then Dill should know this and would get a copy of it. Then Dill would come over to my office and I would get Mr. Roosevelt's message through Field Marshal Sir John Dill. Otherwise I wouldn't know what it was. I had to be very careful that nobody knew this—no one in the War Department—and certainly not the Chiefs of Staff, because Dill would be destroyed in a minute if his was discovered. But he knew I had to have it or should have it and he just brought it to me and read it to me. He sat opposite me at my desk and went over it. Of course, Wilson did not have the benefit of all those exchanges that we had. This was quite a risky thing for Dill but he realized that we just had to have the information.

Why should the British Chiefs of Staff have it—it was from our President—and the American Chiefs of Staff not have it? But it was just Mr. Roosevelt's desire for secrecy. But it went to everybody else so I would get it through Dill, which is a rather unusual circumstance. I got the other the same way. When the Prime Minister sent a message to Mr. Roosevelt, Dill would bring a copy and I never disclosed that fact to any of the Chiefs of Staff and certainly not to the President. But it kept me *au courant* with what was going on and I couldn't have got it any other way. I could understand exactly why they were doing as they did, but I didn't think they quite understood the absolute necessity of the information on my side of the operations. Dill was thoroughly familiar with this. He had been Chief of Staff of the British Army; he was the representative of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington and he was interested solely in the most advantageous conduct of the war. But neither one of us could discuss it with anybody. I will go even further to say— you will have to guard this pretty carefully— that Dill would frequently get messages from Mr. Churchill and ask him to ascertain General Marshall's communication. And then he and I would make up the reply. And very often when I wouldn't agree with it at all, very decidedly wouldn't agree to it, I would comment very forcibly and freely to Dill in a way I couldn't possibly comment to the Prime Minister. Then Dill would report that to Mr. Churchill and that was what I said to Dill. And in that way my own feeling got across to Mr. Churchill. It was a rather curious set up, but a very effectual one in this business because these were all strong men—Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill—and the coordination of these matters was of vital importance. I was in a position so far as it affected military affairs and things of that sort to know better than almost any of them how important it was that we should have certain information and I got it in that way. But I have never disclosed it until this minute.

Q. 59. Early in 1945 a controversy arose between the British and American authorities over Eisenhower's direct approach to Stalin and over Eisenhower's decision to make his main drive from the Ruhr to Leipzig instead of in the north. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff insisted at this point that they must back Eisenhower's judgment. Do you have any comments on developments in this phase of the war?

A. I have no particular comment on this. I still agree with the decision of the American Chiefs of Staff on the matter. It was something for General Eisenhower as commander.

Q. 60. On April 28, 1945, General Marshall said to Eisenhower: "Personally, I should be loathe to hazard American lives for purely political purposes." This and similar views by Generals Eisenhower and Bradley have been attacked by American and British writers as a failure of the military to take proper account of political factors in their decisions. Such views raise the question as to what extent the military should undertake to introduce political considerations into their decisions. What is your view in retrospect of this argument?

A. In regard to the political aspects which some British historians and some British officials feel that I was not sufficiently mindful of—and General Eisenhower and General Bradley—I have this to say: we probably devoted more time in our discussions, our intimate discussions, the American Chiefs of Staffs, to such matters as any one subject, because we were very fearful that we might find our whole campaign upset by some political gesture. I frankly was fearful of Mr. Roosevelt introducing political methods of which he was a genius into a military thing which had to be on a fixed basis. This was particularly so in regard to the Baltic states [probably means Balkans] and the now-termed satellite states and certain Mediterranean things. You can't treat military factors in the way you do political factors. It's quite a different affair. You have to be very exact, very clearly informed and very precise in what you say in regard to military things.

Now as to whether we did not regard diplomatic factors sufficiently, I repeat again that we discussed these things more than anything else. But that was Mr. Roosevelt's and our problem was to be on guard that the military picture—meaning Air, Navy and Army—was not completely disjointed by what I will call some irrelevant political gestures which were made without due thought to what was going on at the time. Of course, Mr. Churchill and the President were the dominant factors in all arrangements and all guidance. And they were the great political leaders of their country but they were also the military leaders and it was quite a delicate issue back and forth particularly in matters like the Mediterranean, the soft belly of Europe, the Balkan states, the marches on Berlin and things of that sort. Well, there were a great many factors connected with all these things but we had to give special regard to the particular military factors and make certain there were no misunderstandings or failure in this respect. I repeat again that I doubt if there was any one thing except the shortage of LSTs that came to our minds more frequently than the political factors. But we were very careful, exceedingly careful, never to discuss them with the British and from that, they took the count that we didn't observe those things at all. But we observed them constantly, with great frequency, and particular solicitude, so that there is no foundation in that. We didn't discuss it with them because we were not in any way putting our neck out as to political factors which were the business of the head of the state—the president—who happened also to be the commander-in-chief.

I have just discussed this pretty plainly and I think to the full. When the final considerations came, the president sat in—well more than sat in, he called the meeting—and we discussed the thing. You take, for example, the subdivisions of Western Europe when we were trying to settle the apportionments for control as the peace was developed. I think we discussed halfway across the South Atlantic the various factors, you might say, of a political nature which

were the President's deep concern in these matters, and which affected vitally the decisions which were made—which now may seem military decisions but they were very decidedly political decisions.

Q. 61. Do you feel that the military authorities should undertake to make political decisions?

A. I do not think the military authorities should make any political decisions unless they are instructed accordingly, because the effects are too wide-reaching, there are too many influences involved, and it is quite a question of how much of this would be familiar to the military participants. And also it must be remembered the military responsibility in operations is very, very large, and it has with it a terrible measure of casualties. I know I was very careful to send Mr. Roosevelt every few days a statement of our casualties and it was done in a very effective way, graphically and rather in colors, so it would be quite clear to him when he had only a moment or two to consider, because I tried to keep before him all the time the casualty results because you get hardened to these things and you have to be very careful to keep them always in the forefront of your mind.

Q. 62. In retrospect, do you feel that we should have tried to take Berlin and Prague as Churchill wanted us to do?

A. No, I do not think we should have gone into Berlin at that time. I am not so certain about Prague. I think it would have been better to have probably done this. However, it must be remembered that all this time we were trying to do business with Russia. We had been fighting with them. They were part of the armed forces—a very decided part. They had played a great part in the fighting, the wearing down of the German strength and we had to take that all into careful regard. At that time, toward the close of the struggle, they were exceedingly sensitive, looking all the time for something that would indicate that the British and Americans were

preparing to go off along and to settle the thing in a way to their—British and American—satisfaction and to the disadvantage of the Russians. So we were very careful about this—the Americans more so than the British—because Mr. Churchill was quite positive in the matter and events and time have rather proved that he was possibly more nearly right than the American position. But we were trying very hard to find a basis of negotiation to go along with the Russian government. Eisenhower was in a particularly trying position because in command of the troops he was brought into constant situations that had to be handled with great delicacy and almost invariably he had to handle them in a way that displeased one party or the other and I thought he did extraordinarily well in this matter. Now just what the effect would have been of the question of Prague is open to discussion. I might say in all this it is very much a Monday quarterback business because all sorts of things have happened since those days and our relations with Russia at that time were quite different. They were always delicate; they were always jealous and it was very, very hard to preserve a coordinated association with them. But we did it to a very large extent at that time, which is unthinkable today in the knowledge of later events. Nobody but the Lord could foresee all that has happened since.

Q. 63. In December 1951 in a speech in New York I said that Eisenhower based his decision to stop at the Elbe on purely military basis and that if he had not he would have been criticized by the same people who now say that political and military factors should be combined. Any comments?

A. I think your answer to that question in New York was correct—in the abstract. In things like this, very often, the people who are criticizing the decision now would have been the most violent attackers of it at the time if it had been carried out the way they advocated.

Q. 63a. Several British writers, including the official historians, have declared that as Roosevelt declined in health, General Marshall took over the making of U. S. strategy. One writer, saying that General Marshall wrote the message of April 5, 1945, in which Roosevelt took Stalin sharply to task for impugning American motives in negotiating with the Germans in Italy, concludes that "unknown to the British, General Marshall has been largely responsible for the strategic decisions bearing Roosevelt's name…" Any comments on this?

A. In regard to the message mentioned of April 5, 1945, although I don't have the records here, but I think I know which one was mentioned. I believe it is the one Mr. Churchill makes quite a point of in his book. I wrote the message and repeated it to Mr. Roosevelt at Warm Springs. It is a fact that more and more Mr. Roosevelt utilized my services in connection with the matters of this sort. I wouldn't say that they were unknown to the British other than to say that we were not required to repeat every conversation Mr. Roosevelt and I had to the British government. That was a matter to be decided between Mr. Roosevelt and myself as he dictated. He had grown seemingly a little more dependent on me as the years went on. I don't think it was entirely a matter of ill health. At first, he didn't accept my views on such matters very easily. He was accustomed to dealing with so many political factors where you have to be so careful and have to possess such a wide background of knowledge of the people involved that it was quite understandable for a long time that he rather hesitated about taking me into his confidence. Also, I had to be proven. He had appointed me without any large war experience—except being with General Pershing in the First World War and for a time Chief of Operations of an army of almost a million men and I was pretty young. But it was quite a long time before he built up confidence in me to anything like the extent that he apparently had in the last year of the war.

I was very careful not to force the issue on any of these things. Harry Hopkins, I think, rendered me a great service, because he was inclined to accept my views right along and would try to have Mr. Roosevelt well aware of them. But I might cite the fact, from the start, from the day I first met Hopkins, he insisted that I should go to Warm Springs with Mr. Roosevelt a day later and explain to him the situation of the Army and its needs. This was about Christmas time 1939, I think. He was very firm in the necessity for me to go to Warm Springs. I might say that he never got me there. I was never invited to Warm Springs during the entire time though Hopkins several times wanted to get me there. He did the same thing in regard to Hyde Park. Two or three times he thought that it was very important that I should go to Hyde Park and talk these matters over with Mr. Roosevelt rather than have him do it. Again he was unable to do it. So I never went to Hyde Park and I never went to Warm Springs. I was not on that basis of intimate relationship with the President that a number of others were.

In thinking of this question I have been answering, there comes to my mind a message from Stalin in 1942, I think about April, when I was having lunch alone with Mr. Churchill in that basement dining room of his at 10 Downing Street. A message came from Stalin which was very rude and very rough. And it had come that morning or within the hour of the time we had sat down, I think. And Mr. Churchill showed it to me, quite furious. And he said he didn't see how he as political head of his country could accept such a thing—the political head of the British Empire—such a message as that from Stalin. I was very new at the business then but it seemed to me quite clear that Stalin was in a desperate situation—we all knew that—he was in desperate need of these things which we couldn't furnish him. He saw only his side of it, which is not unnatural—we have that all the time—and he was a rough character. (Anyone reading his early career would certainly agree with that statement). And this was a message, written by the

head of a country, who was a dictatorial head, who had had a very rough time rising to that position, who was now in a desperate situation, facing possible defeat or destruction and tremendous need of these things he wanted. And he was to be forgiven if he wrote very much in character. And I thought the Prime Minister had to consider that. If that came from some other man in some other position, it would be quite a different matter. But I think it was Stalin *au naturel.* I remember that conversation took place at lunch down in Downing Street, and after we sat out in his garden, as I recall, and he was telling me of some of the historic things which occurred right there.

As a matter of fact, in speaking of my relationships with Mr. Roosevelt where they had political significance, I was always involved in the problem of finding an opportunity to state my case. It was frequently said in those days by politicians who had seen Mr. Roosevelt that they never got a chance to state their case. He was quite charming and quite voluble and the interview was over before they had a chance to say anything. Well, I was aware of that and it was undoubtedly Mr. Roosevelt's system in one way. When I would have something particularly disagreeable—something that was very difficult for him to do at that time—and he didn't want such a matter to be brought up, he would be very communicative and would talk continually and I would never get a look-in until the time had expired. So I was very careful not to prolong such a discussion—to ask any questions about it—but I just stuck to the thing I was after and whenever there was a pause, I started on that. So, one day, he entertained me with what proved to be a very vital discussion or statement. He went on to explain to me just how he expected to handle the question of the Baltic [Balkan] states with the Russians. And that was a great problem at the time, just how he would handle the issue of the Baltic States. Afterwards, I was quite provoked with myself because I was so intent on getting my point across, which was

the reason for my call and to avoid this discursive procedure of Mr. Roosevelt's to keep me from doing it, that I practically paid no attention at all to his discussion of this very vital political question. I always condemned myself in this respect, although the reason for it was very plain.

Q. 64. Isn't it a fact that you had drafted many messages for the President dealing with these matters?

A. I did help draft a good many messages—many more towards the last years of the war—but there I wouldn't know whether it was a question of failing health, he was saddling me with more responsibility, or he was giving me the compliment of having a greater trust in my judgment, in my ability to handle these matters.

Q. 65. Did you write the April 12th message which Mr. Roosevelt sent to Mr. Churchill saying, "I would minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible"?

A. I don't recall this.

Q. 66. Did you make any effort in the last year of the war to get the President to define his unconditional surrender formula more clearly?

A. I don't recall that I did. There were some discussions with all the Chiefs of Staff—I think, I mean the American Chiefs of Staff—with Mr. Roosevelt where this question came up. But I don't recall anything significant that came out of the discussions.

Q. 67. Did you try to get the unconditional surrender formula dropped?

A. I don't recall that I did

Q. 68. Do you feel that the Germans and Japanese fought longer than they would have done if the unconditional surrender formula had been dropped?

A. I think there was quite a possibility that the Germans and Japanese might have conceded the war a little earlier if it had not been for the unconditional surrender formula. However, I think it

had a great psychological effect on our people, on the British people, and on the Allied people generally, as well as on the Germans when it was made at Yalta [Casablanca] because we had been going through a period of defeats and now this came out as a declaration to the world that we were going into this thing to the finish. I recall my satisfaction in reading the decoded cablegrams, or radiograms, from the Japanese embassies in Europe before the people concerned became involved in the war with us—that would be the ambassadors from some of the Scandinavian countries, the ambassador in Moscow, the ambassadors in Spain and Portugal, the ambassador in Switzerland and others like that. In these decipherings came out the story of the pressures that they were exerting on the Japanese prime minister to bring the war to an end. And as I recall they cited the severity of the terms that were being inflicted on Germany by the prolongation of the war. This was cited by some of these ambassadors, all this is in the records, of course, and you can get it straight from there. They wanted a quick conclusion of the war with us and the British because they had nothing to gain and everything to lose by it and it would virtually destroy Germany which it virtually did destroy. And I remember they used this expression once—they said it is very important to get this—you are going to find the Americans the most difficult of all to deal with. Well, I took some satisfaction from that for the reason that a democracy has a very hard time in a war particularly at the start of a war. They can never get ready in advance. The conditions are such that they are very susceptible to surprise action and the arbitrary government like the Hitler government has every advantage in those respects. They are just bound to win at the start unless they are very, very stupid. Of course, in the end, if the democracy is a firm democracy, it builds up a power which outlasts the other and the dictatorship bogs down. But it hadn't bogged down yet. And its firmness of control was illustrated by the results of the effort to assassinate Hitler. And this reference to the American democracy was

standing firm—was going to defeat these people—was impressed on all these Japanese ambassadors.

Q. 69. How closely had you been associated with the development of the bomb?

A. In the development of the bomb, Mr. Stimson was one of the group, which was headed by the vice-president that Mr. Roosevelt, in effect, put in charge of the general development. I was—I don't remember what my status was then—except it fell to me to make the preparations and still do it with secrecy. So we had to construct these huge plants down in the south and out on the Pacific coast which were going to be required and still try to do it in secrecy. Well, that was my job. I picked out the General that I put in charge of it and I even tried to have it done without the knowledge of General Summerall [Somervell]—which I couldn't quite make—but he kept quiet about it. I never did know how much General [Groves] told him. But anyway, I had to get the money and I directed all these preliminary operations and the construction of the affair. Not that I knew anything about the technique at all. But to get the thing done—to amass the money and the men and everything else of that sort. I was rather amused at myself because as time wore on, these long statements that would come, that were filled with complicated procedures necessary in these matters and the technical terms involved—I spent so much time with the *Encyclopedia Britannica* or the dictionary trying to interpret what they said, that I finally just gave it up, deciding that I never would quite understand it all. What I must understand was all the procedure concerned with getting this thing done. I obtained the first money by taking 20 per cent of the appropriations concerning such matters in the development of bombs, artillery, and kindred matters, which was legal. You could divert 20 per cent away from an appropriation to a somewhat similar matter—one connected with defense, for example—and this bomb was certainly connected with defense.

We finally got to the point that I felt that we must get some authority from Congress. Of course that was a very difficult, delicate thing. I don't know how much Mr. Stimson tells about in his book, but what actually happened was, he and I had a meeting with the principal leaders on the Hill—the Speakers and the chairmen of the committees—a very select group of men. And what we wanted from them was then was the assurance that if we put in for, I think it was $600 million on what was then called the Manhattan Project, which was the name least liable to arouse some feeling of a mystery (we might have called it Hoboken, but we called it Manhattan). We went up on the Hill to see these various people and Mr. Stimson made the talk. And it was very difficult to do because he couldn't explain just what is was except that it was a great secret and he could not explain the secret. But they would have to take his word for it and my word for it that it was of vital importance that we get this additional money and that it was of equally vital importance that not a word be breathed of what the thing really was. Well, they agreed that they would do all they could to avoid any debate or any discussion of this in committee. Well, when the time came, I was told that one member of the Military Appropriations Committee of the House—a fellow from down in Alabama, I think, who was very busy with, in all these things and had been unable to get into these plants—at Timber [Oak] Ridge or whatever the name and the plant on the Columbia River—brought up in the committee this matter of the Manhattan Project and the $600 million and stated that it had to bed explained and he was going to insist upon it and they were in quite a dilemma as to how to handle this because in a sense he had a right to demand that and he was always out after this sort of a matter. He was a real busy bee in all this business and particularly resentful of the fact that he had driven out in his car and hadn't been allowed to go through the plants. Well, the chairman called me up and told me they couldn't do anything with him. I believe I was out of town at the time. Anyway, I got back and they had

gone into their final mark-up session, which was the closing out of the whole affair, and they still hadn't handled this man. So as nearly as I can remember the wording used, I went up to this meeting at which I had no right to be present. I didn't consult them, I just opened the door and walked in and sat down. Well, they were all very polite to me. They were all my friends. I sat down and then I addressed myself to this man, and as nearly as I can recall, I told him that I had just learnt this. I just wanted to say to him that if he forced this thing in the open—if he forced a discussion, which would be a public discussion of something that Mr. Stimson, the honorable Secretary of War, and myself had assured these people mustn't be discussed; they must trust us on this as they did the hundreds of thousands of lives of our soldiers—that if he did that, I was going to take the broadcasting radio over and make him ashamed of himself for the rest of his life. Then I got up and left the room and he shut up and didn't make any more demands. I don't recall exactly the English I used, but that was the sense of it. And the rest of them accepted my apology for barging in on them and we got by that last stumbling block in the effort to the $600 million to add to what was over a billion and a half, I think, at that time. Of course, in all these things, it was exceedingly difficult to keep them secret when you had to get at big money it was tremendous amounts of this and build these great plants without explanation. I think only the fact that we were building so many of them diverted the public attention from these particular ones.

As to Admiral Leahy, he was not told what this was because there was no necessity for telling him until the very last moment. We only told those that there was any necessity for telling. We didn't tell Arnold until it was time for him to train his particular pilots for launching the bomb in the Far East and we didn't tell Spaatz—"Tooey" Spaatz—until he was ready to said for the Far East and I don't recall when we told General MacArthur but it was the very last

minute when we brought this matter out into the open. But there were long discussions by Mr. Stimson and myself and later with the special committee on this thing of which Mr. Harrison acted as chairman in Mr. Stimson's absence from time to time. Senator Byrnes was on this committee and would come to Washington in connection with the meetings and was being accused of all sorts of political maneuvers which were actually the meeting in connection with this atomic bomb affair.

Q. 70. How seriously did you take its importance prior to the dropping?

A. We regarded the matter of the dropping of the bomb as exceedingly important. We had just gone through a bitter experience at Okinawa. We had to be proceeded by a number of similar experiences in other Pacific Islands, down north of Australia. The Japanese had demonstrated in each case they would not surrender and they would fight to the death. And even their civilians would commit suicide rather than to be taken under the control of American forces. With this knowledge, particularly of Okinawa, where I think, where we killed something like 120,000 Japanese without a surrender. I think there were several badly wounded that we picked up but literally not a surrender, it was to be expected that the resistance in Japan, with their home ties, would be even more severe. We had had the terrific bombing. We had had the 100,000 people killed in Tokyo in one night by bombs and it had had seemingly no effect whatsoever. It destroyed the Japanese cities, yes, but their morale was not affected as far as we could tell at all. So it seemed quite necessary, if we could, to shock them into action. What we did not take into account as nearly as I can recall and I think my recollection is fairly plain on this, was that the destruction would be so complete, that it would be a long time or quite an appreciable time before the actual facts of the case would get to Tokyo. So the destruction at Hiroshima was so complete that there was no communication at least for a day I think and maybe longer and it was

not until the second destruction took place at Nagasaki that the Japanese were really aware of what had happened in the earlier bomb explosion. Quite evidently, they were shocked into action, because as nearly as they could guess they didn't know how many bombs we had. They didn't know the full details, but they knew that the destruction had been terrific from a single bomb. And they had been told something like that from Potsdam, but they didn't take it seriously. Now it had happened and they get the full word of what had happened at Hiroshima. And now very shortly thereafter it occurred again at Nagasaki. The fact that we had no more bombs completed at the time was unknown to the Japanese and they could see Tokyo probably being wiped out next. And they were, I think, shocked into immediate action which otherwise we would not have gotten out of them. And we would have had a terrible bitter and frightfully expensive in lives and treasure, etc., if we had to proceed with a landing in Japan. There were supposed to be nine more bombs completed in a certain time. And they would be largely in time for the first landing in the southern tip of Japan. There were three corps to come in there as I recall. They didn't know about it at the time but I had gone very carefully into the examinations out in New Mexico as to the after-effects of the bomb because we were having in mind exploding one or two bombs before these landings and then having the landing take place and reserving the other bomb or bombs for the later movements of any Japanese reinforcements that might try to come up. And it was decided then that the casualties from the actual fighting would be very much greater than might occur from the after-effects of the bomb action. So there were to be three bombs for each corps that was landing. One or two, but probably one as a preliminary, then the landing, then another one further inland against the immediate supports and then the third one against any troops that might try to come through the mountains from up on the Inland Sea. And that was the rough idea in our minds. Now Admiral Leahy was not told

until the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, very late in the game, just before the completion of the bomb. I believe it had even been tested then, maybe it hadn't. Anyway, it was the very end, and he was told of this and he had been in the ordnance business in the Navy, quite familiar with explosives and things of that sort and he utterly scouted the proposition of this and regarded it largely as a waste of money. And Admiral King and I were much shocked because of the money…

SIDE 2

Q. 71. Do you feel it was necessary to drop the bomb to shorten the war?

A. I regarded the dropping of the bomb as of great importance and felt that it would end the war possibly better than anything else, which it did, and I think that all the claims about the bombings and all afterwards were rather silly. Because we had had these terrific destructions and it hadn't had these effects. I think it was quite necessary to drop the bombs in order to shorten the war.

Q. 72. Do you feel in retrospect that it would have been better to refrain from using it?

A. In retrospect, I feel the same way about it. There were hundreds and hundreds of thousands of American lives involved in these things as well as hundreds of billions of money. They had been perfectly ruthless. We had notified them of the bomb. They didn't choose to believe that. And what they needed was shock action and they got it. I think it was very wise to use it.

Q. 73. Do you feel that Mr. Stimson was chiefly responsible for dropping the bomb?

A. I don't think Mr. Stimson was chiefly responsible for dropping the bomb. We talked to a great many on the committee that were involved in it—the engineers and others—and this particular committee that Mr. Roosevelt had set up which Mr. Stimson, Mr. Harrison and Secretary Byrnes were members. And I think in the situation, it was demanded, and was very

important to use. But Mr. Stimson was not alone responsible. I was just as much responsible as he was. Because my arguments were very much for using the bomb.

Q. 74. Were you aware of peace offers Japan was making through the Russians in the summer of 1945?

A. I was aware of the peace offerings Japan was making to the Russians in the summer of 1945. I was reading the messages from all the ambassadors of Japan that were still in Europe. I was reading the replies of the prime minister to the situation. I was familiar with Japanese psychology to quite an extent. I had been in Japan a little bit, much more than the ordinary person and I knew what they were doing on each one of these operations. We had to end the war, we had to save American lives. We had to halt this terrific expenditure of money which was reaching a stupendous total. And there was no easy to economize on it until we stopped the war. The bomb stopped the war. Therefore, it was justifiable.

The Japanese peace offers to the Russians—I don't know the details about that. But I had been reading all the Prime Minister said to the various ambassadors of Japan and he was unable at that time to direct the Army. The Army was dominant in these matters and they could only apparently be slugged into submission. And we slugged them.

I'm going to stop dictating now and take this up later, but I'd like to say this: in the later paper that you sent me you give long lists of names of officers and others to have me analyze them and comment on their efficiency, I am not going to do this. I think if anything like this got into the book in any way, the books rather, all the attention would go to that and all the acrimonious debate would go to that and nothing to the really important part of the text. I don't think it would be quite fair because the officer has no chance to answer it at all.

Tape 15M

Interview with General G. C. Marshall

February 14, 1957

TAPE 15

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL AT PINEHURST, FEBRUARY 14, 1957. QUESTIONS PREPARED BY FORREST C. POGUE. RECORDER OPERATED BY SGT. WILLIAM HEFFNER.

Q. 75. Do you feel that Sherwood's impressions on visit to MacArthur in 1945 are accurate regarding: (a) the difficulty of getting to MacArthur and (b) the attitude of MacArthur's staff toward the outside world?

A. The first part regarding the difficulty of getting to MacArthur. There are some problem of this sort. I recall that the Surgeon General got as far as Leyte and then was not permitted to go into Manila. However, at the time I thought there was a little to be said on MacArthur's side because the accommodations in Manila were extremely limited and if a number of outsiders—if you can call inspectors that—arrived in Manila, there would be extreme difficulty in furnishing them accommodations. Now as to the second part, the attitude of MacArthur's staff towards the outside world, those are the reports I received at the time.

Q. 76. Is it correct to say that American military leaders by June 1945 would have liked to dispense with Russian aid against Japan?

A. I do not think so.

Q. 77. Did you ever have any fear the British wouldn't help in the Pacific?

A. It was a little bit the other way as a matter of fact. Churchill was very anxious to get part of the British Fleet into the Pacific and Admiral King was very reluctant to have it, particularly

because he felt that the American Navy might be embarrassed by the necessity of supplying part of the British units that might come into the Pacific.

Q. 78. Did you share Admiral King's unwillingness to have British help in the Pacific?

A. I have already implied answer to that.

Q. 79. Did you favor island-hopping or bypassing in the Pacific?

A. It was not a question of favoring island hopping. We couldn't very well walk on the water. And you had to go from island to island. And where you could isolate the island as we did, I think, in the Marshalls, that was certainly a great advantage in the saving of effort and of troops employed and of tragic burden for the Japanese to carry out under the circumstances. The only issue that really could be brought up here, I don't think it was a compelling one at all, was to concentrate all of the effort in the Southwest, for instance, in MacArthur's territory. Well, there were a great many things to be considered in connection with this. For example, you take the terrific fighting at Iwo Jima. That was very important to us, very important to us as an air base connected with our operations against Japan. When the B-29s came into full use, Iwo Jima was very much used to salvage planes that had to come down before they got back to Guam or other islands like that. It was very useful for that reason. It made a station, a preliminary station, toward Japan—in the moves across the Pacific. Its cost was extreme, but its usefulness was great. That would have to be considered when you were questioning whether or not you would have island hopping. All of this was stirred up into a newspaper affair in which those that favored the Army side and MacArthur and those that favored the Navy side got a great deal to write about. So I think that logic flew out the window and prejudice took its place.

Q. 80. Don't you feel that the heavy casualties inflicted by the Japanese on American naval and army forces at Okinawa and Iwo Jima show that Japan was far from beaten as late as June 1945?

A. I think that the casualties inflicted by the Japanese in Okinawa and Iwo Jima and particularly the refusals of the Japanese to surrender at all were indications that they were far from beaten. I don't mean that they had any chance of winning. But I do mean that there was little chance of expecting them to surrender. How much greater the difficulties would be when we got on their home grounds in Japan you have to judge for yourself.

Q. 81. General MacArthur in October 1955, in replying to criticisms in Mr. Truman's memoirs criticized you, General Bradley, General Collins and others for recommending his relief. He attributes General Bradley's attitude to the fact that General MacArthur had refused to take Bradley as a commander in the Far East and indicates that he had not taken Bradley because of his failures in the Ardennes battle.

As I recall, when you cabled General Bradley suggesting that General Hodges be sent to the Far East, Bradley did ask for a command there. However, you said that there was no opening for an Army group commander and MacArthur felt that Bradley would not care to take a demotion. If the matter of the Ardennes had been involved, it seems to me that MacArthur would not have taken Hodges who commanded the troops in the area most heavily attacked.

Am I right in my recollection of this? Do you have any comments on this?

A. I am a little in doubt as to how to make the answer to your 81. There was so much deep prejudice involved that it's hard to get at a reason other than that prejudice. I remember we sent General Ridgway out and he wasn't given any assurance of a command and came back actually without orders. The nominations I made in the effort to give MacArthur everything that we had

were largely turned down and my own assumption of the reason was one that it was distasteful to him to take anything from the forces which we had been using in Europe. And he was very confident of very loyal to the people under him.

Q. 82. Do you feel that Ehrman, British official historian's views on British Chief of Staff are pretty accurate? I gathered from some remarks that you made to me about Portal that you might place him a little higher than Brooke, so far as mental ability was concerned. I recall your telling how Portal turned the tables on you once.

A. I think the statement headed Admiral Cunningham is pretty correct. Of the Chiefs of Staff, I thought that Portal was probably the most brilliant, but I had great respect for Brooke and I think the characterization regarding him is quite correct.

Q. 83. Do you think that Ehrman's views on difference in position of Leahy and Ismay and of Hopkins' role is correct?

A. My answer to this long, involved statement will have to be very sketchy because I can't talk about myself with the freedom that would be necessary to such an answer. With regard to Leahy, I will say this: I felt that it would not be a good thing to develop the Chiefs of Staff organization where the Air was a member—its leader was a member of the Chiefs of Staff and yet it was subordinate to me—and where I was senior to King. In other words, in a sense, I would have two votes if it was a question of votes and King would only have one. I, therefore, thought it would be wise if we had a chairman and from the Navy, if one could be found that I thought was entirely impersonal and a man of good judgment. I did not know Admiral Leahy at all well, but I knew of him pretty well. He was at that time in France. So I conceived the idea of having Leahy as the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. I thought the Navy couldn't resist this and

from what I had learned I was willing to trust Leahy to be a neutral chairman of the American Chiefs of Staff. I, therefore, took this up with the President and Harry Hopkins. And I did not get very far. When I inquired of Hopkins later he said that the President in his political life had never known any politician to resign any office and he had said that about my effort to resign in February 1941, so that I could clear the way to a younger man who could have more freedom in relieving the large numbers of older men who blocked the way at the top due to the manner of Army promotions up to that time.

So I continued to press for Leahy being returned and made chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. The President always answered my proposals regarding Admiral Leahy by saying, "But you are the Chief of Staff." But I said, "Mr. President, I am only Chief of Staff of the Army and in a sense of the Army Air. There is no Chief of Staff of all the military services." "Well," he said, "I'm the Chief of Staff. I'm the Commander-in-Chief." And I explained to him in great frankness that it was impossible to conceive of one man with all of his duties as President being also, in effect, the Chief of Staff of all the military services. That it was a superman job and I didn't think that even the exaggeration of the powers of superman would quite go far enough in this. And I know he was not very much pleased with my statement. But the trouble there was he didn't quite understand what the role of the Chief of Staff would be. While I was in England, he brought Leahy back and Leahy arrived in Washington and was announced as coming on as presumably the Chiefs of Staff. But the President said he was going to be his "legman." And when I arrived in Washington, Leahy was very much at a loose end. He didn't know quite where he stood. He called on me because he had learnt that I had proposed his name. I was the one who urged his return. Well, I had an office fixed for Leahy over in the building where the Chiefs of Staff met and where the British had their rooms. And it was all ready with its secretary. So I

explained to Leahy what I had in mind. And it wasn't at all what the President implied. He had never understood quite what I wanted and the necessity for it. So I took Leahy over and showed him his office and his secretary and I took him in the room where the Chiefs of Staff met and showed him the chair where he should sit, which was unoccupied at the time because it was at the end of the table—because I always sat to one side though I was the senior on the American side then and I proposed to him when the next meeting came, which I think was the next day, he just calmly sit down in that chair. I don't know, but I was told that Admiral King was very much irritated by this procedure. He was not in favor of that sort of arrangement. However, I thought that was very important that we, in effect, have a neutral agency because we would have had trouble with the Naval Air and the Army Air and the Naval – Army disagreements through the years—which were always exaggerated by the fact that the Navy had a fleet; the Army had no Army. It had little detachments around the United States and in various places and even in Hawaii or in Panama there were very small groups of troops, although they were together there. But the Navy actually had a Navy. They had an Atlantic Fleet, but in particular they had a Pacific Fleet and they had an Admiral who was in command of that fleet, which was one of their great posts of service. But we had nothing like that. The real term of 'Army' as we used it later in the war could not be applied properly to the scattered troops we had except as an administrative reference to all the individuals who were in the military service. Therefore, I thought it was particularly important to have Leahy in the chair and I incurred, possibly, Admiral King's displeasure, but whatever it was Admiral Leahy functioned from that time on as the chairman. The matters became very much confused later on because he became more what you might call the Chief of Staff of the President, which was not my intention in making the proposal and urging that he be brought home. It was excellent to have him in contact with the White

House. It would have been excellent if he had kept us straight on all of the political goings-on, like at Yalta for example. I don't know whether he was at Tehran or not. But anyway, he became more the Chief of Staff of the President and less the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff as time went on. And, for example, at Potsdam, he was almost exclusively engaged in attending the political meetings and I know on one occasion we had been trying to get an answer out of the Russians regarding certain things we wanted them to concede. The Navy was particularly anxious for some stations for part of their people up in the—near Petrograd, not Petrograd, whatever the city is up there on the tip of the Peninsula that leans out towards Japan [Petropovlask]. They finally—the Russian Chiefs of Staff—made a written statement of the commitments they would make in the thing and we came to the next meeting, they wanted a reply to that and we didn't have it. It had gone to Admiral Leahy or at the White House, but wherever it was Mr. Truman was out of Potsdam doing some official reviews or matters of that kind, Admiral Leahy was away and King and I had never seen the paper. And we had to get together and we had to answer all of these Russians comments and what concessions they had made and what they had declined without ever having seen their paper. Even though Leahy's time was more completely given to attending the President in his political meetings, nevertheless, it was quite essential to have the arrangement as it was, because it would never have done to have tried to have gone right straight through the struggle with Admiral King in a secondary position and me as the senior where I was also senior of the Air. And it was quite essential that we have a neutral agency at the top and Leahy in effect was that so far as the Army and Navy requirements and positions were concerned.

I think you have Hopkins pretty well pegged, but I would say this. He was invaluable to me. I didn't see Hopkins very often, because I made it a business not to go to the White House,

but the others like Arnold and Somervell would see him with great frequency. But whenever I hit a tough knot I couldn't handle and seemingly couldn't get anywhere, I would call him up and he would either arrange a meeting with the President for me or he and I together would see the President. And we had a number of talks with the President with no one else present. He was always a strong advocate, it seemed to me, of almost everything I proposed and it required quite a bit of explanation from time to time to have the President see that the set-up could not be handled in the ways he sometimes suggested. And there had to be a very firm position taken in these matters. So he was quite invaluable to me and he was very courageous. And he was particularly so abroad with the British. I heard him make one or two statements to the British Chiefs of Staff—the War Cabinet—and he was certainly was brutally frank. And altogether he acted, I thought, with great courage and particularly in relation to Mr. Roosevelt. Because I couldn't get at the President with the frequency that he could—nothing like it, nor could I be frank, nor could I be as understanding. But he did a job in the war which I thought was of great moment—of great importance to the country. And he showed remarkable courage, but far more courage in a physical way. Because I remember when he first went to London with me and that trip over on the planes of that day were not luxurious and it was rather trying. He had just come back from Russia. Well, I am not certain whether he had just come back at that time. But anyway, I know that in the previous two weeks he had ten transfusions—blood transfusions—and he had been found crawling up the back stairs at Hyde Park because he wasn't strong enough to walk up. And yet Mr. Churchill—Mr. Roosevelt—sent him to London and he took that arduous trip with me and he played a very great part in the affairs that we did over there. He was very honest about the thing. He supported me strongly where I was in difficulties with Churchill and where I was in difficulties with the President. He supported me strongly and he made the

technique, you might say, of the military position—the strategic graphs and all—plainer to the President than I could possibly have done myself.

Q. 85. Do you feel that Ehrman had described the relationship between you and Admiral King correctly?

A. I think the statement regarding the relations between Admiral King and myself is practically correct. Everybody realizes that he was a difficult individual because he was very short of temper and very sensitive, but we got along about as described. I might recite one incident that occurred right at the start. My reception room was across the hall from my office in the old Munitions Building. It was presided over by a young woman. I very purposely didn't have a uniformed aide in it because I had to deal with such a large number of civilians or National Guard Reserves—a problem which the Navy did not have anything approaching—and with a great many Congressmen coming in. I thought it was wise not to have a very stern looking military set-up and I could quite handle the issues without it, which incidentally I think I have said once before—that the reason I continued the headquarters in civilian clothes for such a long time up until actually Pearl Harbor was because I didn't want to antagonize the general public and the Congress with the easily aroused feelings toward the military that had always existed. Now in this case Admiral King came to see me without my knowing he was coming and was received by this young woman in the reception room. Well, he was the head of the Navy and when you arrived on his side of the fence in his offices, a naval aide met you and were escorted very formally in and finally escorted into his presence. It was all done very formally and very efficiently. Here was a young woman receiving the Admiral of the Navy and his not getting to see me right away. Actually, what was happening was the Foreign Minister of Australia who later—I don't know whether he became Prime Minister or not, but anyway he was head of the

United Nations for a period, I have forgotten his name, but he was a very difficult man to deal with. He represented the Labor Party there and he was fighting at the drop of the hat. And at this particular time Australia was in great fear of a Japanese invasion and it wasn't until the battle of the Coral Sea comparatively clarified the atmosphere did we ever get away from that difficulty. And there was also the fear on the part of the New Zealanders who incidentally claimed that the Japanese would be there first and, of course, the Australians said they would go there first and I had to act as the go-between between Australia and New Zealand in this matter which afterwards was treated by both sides with great amusement, but wasn't amusing to me at all at the time when I had to manage the affair. Well, whatever this Foreign Minister's name was—I am sorry I have forgotten (Heffner – Was it MacKenzie? No. Canada). He came to see me on his first visit to Washington. He had only been there about one day, but already word had spread that he created a tempest wherever he came and that he was very frank in his strictures on us and the necessity for our helping save Australia and he was sort of dressing down everybody he came in contact with. Well, I was prepared for him when he arrived at my office. And he immediately started in one what I would call a tirade. And he got a certain distance and I stopped him—sorry I haven't got his name, because it's a little hard to describe it merely as him or he—but I stopped him. I said, "Now, Mr. Minister, presumably we will have a great deal of business to do and over a very vital matter. You are not going to get anywhere by storming in here with me. In the first place, I won't accept it. I won't have you in the office if you do it. So let's get down to business and find a way to get along without this tempestuous performance. I know your country's in great peril, but that isn't going to help you a bit here. That's going to antagonize people. Already, I've heard of how you conducted yourself in other offices. Now you are not going to conduct yourself like that here."

I explained this because at that time Admiral King was waiting in the reception room. I couldn't even give a pause in the conversation to send word out or have them interrupt me to tell me Admiral King was there. Whatever it was when I got rid of him—the Australian—and went over to greet King, I found he had left in a huff and had gone back to his office at the other end of the Munitions Building. So I went right over personally to the Munitions Building and was shown with military formality into King's office. I don't know—remember—just what his attitude was when he greeted me. But I said, "Now, I've come over to talk to you right away and explain what was happening." And I did explain it. Now, I said, "I think this is very important. Because if you or I began fighting at the very start of the war, what in the world will the public have to say about us?" I said, "They won't accept if for a minute. So we just take our tickets and walk out. We can't afford to fight. So we ought to find a way to get along together." King listened to this and sat silent for a minute or two and turned to me and said, "Well, you have been very magnanimous in coming over here the way you have. And we will see if we can get along and I think we can." And we did get along. We had one or two pretty mean fights, but anyone has that.

Now comes to General Arnold. I tried to give Arnold all the power I could. I tried to make him as nearly as I could Chief of Staff of the Air without any restraint though he was my subordinate. And he was very appreciative of this. My main difficulties in the matter came from the fact that he had a very immature staff. They were not immature in years, because they were pretty older, but I would say—I used to characterize them to him—they were, I've forgotten the word—I will say antique staff officers— oh, "passé airmen," "passé fliers," I guess is the right word because they were not trained at that kind of staff thing and they were busy taking stands all the time about promotions. They were already getting more rapid promotions than anybody

else in any Army or military force we had or Navy or anything. But his staff was always agitating about that. And the lesser they were the more they were busy talking about a separate air corps. Well, that was out of the question at that time. They didn't have the trained people for it at all. Spaatz and—who was the man who died the other day? Senator of the same name—Spaatz and the other great airman who was the nephew of the senator by the same name and those people learnt their lesson in the great struggle of the battle and in command of great air forces. So, when they came back, the air corps had the nucleus of a very able staff officers but that wasn't true at all at the start. What's the senator's name? Turn it off.

. . . . . .

I've forgotten just where I was. General Vandenberg was one of those highly experienced officers. But at the start of the war he was a major or lieutenant colonel and I took him to England with me as one of my two advisers. I did that with some other airmen. They were all just making their beginnings at the big things. They had beliefs in heavy bombers—they had beliefs in the independence of the Air Corps and all that. But when it came to the management and development of this tremendous force, they were yet without the experience necessary and I had to take what we had—all the various services were involved in the Army—until the other could be developed more. Not that there were experienced airmen in the General staff, excepting for Spaatz and Arnold and about one or two others, there were not for reasons which I think I have given before.

As I have said, I gave Arnold his head as much as I possibly could, but my main trouble was when his staff would get him in trouble. This is not to be repeated in your book, but I told him I was tired of hearing from that goddamned high school staff he had down there. And he

would always take it very well. In fact, Arnold's disposition to cooperate with me was a very wonderful thing. Because I had to be rough time after time. And he was splendid about the matter and there weren't many difficulties. And I might say here that General Arnold had the conception of using a great bombing force out of England over France and this pinpoint bombing to be prior to a landing in Normandy or wherever we decided to land. He was very strong for that conception before he had any planes to amount to anything and he took it up directly with the President in my presence several times and wedded Mr. Roosevelt to that conception of a powerful air force operating into France and later into Germany before we attempted to land on the coast of France and he should get the credit for that. At the time it was a little bit hard to handle because we didn't have many planes and you couldn't talk very forcibly to the British about something when you didn't have it. They had hard fighting there which had been desperately costly in the First War on the Somme—they never forgot those casualties—and in this last war their quick defeat of their few troops in Northern France and in Belgium had left an indelible imprint on their minds and in affecting their reactions. But Arnold was very deep in that first conception of the powerful air preparation for the landing in Normandy which later followed. He had great success in getting the following of the young airmen. They all liked him—they all respected him and they thought he represented their interests. I had to get into some of this very personally. The first fighting out of Australia and the great island just to the north of it, the Japanese were quite successfully using their Zero planes and our Air Corps said our plane then I don't remember what it was—49 or something of that sort—was too slow and not agile enough as it were. So I sent an officer out there to see the young airmen personally. It wasn't Arnold on this trip. Because I wanted to instill the feeling in these young fellows that just because I wasn't an airman or the staff weren't all Air they wouldn't disregard the interests and

the necessities of the Air Service. These young fellows were having a terrible time. They had no prospect of relief. They were flying much, much too much, and they were having casualties and the replacements were not available and wouldn't be for quite a long time and they had a deep feeling that the Zero plane was far better than theirs. Well, the truth of the matter was—I found out by investigation and particularly by talking to manufacturers—our plane had a lot of equipment in it which was heavy, armored, to protect their backs and things of that sort. So I sent this officer out to tell these young airmen that I would have these planes stripped so they would be as light and as easily handled as the Zero if they wanted that. We would take out all this special equipment which rendered it a little less hazardous for the pilot under fire though it rendered the plane heavy and not so easily handled. When the proposition was put up to the young fliers—"just say the word and I will have the plane stripped"—and I made them do it personally for me because I wanted them to feel that we were thinking about them and would do for them directly. All they had to do was say the word and this man would send the cable home and we would start in stripping the planes. And they voted against it. The minute we were going to take out the armor and other things in the planes, then they didn't want it.

Arnold's role was a very difficult one because he had a budding air force. It had a terrific expansion rate to it. And the upper stories of the Air Corps had a great many of these elderly pilots who were not trained in the staff development. They had kept away from that in a sense in order to make certain that they didn't lose their flying qualification pay. And the result was it was very hard to handle things because they would always be the senior on any group that we would form to study some particular set of circumstances. These young fellows hadn't yet come into any great prominence, like Vandenberg, Tooey Spaatz and other fliers of that category. So we had a hard time. His staff, he had a hard time with. I know one young officer, who right now

is in a leading position in the Air Corps—he has been in command of MATS and he has had other very important commands. I was very much impressed with him when Arnold brought him in as a major. And I said why don't you make that fellow and he said he couldn't make him—he would lose all his staff. They would all quit on him if a many that young was made. And he just couldn't do it. (Heffner—was that General Norstad?) No, I made him a prominent general later. So the next list that came in. I just wrote the officer's name on it. And when Arnold's staff woke up and Arnold woke up this fellow was a brigadier general though he had been a major the day before. And he worked out and I think he is in the Air Corps now on active service.

General Norstad, who is now the Supreme Commander, was one of the young men I looked after with great respect, and, as I recall, I did what I could to push him forward in a hurry.

Q. 87. What were the chief weaknesses in our intelligence system? Judging from our actions in Korea, have we solved our main problems in regard to intelligence?

A. Referring only to the war period and the development of the Intelligence Section, we didn't have enough qualified people. We didn't have nearly enough men in the Intelligence Section. It always got the second deal in it—its head was always a colonel and not a brigadier general because the brigadier generals went to the other three commanding interests of the General Staff. We were not intelligence wise—I will put it that way. We collected a great deal—mass—of intelligence but I thought we were a little slow in its interpretation and the whole section had to be built up. They had a number of heavy thinkers but they didn't impress me very much. It is very hard in time of peace to work up to the state of efficiency you want in a service like the Intelligence Service. They either go far too far and exaggerate the thing or they don't go far enough. Anyway, I was not impressed by so many people in the Intelligence Section and they

led me into some bad pitfalls before I got through. One of the troubles about the Intelligence Service arose out of the fact-finding officers in connection with intelligence in Europe. They were the attaches at the embassies. That's the only way, I guess, you could get them into the country at that time. But the trouble was the Ambassador treated at least one of them as his aide, which he should have, and a little bit the others. Actually what we wanted were attaches for Intelligence who you might say merely were attached to the Embassy—you might say lived there and conducted themselves in a way that did not bring us into trouble with that country. For that, of course, the Ambassador would be responsible. But they ought to have nothing to do with the ordinary attaché business of the Embassy. And it was particularly important that the senior be not depended on for the military intelligence so much because the Ambassador generally used him or his wife used him as military aide as it were. I thought it was wrong in arrangement. I thought the Ambassador should himself have selected who the head man was. And another man could have looked after the wife—which is always essential over there. And they should have been completely under the instructions of the Embassy and no effort made to use them for intelligence at all. The others ought to be attaches by name but in effect entirely independent in their operation and for their purpose.

It takes quite a long time to get the proper kind of intelligence. As a matter of fact until they get into the actual fighting part of the game and realize the necessities and everything there, they probably don't serve you very well in the general sense of the intelligence service. And part of it, of course, is a very restricted matter in one way and very intensive in another. It is a fact-finding and piecing together, with infinite patience of a variety of things of themselves not suspicious, but put together very telling in the information they carry.

I remember a very dramatic bit of intelligence that came to me and it had quite a story—to the individual. The officer, Colonel Truman Smith, who had been with me at Fort Benning when I was running the school down there. I had gotten him an invitation to Germany from the head of the German military service, whose name I've forgotten, but who was later dropped by Hitler as having ostensibly married a carpenter's daughter—and got Hitler to be the best man at the wedding and turned on him and he had to resign. At this time he commanded a division or two in northern Germany and he offered to entertain whomever I sent over. I had Smith go because he could afford the trip and I couldn't get them ordered otherwise. He brought back very complete information about the matters that we wanted to know, particularly about the methods of training of the German forces and just how they were going about the restrictions that had been placed on them against raising an Army. If you will recall in the settlement of the First World War, Germany was restricted to a very small military force and had to have a small officer corps and had to keep these officers. They couldn't go in and out the way they had before—which enabled a great many officers to be trained. He discovered and it became apparent to me what was going on. This small force was of itself literally an officer corps and was being trained like all were to be officers. We got quite a line on this through his visit to this then division commander in northern Germany who later was head of the German Army for a brief period.

All of this has a background relating to the Intelligence Service. It's very hard to say just how the Intelligence Service can best be developed. I am out of touch with it now, but I was in pretty close touch with it during the war and I felt very keenly when there was some failure to get at the most important thing. I would say that the hedgerows in Normandy were a very important thing—the necessity of our artillery training to be a little bit different from that in the wide spaces of Africa. Matters of that sort which were of vital importance to us were not always

accentuated or brought to the front by the Intelligence Service. Though we had a very good Intelligence Service in the war and combined with the Navy Intelligence it was quite effective. And what we got from the British was very effective because they had really developed a very high-rated, in my opinion, Intelligence Service.

Q. 89. Did we rely heavily on British intelligence during the war?

A. We did depend as much as possible on the British Intelligence Service, because it had a long start on us; it was closer to the operations; it had its people engaged a longer period and had had all the while a steady development of Intelligence Service because of its intimate relations with the Continent—affairs on the Continent—which always carried a disturbing characteristic which might threaten Great Britain.

Q. 90. Do you think that democracies can avoid the type of unpreparedness for war which we had in 1939?

A. It would be very difficult for a democracy to avoid some degree of unpreparedness such as we had in 1939. We had almost no preparedness then and I would say the greatest service we have been rendered has been by Molotov and Vishinsky. Because they have kept the Congress so stirred up it has been possible to get military appropriations. If they had subsided, there is no doubt in my mind at all our appropriations would have subsided in a very large measure and there would come the difficulty of keeping the military preparedness. I have felt all along that we should change our approach to this question. The taxpayer is going to dominate and the political action is going to follow. And as soon as it appears quieted down all the appropriations are going to begin to lapse. It has happened and it's happened and will happen again. I went through three experiences of that and the reason I was so—and am so—intensely in favor of

universal military training is that you can create a respectable military force, in a sense, without having the fellows constantly in uniform. And that is the only way you can do it where you have them ready to take the field instantly. There's no other way that I know of. And that's possible to have units at low strength and reserve units with an ability to quickly build up to fighting strength—the product of universal training—the graduate you might say of six months' training—without that you are lost. It took us in some cases twenty-two months to get a division, particularly some National Guard divisions, prepared for service and even then it was not really complete. It took us months and months from September to August to get divisions ready to go to Japan and Korea and then their training wasn't complete. I just sent them ahead. I sent them in April but their training wasn't really finished until August. The same delay took place in connection with the divisions that we had to send to Europe when we increased the force there in the last few years. We've got to remember that heretofore, we have had a year or more or better in which to prepare while Great Britain or France held the field for us. The next time we won't have a day. It will be war from the start and we'll be the leading factor on the Allied side in that war. And unless we have divisions that can instantly take the field and it's not a day when you can take the rifle down from over the mantel piece and go to war. You have to have an immense amount of training or you are just sacrificing your young people and you are sacrificing your cause.

It is possible for a democracy I think to get ready if they adopt some system such as I have been talking about. But the trouble is it's defeated by the articulate opposition which, as a rule, is only a very small percent. But they control votes because they are everlastingly at it. I practically had universal military training when I resigned as chief of staff. And it was only after I went out that they dropped the last more or less inconsequential thing which a small committee

of which Mr. Wadsworth was the chairman had finished its work and I wasn't there to see it completed which was a very small matter of the care that should be taken for young men around the training camps. It was an awful battle getting it carried because the voter is instantly and easily aroused and the congressman who takes a stand with you imperils his seat. And that has to be recognized. But unless we have some system like that anything else would be almost suicidal in expense and my fear has been along in these days that Russia will go along teasing us as it were with the possible threat of war until they break us down economically and that is what I think is their best chance. And that is what, I think, they are looking for.

Q. 91. Considering the way we delegate power to the President and military leaders once we enter war, do you feel that we operate fairly efficiently once war starts?

A. I think we can operate efficiently under the conditions you mention.

Q. & A. 92. As to dictatorship, I think they have a very easy time of it as the start. They very easily can get ahead of us—way ahead of democracy. I think that when they start to break down they go to pieces completely. And then democracy gradually gets stronger as it goes along. There is always a battle in connection. You take the Civil War—the battle of Lincoln to maintain the Union Armies. You can take our battle in the last war when time after time there would be threats against the strength of the Army and these various groups in this country could fight successfully against it. And of course, we've always got to remember that if we carry out our main policy of keeping the war out of the United States we are always up against a very expensive proposition of transport overseas which runs the costs into billions and billions and the management of the Army and the character of the Army has to be very, very carefully considered because you are not at home—you are not guarding your own fireside. You can possibly, almost

probably, in a country which your father and mother and your wife have never seen and do not understand. You are way away from home. I thought in this World War II one of my great problems was to try to bring the Army into closer contact with the parents and the wives because they are way out in the southwest Pacific or across the Pacific generally and they were in Europe far from us and in Africa and the Middle East. Nowhere were they fighting by their doorsill. It is true the atomic weapon, the long range plane, will bring destruction to us, but it won't bring the fighting which has to conquer those weapons, which is to destroy them at their base.

Q. 93. Did you deliberately play down military parades and military demonstrations after 1939 in order to prevent charges that the government was guilty of warmongering?

A. So far as I could I did. I thought the less we paraded military things, the better it was. I was much opposed in this because they said I should show the boys to the people. Well, there's a great deal of truth in that. But the main thing is the farmer gests very sore when he sees great parades and things when he lacks farmhands. And the manufacturer gets very sore when he hasn't enough labor for what he wants and here is the great number of soldiers—to him—hanging around. Actually going through the tedious training that is necessary before they can be sent overseas and which is necessary to have available here within the United States.

Q. 94. Was the widespread use of civilian clothes prior to December 1941 by troops in Washington and large cities due to your desire to avoid the feeling on the part of the public that this was a military state? Did you have some difference of opinion with Mr. Stimson on this point? (I was told that he wanted troops in uniform before December 7, 1941, and was one of the first things he asked about after the Pearl Harbor attack).

A. I think I have already answered this. I was in favor of remaining in civilian clothes at the War Department and the big city headquarters as long as possible though I was much opposed in every way. And I know how quickly the worm turns on this and while I was asking for large forces and asking for billions, I didn't want a lot of uniforms plastered around Washington. I remember in the First World War we came back and we found one of the acrid comments on the Army then was the number of officers around Washington and up on the Hill and the military automobiles—everything of that sort—and I was trying to play that down as much as possible.

Q. 95. Was the chief key to Allied victory the industrial production of the United States?

A. That was a vital link—the industrial production—in the United States. But to say that was the key to the Allied victory, you might say the plane was the key, but more particularly a man was the key and the degree of his training and the degree of his discipline and the degree of his fighting ability and staying ability—they were all involved in it, and of course, the industrial development, particularly where we helped other countries, was of vast importance, but it was played up so much that you might feel you could handle this matter with industry and not even have an Army. And no greater sophistry than that could be spoken.

Q. 96. What is your judgment on the importance of the work of General Somervell as an organizer, planner, operator? How great was his contribution to victory?

A. I regarded him of tremendous efficiency and what he did was a miracle. I depended on him very, very heavily. His handling of things awakened naturally the hostility of the staff departments. That's always been the case. That was the fight way back between General Wood and the onetime adjutant general of the Army—whose name I've forgotten [Aisnworth] who made himself military secretary and tried to destroy Wood and did raise the devil with General

Bell as chief of staff. The services have a degree of permanency—their head would remain in Washington. They used to say in the old days that any head of a service must be a good bridge player and a member of the Metropolitan Club. But when a line officer came to Washington and was only there a short time—two or three years—he had no particular contacts developed with Congress and he was very easily euchred out by these permanent services and that was a great battle which was finally brought to a head by General Wood. I think that we always run into that opposition and while I was out of the country right after the war, this Second World War, and when they had their reorganization conferences, I think they suffered seriously in their results because very few of them had been in this country during the war—they were abroad—and they were not aware of the advantages we had and not aware of the real cause of the troubles, they all inherited from the permanent services hostility to General Somervell. Actually he was one of the most efficient officers I have ever seen. And he got things done in Calcutta just as fast as he did in the meadows there around the Pentagon. Whenever I asked him for something he did it and he got it. He was very forcible. He reformed, and I am using the word accurately, he reformed the adjutant general's department and others. He found conditions there were just intolerable and naturally they were all bitterly against him. And I think all the reorganization so far as supply and services were concerned was built on avoiding any future development of a man like General Somervell. If I went into control in another war, I would start out looking for another General Somervell the very first thing I did and so would anybody else who went through that struggle on this side.

Q. 97. What is your feeling about the contribution to increased production and supply of Knudsen, Donald Nelson, Leon Henderson, Sidney Hillman?

A. So far as I know—I do know that General Knudsen helped us a good deal. Nelson, I never was certain about. Leon Henderson—I didn't know enough of the details of his work, and Sidney Hillman the same. I was very friendly with them but theirs was such an intricate position that I didn't know enough about it. But I remember I got into trouble with some of the labor agreements when I was trying to get stuff off to help Great Britain when they were going through the—what was the name of that landing operation where we had to get them to escape [Dunkirk] – during the Dunkirk episode. The President got me on the telephone and gave me the deuce for doing some work on Sunday when I was trying to get the ships loaded to get arms—obsolete—obsolescent war arms to denuded England.

Q. & A. 99. I made appeals—but the President made the bulk of appeals and he did it very skillfully. He would set the target—we'll say in planes—at a certain amount, and then just as you would settle down to that about three months later he would raise the target and he just kept on doing that. Where they had covered all the issues at first he was interested almost solely in planes and he didn't realize how much you had to do in training pilots and the care of the planes. That almost took longer than the building of the plane did. And it was very hard to get him into the tremendous increase in the production of ammunitions, notably artillery ammunition and rifle ammunition. We had to hold onto the old artillery ammunition for the 75s because we had the guns and we had that stored ammunition. We had almost no ammunition for the new 105 and I was under continual pressure particularly by Congress to begin on the 105 and not do anything about the 75s. Well, the 75s in a sense were all we had. If we didn't have those we didn't have anything. So it was silly what the contest was. It was a complete lack of appreciation of what we really had to do. The delay in getting powder, cartridges, shells for the small arms and machine guns was very serious and it took quite a while to get the production. I remember we

never were able to send that ammunition out to General MacArthur and the Dutch who needed it so badly.

I made a great many appeals to labor leaders and they were very good about their meetings with me. I found they were very willing to help. It was pretty difficult at times for them. You had a combination of complications there in that industries had to have these men, the labor had to have these men—the farmers wanted these men—the Army had to have the soldiers. So all these combined introduced a very difficult question to solve and put the Congress under a very great pressure from various directions.

Q. 100. What were our greatest feats in production? The greatest feats in getting supplies to troops?

A. I don't recall offhand the great feat in production, because there were so many of them that at the present time I can't remember just which one to dignify especially.

Q. 101. Were you sometimes dissatisfied with the workings of reverse Lend-Lease on the part of the British?

A. I don't recall being particularly dissatisfied with the workings of the reverse lend-lease. My principal concern with it was a proof of good intentions rather than our getting any material assistance from it.

Q. 102. In your opinion which of our weapons contributed most to our victory? What changes would you make if you had to do it over?

A. As to the weapons, again I would not endeavor to qualify exactly what weapons were the most vital. You can say the atomic bomb ended the war suddenly—that's conclusive in my

mind. It provided the shock action that you needed to jar the action into the Japanese military force. But as to the various weapons, I wouldn't know. I think the rifle was very satisfactory. I think the machine gun was very satisfactory—the 105. I think was very satisfactory, and the use of the artillery was very highly developed and very, very efficient. Their fire control and all was remarkably well done and hit the enemy like a blast when we turned it loose on them.

There was great difficulty in getting the Garand rifle adopted because a Marine Officer, retired or reserve, I don't remember which, had developed a very, very effective rifle and he got great political backing particularly from the chairman of the Senate.

END OF SIDE ONE

The chairman of the Senate Committee—military committee, was a warm friend of mine but he was an ardent supporter of the Marine development and finally forced a test for the benefit of the Senate Committee. We had had all our military tests and everything and they were all in favor of the Garand rifle but under this pressure a very difficult situation was created and it wasn't improved by the head of the Marine Corps, long since retired, when he came out naturally in favor of the Marine rifle. I say Marine, but I mean this ex-officer of the Marine Corps who had developed the gun. Those are the things which are always so difficult to handle and take an immense amount of time when there are so many compelling things that you have to do.

Q. 103. What was our greatest strength on the ground—armor or artillery?

A. That is a very difficult question to answer and I don't think you can answer it, other than to say that each one is of vital importance in its particular field. An Army without tanks over in Europe at that time would have been in a fatal position. An Army without ground [forces] would

have been lost. An Army without artillery would have been very sorely afflicted. But if you have them all and they are efficient, they each have their place and you go from there.

Q. 104. What do you consider of greatest importance among our new equipment: bridging, winter clothing, trucks, prime movers, jeeps, etc?

A. I can't answer that because I am not sufficiently familiar with the new developments and the new equipment that is available and its performance.

Q. 105. How did you attempt to handle criticisms of our tanks, planes, and other equipment? Which criticisms caused you the most concern? (You have told me of airmen wanting a lighter plane until they found it meant less armor).

A. Questions of this sort—criticisms of tanks, planes, other equipment, are very common—certainly to an Army of democracy and a particular type of newsman will get on one subject and make that his play and of course every military sympathizer who is an officer in the field, we'll say, feeds him the ammunition for his newspaper gun. And members of Congress will take that up. If they are hostile to you, they can make it very difficult for you. I was very fortunate in having quite a friendly Congress. I had to labor with them. I had to make plain to them these various things. But they were not set out to destroy me. They were set out to help me. And these issues would come up—with which they would be very much impressed by wherever they got it from—a newspaper man who had been on the front or from matters of that sort. But it was done without the prejudices that often accompanies such pressures where they have antagonism to the principal officer concerned. My main trouble was in getting the thing on an impartial basis: for instance, tanks. We had a very difficult time settling on the pattern for the tanks and I finally (naturally I had all the American side, Chaffee was the head of the tank corps at the time).

I got the principal Britisher, confidentially, and I told him to tell me—I wouldn't repeat what he said—but just tell me exactly in the frankest way possible just what he wanted to say about this tank question as to the importance of the American side and the British side. Well, I very readily came to the feeling that the trouble was this—that the American tank was far more mobile. We had had a great deal of mobility involved in the tractors and things of that sort so that we understood that. And I thought that our tank was far and away beyond the British tank in mobility—being able to handle it. On the other hand, I thought that the British tank had its fighting characteristics for the crew and matters of that sort far ahead of ours because they had had experience in that and knew what it was so my effort was to bring about the settlement of the thing on the basis of what the Americans did best and what the British did best without any prejudice in connection with either one. And I literally settled the tank dispute on that basis with the civilian who was largely responsible for the adjustment and who is now one of the heads of industry. I will not go into the question of his name.

With the planes it grew less difficult as time went on. At first, there was a regular war between those who were opposed to large planes and those who were in favor of large planes. Those in favor of large planes were almost to the point of ignoring any plane that could help the troops, which was a fatal mistake and those who opposed the large bomber planes were again, as we can all see today, making a fatal mistake. Well, it was necessary to compromise these judgments and get the thing underway, without prejudice, if it was possible to do so. I would always find certain officers that would approach the thing purely objectively and I would depend on them to a very large degree but I would do it quietly and I would get myself armed for whatever discussions I had to go through and whatever decisions I had to make. But that was

inherent in practically all these questions. The only thing they didn't oppose much was the jeep. They all opposed its development, and then they were all strong for it if they could get enough.

I don't know but what the battle over the tanks was probably the most difficult to handle. There were great difficulties about the planes but they were of a nature that was more you might say was industrial. But in all these things—the difficulties in a democracy are that everybody can find a back door to the White House. And until you have proven yourself and are, you might say, in command of the situation at least you have the respect of Congress, you have the respect of the command in chief and all. It is a very difficult position because this person, a classmate we'll say, of the President's or somebody else gets to him and just proves that we don't know what we are doing at all and he gets to him, and this man probably talks well. I remember taking issue with—(interrupted and didn't finish).

Early in the period between '39 and '40, I had great difficulty in meeting what I would call the back door influences. It would manifest itself in a variety of ways. I did a number of things to meet this. In the first place, I was very careful not to get mad. Then I got a collection of rather leading fellows on the Hill and I would have them come down and give them very intimate talks on what the situation was and what our position was. That helped a great deal. And I was able to meet these difficulties somewhat in that manner. But I repeat again, I had to keep my temper very carefully and I had to be long-suffering, and had to have a tremendous amount of my time consumed in meeting this sort of influence. You couldn't ignore and to get mad didn't do you any good at all. I had officers who had specific individuals they must go around with and keep straight. I know General Collins, who afterwards became Chief of Staff of the Army and was a very celebrated corps commander in Europe and who captured Cherbourg, he had a single individual civilian who was very intimate with the President and Collins had to

stay with him all the time and if he travelled take him around and stay right with him all the time. Otherwise, he would get loose and no telling what would happen next. I had quite a number of these and each one of my people had one. I remember Smith of very conspicuous reputation, Bedell Smith, he had a particular man he had to look after. Any number of them had these assignments. And their job was to keep in touch with these officers and if the fellow wanted to travel, take him, but stay with him and try to keep the thing straight. There would be some man who was the classmate of the President. We had to have an officer stay with him all the time practically. The officer couldn't trail him or anything like that but he was always available and he was always in touch with what was going on. And in that way we could finally get things over the bar in some degree of safety. But you couldn't ignore these things. And I had to do it in some such way as that or I never would have had time to do my own work. But the first rule of all was that I had to keep my temper, because in a sense you had every right to get just furious considering how grave the hazards were. That didn't develop later on in the war much because they conceded that you knew and that you were being successful. But before that they all knew far better than I knew. Anyone could tell me just exactly. You could learn more on Wall Street or up in New York by far than you could in the War Department.

Q. 106. What was your view on the role of the commander in battle? Should he give general directions and leave the main handling of the battle to his subordinates or should he intervene in the battle? (I ask this because some writers feel that General Lee's chief weakness was a failure to intervene. There are some who feel the same about General Eisenhower. On the other hand, I have interviewed officers in World War II who felt that General Patton and General Stilwell intervened at too low a level in the battle).

A. Foch said that the plan was 10 percent and the execution was 90 percent. Well, that is correct today as it was when Foch said it. It has always been correct. It is not very difficult to get at the plan of these things. The great difficulty is observing the execution and pushing it at the weak point and getting it ahead and those things require not only great ability as a leader, great ability to demand the respect all the people, and great ability as a staff officer. But you have got to go. I sometimes have wondered how I could have gotten along with nine different theaters of operations and over eight and one-half million men in the service—of course many more that that counting those that came in and went out again one way or another—if I hadn't been able to fly. During the early formation of the Army, I used to fly every other week, almost all week. Of course, I could go great distances in a very short time and deal with things there. I never got caught in a review but once and I would go right to where they were working when I got to the place. And as a rule, I wouldn't tell them when I was coming because I just wanted to see exactly what they were doing at that particular time and when I left, I tried, as far as I could, to avoid meals and take them entirely in the plane. And we got, the planes were not as well served as they are today, but I got a very good Filipino—they procured him for me—so that he could give me very decent meals and relaxation. I never liked to take anybody with me on the plane. I tried that at first and I found that they talked all the time and kept me from relaxing. What I wanted to do was to sit down and put on a flying coat and put on sneakers and put on what do you call—moccasins—loafers—and sit down in one chair with my feet on the other and probably read the *Saturday Evening Post* or some such book as that. I always had a collection of these Army books that we had printed. So that the big problem with me was to get around and see these things and find out how they were going on at the time and I had to carry that all over the world and I think my mileage towards the end—I don't remember whether it was while I was

Secretary of State or when I ended with Chief of Staff but it was 1,400,000 miles. So I was involved in a tremendous amount of travel. I got caught up with the things right then—saw the situation and could take action in many cases within the hour by communicating back to Washington in regard to these matters which we had not understood or which required something more of correction that had to start from headquarters. But the travelling was very important. I was quite surprised when I got out to Ft. Sill—I was there a number of times—I found it was the first time the Chief of Staff had ever been to Ft. Sill. But of course, they didn't have planes in those days. But on these occasions, I could go great distances in a very short time. And about every other week, I was on the go entirely. And sometimes I went all night and get my sleep on the plane and that saved a day in there. You can't take for granted how things are going to work out. You have got to see. You have got to follow up. Not interfere. Not irritate people. But you get there. I think the best lesson of that sort that you get is Wellington's campaign in Portugal and Spain. His campaigns I should say…(He was interrupted here by the arrival of a little boy. He said, "Johnny, you are going to get shot it you grab that instrument).

I can't emphasize this too much that if you just get out a plan and set back, why you are lost. And on the other hand, it you get out a plan and then irritate the other fellow, you are lost again. And the method you do that has to be very largely influenced by the character of the Army that you are dealing with or the troops you are dealing with at the time.

Q. 107. What were our great virtues and our great weaknesses in command as opposed to the British, Germans, and Russians?

A. I think the German command relationship until Hitler began to take it all apart was so far as military affairs are concerned was the best. Of course, they had a very highly disciplined Army

and a higher disciplined officer force. The Russians, I don't know enough about it. It seems to have been a very arbitrary matter. If they didn't like you, they shot you, which is one way of getting things done. The British, they got people like Montgomery eventually and all, but they had a pretty slow time doing it and great difficulties doing it. They had the same problem as we have on the political situation.

I might say that I was very fortunate in regard to that. I was very fortunate that the President didn't interfere with me on command and allowed me more or less complete freedom of action. And it was only when I got into the business of reducing these fellows that I got into difficulties with the President because that instantly produced great political pressures. That we were doing all wrong. That we were victimizing our individuals and that he shouldn't be reduced. And that became particularly evident when we started to demobilize and you naturally had to cut down command and that was a very tragic thing to have to do. But when it got into a political swarm then it was all the worse. I recall one situation that took a very curious trail. In the first place, it was man that I knew very intimately out in the west who had gotten into the school that I had started myself at Charlottesville for the training of officers to be put in villages and cities and towns to conduct that part of the administration of captured territory or freed territory for that matter. I had gone in myself as a second lieutenant with no instruction of any kind whatsoever—no school of any kind whatsoever—and not even an Army regulation. A storm had destroyed practically all the papers and what I could find were in a barrel, rain-soaked, and I had to make up all my returns—I was the only officer there—and I had some of my early returns for property I had to deal with and supplies I had to issue—were made up almost out of my imagination. But I was given no instructions at all and I was practically governor in effect of quite a large territory, about half an island. And I remember in the First World War it was not

until after the actual fighting that they started in to try to get hold of officers that had been trained—some by Funston in Mexico—and began circulating to get any copies of the information of the regulations which had been gotten out at that time. So I started this school in Charlottesville and the head of this school was confirmed by the Secretary of War. It was a very fine lawyer of New York whose father had been, I think, Attorney General before him. Now, of course, I have forgotten his name at the moment. He was put in charge of the school down there, and a very capable colonel of the Regular Army was put in charge of the real management of the school, and we got this started. Well, the first thing I had to do was to stop division commanders sending officers there they wanted to get rid of. They didn't want their chief of staff, but they didn't quite have the nerve to reduce him or get him transferred. So they would want to sent him to a school like that—kick him upstairs as it were—and I had to act very drastically with several of them for using this as a convenience to get rid of people that they didn't have the nerve to do it themselves. And one of these was a fellow from the Midwest. And he was well-known for his characteristics which we weren't very excited about and by his same name was another officer who was another individual—who was the intimate of one of the distinguished Republicans and was anathema to Mr. Roosevelt. There were some accusations that this school down there was teaching a kind of government that was not compatible with our American type of government. That we were trying to organize a new government. I think they said we were doing everything. They didn't claim we were making glass, but I never heard of so many foolish cracks about it. Mr. Stimson came back from a cabinet meeting that lasted almost all afternoon and I discovered they had been discussing entirely this particular officer whose name was the same as that of an intimate of onetime Republican leaders. And Mr. Roosevelt was very bitter about this matter and Mr. Stimson was very much stirred up over it. I listened to this thing and I finally found out

they were talking about somebody they didn't even know—who wasn't the officer at all—and I was already investigating because I thought they had kicked him upstairs and loaded the school up with a man who had no business up there. And I was shocked when I found out how long the cabinet spent—all afternoon—warring over this thing. And I expressed my surprise and incredulity that such a thing should happen and Mr. Stimson called up the President then and explained they were talking about the wrong man all the time that they were so excited. But they got the school on the carpet as it were. And they claimed all sorts of things about the school. I called attention of Mr. Stimson to the fact that he had confirmed the head of the institution who was a very fine officer—he was a reserve officer and he was a general and his father had been in high cabinet position and he was altogether a fine man, but the thing got so bad that I had an investigation of a certain individual who was on the Army staff and Mr. Roosevelt got after him once or twice and finally I called this man in and said, "Why haven't you reported back the result of your investigation about this?" "Well," he said, "I was ashamed to." 'Well,'' I said "what were you ashamed about?" And he said, "I don't want to tell you." I said, "My gosh, you were to investigate. Now what was it?" "Well," he said, "I found out that there was supposed to be—just supposed to be—a plot of which this particular individual, who they were all talking about, was to be the President of this new republic and you were to be the Vice-President." "Well," I said, "I can tell you right now the first part of it, if there is anything to it, I was going to be President, I was not going to be the Vice-President." "But," I said, "The whole thing is utterly ridiculous." And yet that had gotten to the point among people of some sanity and some reserve—that had gotten up and twisted clear round to the Cabinet. So I took it to Mr. Stimson and he was very much embarrassed at talking to the President about it and then the President showed me a list of couple of fellows that were reserve officers—who were generals—and who were going to be

relieved. We were reducing in every way we could because the discharges were going on very, very fast—demobilization—and they thought this showed a determination to expel all these people out of the Army and build up a new republic or something of that sort. Nothing was too wild not to mention. I was having the two officers relieved because there was no job for them. So they came to me to consult me. Did they dare to relieve those two political National Guardsmen? That's what it was. That is they were marshalling political power. And I said, "Go ahead and do it." And I told Mr. Roosevelt about this. (Chuckles) He was very much taken aback but he was very much embarrassed. Because there was heavy pressure to retain them. "Well," I said, "Mr. Roosevelt, you just have to make a decision. You are going to have a reserve army and no Regular army. We'll demote all the regular officers and keep all the other officers." Of course, I exaggerated it. He said, "Not that exactly." "Well," I said, "Will you let me handle it?" And he said, "All right" and he never spoke to me again about it and we went ahead and reduced these people. But we had to get them out. We had to reduce our own regular generals, and I objected very much to be held as Chief of Staff because I had made all these people. I had relieved all the ones I thought were not efficient enough to be retained. I had many enemies of them and their families. Now I was being called on to reduce about six hundred generals and make enemies of them too. I wouldn't have anybody left but my wife by the time I got through this thing. And I wanted to be relieved as Chief of Staff. And he made me hold on—Mr. Truman did that—until he brought Eisenhower back and he was very slow about bringing Eisenhower back. And Eisenhower, he didn't want to come back either, nobody wanted that job. So it was a very difficult period and there were these wild ideas that people were plotting this and plotting that.

I might go further about that school. In the first place, we got in trouble with it because Mr. Roosevelt forbade us to put these people into Sicily. We had sent them over and established a pool there in Africa and we wanted them to go into Sicily and be the men trained to take charge of these villages. So right away we would have somebody regulating those matters. And the village was picked out that each man was to take and he was educated in connection with that village and everybody in it who might have influence in the matter. And Mr. Roosevelt at first forbade us to put them in there. We had them in a camp in Africa and we couldn't do anything with them. Finally we got so we moved them in and this book that was a great best seller, I forget the name of that—that gave Patton the devil for shooting a hole in a tank or something—something of that sort—was made into a play—a best seller as a book and very popular as a play—but that was the officer that we had educated who was conducting this thing and was on the side of the villagers and in a sense against what the military were doing at that place. All of those things were very difficult to handle and so extraordinary you would hardly believe them today—the feeling of uncertainty about such things as that—and all these plots that were taken to the President and he had to pick out what was important and what was not. And it was no easy thing because the people who went to him were deeply prejudiced and very active. And I seldom went because if I got into all those discussions, I would soon exhaust my power entirely.

A. As to that further answer to that 107, I don't know what weakness I would say in command we had. I think our command questions worked out very, very well. We had comparatively speaking few reliefs. We relieved men. General Eisenhower was very firm about that and very courageous about that. And we relieved men on a number of occasions. But we did all our weeding out in this country whereas in the First World War they left the weeding out to General Pershing in France. And he had a terrible time. I remember one period, as I recall it; there were

thirty-two regular brigadier generals on the road at the same time going to the rear. And I may be off in that number because it is years back. But they had given them all physical examinations—things of that sort—but that didn't matter about the physical examinations—they were going to get shot. He could function until he got shot. If he was going to get sick, he could function until he got sick. But what you wanted was a vigorous man, who could command the respect the troops, who could go at it aggressively in his leadership, who was not fatigued and therefore lowered in morale by reason of that fatigue.

Q. 109. I have read that we would have adopted the title "marshal" for five star generals but for the fact that you felt that Marshal Marshall wouldn't sound very good. Isn't it rather that "marshal" has a foreign sound?

A. I didn't want any promotion at all. I didn't need it. The Chiefs of Staff on the British side were already field marshals so they would be senior to me whatever I was made. I didn't think I needed that rank and I didn't want to be beholden to Congress for any rank or anything of that kind. I wanted to be able to go in there with my skirts clean and with no personal ambitions concerned in it in any way, and I could get all I wanted with the rank I had. But that was twisted around and somebody said I didn't like the term marshal because it was the same as my name. I know Mr. Churchill twitted me about this in a rather scathing tone. I don't recall that I ever made the expression. But my reason for not wanting it was that I felt that it was much better that I personally shouldn't be beholden to anything for Congress except for fair treatment which they gave me.

Q. 110. Were you ever put under political pressure to give certain divisions to particular individuals?

A. Of course, I was under some pressure but not as much as you might think. The pressure there came when I was relieving the man. I remember one occasion I had thirteen senators come into my office at the same time to defend this man. And I finally said, "I'll put it this way gentlemen. I don't understand your position because I should think your constituents should be your principal interest, and here it seems to me you are only considering one constituent and ignoring all the other constituents who are members of the division. I am concerned with them and I am determined to see that they get the best leadership that there is available. And I said in this particular case we were very generous with the individual. We have him a long time to ease himself out of this thing and I don't think we could have done any better. "I am not going to leave him in command of that division. So I will put it to you this way—if he stays, I go, and if I stay, he goes." And that broke up the meeting. And one senator came back the next day and he said, "You know, I told my wife about the meeting yesterday"—and incidentally he was the only one who spoke to me about it—"and she said she was very happy, that her son was in the army and that you were head of the army."

I don't care to list these divisions and corps commanders unless I had some special reason for it at the time because comparisons are odious and if this book is a lot of comparisons with respect to efficiency to this, that or the other person, nobody will read the story except as to get at the acrimonious features such as that.

(Chuckles. What's he got? Johnny, you want an orange? He looks so pathetic…)

Q. 113. You have told me some of your problems with National Guard commanders. In view of recent controversy, do you have any comments on the problem of getting good National Guard commanders?

A. I will comment to you on this personally.

Q. 113A. What were some the chief advances of medicine in World War II over the earlier wars?

A. Wartime medicines. I won't comment on that. You have better sources of information. What I wanted particularly from the doctors—there was one group of vast importance to us—to man the hospitals and everything of that sort—where the scientific information was invaluable to us. There was another group that had to be executives and handle things in the field and that was quite apart from their specialized knowledge for which they were famous you might say in medicine or medicinal practices. I had great difficulty with that. I wanted the head of the medical corps during the war to be a great executive who could develop the medical corps and could see in the field that it was properly handled. And the pressures all were directed towards getting the great surgeon or the great medical leader. What you needed in Europe with the armies was the great executive to get these things set up—to get the hospitals—temporary things, the evacuation, everything of that sort, going and to see that the attention at the front was absolutely up to the peak of perfection. So I had some difficulty about this. A man might be a wonder on running a hospital and yet on the other hand be unfitted for a field executive which was the essential thing in the European theater.

Q. 114. You have told me of some of your work in dealing with malaria in the Pacific. Was this your chief medical problem during the war?

A. The principal medical problem was malaria and I explained to you about that where we had to go at that in order to save ourselves in the southwest Pacific. We would have a single division

to be out of action for over a year, as was the case, I think, of the First Marine Division, which was sent down to New Zealand.

My chief medical problem was getting the hospital started in time. The draft was going at a tremendous rate. I know at one time there we were taking in as many men in a month as there were men in the entire Navy. And the hospitals weren't finished. And you might say that the patients went in one side and the shavings came out of the other. And I had to get them started and one officer who played a great part in this is now the medical aide to the President—General Snyder—I picked him up and sent him all over the world but particularly all over this country when the hospitals were being established and he saw that the thing ran—that these overwhelming numbers of recruits coming in were attended. There was a flu epidemic at the time and he saw that the proper steps were taken in advance in connection with that and he had a very hard time because he never had a good plane and flying was a little bit primitive at that time in some respects and he just had to fly all the time and had some dreadful flights and very dangerous flights. But he was perfectly splendid in what he did and should have received great rewards for it. However, his work now is very much appreciated, I believe, with the President. I made him, incidentally, assistant Inspector General. I don't recall that I even spoke to the Inspector General department—they were pretty much hidebound, those fellows—so the first he knew about it I think was when Snyder was made a brigadier general. The Medical Department didn't know about it. I put his name on the list and appointed him the minute he was made an assistant inspector general. Then he was put in charge of all the inspections and everything of that sort relating in any way to medicine or health in connection with the draft. And that's where he came in—these new hospitals—the handling of all the recruits on the medical end. That gave me something to lean on which I felt up to that time I didn't have at all.

I did virtually the same thing with production. I had one inspector general whose practically principal job was to be in touch with all the production plants and things of that sort—and equipment—and travelled all over the country to keep me advised of what was needed—where we were limping and what should be done. Theretofore, the Inspector General was generally kept busy trying to figure out some question of an officer's payments to his divorced wife and things of that sort. I got them right down to production, to health, and one or two others things which I won't mention here. One of them, I will say, was the colored question.

I might say right here and now that I figure one of the greatest mistakes I made during the war was accepting the pressure of the staff—I don't want exactly to pin it on them—but they exerted the pressure of me and I failed to sense what was going to be a real, vital quality involved, denouement involved. I wanted the camps kept largely in the south because they didn't have to have such construction as they would in a northern climate and in addition to that training would be much facilitated because they could train outdoors for more days in the year. So I wanted, incidentally, all the colored division trained in the south, and the staff was very much opposed to that. They thought the division should be near the district it came from and they insisted on putting some of these colored divisions in the north. And of course they practically couldn't train at all it was so cold. And what was the real difficulty was—I overlooked entirely—and I say it frankly—I overlooked entirely…

That's my wife, Johnny. Will you give this cannibal something to eat out there?

I completely overlooked the fact that the tragic part of it would have these northern Negroes in a southern community. We couldn't change the bus arrangement, we couldn't change any of the things of that nature and they found themselves very much circumscribed—to

them outrageously so—because they were in there to train to fight for their country and put their lives ostensibly on the line and they were being denied this and denied that and denied the other things that the white troops accepted as a matter of course. And it made it extremely difficult and I know Jack McCloy, who was the assistant Secretary of War, that was one of his particular pigeons and he would come down to see me with great frequency because he was always in trouble and as a matter of fact at that time, under those conditions, there just wasn't any solution. We never should have coagulated the south with these Negro camps. We should have kept time in the north, but my refusal was not based on that understanding. I failed to visualize what was going to happen and it caused us all sorts of difficulties and I regarded it as one of the most important mistakes I made in the mobilization of the Army because, as I say, there was no hope of settling that at that time. Anything of that kind would just lead to dissension and we had enough on our hands to get a fighting Army.

Q. 115. You mentioned to me your part in providing air evacuation for Wingate's raiders. Did you press for this in Europe also?

A. I did not press for air evacuation in Europe. As a matter of fact my pressure was the other way around. That was a very desirable thing—that air evacuation. But the trouble was we didn't have enough planes and we wanted to use the planes for another military attack but they were absorbed in air evacuation. Now the question was did we evacuate more efficiency and progress with the war more slowly. And I felt that the saving in the end was in expediting the business of the war and that; of course, led to taking these planes away from the evacuation of the wounded earlier than otherwise would be the case. So I made it my business—particularly when they sent women to France—to explain this thing to them before they got there and heard the doctors appeal for more planes. They had the planes until we had to have them for further military

operations. But that must not be delayed because it was to our interest to end the war as quickly as possible. And while the evacuation of the wounded was better they were actually by doing so would be losing the battle they were wounded in trying to win for us.

Q. 116. Any general comments on the work of the medical corps?

A. I thought the Medical Corps, as a whole, was very efficient during the war and I know that the handling of the wounded on the battlefield always won great plaudit, great appreciation, from all the men. And I think the Medical Corps acquitted itself very finely. The medical profession I should say. Training.

Q. 117. Did we develop unrealistic views about training in the 1920-39 period? Was there too much "spit and polish" and not enough field training? (Frye in his book on you tells how when you were in the Philippines you won a bet in which you said the inspecting officer would find three things wrong in regard to barracks and men's clothing, but overlook three basic errors in field activities). Is this true?

A. I do not think we had too much spit and polish. It has a certain disciplinary effect. It was very hard for the men to keep up anyway and if you let that deteriorate, it was very, very bad. And the deeper the mud, the more important it was to spruce them up as quickly as you could thereafter. But if you let them rest in the mud their morale went to pieces. So I would not say that spit and polish at all adversely affected the training. It had a very strong disciplinary effect. The training was realistic enough, In fact we had the greatest maneuver I think in peacetime that any military force has ever had. In fact we took over West Texas and almost all of Louisiana for a field maneuver. We took a large part of Tennessee and, I believe, a little of Kentucky in the same way. And I know we took in the Carolinas, large acreage, in order to have maneuvers.

And we had as many as five hundred thousand men in a maneuver. I saw in a paper just yesterday some reference to the "giant" Army maneuver they are going to have—and there are twenty thousand troops involved.

(Don't do that Johnny)

And we had them up to five hundred thousand. I remember one senator who had since retired coming to me and said—no I went to him because he was on the committee up in Congress and I think he was chairmen of the committee.

(What is it you want Johnny?)

This senator objected to what I was doing—objected to the money I was expending on maneuvers. He said they had a critique and they exposed all these mistakes—when did they do it with all those mistakes. I said, "My God, senator, that's the reason I do it. I want the mistake down in Louisiana, not over in Europe, and the only way to do this thing is to try it out and if it doesn't work, find out what we need to do to make it work." And here for the first time High Command could be trained, because we could use these divisions. They weren't just called in, the men, for two weeks' training and we could march them long distances and do the things you have to do in war, which is a very strenuous, terrible strain on the individual. And that gave the commanders an opportunity to exercise command and bear the results of their errors and profit by their successes. Eisenhower, for example, was Chief of Staff of General Krueger's command in the south. He came on from the northwest for that purpose. All of them learnt a great deal. I remember in the five-hundred-thousand- man maneuvers down in Louisiana, I directed that they change their bases on each side and they told me it would take a month or something like that, and be very, very expensive. Well, I said, they would have to do it anyway. They would have to

do it in Europe and I wanted them to do it here. So they changed the bases. I know in one case, I remember exactly what the result was. It only took ten days and it only cost $40,000, I think. That seems like a large sum for a maneuver like that. But it is a very economical sum when it came to the efficiency it developed in the troops and that's the reason that Patton and Hodges and the others and Bradley were able to move as rapidly across the face of Europe.

Q. 118. Did the OCS School at Fort Benning proceed along lines you had laid down earlier at the Infantry School? What part did General Bradley have in organizing the OCS organization?

A. I think the officers' school went along about the lines prescribed. Of course there was much less time in which to do it. And there was a much less qualified group to take the training. But they did a very satisfactory job.

Q. 119. The Marines argue that the Army is too lax in training and that we coddle our troops. Could we have done more with draftees particularly when many of them were older than the men training them? (Apparently the Marines have been having some trouble in peacetime with this).

A. I think the Marines' argument about the training is a little big off. They have a great advantage in that their service is almost entirely voluntary and it's small. For instance, during the war they really only got, as I recall, only four divisions into action. Well, we had seventy-nine, I think. And we had a force about a third as large or maybe half as large in special troops all of which we had to get trained and we weren't allowed to take volunteers to any extent at all. Mr. Roosevelt allowed the Navy to proceed with volunteers and the Marine Corps to proceed with volunteers for a long time. That made it very hard on the Army—very hard—and I think it is a most unwise procedure. I know it is in the end. There's no doubt about it at all. Of course they like it. Of course the Navy liked it and, of course, the Air liked it. I say the other day when

they were commenting on this lieutenant general—this superb leader we had developed—this Oklahoman—when he died he wrote an article—before he died—for *Life* magazine and went on to say why we should have universal training and everything of that sort. And at the end of the article in *Life* they said, of course, the Air and the Navy and, he may have said, the Marines don't agree with this. Well, naturally they don't agree. They had every advantage in the world to have that and it was not right.

You take in the naval thing. That is to get a very efficient infantry outfit requires a world more training than it does for these other jobs. Because in the Navy you know your job, you know where it is. You know the exact place you are going to stand—for most of them during the battle. You take a bath before you go. You put on fresh underclothes. You sleep in the same bed that you slept in before you got into action. While the poor devil in the Army is marching tremendous distances, he is in the mud, he's filthy dirty, he hasn't had a full meal and he makes him maximum exertion before the fight and a minimum of sleep and a minimum of well-prepared food and then he fights in a place he has never seen before and probably goes into it during the hours of darkness. His communications are not fastened in by some contractor like Westinghouse of that is a ship; his communications are mobile and have moved about and generally go into place during the night or very hastily in the daytime. He may never see them. He may work with artillery he never lays his eyes on which labors far in the rear and with communications that carry back reports on targets. So we almost never have completely trained infantry. We came more near it is this war than in any other, but we were under great disadvantage in the fact these other services had volunteers and we did not. It was under a completely mistaken illusion that that was easy to train. It's been easy to badly train and it's been badly trained in practically every war we've had. And I made a herculean effort to see it

was rightly trained in this war. And if I hadn't had a very friendly Congress with me, I never would have gotten by with it because they thought I was taking too—doing too—much in the way of preparations with these men. I was moving them out to the west Coast in that Desert Training Center and that cost money to get them out there. I gave them every bit of training every time that we could work out for them and they profited greatly by it when they got over to Europe. General Bradley had quite a bit to do with the primary organization of the officers' school.

Q. 120. Did you originate the World War II practice of insisting that the soldier be informed of what he was fighting for? Did you set up the Information and Education program? Were you ever satisfied with it?

A. I did insist that the soldier be informed of what he was fighting for. At first they prepared pamphlets—very well-prepared by experts from the colleges and all—but I found as a rule they were presented after lunch and the man was tired and he went to sleep and the company officer who was explaining the thing was a very poor actor or performer and I called in Frank Capra, the leading motion picture director at that time and had him prepare the films which were a complete education I think on the war to civilians as well as to the recruits in the Army. And I had to do it, you might say, on the Q. T. I never allowed the Secretary of War to see it or the White House to see it until we had it finished. And Mr. Truman [Roosevelt] was thrilled by it, but still he had a great many ideas. We got it over to the White House—Lowell Mellett was mixed up with it—and I didn't get it away for four months. I had to get it out to the troops in two weeks. I was raising on Army and I required that every soldier see that before he left the United States. And I think—I remember the reports they gave me of the millions that saw it. Mr. Churchill got hold of them and showed them all over England and even prepared and delivered an introduction to

the films. I think they are one of the best educational set-ups that I have ever seen and they were very interesting and they were done very expertly. They were amusing—they were serious—they were tremendous in their scope. I remember I took Mrs. Churchill over to see one that had not yet been released. And I remember I would only do it on the basis that she would not mention it to anybody at the White House. Field Marshal Dill took her up and I went up to the little War Department projection room in the Pentagon. And she looked at this thing. She cried; she laughed and she was just thrilled to the last and just begged me to let the Prime Minister see it. Well, I said, I can't exactly promise for the Prime Minister. I don't want him to speak to the President because I am not ready for the President to see it yet. And to put it frankly, I wanted to get it on the road because I knew it would be called in and we would fool around for a month or two, trying to get the thing fixed up. And time was golden with me and that had to be gotten out as fast as possible. Well, she promised me and then she went over there and got to talking to Harry Hopkins, and they told the Prime Minister and Hopkins got on the phone and said the Prime Minister wanted to see it. I said he couldn't. Then the Prime Minister got on the phone. Mr. Roosevelt was out of town at the time at Hyde Park at the moment. Mr. Churchill wanted to see this right away. "Well," I said, "I'm sorry, Mr. Churchill, because I don't want that to get out until it's ready because I will have all sorts of trouble with it if it does." There was a series of these pictures you see and when you got it into the White House with a thing like that you just never got it back. And as I say, time was golden with me. And I was perfectly confident with what I had that Capra in each case had done a superb job. They could use those things yet for great historical purposes. Anyway, Mr. Churchill came on and said he wanted them right away. I said, "Mr. Churchill, I'm sorry but I can't give it to you." "Well," he said, "I'm asking you, I'm asking you." And I said, "I know you are, Mr. Churchill, and I know you are the Prime

Minister of the British Commonwealth and you are a guest of the President, but he hasn't seen it yet and you are not going to see it ahead of him." "Well," he said, "when are you going to show it to him?" I said, "When it is finished. It isn't finished. I'll never get it finished if I get involved in this circuit you are proposing." "Well," he said, "I want very much to see it, Marshall." "Well," I said, "if you will swear to me that you won't mention it to the President or anybody else—anybody else. Mrs. Churchill promised me that and she went and mentioned it to you or Harry Hopkins, but if you will promise me that you won't mention it to anybody else, I will send it over there for a private showing for you." "Well," he said, "I think you can hardly exact a promise from the Prime Minister of the British Empire that you just referred to." "Well," I said, "I can't, but I'll just not send the picture. That's the way to do it. I won't send it over." He said, "You've got me there. I'll just have to wait until the President gets back. I said, "Well, if you tell him, you'll break a promise there. I'm not going to do it. I'm not going to have this thing stalled by this sort of procedure." I said, "Even the Secretary of War hasn't seen it." Because I knew if I got all those people into it, I would never get it done. And Capra is a great expert and he had all of the data and he made up the thing and I'm for it the way he's got it. Of course, there was a whole series of these pictures—the Prelude to War and then the things on the various countries—they were beautifully done. They would educate our men who were going into these countries. Well, anyway, I sent it over and Churchill had it and Churchill immediately sent back and he wanted to take it to England. "Well," I said, "you can't do that until the President sees it." "Well," he said, "I'm going to hurry it up. "Well," I said, "it's the last damn thing you are going to get from me if you try to hurry it up. I'm doing a job and you are interfering—I'm doing a doing a job and you are interfering." I remember I repeated it twice. "Well," he said, "you certainly are stubborn." "Well," I said, "I'm not half as stubborn as you

are. But I'm not going to get this out." I said, "I am very, very fond of Mrs. Churchill. I admire her greatly, but I will never forgive her for telling you, because I might have known that this would happen." Well, that is the way we got into this thing. I didn't send it over to Mr. Roosevelt for quite a long time. And they kept it four months. But meanwhile, three million troops had seen it. I would not let it go until three million men had seen it. I don't know how much Lowell Mellett had the thing, but I know he was in the figure that our moving picture theaters didn't show it because it was over fifty minutes long. And every moving picture theater in England showed it. And the whole English people got this education and were crazy about it. And I always thought it was very tragic that our people didn't get the chance to see the picture—or pictures rather.

Q. 121. What were our strong points in training and the weak points?

A. The weak points in training are the great difficulty of making it practical and the great difficulty of taking any officer, we'll say, of company grade and having to accept him as your professor because it takes a great deal of imagination and a great deal of showmanship to make the maneuvers really as valuable as they should be.

Q. 122. Was General McNair the best training general we had in the whole training period?

A. General McNair. He was a senior officer. He was in charge of all ground troop development in this country. And I felt he was about as able a trainer as we could get and very, very thorough. General Clark was his principal assistant and he was one of the best training actors that I know about. And a lot of the organization of the new units which played such a dominant part in the war were of his devising. We would sit down together at my desk and work out together how these new units would be formed, where everybody in it was selected.

Q. 124. Did you originate the airborne unit? General Ridgway in his book *Soldier* says that you backed his request to increase the size of the airborne unit. He indicates that he sent General Maxwell Taylor back to see you on this at the time of the Bulge. General Ridgway adds that you were the best friend the fighting man had.

A. The airborne unit was a collective enterprise. I was very strong for it. I opposed the way the air was used even to the last. The pressure, of course, is to give each person air. They used it very much like the Federal Army, until Grant came along with Sheridan—used their cavalry in the Civil War. They pieced it all over the place. I've always felt, for instance, that in the final battle in Normandy, that the plan they had worked out in detail for the air, but which Eisenhower's people didn't think they could safely risk, was the quick way to end the battle—and that was to seize a field near Paris with glider planes, with parachute troops, and then fly in these small tractors and other things and then gather in all the motor transport of the surrounding country and of course all the French undercover units would have joined us and built up there with the ammunition—which of course we could do—we could put in these 105 guns and build up a force there right behind the German lines before they had time to get things together and make it almost impossible for them to do anything but to fight you with small groups. However, that was a hazard. It was a brand new thing and Eisenhower's staff and Eisenhower, I guess, himself, I guess, himself didn't feel it was proper to take the risk. But I always thought it was wrong to divide up these men into little groups everywhere. It was very natural for the commander to want them. It was very natural for them to want certain passes, certain crossings in connection with the first landing—going up on the right flank on Utah Beach and with General Montgomery on his part of the front. But I believe the air could have been used with great effect in splitting up the Germans very quickly at the start. And the minute it was a little

split up the whole thing would more or less fall because the continued reinforcement would have been a very simple matter and I think you would have all the undercover troops of the French accumulating there and we could have let the ammunition and everything go into there very easily. General Maxwell Taylor came back to see me about the very thing you referred to here. Incidentally, he was a superb commander of this unit—I don't mind, let it go. [He apparently was referring to the fact that he was near the end of the tape.] He was sitting at my desk in the first conference we had on this matter when he got news of the attack in the Bulge and he left and as I recall he left his hat, but I'm not quite certain, his cap. Anyway, left my office and went straight to his plane and got in it and flew to get over to France and got over very, very promptly. But he got the news while he was sitting at my desk.

Ends on720.

TAPE 16M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

February 15, 1957

Interview with General George C. Marshall at Pinehurst, February 15, 1957 to questions by Forrest C. Pogue. The machine was run by Sgt. Heffner

Q. 123. What was your view concerning the organization of elite units such as the Rangers? I know that General McNair argued with General Lear about the latter's insistence on the value of these troops. General McNair said that such a practice took the best leaders away from all the units and put them in a few specialized units. I gather that this reflected your thinking?

A. This question concerns my views and those of General McNair and others as to the organization of Rangers. I favored this in a way but felt that it had to be handled with considerable care. The first Rangers, in effect, were the special unit or units that we organized for a possible operation on dropping them on a glacier in Norway when we were trying to get at the destruction of what was a heavy water plant of the Germans, meaning something leading up to the atomic energy proposition.

The reasons against these special units is quite well understood. They had exactly the same battle in Great Britain. Mr. Churchill was warmly disposed towards these special units and the head of the ground army training in England was very much against it. Mr. Churchill referred to them, these special fighters, as "the dull mass". I mean in contrast to the special fighter. He referred to the general organization as the "dull mass" of the army and the special fighters as just what they were, the Rangers or whatever we choose to call them. When we had no longer the necessity of holding them in Norway, then the question was what we were going to do with them and they performed a magnificent service in the Anzio battle to retain that salient when it was under—the beachhead—when it was under heavy attack. I've forgotten just now all the places we tried to use them. But there is a very good place for them but there's always

opposition because it takes good man and to that extent it would take them away from the other organizations of the Army. The thing could be easily overdone and it would have to be handled, I think, with discretion. But it serves as sort of a model as to what you can get, and it also points out what is the great advantage in having a volunteer service which the Marines and the Navy and the Air Corps enjoyed. We later on organized airborne divisions in which everybody in it, as I recall, was a volunteer from the already enlisted Army. And I think their performance and their discipline, their fighting dash was excelled by none. In fact, I hardly think it was equaled by virtually any other troops. I'm talking about the 82nd Division and the 101st, I believe and several other special units of that character who rendered such magnificent fighting records in France, and Germany, I believe. It is rather odd though that exactly the same fight was being made in Great Britain with Mr. Churchill backing these units.

I do not want under any circumstances to have him quoted publicly as referring to the rest of the Army as the dull mass. Be very careful about this, please.

Q. 124. Did you originate the airborne unit? General Ridgway, in his book, *SOLDIER,* says that you backed his request to increase the size of the airborne unit. He indicates that he sent General Maxwell Taylor back to see you on this at the time of the Bulge. General Ridgway adds that you were the best friend the fighting man had.

A. I do not recall about the airborne unit. I think it was a gradual development. I know I was very much in favor of it. You speak in the question of General Maxwell Taylor coming back to see me on the subject of the special units – General Ridgway having sent him back – just at the time of the Bulge. I think I earlier referred to this in saying he was sitting at my desk when we

got our first information regarding the Bulge attack and he left instantly and as I recall, he went directly to the airport and flew back to France.

Q. 125. What do you consider were the chief wartime problems with training?

A. The greatest problem of wartime training, I don't know. The greatest problem was to continue long enough with the basic training of which they were all impatient. And it is dull, and it is long, and it is very strenuous, and unless it is well done, thoroughly done, the troops are going to be lacking in discipline and performance from that time on. And yet, it is very hard to have them see the reason for it. I remember I had some special professional fact-gatherers for me. And one of the interesting facts was – the file records up there will show it – that they saw the men in training in the country and talked to them about what they thought of the training, whether they thought it was too much, too little of the right kind, and so forth. Then they found these same men on the front after they had been engaged and they found almost everything the man objected to in this country, over there after a brief experience he said there was not enough of. The men can never understand how intense this must be in order to register in long drawn out engagements and ever the severities of a battlefield experience. But it was rather striking that the very men – the very same men – man – that opposed it so in his criticisms in this country when our fact-finders found them – professional fact-finder found them abroad and he looked him up purposely, he found that they then said they very thing they get the least of, that they objected to most in this country they now felt they did not get enough of.

The training – the infantry training rather than the artillery training, the infantry training rather than the tank training is a very trying thing, it is a very monotonous thing but I repeat again it is a very trying thing – very arduous and not anything spectacular about it so that the

men naturally object to it and I found that particularly true in the National Guard units, thought this was really due to their own leaders not realizing the vast importance of it. There was also the problem of the land because the training of ground units, with their tanks, artillery and other things of that nature requires a tremendous area of ground and will do a great deal of destruction to crops and things of that nature. So that is hard to arrange. At first, it was very difficult to get the money from Congress and I had to have several special hearings in order to get enough money for the large maneuvers. Senator Byrnes was very helpful in this and I think one of my hearings with the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House – the military section – he was a banker from Upstate New York. Senator Byrnes arranged it and I saw this man alone and Senator Byrnes as I recall had my discussion to this representative printed and distributed and given a wide distribution, in order that others might read it and see what the arguments were for the expenditure of these large sums of money for this training – and they were very large sums. But I thought that was one of the most important aspects of the matter that for once at least America was going to go into the battle with thoroughly trained ground troops. It wasn't much trouble getting the air trained; it wasn't a great deal of trouble getting the artillery trained because you could fix very carefully what the things were to do and it didn't involve such arduous service except for the spotters – I might call them – the officers commanding units that have to go to the front and be with the ground units in order to report the necessary firing points. And there is [Sgt. Heffner – observation] the observation detail and generally the battery commander.

I will repeat again that the maneuvers were not only valuable, but they were invaluable. We never could have made our way in Europe without these. As a matter of fact, our units, after they had been in Great Britain for a time, lost in training because you couldn't train over there

extensively – you would have destroyed too many valuable crops. And the leaders always claimed they landed in France or wherever it was in Italy or Africa at a less high training standard than they had left the United States.

Q. 127. I have heard it said that General Eisenhower was "discovered" by you and others as a result of his work as chief of staff of General Krueger's Third Army in the 1941 maneuvers?

A. Regarding the selection of Eisenhower. I had met Eisenhower a long time back. I had wanted to get him to Benning as an instructor for me before the war. I knew of his qualities. He had been with General Pershing for quite a long time. I followed him when we started in the organization of the Army and I knew of his work as Chief of Staff to General Krueger and I knew also that during the maneuvers that you refer to that he had done an excellent job for General Krueger. All of which bore on his selection by me. I will say this, that if he had not done a good job for General Krueger – I wouldn't have taken him. But I was looking at him before he ever got to that point in the development of the Army.

Q. 128. Were you responsible for the organization of the special regiments—such as Japanese, Norwegian, Austrian and the like? Any comment on the work of the Japanese regiment?

A. I was partly responsible for the development of these special units. I don't remember very clearly about the Norwegian unit or the Austrian unit and the like, but I remember very, very distinctly about the Japanese. We had a battalion in Hawaii. Our commander out there – I think it was General Herron – urged that we use these fellows. The prejudice against them of course back on the West Coast – California in particular – was very strong. So I offered them to – in the first place I knew that it was quite unwise and quite unfair to send them to the Southwest Pacific where they would be in contact with their own people – the Japanese army – it would be too hard

on them in every way. So we sent messages to commanders in Europe and as I recall – I may be wrong about this – but as I recall Eisenhower's staff people declined them. Then I offered them to General Clark and his reply was, "We will take anybody that will fight." So I sent this battalion over to him. Then we organized another one in California and we finally built this up into a regiment. The division that we first attached this battalion to in Italy were opposed to it – their prejudice was so deep against the Japanese. And the next turn I found was when I was going to take them away and build it up into a regiment I had political pressure from Congress not to take this battalion away from the unit that it was then with who had opposed having it in the first place. I will say about the Japanese fighting then in these units we had: They were superb. That word correctly describes it – superb. They took terrific casualties. They showed rare courage and tremendous fighting spirit. Not too much can be said of the performance of those battalions in Europe and everybody wanted them with them in the operations and we used them quite dramatically in the great advance in Italy which led up to the termination of the fighting there.

I thought the organization of the additional battalions was very essential because we felt unless we did something about the Japanese in this country we would have a very hard time afterwards. I don't mean the Army, I mean the civil population. As a matter of fact, even with their brilliant performance abroad some communities rather blackballed the men when they came home as veterans.

Q. 129. How would you compare the fighting qualities of the American soldier with that of British, German and Russian?

A. The fighting quality of the American soldier has to be measured in several ways. In the first place, a man's fighting quality, his stamina, his relentless purpose, comes most strongly from the association with his home and his family, and any American fighting near his own doorsill will display exactly that same spirit. Our great difficulty was that the men were all far from their home – they were far from the issues – they were thousands of miles from home in the Southwest Pacific and Italy, in Africa, in places that they had hardly ever heard of. There was none of that tremendous spirit that comes of defending your own home – your own wife and children – such as would fall to the French soldier in particular and to the others in somewhat the same way. The fighting of men far from home could seldom reach the effectiveness of that close to their homes – close to the issues – close to the realization of what it was all about. That was one of the reasons I thought it was so vitally important to have the Army educated as to what we were fighting about. Because it was all done so far from home and always will so far as we are able to carry out our policy of keeping the fighting out of continental United States. That imposes a very great difficulty – that imposes a great problem of morale because a little detachment up in the Pribilof Islands or in the Himalaya Mountains – in Burma – in Africa and all – has to be handled with a certain spirit. However, in all of this a great deal depends on the monotony of the thing. You know, fighting as rule is a very monotonous thing unless you are on a grand rush like Patton's move through France. That seldom is the case. And it's the monotony that is very hard to endure, and it's the monotony that has very evil effects on morale, and particularly when you are far removed from home – when you have been in the affair a long time. I found when I went over to Africa that after the successful battle in Tunisia that some of the regiments – some of the divisions – had been led to believe, very unfortunately, that they now should go home. Well, that wasn't possible because if we used the tonnage to get them

home, we'd never get the other troops over and we'd never be able to build up a command. So it was a very difficult thing – even with the old non-commissioned officers – at first when they assembled there in Africa, getting ready for the operation in Sicily, to take in the fact that there was no "go-home" to this until the war ended and there was no possible way to manage it unless you got wounded. We would do everything we could for you while you were there but you couldn't be sent home for a rest trip. Out in the Southwest Pacific with malaria as it was and with the condition of shipping as we were we did send troops to New Zealand, I think some to Australia, because they couldn't get ahead in their malarial condition without a rest up. But over in Europe, our struggle was to get troops there as rapidly as possible to accumulate them prior to the prospective invasion in Normandy as it turned out. And yet morale suffered very heavily in Africa at one stage by reason of the rumor spread that these men were to go home and then we broke faith with them and we didn't send them home. I know I talked to a lot of non-commissioned officers of my old division – the First Division – and tried to explain to them that the thing was just out of the question. It was hard – but you couldn't help it. I was always struck by the British troops that took the long indeterminate periods in Africa near Cairo – omit "near Cairo" – that spoils the whole meaning – the way they accepted the very hard life they had to lead and the long time they were away from home and the heavy fighting they had to do and the losses they had to accept.

The Japanese were a more spiritual fighter if you accept Buddhism as being a spiritual basis for the fighting. They were all dedicated to the thing. Their lives were involved and they expected to give them up. They could not surrender. They were desperate in the defense of their leader. And they were very well-trained as there was plenty of time to train this army which was – well you can call it – a conscript army.

I don't know about the Austrians or the Norwegians and I wouldn't care to comment on the Austrians and the like as you express it.

The British fighters were very stolid in some respects, very determined, and accepted discipline without question as far as I could see. This was particularly true of the troops off in Northeast Africa.

The Germans are natural fighters. We must accept that. They are natural warriors. And they were very highly trained – very ably trained – particularly in their non-commissioned officers. And the basis of their discipline was unbending. And the thing you would find most effective with the Germans was that if you left a sergeant with a few men he fought like he had a lieutenant general in command isolated. Too often, our fellows, when they were new at the game would think that somebody else ought to come right away and reinforce them or take over. And they would tell the press so accordingly. However, when the time came, such as the Battle of the Bulge, when they got going in that –not the first surprise – which was a new division – they displayed magnificent fighting characteristics. They always would under proper conditions. But they were far from home and the ordinary military quality is not dominant in the American any more. It's no longer the question of taking the gun down off the mantelpiece and fighting against the savages. So often you'd see newspaper accounts in the early days – particularly the First War – but these men were natural woodsmen and everything. Well, many of them had never seen the woods except in the national park or city park. And all of that had gone with the Indian and with the development of the West and of course, the development of the East in the earliest days.

The Russians, I think, I wouldn't say he was an intelligent soldier in any way but he had the courage to go ahead though he didn't understand at all why he was going. He accepted the leadership if it was anyway decent and took terrific losses and accepted blindly lots of mismanagement. Later on, when the leadership vastly improved, particularly after the Russian tsaristic army broke up, they displayed more individual efficiency than they did in the early stages. But I would way in one sense they were dependable. Because they would do what you led them to do and not argue about it as far as I could tell. With us you had to feel that all of your soldiers were readers of *TIME* magazine and editorials from other sources and had listened to all the newspaper men and all those had to be met in this army of democracy. But it was a magnificent army when it reached its full development. I remember Eisenhower asking me to come over before it began demobilize in order to see it as it was. And I don't think you could have found a better, more powerful army in the world then we had in France in 1945. But it takes a long time to make such an Army. It's a long time to get the necessary leaders because the subordinate leaders are so important, and so few of those were of Regular origin. But the whole army, meaning a variety of numbered armies, was imbued with a tremendous fighting spirit and was remarkably well led. We had some the most efficient Army commanders and division commanders and Corps commanders that we have ever heard of except maybe in the last year of the Civil War.

Before going on to the next list of questions, I want to register several comments and, in a way, questions.

In the first place, I am dictating this without a mass of records about me and without secretaries and clerks to gather the papers and look at the facts and find them for me before I talk. I am doing this out of hand –off the cuff as it were—and it should be so far as the sources

are available to be checked for that reason. You must be very careful not to just publish in any way or broadcast or arrange for later publication just out of hand what I say here – speaking off the cuff and at considerable length and of course at times when I'm a little bit tired. I am covering a vast bit of ground in a very short time. I would say that if a critic was analyzing this and particularly was desirous of finding charges against me as to why a lot that I say should be ignored he could very readily pick up the names that I don't remember and say if my memory's as poor as that how could I be trusted to this off hand dictation of a lot of facts which are of great importance in interpreting what really was going on at that time in the war. Well, that name problem is almost entirely one of a certain habit that one has when they start to mention a person's name and they have had in their mind one minute and they have lost in the next – which I have always had, and I still have and maybe in a little bit greater degree than formerly. My memory is just about the same but Mrs. Marshall and I both have trouble in remembering this name and that name. Like the other day, I was studying over the name of Senator Vandenberg. Well, there is no public leader that I knew better than Vandenberg and no one of whom I have more vivid recollections than I have of Senator Vandenberg and yet I was fishing around here for his name. The last time I dictated I was reaching for the name of the atomic plants and I couldn't remember either one. Well, they were just printed on my brain for a long time and I still haven't remembered the name – I've got Oak Ridge all right, but I still haven't remembered the name of the one out on the Pacific on the Columbia River that we had to build out there. I will remember it in a minute or two, I would guess, but I've forgotten it for the time being now. I am somewhat – regarding names and some places in the position of the person who said "Well, I remembered that until you spoke of it and it knocked it right out of my mind." So that I do not think should

be taken as an example of my uncertainty the fact that I always fished for the name and you find it for me is evidence enough that I am getting at the real fact of the case.

To go back to that atomic question, I might add here that in the location of these atomic plants – maintaining the secrecy of what we were doing—we had a great deal of difficulty because the necessities of such a plant were such that it made it a very difficult problem of selection. You had to have plenty of water. You should have cool water and for that reason we took the Columbia River. Now that was very unfortunate in one respect because out there was a labor shortage and yet we came in there in a region where there was not much labor available and located a plant which demanded tremendous amount of labor. Now the civil official who was in charge of such matters for the President came to me and, in a sense, rebuked us – not mildly – against putting this plant out there on the Columbia River, though he did not know what the plant was for without consulting them. Well, we couldn't very well consult them without telling them what we were doing. And I just had to sit silent and take the beating. When, as a matter of fact, we had to have an unlimited water supply and it ought to be cool water if we could get it. And I believe we lowered the temperature of the Columbia River some degrees – I've forgotten what – of the water that passed through the plant and then was wasted into the river again on the other side. We had quite a problem of the labor situation at Oak Ridge and again we couldn't explain just what we were doing. We were getting in close to the Tennessee Authority – the TVA I think they call it. That was the reason we put it there. There were other reasons why it shouldn't be there. But the importance of it, the difficulty of finding any other suitable place, were such that we had to put it there. And yet we had to do it largely without explanation. So this made it very hard to manage these things and rather stirred up the

feelings on the part of some of those that were looking into the matter that we were rather dull-witted to do these stupid things without any coordination.

Your letter of February 13th came this morning. You asked several questions in it and made several comments to which I will refer now. The only trouble we were having with the microphone was my voice getting weak. We received all the tapes that you sent or were sent to us. [Sgt. Heffner – Also the cleaning fluid.]

The plant that I was trying to refer to that you got with the word "plank" actually was "blank". I couldn't remember the name so I said "blank." Actually, it was the plant on the Columbia River.

Before I go any further, I want to make some comments regarding your statement that you had about reached the end of the war period with these questions. There are a number of things that haven't been discussed and I would like to mention some of them that occur to me at the moment.

In the first place, during the period that I was Deputy Chief of Staff and General Craig was Chief of Staff and Morgenthau was given the principal leadership – getting planes for the French and matters of that kind and being on generally very cool terms with Woodring who was Secretary of War. There were some things developing that I think have a bearing on the question of the mobilization period. In the first place, I found it was very difficult to bring to Mr. Roosevelt's attention our tragic lack in ammunition. I think I've mentioned this once before but it won't do any harm to mention it again. I remember distinctly when I was telling him how little artillery ammunition we had, how much we had to have, particularly in the 105 and these other lacks in ammunition and he said, "Well you can have plenty of artillery ammunition, the Navy

has a plant down here on the Potomac below Washington and they can manufacture it for us." My Lord, we had plants all over the country before we got through with this thing and the Navy too. That plant could no more touch the Army requirements than a small boy could have. However, those were the points of view at that time when the great strain was the difficulty of getting the appropriations, was the difficulty of being charged with promoting war, was the difficulty of getting along in reasonable harmony with the Middle West, and was the fact that we were running up to our limit on the allowed amount of money in the public debt which was permitted by law. So that was a battle through this period and at that time the President's mind was almost solely concentrated on airplanes and with the particular idea of the great necessity that the French and the British would have where they were not to be interfered with by bombing as we would be free to do that in the United States. Well, it takes longer we found really to train the pilot than it does to build the plane. We were going to get more airplanes that we were going to get conditions under which we could use them. I was trying to get a balanced result. Otherwise to my mind we were just engaged in a futility. But the trouble was to create in the President's mind an understanding of the ammunition situation. I remember he was going to Warm Springs and I had, as I recall, I had stated this case to General Pershing who was then at the Walter Reed Hospital. And on his last call, as I recall, on the President, he talked about this. Well, General Pershing was not too familiar with the problem, and was sort of out of touch, although I saw him about once a week and also was not too strong physically. But if General Pershing said it, that made an impression on the President. But when he told me what had happened and he made the familiar remark that Mr. Roosevelt had done practically all the talking, I began to be very fearful of whether or not he had been able to make his point. So I prepared a letter for General Pershing and got his stationery. I dictated the letter and it was to the

President on the grounds that he – General Pershing – had been too hurried in his call on the President the other day and he wanted to make certain that the President understood his – General Pershing's – view with regard to the necessities other than airplanes. Therefore he took the liberty of writing to him since my – General Pershing's – arrival in San Antonio and disturbing the President in his rest period at Warm Springs, and I dictated the rest of the letter stating our tragic munitions situation – all, General Pershing telling this – to the General and writing it at San Antonio and sending it to the President at Warm Springs. So then we sent this letter down by plane to General Pershing and, fortunately, he accepted and signed it and mailed it from San Antonio to the President. And it had a tremendous effect. And we began to get a little ground in the approval of effort to get appropriations for ammunition as well as other things that had to be. But that most of all, I just remember this rather intricate procedure that we followed in order to get this going.

There was another thing that occurred during the mobilization period. I think about February 1941 our promotion situation in the Army had been in a sense on an elimination basis. The only trouble was the eliminated fellow continued in service. So we got an accumulation of colonels, senior colonels, at the head of the Army. In the Navy, they were retired so they didn't have this accumulation of fellows that still had a desperate hope and still had a real strong feeling against the position in which they had been placed. We had gotten working down in age to about fifty-four at that time for a brigadier general. But we had an accumulation of colonels who were in the 60's. And it was very difficult to handle because if you had any board of any kind with a colonel at the head of it – one of these colonels would be the head of it and he was the senior. So you ran upon the same block to progress that comes when you use men that have sort of lost their touch, in other words, they are no longer the vigorous men that they were in their 30's and 40's.

This situation had resulted in the accumulation of a large number of these senior officers who I felt were not suitable for combat command. And it was a very embarrassing situation because no man will agree to himself to the fact that he is not quite up to the punch and certainly his family will not. And yet we had to get ahead and get ahead fast. It took a great deal of imagination; it took a great deal of vigor in order to lead the mobilization of this vast army which we were starting to build up. Now in this situation I felt I was greatly embarrassed because of my age because I couldn't be so aggressive regarding these fellows if I was so old myself. And the whole point was that not everyone of that age is lacking, but it is the average of that age that is lacking. For instance, General Patton was up in years and incidentally would always talk to me about the age question all the time for fear we would apply it to him. Well, he was the epitome of vigor and leadership and that sort of thing. But he was an exception and there were not a great many like him. But this presented a very serious problem and a great morale problem because an officer of that age – he has a sort of clientele of younger men about him and his feelings are passed on to them, and you would build up a very discontented feeling in a large group of officers in the Army who would naturally weld together in opposition to what they would consider ruthless procedure in eliminating or retiring them or finding some way to use their services other than with combat troops or vitally important mobilization duties. So it seemed to me the only way that this could be done and not hurt morale generally in the Army would be for me to resign and state exactly my reason that I thought it was vitally important to be done and that I was old myself and therefore I would forfeit my career in the effort to make it possible to do this by a younger Chief of Staff and not stir up too much turmoil and damage to morale. So Hopkins and I went to see the President in February – I think – up in his study and I proposed this to him and explained exactly why that I thought that I did this relieving of people

and retiring of people the way it was going to have to be done and done very quickly that it should be done by a younger man and therefore I wished to tender my resignation as Chief of Staff. He listened to me and thanked me and that was the end of it. Talked about something else right away. A week or two passed and I spoke to Hopkins again and I said how about that and he said the President just laughs at you. He says no politician ever resigns a job and that's just talk. And Hopkins told him, "No it wasn't", that I really meant it – that I was sincere about it and that I was pressing him to get the President's conclusion. So then I went and saw Mr. Roosevelt again and I told him again just what this thing was and how important that I thought it was to do it and I explained how I wanted it done – how I suggested it be done – to let me pick the man I thought ought to be Chief of Staff and get Mr. Roosevelt's approval. Nobody else would know anything about it. I would bring the man into the War Department – keep him there two months – put him in touch with what was happening and then I would send him to Panama, I would send him to Hawaii, I would send him to the Philippines (we were just in the mobilization period then), and I would send him even to Iceland so that he could get in touch – in Alaska – so that he could get in touch with everything that was going on. Then I would bring him back to Washington and have him there in the General Staff until he became thoroughly familiar with the conditions there – guarding as much as I could against any feeling on anybody's part that he was headed for any other job, except in the normal routine of affairs. Then the President could announce my resignation and announce the man's appointment all in the same way. Well, I never got any action out of Mr. Roosevelt. As I say, after my second trip over – I told him, I think, I told him then Hopkins had said it didn't make much impression on him, the President, because he never knew a politician to resign. Well, I told him that wasn't the case at all that really I was dedicated to do this thing – that I had this serious situation in the Army and that I

didn't think it could be cured without terrible damage to morale if it was done by an old man – like I was in years – an older man I should say, like I was in years – but the issue died there and my efforts to resign were defeated.

I might say that I had been pretty fortunate during the war in selecting commanders – theater commanders in particular – men like General Eisenhower, General Bradley, General Smith and so on. But my proposed selection to be my successor as the Chief of Staff would have been an utter failure I learned later. So I was spared that horrible error in judgment by the President not accepting my proposition.

Now there was another factor I wanted to discuss that took place during this mobilization period. I'm sorry right now I can't remember it. But it covers quite an area of development and of great interest and I will hand it to you later when it pops into my mind. I had it this morning but I haven't got it now.

Q. 130. Did you ever feel that we were weak in the true fighting qualities of ground troops, so that we depended on air and artillery fire to achieve our goals? (It was a familiar criticism by the French during the war and by the Germans afterwards that American troops lacked the true fighting spirit and that they refused to advance unless they had used the maximum in firepower?)

A. Now as to the fighting quality of troops. Did I ever feel that we were weak in the true fighting qualities of ground troops? Until they were thoroughly trained – decidedly so. And we had some issues in Africa that would prove this. But it was through lack of training, not lack of leadership – though there were some mix-ups in that respect too. It was much easier to train the air and to train the artillery. The general feeling was that it was much more difficult, but it was not. Because they had something fixed to work with, whereas the ground troops were not in that

fortunate position. They had the ground in tremendous areas and the dark and uncertainties in every direction and tremendous fatigue and problems in endurance which the others didn't have at all to the same extent. Just the fact of an artilleryman having a piece of artillery there gave him a sort of rallying point. There was nothing like that for the infantry soldier. Most of his fighting was done when he came forward in the dark, never having seen the ground at first, and going into a general confusion of action which is bound to be the situation almost in any ground combat today. When we had time to thoroughly train them, I thought they were magnificent. I published an article by a private in a regiment in Africa who was writing up the duties of a reconnaissance platoon. And he went on to explain some of the tragedies that were happening. And he likened it to the fact that the men didn't realize what they were getting into. They didn't realize the brutality of the war. They didn't realize the determination and ruthlessness of the Germans. And he went back to say that these men had probably seen the ruins in London but they were other peoples' ruins and they didn't make much impression on him. He saw – he knew there had been a lot of bombing and he knew there had been a lot of lives lost but not until the thing landed in his lap did he fully comprehend how ruthless war was and how ruthless the Germans were, and he had behaved very badly in some of the earlier encounters in Africa. Their training was only partially completed and Rommel's people came at them in a very vicious way and rather surprised them it seemed. They walked around and displayed themselves, looking at the souvenirs they could get out of a village while the Germans observed them in their performance and in due time came down on them with ruthless force and savagery. But they quickly got over this and as the trained divisions arrived – it takes a long time to complete this training – that disappeared and they became magnificent fighting men. I don't think you could

find any more wonderful fighting than that which was done by the troops in the Bulge after the first surprise of this newly-arrived division, widely scattered, in a strange place.

Q. 131. Did we use ground-air operations properly early in the war? Do you feel that we worked out our problems before the war ended?

A. No, we didn't use ground-air operations properly early in the war. We hadn't maneuvered enough with them. Our planes were too scarce to give us all we needed back in the maneuver areas and it's very hard – very hard – to get across air-ground training and have the soldier realize what's to be done and have the airman – particular – realize the importance of what he's trying to do because he gets no reaction at all in his ordinary training procedure. Therefore it is very hard to get that properly done, and not until he's been in action does he really get at the training right. Then he gets it. Then he's determined about it and then he brings every pressure in the world to bear on the air to do their part. And the airman generally responds in a like manner. I felt that we had worked out our problem very well – very, very well – before the war ended. I remember having a German officer – a Captain in the German Army that we had as a student officer at Leavenworth – he had been in nearly every action practically from the outbreak of the war – the first advance into Belgium – up until the final action when he was a prisoner. And he described the reaction of the German infantry to airplanes when they first came up as the German Army made its initial advance down through Belgium into France in the First World War. And they did everything wrong. They misconceived everything wrong. And he had to be very careful about allowing me to print it for fear it would get him in Dutch with the authorities back in Germany.

Q. 132. What do you feel are the chief strong and weak points of the American soldier?

A. The strong and the weak points of the American soldier. I think the first thing is that he has to know what it is all about – much more than any other soldier. I think the next thing is there has to be time to get him trained. I think the next thing is that we have to have time to get him trained. I think the next thing is that we have to have very competent instructors – which we lacked at the opening of the war because they were not available in any number at all. We were taking in at one time – every month – as many men as there were in the entire United States Navy. Well, we couldn't—we had to do that. We were being pressed to do that. I wanted to slow up on the draft act but I was told I couldn't politically do that without having it cut off on me. We just didn't have the instructors. One of the reasons that I was very loathe to expand very rapidly our officers' schools at the outbreak of the war – Mr. Stimson and his friends from the First World War experience were trying to force the issue – was I didn't have enough competent instructors and I was unwilling to have these men put in there for being instructed when we couldn't line up the necessary number of competent instructors, and it wasn't really until we had had the reserves in line for about a year that we began to develop a plenitude of instructors – which we didn't have at first. And as soon as I could bring recovered wounded men back from France that changed the whole complexion of the instructional question. In England where they were pretty close to the conflict and saw the scars and strokes of some of the conflict, and in France of course, where they were close up to it, it was quite another matter. Now when the American soldier knew what it was all about – when he saw the results of his training, as I have said before, the very things he objected to in this country were the things he thought he hadn't got enough of when he was questioned abroad. And also, you have the question of his fighting for a cause that is very remote from his own affairs. You take an Iowa farmer – you can't get a much stronger character than that man – yet all of this thing was in a distant field

from his home, among distant people, and for a cause that couldn't cut it right down to something like an Indian shooting at you, or a local army fighting against you.

Q. 133. Did you agree with those who felt that we tended to coddle the soldier too much; that we made life too easy for him?

A. As to coddling the soldiers. I was responsible probably for as much of that abroad – not much of it back here – as anybody because I felt that we had to do everything we could to make the man feel we had the highest solicitude for their condition of affairs. They were being taken from home; they were being taken away from the plows and their wives and families and everything of that sort, and in a distant country where the fighting was quite desperate and, as I say, the reasons were a little bit remote from them although I had done everything I could to illustrate those through De Capra's famous movies and I felt that we must do all we could to convince the soldier that we were all solicitude for his well-being. I was for supplying everything we could and then requiring him to fight to the death when the time came. You had to put these two things together. If it were all solicitude then you had no army. But you couldn't be severe in your demands unless he was convinced that you were doing everything you could to make matters well for him. Also, we had the papers going to them – to some extent – and certainly the magazines and he saw what was happening back in the States. He saw about labor strikes – he saw the high wages of labor. He was losing his job – he was separated from his family – he was risking his life – he was drawing very, very low pay – all the conditions were hardships. And yet here was labor back home getting a very high salary and having all sorts of advantages which were undreamed among the troops abroad. Therefore, I thought it was quite essential – quite essential – that the soldier be convinced that so far as we were concerned in the Pentagon, or the Munitions Building, or wherever we were – we were doing everything in our

power we could to help him. And I remember when I took over several breweries in France – thought I would be investigated for that – that's about the only thing I wasn't investigated for – but they never picked that up, but I saw every brewery we could get our hands on was recreated, put into service, for our men who like beer. I suppose now, if this came out, I will be able to be attacked again. But I didn't get into the production of hard liquor but I did all the beer that we could possible manage. I was challenged once about trying to have orange juice for these men. Well, we couldn't have much orange juiced– it's bulky and hard to ship – but we got some shipments through just like we did Thanksgiving turkeys – to have them feel that we were trying to get them what they craved so much in this touch of home. That was the reason that I had for doing these things. And they responded, I thought, magnificently to that.

I went over the post exchanges in France and Italy very carefully. And some of them were models. Particularly, I saw one in Naples which was the most perfect little shop I ever got into for its kind and in the condition of affairs. But those have to be evidences that you were thoughtful of them. And it might have seemed like coddling. Now when they wanted to go home and get a rest and not stay in the fighting, then I was adamant. They couldn't go home; they had to stay right there. When the time came up when they wanted to be relieved from the line, we probably couldn't relieve them from the line. And I was adamant again so far as that was concerned. And they would respond because they felt that you were really trying to do for them. And while they wanted this – and were encouraged in those demands – they in the end gave away to sober thoughts and responded the way you wanted them to. When it was written up that we had these divisions in Italy and they were forgotten – well, if anyone can forget twenty-seven divisions, he's got a marvelous forgettory. That hit morale a dreadful blow – a really dreadful blow – and some of the Corps commanders told me they didn't know what to do

about their troops. They had gotten obsessed with this fact that we had forgotten them entirely. Well, of course, the semi-amusing part of this was the troops in Southwest Pacific had exactly that same feeling about the troops in Africa. All the writing was about the troops in Africa and the troops in Sicily, and they felt that they were being ignored. Now they were into the fighting and the troops in Italy were obsessed with the idea that they were forgotten. And this thing just rattled back and forth, but the great trouble was the way it was approached by some of the press or some particular writers who I will not name. The battle to maintain morale under those conditions was very, very hard and it was quite amazing that we got through that as well as we did. But I think the battle in Italy where they were told we had forgotten those divisions there was one of the hardest of all – was one of the most absurd – one of the most absurd challenges that you could have gotten.

Q. 134. What caused the big civil affairs flare-up in Italy? Did this cause you a great deal of trouble?

A. The civil officers' flare-up in Italy. It caused us more trouble, but it caused largely to Mr. Stimson because I didn't concern myself much with it. We had one military official of rather high rank who was in the temporary Army and who didn't like the way something was going. And he announced, as I understood it, that if they didn't change that he would resign and come home. And I sent him word by an officer – I didn't put it in writing – by an officer, he wouldn't resign and wouldn't come home, and I'd put him in the front rank as a private if I heard another damn word out of him. I didn't hear any after that from him.

Q. 135. What was your view as the success of psychological warfare in World War II?

A. As to psychological warfare, I don't know about that. We did our best with it. But it's very

difficult to be certain that you are accomplishing something. Although tremendous things can be done in psychological warfare. I think the main trouble was – we took it – our instructors in the development took it too seriously in trying to do it in a grand way, when, as a matter of fact, very little things, very little things psychologically can almost wreck the morale of the Army. I just referred to one in the case of Italy. Little moves like that can do more to upset the applecart than grandiose schemes, though it's all right to have the plan but we didn't get very far with the grand planning as far as I could see.

Q. 136. Did you have major difficulties in dealing with General Donovan and with OSS generally? What changes would you have liked to see in that organization? How valuable do you think was the word of OSS?

A. At first we had considerable difficulty in dealing with General Donovan and the OSS generally. This was composed of a very fine group of men – a rather brilliant group of men – and it was led by Donovan who was a very effective soldier, and had been a very gallant soldier as measured by his Medal of Honor. But he was also a classmate of the President and that presented complications right away. Because I could deal with all manner of things in one way, but when I ran into a classmate of the President's I may have run into a complete stumbling block. I remember in General Donovan's case – I admired him – he was a very able man and had been a very brave man and had been a very fine leader, and he wanted very much to be Commanding General of the Twenty-seventh Division in New York and was very strongly opposed by the then commander who was about to retire or had retired. I didn't blame him for wanting the job and I didn't blame the other fellow for his opposition. I didn't blame any of them as a matter of fact for being quite human. But I took an officer who had a very distinguished record afterwards and he had to see that Donovan got what he wanted that we

could give him without complicating jour setup. I remember he went on trips with him and things of that sort, and he was a very brilliant young officer. This same problem applied to others and I took the same means to settle it. One of dear friends and one of the great helpers in the war was Barney Baruch and he was very strongly in touch with the President and could exert a powerful influence. So I had an officer – and I don't mind telling who it was – it was General Bedell Smith of the later distinguished career as Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, Ambassador to Moscow and was head of the CIA and Under Secretary of State and so forth, and I detailed Smith to be in touch with Baruch and he did it very, very successfully and won Baruch's confidence and in that way eased my problem because I didn't have to try to settle so many of these things myself.

Afterwards Baruch rendered me a very invaluable service which I think I might describe right now lest I forget it later on. During this mobilization period – during the period we were trying to get these big appropriations through – during the period we were trying to build up the Army and all – I think it must have been about April 1941 – I called in Baruch for very specific services. He would always come in to see me and would always tell me that he stood ready to do something for me the minute I wanted it done. After he would see the President he would generally come in and see me and then see Mr. Stimson. I didn't have need for his services right then. It didn't pan out quite the way I wanted it. And when I used it I wanted to use it the way I thought it would be most profitable. Well, I had an appropriation in that had been once accepted by the Budget Committee which was pretty hard to pass some of these things through, and it had been accepted by the Appropriations Committee of the House and then on the resumption of the question at a later date, they struck out – the Committee – the two things that I had in this proposal which were most important at the time. They were so insignificant in the light of later

appropriations that people would not treat it seriously, I don't think in listening to it. But it was very serious to us when it was very hard to get a dollar. I had $10 or $11 millions - $11 I think – for Alaska. We wanted to develop, start the defenses of the Aleutian Peninsula, but we had to have some place for our people to weather, to endure this very cold weather, so I wanted to build up at Anchorage a base point – now a very large post and quite an air base. So I wanted $11 million for that and I wanted $11 million for Alaska, and I wanted a complement of planes that I could reinforce the Army with during the ensuing fiscal year. I'd just had an increase in planes which the President had got which was his first great defense effort, but I needed – I've forgotten how many – the records will show – oh, say fifteen hundred two thousand planes whatever it was.

SIDE #2

I want to say before I leave this subject of the SOS [OSS] and General Donovan that the organization he built up was a very efficient one. It had very fine men in it and they did a very fine job in the end and they cooperated very completely with the Army – largely due to the missionary work of General Smith. There was one time, I believe, when General Donovan and his headquarters were in differences with Elmer Davis and his work during that period General Smith effected a great many adjustments which were very helpful in the long run of things.

I do not wish to comment on the work of Elmer Davis and Lowell Mellett. Lowell Mellett was the White House and Davis was running a very large concern. I don't know enough about their work. A lot of these things would hit at me in one way or help me in another and I think it is better that I don't comment. And I might say again – I want to emphasize this – that most of these problems that we've been talking about now developed during the mobilization

period, once the fight started – once we got deeply into it – during most of that time – I didn't have these troubles at all. Everybody backed us and tried to help us and it was only occasionally that we got into difficulties and that was only natural.

Q. 137 and 138 – skipped.

Q. 139. I have been told that generally press relations was the most poorly handled thing at most headquarters. Was this your view?

A. As to press relations, I think we got a pretty well organized press relations section.

Q. 140. Did the handling of Press relations cause you a great deal of trouble? How effective was General Surles in this connection?

A. I think in the main the handling of the press section did not get too difficult and I think General Surles did a very good job. I know he did for me and I think he did for Mr. Stimson.

Q. 141. Were you briefed daily on editorial opinion? How did you attempt to handle the press? What use did you make of press conferences?

A. I was not briefed daily on editorial opinion. I got general statements at times, but I couldn't get into this all the time. I was briefed daily on the complete layout of our operations when we had nine theaters of operations which was beautifully done and I'll describe in detail later on. But I was only told about editorial things when they were very pointed. I, myself, scanned nine papers every day and I saw a good bit of this for myself. I found that if I got too deeply involved in this sort of thing, I lost my perspective about the war generally. However, that press relations, editorial opinion and all was very important during the mobilization period but after we got entrenched and at war it was not so difficult to deal with. Every now and then some particular

thing would come up and some representative of the paper would encounter a discontented officer – particularly a senior officer who didn't think his way of doing the things was being followed which he thought was far better than the way we were doing it. But if that officer was very articulate sometimes that would be brought in heavy pressure on me. But that's only to be expected and was treated in that way.

Q. 142. Were you strongly in favor of *STARS AND STRIPES* and *YANK*? Did you feel that they were allowed to get out of hand?

A. I was in favor of *STARS AND STRIPES* and *YANK*. I thought of course that they got away with themselves sometimes. I think in a democratic army a paper such as that is quite essential as long as you don't find some individuals who are rather brilliant and take a particular joy in trying to take cracks at the officer Corps or a particular commander. It's very difficult to control that because if you begin to restrain it the paper loses its caste as the voice of the enlisted man. In an army of democracy that's pretty near a necessity, and for that reason I was in favor of the paper though it was very provoking to commanders and all who had the responsibility for this thing, and here these privates or others with some writing ability were criticizing them or holding them almost to contempt to their troops – not quite as bad as that but almost that. And yet I had seen it in the First World War. I knew General Pershing's problems with it. Some very famous writers came out of the *STARS AND STRIPES*. And he had to uphold them against the strictures of the troop commanders who were violent over what the *STARS AND STRIPES* used to write. But if they were particularly violent that was considered an achievement for the *STARS AND STRIPES*. And, of course, the men liked that. It's one of those things that requires very delicate handling because it can easily go wild and you can have one or two men in there – the more brilliant they are, the more dangerous they are – who stir up these things and who are just trying

to stir up a mess between the officers and the privates. The fellow's is making a reputation for himself that he couldn't get in any other way, and generally you found him in prominent positions in writing after the war.

Q. 143. Skipped.

Q. 144. What episodes in public relations gave you the most trouble during the war—Patton slapping, Patton's speech in England, the Darlan episode, the Yoo-hoo incident with General Lear (this was of course before Pearl Harbor), etc?

A. All the incidents in 144 that you mention about public relations were difficult—the Patton slapping, his speech in London, the Darlan episode, the yoo-hoo incident with General Lear which was played up in a fantastic way by the press and made it extremely difficult for General Lear. Maybe he shouldn't have said it. Well, there are lots of things that you shouldn't have said yesterday that you are talking about today, but you don't have it handled by the Press of the country to hold you up to. Everything, for instance, you said to your children they could make quite fun of you, if they published it all. And yet that was a very serious thing because it was hitting at the prestige of a commander. But you have to tolerate that with some tactfulness in an army of democracy. But you certainly shouldn't encourage it. Now in the Darlan episode, I brought down a group of members of Congress – particularly of the Senate, very carefully selected men and explained to them what the situation was and read them a message – a long message – I just got from General Eisenhower that day which explained his point of view at that moment, that helped a great deal because it gave us defenders on the floor of the Senate and the floor of the House. And they were very loyal in the fact that they didn't spread this all over the place. And there were some very strong men in it who were very settled in their own opinions.

As a matter of fact, we had about as much difficulty with English opinion as we did with American press opinion, and Eisenhower and General Clark had a very, very difficult time. It was hard enough fighting on about a six hundred mile front with 105,000 troops. But when you have to fight, really literally fight, all the editorial press and everything of your own country, that was really – that was really a difficult proposition. And I thought General Eisenhower carried it off very, very well and with great restraint.

Q. 145. What papers gave you the most intelligent support?

A. As to the papers that gave me the most intelligent support, I wouldn't care to go into that. Some of them did – quite a few of them did and were very loyal about it throughout the war. I'll only mention one – because it's in sort of a part by itself. And that was the *Christian Science Monitor* and I felt a great admiration for the way they met the problems –not only then, but later when I was Secretary of State.

Q. 146. Skipped.

Q. 147. What efforts did you make to keep yourself informed of soldier gripes and to remove their discontent?

A. Morale. I had trained men – civilians – who traveled all over the Army and see the individual soldiers and that had to be handled very carefully because you don't want to begin encouraging the men to make criticisms, and yet we wanted to find what their reactions were. But they did it very well and they graphed it for me so that I could see the things graphically when they came back and rendered their reports. In that way, I kept fair contact. I did a tremendous amount of travelling myself and I had all the officers who went made these surveys for me in addition to what other duty they were performing. But having the airplanes – we did a

great deal of travelling and covered vast territory in order to keep in touch with what the morale factors were.

Q. 148. Skipped.

Q. 149. How valuable did you think the U. S. O. was?

A. The U. S. O. was invaluable. I started to organize that before they came out with the ordinary U. S. O. thing. I was doing it in another, more primitive way, but one which would have gotten results much more fast. And then I discovered that Mr. Stimson had already started on the thing. And the funny thing was that I sent for this prominent civilian to come here and he reported then and the message went to the Secretary of War that he was coming. Mr. Stimson thought he was coming to him but I had sent for him. And the officer didn't know what I'd gotten him for. So he worked out on the train how he thought this ought to be done. Not the officer, but the civilian, he worked out on the train how he thought this ought to be done and Mr. Stimson approved it. And he never even heard from me why I brought him back. So I had quite a difficult time over that and it was concerned with the U.S.O. – that I wanted him back. But not the formal organization. I wanted to do something in the next two weeks because the conditions in some of the southern towns were just terrible and something had to be done instanter. I remember I went to Milledgeville I think it was, down in Georgia, I think it was Milledgeville but wherever it was I wouldn't allow anybody – I didn't have any aide with me and the local commanders – there were two big training camps there – I had them just reserve a room at the hotel for me and then I didn't have them stay around because I wanted to be perfectly footloose and I was in civilian clothes. The net result was it was half past six when this started and I never got anything to eat until it was half past ten that night. Every place was

crowded and I got up to a lunch counter where I just had some warmed over biscuits and things of that sort. There wasn't a place to sit down. It was a town of very wide streets – and I think Milledgeville is the town – very wide streets and a lovely central park down the center of the street and there were some benches there. But the town was so overstocked with soldiers that there wasn't anywhere that you could relax. It was quite evident that unless we had something done immediately that the situation could not continue without some outbreak of some sort or other. That was so even to a greater extent in some very small to**w**ns; particularly I think one in Mississippi, where there was a division camp and almost no town.

Q. 150. Skipped.

Q. 151. Did you ever get promotion policy organized to suit you?

A. It took me quite a while to get the promotion policy settled. The trouble was the board I had with General Craig at the head of it to control the thing would clear these blocks of promotion – and the trouble is the officers in command would want to do it all at once. It was very nice to promote a whole lot of fellows. And over where the divisions were engaged in Africa, they help up a very high standard, a very high standard, with the result that that man on the quiet front back home was getting promoted and his teammate so far as time of serviced went was going through battles and getting wounded and not being promoted. And I had a very hard time getting this straightened out. I had to block the promotion very decidedly of some of the new services – like the antiaircraft service and all where they had tremendous increases because they were promoting the men way ahead of, I thought, the time that it should be considering the man's efficiency. There was a place in the organization for him but I thought the time had come when we could have too many second lieutenants and not untrained first lieutenants. And I finally got

to the point where I wouldn't promote a division commander a brigadier to a major general until he had served in command of that division in the field as a brigadier. But that was a long time before we could do that because a great portion of the early army had to be organized without any fighting at all and you had to have commanders. I remember when I had a delay in getting promotions done and I was trying to impress on the President the authority to do this. I found in some places – one place in particular – I found a major in command of twenty thousand troops and I was trying to get a brigadier general to command that lot of men.

At first, with the tremendous increases in the Army and the necessity of having some rank to control it, we had to promote a great many men far ahead – you might say – of their training, their experience in that rank. I think I recall one case where we had 20,000 men under a major. Mr. Roosevelt was very slow about this—brigadiers—because it was so much faster than the Navy. But he never could take in the fact that I was taking in as many men in a month as there were in the entire Navy. And once he proposed that I take the Naval policy of doing it on a percentage basis. I accepted it instantly and he got suspicious and questioned me and found out that I would be making brigadiers twice as fast as I was already asking him to make them.

Q. 152. You made every effort possible to use decorations for the purpose of promoting morale. Unfortunately, in many cases, the way in which decorations were given led to dissatisfaction. Any comments on this?

A. In the matter of decorations for the purpose of morale, I insisted that they be given as near to the performance as possible – that is, on the battlefield, just as quickly as they could find the thing to promote the man, or decorate the man, if that seemed advisable. I thought that was twice as effective if it were done there – would have immediate effect on morale – would put

new fighting spirit into the men. That was opposed by the ordinary staff in Washington because there would be mistakes made. Well, of course, there are mistakes made. But it was a great deal better to have a man rewarded right then in the presence of the soldiers than to have to wait maybe six months when it was done without any immediate relation to what his performance had been of that day and hour. This was quite a battle but I had seen what had happened in the First World War. I remember one case in particular where I went up to see about a big raid that had been conducted and there had been very heavy casualties in the raid and very large captures by our men. It was a very successful raid, and I found in the group of eight men selected for Distinguished Service Crosses four who had been wounded in a previous raid and never been rewarded for that yet, and when raids and contact were very rare occasions which ought to be treated immediately. And before I finished getting these fellows started, these four men – one in particularly, the Commander had been in a raid that night which had been very successful and he was covered with blood from a hand-to-hand encounter with a German officer. And then word came that General Pershing was coming that day – that hour – and to that place. And I very foolishly – very foolishly – allowed them to borrow somebody's clothes for this officer who was covered with blood – and I had them paraded particularly for General Pershing to see. And I had quite a hard time getting his staff to slow up – he had a long way to go, you see – to see these men and hear what they had done. And I regretted bitterly at the time that I hadn't left the fellow in his clothes covered with blood, except that I thought General Pershing might have thought that I was trying to force the issue. But the great trouble then was in the first war they had an officer for a time in charge of promotions and in charge of decorations and he was about six months behind time. I remember I got a croix de guerre and I was about five months before it was delivered to me. I had forgotten all about it by that time, and anybody else who might have had

any concern about it. And it was very harmful to morale because if you decorated a man then and there he got it and everybody else reacted to the spirit of the occasion. So I insisted on having battlefield promotions and battlefield decorations. And we put a limit on the number – I vaguely recall this but I think I said the division commander could make one decoration for every four he recommended. Well, they said he'll make a whole lot of extra recommendations. And I said, "I'll relieve him if he does." And I let that be scattered around so that put a little brake on the thing. But it was very essential if you were going to get true reward for them – that was the purpose of the thing – to have it done at the time when everybody else could see what was happening and how the fellow was esteemed by the higher authorities.

Q. 153. One of your efforts to raise morale was your order to have pamphlets prepared on various actions which would be given to soldiers who were wounded in these actions. To a great extent the Army historical program grew out of this. What other such measures did you take?

A. I have a great many measures of that kind, but I can't remember them all right now. But I tried throughout to keep the reactions of the fighting men very alive and without the delays that come in red tape and approvals and everything. I remember I got the service medal out when there was a sort of stalemate there and no fighting particularly going on, and these fellows out on these islands in the Pacific, and it was a new decoration and the President was rather critical of it. But I wanted it because I wanted these fellows on these islands to get something to show for what they were doing. And they all value a ribbon tremendously. So I insisted that the ribbon be given to them when they landed. Well, I found out that the terms of the issue of the ribbon was that they had to submit a request to the Quartermaster General in Washington. So I ordered the Quartermaster General to send a paper bag of ribbons to each port and that fellow was to get that

the day he landed there. Well, they thought that was a wild performance. Well, I thought it was a very wise performance.

YOU CAN TAKE THIS DOWN AFTER YOU EAT YOUR MEAL. WELL, I'VE GOT TO STOP HERE.

TAPE 18M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

November 19, 1956

I talked to representatives of a number of women's organizations about ERP. You will put it over and then I went into it. My goodness, they went back home and they scared Congress to death in the next twenty-four hours. You never saw such rapid action in your life as I got out of that.

Oh dear, I didn't know that I had that thing. I guess I had better put this in here to take with me. I said the men will agree with me they don't do a darn thing. This represented I think, ten thousand subsidiary little clubs and they went into those and everybody went after these. It was electric what happened, just electric.

[Dr. Pogue – I remember attending some of those early debates and the opposition was ferocious and then it began to diminish.]

That's the thing I take pride in—putting the damned thing over. Anybody, well you take a campaign or anything like that, there's nothing so profound in the logic of the thing. But the execution of it, that's another matter. It's like our mobilization here. I flew thousands of miles a week, following through everything that happened in this country. And then when we got the whole thing going, I went all over the world—and that was not unlike the Red Cross, I was there

only with the Red Cross a year, but I went thirty-five miles because I was up against a difficult situation.

But Vandenberg, he was just the whole show when we got to the actual movement of the thing. I used to meet him at Blair House. I didn't go to his office and he didn't come to mine. We would meet over at Blair House and at the time, what's his name of the *NEW YORK TIMES* was attacking me for not having any bipartisan policy. He was just about as far off as it was possible to get and still be on this earth. [Dr. Pogue – Krock?] Yeah. [Dr. Pogue – He just didn't know what was happening.] He was profound in his own knowledge and he didn't know a damn thing. Vandenberg and I were just handling this business. He was marvelous to work with, and fortunate he thought I was. So the combination. Right funny he went to Brazil with me, Tom Connolly and Vandenberg and that Jewish Congressman that was chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee [Sol Bloom]. [Dr. Pogue – You mean Sabath?, No Sabath, he was a Czech]. No, he wasn't [the man]. I think he was mixed up with the Jeffersonian-Mount Vernon thing. Anyway, he was Chairman of the Committee. He went down with us too. They wanted him to talk down there and he wanted $500 for the talk (chuckle). But anyway when we came out of there Vandenberg said you should never have a member of Congress on those committee—he had a terrible time with Tom Connolly. And the point was it wasn't about what Connolly was responsible for it was about what Vandenberg was responsible for. I divided these things up. But Tom Connolly got over into Vandenberg's field and objected to everything Vandenberg was trying to do. Vandenberg got irate at me at first because I didn't move in. I just sat there and went through these things and finally one day Tom Connolly said, "Well, if that's the way you feel about it." I grabbed him right there and didn't let him get away and sealed the whole

compact in about two minutes. [Dr. Pogue – He was an awful talker.] Well, but he was so unreasonable. I was trying to conduct this thing along.

THIS IS VERY INTIMATE AND I WOULDN'T HAVE IT EVER LEAK OUT IN ANY WAY but I was immensely flattered once by Vandenberg giving an imitation of Byrnes conducting a conference and my conducting a conference. [Dr. Pogue – chuckle] I can't say much for Byrnes. [Dr. Pogue – chuckle]

All right, let's see. [Dr. Pogue – I'll get the stuff. If you want a minute I will just turn it off here.]

Beginning of Questions –

TAPE 18

Interview with General George C. Marshall at Pinehurst, November 19, 1956. Questions prepared by Forrest C. Pogue.

Q. 1. General J. F. C. Fuller attributes much of General Bradley's difficulty on Omaha Beach to the fact that he had refused to make use of several new devices which General Montgomery offered him. Do you feel that this is true?

A. General Fuller's remark about Bradley on Omaha Beach. I can't believe any of it. It's quite contrary to Bradley. He was an opposite character. [Dr. Pogue – Fuller is very critical of our whole policy. He is a Balkanite. He wanted the Balkans and he ...] It would lead me to believe that Fuller was desperately looking for something to criticize and he couldn't have picked a poorer subject. I've known Bradley's reactions since he was a major.

Q. 2. Several officers at SHAEF and at Montgomery's headquarters have suggested that they did not want to do the Arnhem drop in September 1944, but that pressure was on from Washington

to make use of the considerable airborne force which had been built up and they could not resist the pressure. Do you feel that this has any basis in fact?

A. I never heard of any suggestion to Bradley from Montgomery of the character described here. Or, in fact, any of them. Bradley wanted to get ahead. [Dr. Pogue – on both of these I have said flatly that I don't believe it in my own writing but I just thought I would like to get your view on it.]

Q. 3. None

Q. 4. The charge has been made that the Army never did intend to implement the ASTP program, and that it was set up only to stop criticism of college presidents. Do you agree in any way with this statement?

A. There's no foundation for the statement. As a matter of a fact, the Secretary of War – Mr. Stimson – was intensely interested in the college program and very much disturbed when I tore it apart through necessity. I think in the records you will find a memorandum from me to him in which I outlined what our situation was. And as I recall – the memorandum will definitely state this – I summed it up by saying we either did this or we just took apart two divisions. I made it my business afterwards to see these men at a great many places in the country and explained to them what had happened and why. [Dr. Pogue – on that point I later talked to ..] Our need, I might say, was so desperate that it would have been necessary to reduce the number of divisions in order to get the replacements. [Dr. Pogue – It might interest you to know that I talked to General Keating who had either the 102nd or 104th and he was one of those who got nearly a whole regiment of these men. He said that a lot of people felt that it would ruin the outfit but that actually they toned it up and helped it along that drive to the Rhine.] The influence of the mothers in this was very profound where their sons were taken and put into the combat. I recall

one mother and father writing to me in strong protest, and later their boy was killed in France or Germany and they accepted my explanation in spite of their great sorrow and in effect reassured me as to what I had done. This made a great impression on me.

Q. 5. Do you feel the ASTP program was worth the time and effort spent on it?

A. I really don't know. I was so busy with other things that I couldn't give a reply. Mr. Stimson made this his particular baby. [Dr. Pogue – Just to get it recorded here, you told me one day when I had lunch with you about your policy of writing a letter to parents who'd lost sons. Would you say a word about that so I could have it here?] Incidentally, during the early part of the war when we had so many losses and no victories or successes, I made it my business to write a personal letter to the parents or the wives of many of our casualties. There is on file somewhere there a book of these which I turned over to Mrs. Roosevelt. In continued this until the numbers grew beyond me. I'd like to say that I tried to make the letters individual and in no way form letters. And the replies I received were wonderful in the spirit in which they were written. We spend a great deal of time afterwards in composing a card from me to the parents or wives of the men that were killed. I went over many suggestions. We were trying to get the card as personal as such a thing can be. And I do recall that there was only one person who replied in criticism of this reminder. Unfortunately, the casualties had gone beyond my personal, individual attention. I had them composed incidentally in a rather graphic chart – in colors – and sent this over the President at regular intervals so that he himself could see just what we were suffering. These things required a great deal of time and much thoughtfulness, but they were critically essential in a war which took place far beyond our borders.

I might say here, although this is not the appropriate place for it, that our people were all in agreement, seemingly, that the fighting, if any, should be abroad and not at home. But on the

other hand they seemed wholly unaware of the great difficulty of conducting fighting far away from home and of maintaining the morale of the men at such distances and of their own reactions to their distant sons or husbands. This was a continued battle which had its beginning with the loss of so many prisoners following the surrender in the Philippines. There was one state – New Mexico – that provided one regiment, which I believe, composed, almost its entire National Guard. It was the only antiaircraft regiment that had its equipment, the regular regiments did not have more than one battery to a regiment, all the rest were used in training, so it was sent to the Philippines. With the capture of that regiment went the entire National Guard of New Mexico. And from then on I was under continuous pressure from the mothers of those men and Senator Chavez used to bring them to the War Department at frequent intervals and I had a very difficult time. The pressure was somewhat relieved by the fact that the wife of a regular brigadier general, who was a prisoner, took it upon herself to try to compose these women's feeling because there was nothing we could do. We tried every way under the heavens to reach these men with help of some kind but we couldn't break through the Japanese barrier. Finally, as I recall, we gave a ship to Japan loaded with supplies and, of course, lost the ship. [Dr. Pogue – I had never heard of that. Now this wasn't done in the First War was it, this careful business on casualties and all that?] Confidentially, no. [Dr. Pogue – I didn't think so.] I don't like to talk about that, but it was just terrible. They didn't do a damn thing of this kind. [Dr. Pogue – I'd never heard of it.] I saw the result over there in France and the minute we got into this war I promised myself I would not let these things occur. So much of this I saw over in France, first, as a member of the First Division for over a year, and later as member of the GHQ. Now, I had instructions from the Chief of Staff on trips that he sent me all over the SOS to report to him anything that I saw that was wrong. At the risk of taking some of your time, I will explain one of

these things to show how it works and why I sent General Lear to France. [Dr. Pogue – This is very important.] While I was on a lecture tour on the SOS in 1919, I was sent to talk to the Twenty-seventh Division. And it had just boarded the transport, the *Leviathan*, and I talked to them on the boat. The resentment of this division, and particularly of its leaders, was extreme. For the reason that at Le Mans, which was the intermediate area of concentration, they had been called upon to prepare, I think, five copies of these reports on individuals and to see these men were equipped with all these various things, including safety razors and everything of that sort, and they had worked all night, for days, to get this done so that they could be on their way. When they reached Brest they were required to do the whole thing over again and they were infuriated. And they poured this all out into my lap. I knew most of them, particularly the commander. So, I talked to our general and his chief of staff at Brest and he said they had to do this because that was the order. Then I dropped the task I was sent out to do – this lecture – and went to Le Mans and saw the general there and his chief of staff, the latter who was a great friend of mine, and I got nowhere there. These were the orders. I explained what was happening and the terrific effect on morale, wholly unnecessary, profound irritation of these men going home. The general would hardly listen to me. He didn't know me and he just treated me as an intruder. The Chief of Staff was though an intimate friend of mine, but I got nowhere.

So I motored down to Tours and saw the commanding general there and he was a man I knew, but he was intolerant of my intrusion. But his G-4, within whose hands this was, was an old friend of mine – a very nice, gentle fellow. So I tried with him to countermand this damned order and I couldn't get action there. I've forgotten the reasons he gave men, but he had reasons. So he told me to go back and talk to them at Le Mans. I said I had already done that and the commanding general there didn't even want to see me. So he said, see his chief of staff, you

know him. So I went to Le Mans and talked to him and he said he couldn't do this thing without an order from Tours. Well, I called up my friend, the chief of staff of SOS at Tours, and told him of my lack of success there and the reasons they gave and said he was sorry. I remember saying "You may be sorry but that doesn't cure anything. Now I have reached the point where I am going to carry out the order I have and I am going to communicate directly with the chief of staff of the AEF," who was not only a friend of mine but had been a student under me at Leavenworth – McAndrew. Then he said, "Well, give me two hours." I said, "I'll give you an hour and a half and no longer." He talked to Brest and he talked to Le Mans and then he called me back and said "it's all cured."

Well, I saw a good bit of this and the thing that particularly impressed me is that these were all fine men, but it was a huge machine and they were reluctant to make changes in it which would complicate things they didn't foresee. And though they had faith in me, knew me well – I had been an instructor over most of them at the Staff College – they couldn't help but look upon me as rather a visiting fireman. This took place regarding many things in many regions of the SOS. I finally wrote a letter to General McAndrew, I remember I typed it out myself very roughly, and he turned this over to General Pershing though I didn't know it. General Pershing made a great many notes on it and in most cases he would say "do this" or "do this" on the various suggestions I made. I never saw the paper until Mr. Baker sent for me in Washington and produced the paper and asked me about it. He was in a fight then with Congress, defending the AEF. Now, this sort of thing was going on, and as I say, with remarkably efficient men. Therefore, I was much concerned at the reports I got from a few trusted officers of what was happening in the rear areas of General Eisenhower's command. You see, the men that were relieved from combat duty were put on duty in these rear areas, so you didn't have the most

efficient people. As a matter of fact, it was quite the opposite, added to which they were all disgruntled. And I sent a very splendid officer over to France and because he had trouble with his heart he was not allowed to fly. So he motored through the rear areas and the minute he came back he gave me this terrible report on the conditions he found. On that basis I sent General Lear and several assistants to France and incidentally I irritated GHQ very profoundly. [Dr. Pogue – Oh, Bedell Smith was just furious about it.] Oh, I know, I know. [Dr. Pogue – He said they just dump garbage over here.] (Chuckle.) Well, I did send a couple of garbage pails. (Chuckle) Political pails, they were, but Lear was not a garbage pail. [Dr. Pogue – No.] And his first assistant was not. I think I got him from Iceland, I don't remember. [Dr. Pogue – Well you sent Bonesteel.] Well, Bonesteel came from Iceland. [Dr. Pogue – Well, he was an able man wasn't he?] Yes, very able. [Dr. Pogue – Well he was old, he was getting old.] Well, he was in command in Iceland, yes, very able. But the point there was the headquarters naturally was looking ahead. They were looking to the front. They were looking to the fighting, and their rear was largely controlled by officers who were relieved from combat duty, as a rule by them. They had a knowledge of administration that we could not lose. For that reason they accumulated in the SOS and also for that reason they were generally senior which was the main trouble in utilizing older officers. I might say that the British used to have a system in their Navy that a retired admiral could serve as a commodore and they would put him in command of convoys and things. In our Navy they could not take these people without putting them in command of larger forces. So I thought that scheme was a very fine one. It didn't reflect on the individual because that was the general practice. Well, our great trouble was these fellows that had been relieved from duty as to combat were senior, were of such seniority that they took the leadership of practically every minor subdivision. My struggle was to straighten this out. As to General

Smith's remark, we did a miracle in spurring him. He didn't know what such a thing was and could be. He got a couple of high rankers there whom I spoke to you about but they were capable men. [Dr. Pogue – Lear told me that Lee never did let him operate like you wanted him to.] Lee, well I know Lee was very jealous of power. [Dr. Pogue – wouldn't give him any staff, wouldn't give him any cooperation.] Lee was on the other hand, Lee had his difficulties. In these matters you are dealing with so many personalities, that it's extraordinarily difficult. And the most difficult duty I ever had, and the most embarrassing, of course, was ignoring these personalities as to peculiarities and making them come across. I did that in the matter of leaders and that was a matter of honor with me because I felt that in the past that had not been done. That was a great weakness in our system – that we had an accumulation of people at the top who were no longer capable as they should be for such high positions. And my struggles with them were very difficult and embarrassing.

[Dr. Pogue – Well, if you had had a larger Army in peacetime, you could have worked these people out.] The trouble was we had no elimination process. And when they got up and were passed for further promotion, they continued on and were just a drag on the whole military system. I remember Somervell coming to me and saying that I had to do something for him. He couldn't handle the SOS unless I got rid of these people. Because they had seniority on practically every sub-board he had. And that's when I turned in, I think, I retired nine hundred – maybe it was six hundred. And I was accused right away by the service papers of getting rid of all the brains of the army. I couldn't reply that I was eliminating considerable arteriosclerosis.

Incidentally, this is in a sense not related to this, however, it is instructive, I think. I was so astonished (I am referring now to my reference to arteriosclerosis) to see the changes in men at the ages the change took place. I found that along about forty-six or forty-seven, in some

cases, the man began to change in his fine qualities. Of course in the early fifties the changes were more frequent. When he got near sixty they were very frequent. When they got up towards the ordinary retirement age, very few at that period properly were usable. They were very few Pattons, there were very few people like that. As you went on beyond, it got, greater was the rarity of finding a man that had retained his previous characteristics of command and control in organization and administration. And what astonished me was to see a man that I had known as a very able citizen. And possibly fifteen years had passed, and I sent for him because I knew him. The struggle was always to get the man that had it. If you knew him you used him, but the great trouble was to find out who had it. Who was this fellow? And I was shocked in so many cases in sending for a man that I knew and now suddenly were available where they were and having to come to Washington and to find that they were completely changed and just were no longer usable. And some at a fairly early age. That was so frequent that it was not extraordinary at all. I remember one intimate friend of mine – a fellow I was very fond of – who had been very able. And General Hull came to me because I had nominated this man for a command in France. He had just come to a post that wasn't of any particular importance in the United States and he said, "I don't know what to do about your friend. I called him up on the phone and he says he can't go to France because the furniture isn't packed and his wife's away. He said, "I never heard of such a thing." I suggested that he leave his aide to pack the furniture – he had a couple – he said, No, he couldn't possibly leave. So he turned down a command in France for this reason. I couldn't believe what I was hearing. So I called him up and talked to him for the first time in many years and said General Hull had told me this and I said, "How about it, was that a fact?" And he said, "Yes, I can't leave here now because so and so's things are out and I can't go off and she won't be back for a month." So I said, "Well, my God man, we are at war and

you are a general." He said, "Well, I'm sorry." And I said, "I'm sorry, too, but you will be retired tomorrow." And I just moved him out. He was a very dear friend of mine. [Dr. Pogue – Unbelieveable.] That was deterioration, I suppose, of arteriosclerosis. Now in all of this I was always very sensitive because I was getting old and I wondered if I was functioning this way. And the man himself could never tell. But that was quite marked in so many cases. Man after man I would find. So I began to believe my young assistants who had seen the fellow when they told me "he no longer had it, if he ever did." [Dr. Pogue – It may explain too this thing that you mentioned several times why that they got so they worried more about the two cars and the extra bathrooms.] Well, during the peacetime there was so little command for a general. So little command unless he was at San Antonio, or at Benning – that wasn't very large, only about five thousand troops – or in Hawaii, or the Philippines or in Panama. There were so few soldiers. As a matter of fact, at one time they said you could put almost all the Regular Army non-commissioned officers in Yankee Stadium, there were so few of them. And you were checked so severely by the War Department for all the minorities – if that is the proper word to use. I would find at Benning, I almost stopped the instruction in grenades because we had several accidents and little fragments – nobody was killed or anything. But the restrictions they put on us were so severe that we practically couldn't train because they were so sensitive to any reaction against them if somebody got hurt. And the severity of the criticisms of the military committees and all were such that I felt the War Department didn't show any backbone at all. This is rather embarrassing for me because it seems immodest but I swore when I got up there that I wasn't going to have any of that damn business and I carried the flag when we went before the committees of Congress and I just wouldn't swallow the stuff they were trying to put out, although I was always advised to keep the peace with them. There were some things you kept

the peace on, but the boys didn't see that part. They only saw this other part. But there is bound to be deterioration when there is no active responsibility. I was always sort of interested in the reports of the chiefs of staff. It took them to November to get them out because there wasn't anything to talk about.

That first biennial of mine was gotten out in three days. The whole report, which is a book, though there was a particular reason for that haste.

Q. [Dr. Pogue] Don't you feel that since the war the Army has gone back to the business of being hypersensitive to criticism?

A. Oh, yes, very much so. They always do it to a certain extent. Of course, the position, for instance, of the chief of staff now is utterly different. He has so many over him - I don't know how many assistant secretaries he's got, undersecretaries and secretaries, and his power is so reduced that he is kept busy explaining things. He just isn't able to stride into Congress and defend himself.

Q. [Dr. Pogue – It does seem to me that they have ruined their case again and again by just hearing a little something, having rabbit ears as they say about ball players, and running and changing something when if they had written it out for a week or so it would have been allright.]

A. I know, I know. I don't know about this now, but I always used to feel that the War Department didn't defend its people. They would just descend on you for this little thing and that little thing. And then some buster that needed to be trimmed they didn't touch him, because that was an embarrassing thing. Unless they could deal with it on a generality basis, they didn't touch him.

Q. [Dr. Pogue] Then one other thing – when you sent General Lear and Bonesteel over, you wrote a very interesting, fine letter. I think it is one of your great letters, because when I first

saw it I copied it and I did not have a place to put it in my book but I have always remembered it. You said, "I feel that we lost our Army program after World War I because of the resentment of the men who became citizen civilians and voters and I don't want that to happen again." But I do think that you were entirely right that that resentment has gone on and on and helps to make us anti-Army, don't you?

A. Very much so. All those restraints after the fighting create all manner of disturbances. The men are impatient of everything, they want to get back and they want to do this and they want to do that. And then all this military repression occurs. That was notably the case in General Pershing's command over there. As a matter of fact he turned on an extremely heavy program because of his G-5's insistence and he was rather Prussian (the G-5) in his methods which the men never forgot. They were getting out in the cold and wet and slime and going through these things in some godforsaken little village which didn't have a pavement in the place, not a thing to see after dark, and this severe program and they were embittered in a way that they never forgot. That's one reason at the end of the war when I began bringing people back I specified that no movements were to start from the rear. Of course we had the transportation then and we could do this from the front. And I also specified that in the first return of these commanders, they should bring a certain number, I have forgotten what it was, of men from the front line who had some conspicuous service. But you can find all that up there, it was the program Young was carrying out. And we moved them by air right from the front line into the United States. Unfortunately, I didn't send them back, which would have been hard on them, but they had a grand trip – sat in on all these big dinners and everything, so they could tell the fellows over there what had happened. It was all right for them but it wasn't right for the men remaining over there.

Q. [Dr. Pogue] It still had an effect though because *STARS AND STRIPES* played it up and I can remember – I was at First Army when the war ended, I was actually with Fifth Corps when we went into Pilsen. I went back to First Army to get my gear because I was staying on they, you will remember, were being pulled out to go to Japan but they were given new uniforms and they were going to fly back and parade and it had a great effect. But to my mind another piece of interesting psychology on your part or understanding of psychology was the letter you wrote General Eisenhower on which you said "A man likes to get away and if you can let two or three of them have a jeep and some K rations and plan their trip for two or three days and that would be a fine thing and some did it and it had an enormous effect. But this grew out of your World War I experience.

A. All these things I saw over there. You see I toured the whole SOS and I found on every side these things that infuriated the future citizens. For example, one thing that was the most irritating of all, in one town you couldn't go to a café before 6 o'clock. In the next town you couldn't go to a café after 6 o'clock. They didn't have any coordination of that and they had a very severe man at the top – "Kitty" Connor. It was like the training program. I always thought General Pershing made a great mistake in not having had Heintzleman in charge of the training program because he could have done it and made them all like it. Instead of that they were just thrown into it, forced into it, and I know in the First Division we were just inflamed. In fact it almost smashed my career. I got so mad and I was young. I talked too much. And I would have been in many things if I had kept my mouth shut. I was so infuriated by what was going on. But all of this was a profound lesson to me, particularly that trip all over the SOS – it took me a month or more. And I saw the whole business. I just gave you one example of the difficulties of

getting these things straightened out. So my mind turned in Eisenhower's case to avoid this sort of thing.

I will talk to you at length later about the awful mess we got into [here he refers to re-deployment and demobilization], because our plans were so beautifully laid at the end of the affair and the twist of the Japanese surrender just turned everything upside down. Everybody was in the wrong place and we just had the devil's own time.

Q. [Dr. Pogue] I have often thought that from the standpoint of everything naturally but casually, it would have gone so much smoother if you had had another year of war.

A. Well, if we had had a month, one month would have changed the whole thing. But actually it caught us. The thing was beautifully arranged in every way, everything that happened and bang this thing occurred. Well, it caught everybody in the wrong position. The men that were home – that had been sent home – were the ones that should have stayed in Europe. They were going to the Pacific because they had enough service to perform. Instead of that here they were home and they wanted to be released. [Dr. Pogue – The pressure was enormous] The whole thing was just a contwisted affair. Everything was exactly wrong. Whereas – it was beautifully planned – would have been right. The perfection of the plan was its destruction and you just couldn't deal with it. Someone said you ought to have known the war was going to end. Well, we didn't know the bomb was going to go off. [Dr. Pogue – Or have the effect it did] Well, we were calculating on that if it went off the way they said it would. We thought the shock would be enough for most anybody.

You take the preparations for the schools in Europe. Those were tremendous. I think we three million volumes—or some tremendous number— in Paris. [Dr. Pogue – I know there were.] I had insisted that the selection of instructors be such and such. And everything should

be such and such. All this was set up to go and of course the top blew out of it and afterwards when I was in China, and I read these terrific performances of the troops in Europe – at least they were getting an awful press back home – I didn't follow it very closely, as a matter of fact it wasn't until a year later that they had named a bridge – the first bridge over the Rhine – for me. [Dr. Pogue – Yes they did.] That bridge up there near Dusseldorf. Anyway they named for me and I didn't even know it for over a year.

Q. [Dr. Pogue] There was a Patton bridge, a Marshall bridge, and so on. I crossed it. It is not too far from Cologne. But another time I want to go into this very thoroughly because many people assume – I have seen it many places – Marshall is an old-time Pershing type of disciplinarian, put about everything else this ramrod discipline. Your approach has never been that. You wanted them to be right but not that.

A. It was just the opposite. I remember just before the Battle of the Bulge I was up in Holland at Maastricht and the men were terribly tired. And there had been no relief for them. We couldn't move these other divisions in because there weren't any supplies. So I proposed first that they bring the new troops forward without their equipment. That would reduce the carriage and everything of that sort and gasoline consumption and only allow them so many Jeeps or whatever it was, and relieve these other troops that were so tired and move them back because they had been fighting and fighting since June and they were just worn out. Then I proposed that they take Maastricht and those other resort towns and do them all up as resort places for soldiers and pretty girls and everything of that sort and no Military Police in sight and that was to be done because I ordered it to be done. And then just about then – bang – came the Battle of the Bulge within about ten days or two weeks. But they were not doing anything about it and the men were just exhausted.

Q. [Dr. Pogue] I didn't know that you had ordered that as a result of it. But I was up there on the Belgium-German border and that had begun to happen. I would go up to interview people and they would say the men you want have just been taken back ten miles. They are going back to have a warm bath, sleep in a warm place, they are going to get a change of clothes; and then the USO is bringing a show up. I've seen them come back and they were just like brand new people.

A. What made me tired was that these things weren't looked into. That was Bedell Smith's great error. He was so intent on the forward part of the thing that he didn't have somebody that would do that and break over the restrictions. It is a very hard thing to break over the restrictions. The demands were severe and you had to be severe. But there was a change here to modify the thing, you see. It is very difficult for me to talk about these things because it puts me in the position of knowing it all and the other fellow did not. But the point was I had seen all this. I had always had the habit of drawing conclusions and I had seen all these things happen. Sometimes I made General Pershing perfectly furious with things.

Q. This is most important. I hope that one whole batch of this material can be used by the service schools – on leadership and on this sort of thing. So some time when we have finished the basic questions I would like to go into this.

A. Well, you have to play it largely from the point – not to put me in a terrible position – largely from the point of view that I saw all this and I fortunately was in the habit of drawing conclusions and I was determined that it shouldn't happen again.

Q. [Dr. Pogue] Another thing, I have seen your directives and all that but for a long time supposed it was something that somebody in your shop drew up and you merely signed it, but it is quite clear it came from your past experience. It is awfully important that young officers, I

think, know that people like yourself value and put great stress on this looking after morale instead of just merely the spit and polish type of inspection.

A. This thing of the hazard, speaking of the ninety division. No, that was not the hazard. The hazard was having badly trained divisions. Patton could never have carried out his performance if we hadn't had highly trained divisions. But you can't have highly trained divisions and keep watering them down in order to maintain a very large number.

Q. 7. The New Allied set up in the Mediterranean gave Churchill a freer hand and played a more direct role in the conduct of the Italian campaign. He was determined to break the stalemate. At a meeting with the Allied commanders at Carthage on December 26th, 1943 he reached the decision to launch an attack at Anzio. Was this altogether a British decision? Did you or other Americans oppose it at the time?

A. As to the Carthage debate, I don't recall the situation there except that Churchill was just taking command. Wilson was not able to control the thing at all. But Eisenhower was at Carthage.

Q. Wilson wasn't tremendously able?

A. No, he was a bad choice. As a matter of fact, Dill told me that Wilson was the ablest one. Maybe he was the best we could get. But poor Wilson, quite evidently, was trying to imitate Dill with me, but I didn't rise to it very well, I'm afraid. Churchill took able advantage of the conservatism of staffs and that played quite a part in the approach to AVALANCHE, Anzio and the like. He was strong for action and of course the staffs were conservative. The commanders got to be pretty conservative. But he was pushing for action. I was always pushing for action, but I didn't push them over the head the way Churchill did. Part of my thought was I wanted Eisenhower to feel that we were always behind him. We might push but we were behind him. I

know we pressed him to move to France and take command over there before his communications were ready, and he said he found himself out in an orchard with no communications. As a matter of fact that was politically necessary the thing, the pressure was getting so great on this end that we were letting it all go to somebody else that we had to take cognizance of the fact and get some action. So we pressed him to go ahead of the time he thought he should go which was when his communications were all established.

In February while the question of postponing the southern France operation was being debated, General Marshall wrote Eisenhower:

I will use my influence here to agree with your desires.

I merely wish to be certain that localities is not developing and that the pressures on you have not warped your judgment.

Q. 8. This matter of localities is mentioned in your letters two or three times. Were you worried mainly about the personal pressure from Churchill and the British Chiefs on General Eisenhower or was it the feeling that he was letting his clear view of the needs of the ANVIL operation?

A. My worry was in regard to Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff. At Malta we had a very acid meeting and Smith came on and the British put great pressure on him. They were opposing the previously agreed upon plan and General Eisenhower's procedure and in particular the advance to the Rhine. In describing the advance the Americans on the Combined Staff had let themselves in for a British term "close on the Rhine" which Churchill seized and whipped the whole affair with. Smith was trying to explain it was a British expression, but to me it was the sort of Gettysburg address stuff not a simple statement of what you wanted. At this meeting, having heard from Smith as a result of some of his conversations with the British, Brooke was presiding for the British and I was presiding for the Americans. Brooke said the British Chiefs

of Staff were very much worried by the influence on General Eisenhower by General Bradley and I think he mentioned General Patton. And I said, Well, Brooke, they are not nearly as much worried as the American Chiefs of Staff are worried about the immediate pressures and influence of Mr. Churchill on General Eisenhower. The President practically never seen General Eisenhower, never writes to him – that is at my advice because he is an Allied Commander – and we are deeply concerned by the pressures of the Prime Minister and the fact of the proximity of the British Chiefs of Staff, so I think your worries are non the wrong foot. We had a terrible meeting.

Q. I remember that you insisted on reworking the cable that was sent to Eisenhower so that there would be no question about the fact that you backed him. I've forgotten the exact wording of it but you rewrote part of it.

A. Incidentally, whenever the "I" is in it, it was mine. I wouldn't allow anyone else to use "I" for me. That was used freely early in the game, long towards the last before went into the Rhine at times like that. I recall a cable if I found the personal pronoun "I" in it and I hadn't personally OK'd that particular thing. I noticed this one little statement I just ready had two "I's" in it.

[Dr. Pogue] It was always interesting to watch his action after he'd gotten one of these rather stiff cables in which you said we're behind you 100 per cent and an hour or two later he would see Churchill and he would hit him hard.] He would.

Q. 9. Do you feel that you could have launched both OVERLORD and ANVIL on June 6th if Eisenhower and his staff had held firm for it?

A. I don't remember this dispute about this date June 6.

[Dr. Pogue – That was that debate in March and April when we kept arguing here that there was enough stuff there to do both of them. Eisenhower said so at first and finally under pressure

from Bradley and Montgomery, he said, Well, I'd rather give it up and have a strong OVERLORD.]

SECOND PART OF NOVEMBER 19, 1956 INTERVIEW.

About the criticism of Bradley produced by Fuller. I was talking of Benning. Bradley was a major there and very competent and very quiet. Incidentally, Collins was a captain, an instructor. Smith, I brought in to be assistant executive officer though I had never known him before; and as I said Vinegar Joe Stilwell was the leading tactical instructor and there were many, many others. But Bradley was conspicuous for his ability to handle people and his ability to see things very simply and clearly. I was trying to get the weapons section straightened out beyond the mere shooting of the guns. For one thing, for example, they were obsessed with the idea of machine gun barrages with the .30 caliber weapon and they wished to practically equip the companies with a great deal of the communication set-up of a battery of artillery. I was opposed to this, not that I knew much about the details, but I was certain it was not a good thing to load down an infantry company with so much equipment. I transferred Bradley to the leadership of this weapons section and told him to take a close look at this machine gun situation. After about two weeks, I think, he asked me to come out to the field with him to see demonstrated the fact that the companies already had enough equipment to do the entire thing but it wasn't being used, wasn't being utilized to its proper purpose. A calculation that had required, as I dimly recall, several hours, Bradley had cut down to six minutes. There were many other things of this same nature that he attended to.

I might say here, that the general supply system of the Army for regiments, battalions and divisions grew out of demonstrations at Benning under the leadership of Bull. The manner of the development is rather interesting. We had little to guide us. And a demonstration of supply took three days in the field. The pamphlet on supply was on a mimeographed basis. Benning didn't have the equipment to print anything until I got it out of our funds from our book shop. And this pamphlet was 120 pages mimeographed, single spaced typing. I informed them they would have to cut that down, that the way it was set up now would indicate that only a trained regular could handle supply, certainly only a trained regular in the early part of the war and I doubt if he would understand it. After about a year I found they had reduced this 120 pages to 90 odd and when I sent word that this must be cut down, the head of the editorial section, Major Fletcher came to me and said that couldn't be cut down any further, but would have to be rewritten. So I send word to cut this down to 12 pages and I think I prescribed that it should be double-spaced, though I'm not certain about this. Anyway, the two instructors – one of whom became a great battle leader later – resigned or tried to resign and I composed them a little bit by telling them I didn't admire them as editors at all and they hadn't written this in the first place. But they were very much worked up over it. One of them was Huebner, who afterwards commanded our troops in Europe. [Dr. Pogue – Oh, yes] and I'd known as a lieutenant in the First Division in France in dugouts, and trenches, etc. and I had a great fondness for and admiration for, particularly for his fighting qualities. So, I changed the set-up in control of this supply business and gave it to Bull and told him to demonstrate this as a mobile supply problem, not a set-up affair and to do it as quickly as possible. Bull had paid no attention to supply and was very emphatic in telling me that. I told him to go ahead. And I must say I gave him no ideas at all except time limits. I

might say I was working on the proposition that we had to hurriedly train an army and if we couldn't be concise and brief, there was no hope in the manuals.

So Bull went at this thing and he was to set-up this demonstration. As I recall, he finally succeeded in getting this thing on the basis of a day and a half. And as I absolutely recall, as I perfectly recall, he later on cut this down to a half day. That is the supply basis for our army – his development. In all this I must say, in a sense, I had no part. I merely furnished the directives and the drive and the arbitrary orders it must be done. From being the most unpopular course in school, it became one of the most popular. The only trouble was, they were always afraid that the man who wrote the 122- page mimeographed affair would learn about it, because he was filling a leading place at Leavenworth.

I might say that the battalion command at Leavenworth there in some of the problems were several pages long. I turned our battalion solutions into about one-third of a page. And later learned to my delight and to the great influence of the instructors, that the Germans were giving division orders orally.

THIS IS ENTIRELY CONFIDENTIAL

I had a terrible time getting instructors to simplify these things because they'd had this elaborate Leavenworth training which was really based on a static war. I was familiar with the static war. I had gone through one, but we weren't training for that sort of a fight. But this particular procedure of which Bull had charge had very phenomenal results. I might say that during all this I had many visitors and they often wanted to write up these things – particularly Johnson Hagood. But I had to use pressure to see that they wrote about nothing because I knew I would be suppressed by the War Department and Leavenworth.

But I was assisted by a very brilliant group of young instructors – Stilwell, Bradley, Collins, Bull and a number of others. [Dr. Pogue – Lanham was there part of that time.] Yes, Lanham was a student, I think. I used to have these fellows to come to my house. I was a bachelor or widower at the time and we would have an evening of discussions with various ones taking the lead. These were very interesting, and very helpful, very illuminating. I noticed shortly after the war that General Collins wrote an article in the *SATURDAY EVENING POST* about his services in the Southwest Pacific, and Guadalcanal, in Europe, the surrender of Brest, etc. and he has made reference to these meetings as being the most uplifting - though he didn't use that word – in his career.

[Dr. Pogue – Then you would say this was one of the most profitable parts of your own career, one of the most important from the standpoint of the wartime army.]

Oh, my, yes. I was left there for five years which gave me time to make changes without doing it with violence.

They had developed a very effective system of instruction, extraordinarily so, and they had followed the best recommendations on the – what is the word – pedagogy of the day. A professor from the University of Wisconsin, who was a leader in this field, visited Benning and thought the procedure there was more advanced than anywhere in the United States. Of course you could do that there because the faculty was young and if the individual was reluctant it was very easy to get rid of him. This occurred before my time. I was interested in brevity. The instructor used to read his lecture and it had to be sent to the editorial section about a month in advance to make certain that it didn't contravene any of the agreed policies. I finally forbade any reading and allowed them to have a card to note down the principal factors but when I heard an instructor say one day say I am required this morning to discuss - and then look down at his card

to see what to discuss – it was merely a nervous gesture - I suppressed the card too, because I found it was many times more effective when a man talked off the cuff, as it were, although it was a very well ironed cuff. I also revoked one of the binding rules of the school that when you finished you stopped and you didn't prolong the session to the end of the hour. That was enthusiastically received by the students. Strangely, it was opposed by all the instructors.

I had a very amusing experience in my effort to have them brief their presentations – make them more incisive. So I quoted from a story where a little girl is writing to her guardian and describing what she has just learned had in rhetoric. She writes a very amusing letter to her guardian after the style indicated in rhetoric, numbered 1-5 which exactly equaled our field order distribution. I read this to them and it proved highly amusing and they tried for several weeks to find out where I got it. They finally traced me to the library in Columbus and discovered this was "Daddy-Long-Legs" of Mary Pickford fame. [Dr. Pogue – (Chuckle)]

As a matter of fact, I had to use every device I could think of to carry my point. Because it doesn't do to just issue a ukase, if that is the word, regarding such matters, they have all got to believe them. So "Daddy-Long-Legs" won the day.

[Dr. Pogue – (Chuckle) What, did you just run across it in reading it?]

I remembered it and went back and looked it up. It was funny as the deuce, you ought to go look at it. It was funny as the deuce.

[Dr. Pogue – That would make a beautiful little story in a book, you see, it lightens, it, but it gets the point across. I'll look it up.]

Daddy-Long-Legs. It's very short and very charming little story, you know. We better get down to business here.

[Dr. Pogue – Well, this though is business, not these particular questions, but I'm delighted when you… There are a lot of things I don't know enough about to ask you about, you see. Someday I'll say well let's talk about many but you may not talk about all of them then so I'm delighted when one of these hits your mind you'll go into it because I have a feeling that some of the most fascination part of the book for service people is going to be this part.]

As I have said several times this puts me in the very embarrassing position of seeming to be the one who knew, when as a matter of fact, throughout all of this, I'm largely recording my reactions to the experiences of the AEF and the later training the Army when I was with General Pershing and my own experiences in these schools.

Q. Churchill in the spring of 1944 continued to press for operations in the Aegean. The President said he would not consider even token forces for such a project. General Marshall agreed emphatically: "That it would be very bad indeed and would probably be bound to result in a new war."

Q. 10. Did the President take this view as a result of arguments from you and Mr. Stimson or did he reach these views on his own?

A. I don't recall, except that the President was getting very cautious about getting our troops involved in distant fields.

Q. 11. Do you believe that General Eisenhower would have kept Patton in without your very strong backing?

A. I don't know. I know that Mr. Stimson was very much pleased with my letter to Eisenhower because Patton had been his aide and he was much distressed at the hole Patton had gotten himself into. I might say, that I heard Mrs. Marshall say to Patton when Patton was a colonel, "George, you mustn't talk like that. You say these outrageous things and then you look at me to see if I'm going to smile. Now you could do that as a captain or a major, but you aspire to be a general and a general cannot talk in any such wild way." He just laughed at her and that was the end of it. But she hit the nail on the head.

(Turn that off.

At the time we were having discussions with Mr. Churchill here in Washington about sending troops to Cairo at the moment with British distress there or Alexandria, I was vigorously opposed to sending troops, but very much in favor of sending tanks. (Incidentally it was very embarrassing to me because if you sent them, we had to take them away from the divisions that had never had the new tanks before and only had these for two weeks. Yet, we couldn't explain why we were doing it and received rather heavy lambastings for our inconsistencies of our staff procedure. So these tanks were sent out and a whole lot were lost when the vessels sank and we had to go and skim the rest away from the troops, so that they had nothing left at all. Well, I brought Patton on and sent him down to the War College to make the plans for moving a division into this thing – hoping against hope that I wouldn't have to do it, but feeling I should be prepared to do it in case the President ordered the move. I told Patton when he came that we were all opposed to this, but I felt it was necessary to make the planes. I said there had been a big discussion about it, particularly as to what we would send and the decision is final that it would be a division, a total of 18,000 troops (a division then was about 12,000). That's all the special troops we could send. That there would be no question of sending another division –

make it a corps. I didn't want that brought up at ll. I didn't want to hear from him on that. That was settled. So he'd get down to the War College and get to work. So, he went down to the War College and to my intense surprise – early the next morning I got a letter from Patton vigorously proposing sending an additional division. So I sent one of the secretaries of the General Staff to get General Patton and put him on a plane and send him back to California that morning, which they did. Scared him half to death.

DR. POGUE'S NOTES – THIS IS NOT ON TAPE

Q. 12. You have already told me something of General Patton's habit of saying something outrageous and then of looking to see how it went over. Will you go a little further into his personality and tell me a little more about his strength and weaknesses as you saw them?

Would you have ever considered Patton for a higher command than that of Army? Do you feel, as many do, that he was the best combat commander of the war?

How much difficulty with the Congress and the Press did the slapping incident and the outburst in England cause? Was the final outburst which caused his relief worse than the others or just the result of a cumulative development? Was he relieved as a result of Presidential pressure? I have been told that Mrs. Patton was very bitter at General Eisenhower. Don't you feel that he rather should have had the gratitude of the Patton family?

A. Part of question 12 relative to Patton is discussed here. Patton not only indiscreet, descended almost to buffoonery at times. I like him. Had lived with him at Fort Myer for a time. I remember a colonel of his who wrote some sharp criticisms of the War Department – wholly unjustifiable. I know that Patton had encouraged him. He liked the idea of taking slaps at the

War Department people while he was striding about with two revolvers on his hip in the field. It wasn't right because a lot of people he was criticizing – like Bell – would have given anything to be in a command. Later when I was overseas he asked me to promote the colonel, I said, No. Then at the table one night he pressed the matter. I said to him, this is not the time to bring this up. This is a social gathering not a business meeting. I am speaking now as the chief of staff to General Patton and not to my friend, General Patton. I will not promote him; never mention it to me again.

Here he took up the matter of tanks to Egypt and how he disciplined Patton. He then told how he went to maneuvers in North Carolina and picked Patton over Magruder. In late November 1941, Marshall went to North Carolina to watch how the two men handled armor. In the maneuvers Magruder got captured every day; Patton never got captured. Marshall decided that Patton was his man. This was the time, General Marshall said, when I was away just before Pearl Harbor.

Eisenhower was under great pressure in the spring of 1944 to remove Patton. I know Stimson was pleased that we saved Patton. He had been Stimson's aide.

Patton was a natural fighter and a very skillful one. It was amazing how he could plunge ahead and then check himself. One of the best examples was at Coblenz when he turned south against the German 7th Army. He turned south and went 22 km against the enemy and we in the War Department expected him to do it again. To our surprise he didn't. What he did do illustrated his talent as a commander. He reorganized his troops and then was ready to finish the 7th Army when they moved against him. Clever leader. Members of his staff told me that when he moved northward from near that place where the truffles and liver comes from (I ventured Perigord and Strasburg and he took Strasburg) he moved mostly at night, on icy roads, great

confusion. He interviewed several commanders. In each case they, in accordance with their training, began to tell him about enemy movements. They were doing what they were taught. But this was a great emergency. Everything was in confusion. In each case Patton would interrupt them and say I don't want to know a god damn thing about the enemy; what are you doing? This changed their psychology. It was a perfect example of leadership.

I don't condone his profanity. I have a story about that. I had a friend who was a great bishop in the northwest. I used to go fishing out there; slip away with Frank McCarthy and be there a few days without people knowing where I was. Erskine Wood owned the place. I would have him arrange a dinner for 25-30 without letting them know I was the host. I would come in at the end of cocktails and then entertain. On one of these occasions, I had the bishop on my right. He had written to me after Patton had gone to Los Angeles and had cursed on the radio. Bishop had said can't something be done to stop this; children listen to him. I said I regretted it and that I didn't think it would happen again. I told him that in nearly all of our orderly rooms there was a facsimile of Washington's order forbidding swearing, but that it was a little hard to keep it under control. I said he wasn't able to handle it in his army and we have a much larger one. That night -- some time later – at dinner, the bishop said, "How large was Washington's army?" I said I think never more than 10,000. I said you are thinking about that profanity question. If George couldn't do it with his small force, think of our problem with 8 million men. Then I said I look at your constituents around the table. They have all made a speech. I have never heard more profanity than I have here. He said I see your point.

I used to swear a good bit during the war. I told Frank McCarthy I did it for emphasis, but it is the poorest way to get it. I was ashamed of doing it and stopped after the war. I didn't take it up again until I had to spend a lot of time in bed. Now I do sometimes. (He grinned.)

TAPE 17M

INTERVIEW WITH

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

February 20, 1957

Sgt. Heffner ran the machine.

Q. 150. How valuable was USAFI – the program for giving correspondence work to soldiers?

A. This never had a full development. We had made very large preparations for the correspondence work of the soldiers to be in Europe after the war when we moved so much of the Army in Europe towards the Pacific. We made really tremendous preparations there and it was not to be all correspondence. We hoped to really accomplish quite a fine educational effort and were selecting teachers from among the soldiers who had that experience in their civil occupations. I think we had – as my recollection goes – almost three million books accumulated in Paris to be used in this work. Of course, the sudden surrender of Japan and the reversal of the Army procedure blocked this and did away with the immediate necessity, and the new forces that accumulated in Europe after the war I do not believe got well started in it. But I had nothing to do with that as my tour as Chief of Staff had expired. I felt that we could accomplish a great deal and set up a very fine educational system but it had to be backed very heavily by command and I was prepared to see that that was done. (I might interject at this point – the remarkable upset of our arrangements which came about by the fortunate circumstance of the surrender of Japan following the atomic explosions. We were confronted by a situation where the need for a large army in Europe was dissipated by the surrender of the Nazi regime. On the other hand, certain troops had to be maintained there even though at that time we still were not clear as to the intensity of the Russian effort to dominate the whole procedure in Continental Europe. In order

to meet the situation of peace in Europe and war with Japan at the same time, which involved the demobilization of large forces and the continuance in service of large forces for the war in the Pacific, it was necessary to go through an elaborate regime – to set up an elaborate regime in order to see that the right men were given the privilege of demobilization and the men with the longest service were continued in the service. Now, this immediately involved a sorting out of troops in Europe, in the Pacific, and the United States. And as I briefly recall the main outline of the procedure was for the men in Europe who had eighteen months yet to serve to be moved to the U. S. and on out to the Pacific. The men with a very short term of service were to be brought home for discharge. The men in between were to remain in Europe or to be taken to Europe as the case might be. An elaborate point – I repeat, point – system was set up which would determine whether a man was to be discharged or to continue in the service and so on. This would involve a complete reorganization of the troops in Europe – which was a great task for the command over there when they had to undertake this reorganization in a field where it was essential that there be a workable organization for fighting if that should suddenly become necessary. This also involved the transportation of a large force from Europe to the Pacific – those men with eighteen months yet to serve. There was also involved the necessity of giving these men an opportunity to visit their homes on a short leave before they went on to the Pacific. There was a requirement by Congress that ten days leave should be given under certain circumstances. There was the necessity for the immediate discharge of a certain number of men who had an accumulation of points which justified their discharge. Well, all of these involved movement. In the first place, immediately following the surrender, I tried to reverse entirely the procedure which we had to follow in 1919 where the men had to be moved to the ports very

slowly – and during one period could practically not move at all because of the complete lack of railroad transportation as it was entirely involved by the French in their evacuation of troops from the devastated zone in France. Then, also, they were forced into the very undesirable situation of moving home on the ships then available the men who were closest to the ports because it would be a long journey from the front to the port cities. That, of course, involved hard feelings because the men that had just gotten over there, while they might want to go home, at the same time wanted to stay long enough in France to see what it was like – which would involve moving toward the front and then moving back to the ports, and we did not have the available transportation. It set up an extremely difficult situation for General Pershing to meet, and there also was the fact that winter was on us and for men to sit around idle would just breed violent dissatisfaction. So the only way out of that was to work those who were there very hard in military training which was unpopular to the extreme and set up a very difficult reaction in the United States. Now I was trying to avoid all this lesson— from the First World War— and if I do say it myself we had developed a very fine plan for this exceedingly complicated situation. It worked a great lot of hard work on the staffs concerned particularly in Europe where they practically had to reorganize divisions and yet keep them in a condition where they could be employed. But the first thing that I was intent about was to see that the first movements of men home would come from the front and not at the tail end as was the necessary case in the First World War and which created such a profound dissatisfaction and a great unpopularity for General Pershing. So the first move was to transport by air men with certain number of points justifying discharge and men who had very conspicuous service – had been recommended for this or that and all decorated men – and to move them by air for the front back to the United

States so that the men in rear who had not been on the front or in the fighting didn't get the first turn at demobilization. This part worked very well. Then the men with eighteen months to serve moved home. Well, of course, that seemingly was just the reverse of what it should be because the men with the longest service to do were naturally the men with the shortest service in the European Theater, and the men with the longest service in the European Theater were the ones that would want to get home. But we had to hold them there for the time being – the men with the longest service in the European Theater – while we moved these men with eighteen months service home *en route* to the Pacific. Then it was necessary to transfer them clear across the Continent, but also to give them ten days leave at home because that was a Congressional action, I believe, and I know we did it. This involved a very great complication and how we handled it – in the rough – was when the men reached New York they were sorted out by residence and those trains went right straight through to that vicinity, and if there were men in the division who belonged in the South in the same division that belonged in the North, they were separated from each other there and shipped on these special trains straight to their home region, and from there distributed. For instance, Chicago was distribution point and trains went out from Chicago with local arrangements for getting men to their home. Yet this was only for ten days. So it involved a very great difficulty. Meanwhile the headquarters of their division moved across the Continent and was established on the West Coast. Now when these men finished their ten days at home, then they were collected again and carried in to a center like Chicago or San Antonio or Atlanta or places like that and put on trains and shipped out to the West Coast or wherever their division headquarters would be by that time. And there the division was reassembled and on its way to the Pacific with the men of the longest service [to serve] in the ranks as should be. This also

involved, of course, a rearrangement in the Pacific where the war was going on with Japan. And that was more difficult. However, that was worked out pretty well I thought and the whole machine was beginning to grind when Japan surrendered. This reversed everything. Everybody was now in the wrong place. The men with the longest service [to do] were in the United States having just been sent to their homes prior to their going to the Pacific. The men with the shortest service were still in the theaters of operations in Europe and in the Pacific. Everybody was at the wrong spot. This could not have been avoided without a previous exact knowledge of just when the Japanese were going to surrender. And the atomic bomb was then an unknown factor until it actually went off. We then found ourselves changed from what I thought was a remarkable arrangement – I think it would have won admiration from the Press and everybody in close contact with it – the extent to which we had figured out in the War Department how to handle this partial demobilization of the Army – this re-assortment of the Army from Europe to the Pacific and this partial demobilization of the troops that would not be needed merely for the war with Japan. Instead of that we found ourselves in the midst of the greatest muddle I have ever seen and the most violent repercussions of the individuals concerned and the press generally. It was too complicated a situation to explain in full just why it occurred that way, but it resulted from the fortunate fact that Japan had surrendered. And I suppose that those Monday quarterbacks could have said right away that we should have foreseen that and had everybody arranged in preparation for that surrender. However, there were no indications that I saw or that the Chiefs of Staff saw, with all the information that was available, but which all the innumerable public writers could see instantly which we were not able with our intellects to understand. However, it was very easy to understand it afterwards. So we had to get out of this mess or

rearrangement which brought everybody in the wrong place. Now there set up a tremendous pressure to discharge these men in the United States, who were home on their ten days leave and not try to transport them to the Pacific. However, there were the men with short terms of service in the Pacific that were due for discharge. Not all of them, of course, but most of them. Then with the Press behind and all the various criticisms and reports that are incidental to a democracy when it gets involved in a very huge enterprise such as this war, the men in the divisions yet to go to the Pacific were steamed up to oppose every move of any kind and were threatening what amounted actually to a form of mutiny. We received no help from the press (chuckles) as I recall during this period or from Congress. They were all responding to the immediate urge of the individual who was at home and was going to stay at home if he could possibly manage it. We had quite an accumulation of air people in the United States who were on the way to the Southwest Pacific. And now there was no immediate need for them. Yet, on the other hand, there were these men with very long service in the Pacific, and also to a certain extent in Europe, who should be immediately discharged when we could get them home. But the men who were home who still had long serviced to do now in a sense, you might say, verbally rebelled against not being discharged immediately, particularly when they were home. And when you tried to hold them until the men who were deserving of immediate discharge could be gotten back to the United States, then, we were confronted with the great difficulty of dealing with these men for whom there was no immediate problem of work. There was also a staff problem involved because to accomplish a proper demobilization and not have so many of the mishaps that we had in the 1919 demobilization it was necessary to build up a very large organization of trained staff. [We had to make pause here – I've forgotten exactly where I left off] but I think I've told enough

of the complication, to satisfy, except I do add that these airmen became so restless that we finally got enough trained staff to handle all these demobilization points scattered about the country and got these air fellows – who were probably the most restless of all – discharged before they burst into flames as it were.

Q. 151. Did you ever get promotion policy organized to suit you?

A. I think towards the end we succeeded in getting the promotion problem pretty well straightened out. Though as I recall I have already recited, it was very difficult when we organized new units. There were all these vacancies and the tendency of all the commanders was to fill all the vacancies and give promotions to all the men waiting. But it would have been just as satisfactory and far better for the Army if they had been willing to have had an accumulation of lieutenants with troops instead of putting them all in their appropriate grades before they themselves had had a chance to qualify for those grades. And it was further complicated, as I believe I have said, by the fact that in Europe they were very strict with promotions because they would only give them as a reward for real service when a man showed his qualifications in battle. Therefore, the men in Europe were far behind the men in the United States, and I had quite a difficult time straightening this out – and restraining commanders from promoting everybody for whom there was an organizational vacancy instead of keeping them in lower grades until they had a chance to qualify themselves. And on the other hand, General Eisenhower's problem in Europe where he was doing exactly the right thing by promoting slowly after the men had had experience and had been tested in battle. I had an example of that in my own home with two stepsons – one in the United States and one in Africa. In Africa the

promotions were very slow and the boy there found so many of his associates in his grade – second lieutenant – had been in battle and many of them had been wounded and recovered, while back in the states his brother was stationed where they were promoting too rapidly filling vacancies so he was far ahead of his brother in Europe who had been in action and he had not. It was quite difficult to get this straightened out. Commanders who were established – for instance, the commander that I put in Cairo at this time immediately promoted everybody on his staff to the grade which was permitted for that position. But it put them far ahead of their service – their actual service.

Q. 152. You made every effort possible to use decorations for the purpose of promoting morale. Unfortunately, in many cases, the way in which decorations were given led to dissatisfaction. Any comment on this.

A. As to the matter of decorations. I don't think we had any particular trouble with that except too quick decorations for merely service performance by members of the Air Corps where the development was going ahead with such tremendous expansions. I restrained that very much but it had gotten started pretty well and awakened naval resentment because their Air corps weren't getting the same rapid promotion which stirred up comment in the Press and all of which was unfavorable to the Army Air and it led to the joke – a favorite of the period – that a man entered the Pentagon labyrinth a second lieutenant and by the time he found his way out he was a lieutenant colonel. There's some slight exaggeration in this [chuckles]. [Sgt. Heffner – "I remember that very well."]

Q. 153. One of your efforts to raise morale was your order to have pamphlets prepared on various actions which would be given to soldiers who were wounded in these actions. To a great extent the Army historical program grew out of this. What other such measures did you take?

A. The Army historical program – if I know just what is meant by this – was a development to record the history of the war with as much talent to do the job as possible and as promptly as possible and not have it to take years as it did even in the First World War and as it did, of course, in the Civil War.

When I first began answering the question 153, I had lost the point of the question which related to the development of descriptions in the hospitals to the wounded men of what was going on in the front, particularly where they had left it. You know, the movement of evacuation was so prompt when we could make it such – that a man was entirely disassociated with his organization and with his theater, he might be flown clear back to the United States very quickly, or at least to the rear in the hospitals – Italy or France, or wherever it might happen to be. And I found that those men in the hospitals would get back to Walter Reed who were flown through White Sulphur Springs and other places like that didn't know at all what was really happening, particularly in their unit and particularly in the theater of operations that they had recently served. So I started the business of trying to get out accounts of the fighting for the benefit of these men. Because it was needed for their morale, though it was very difficult of arrangement and I don't recall now some of the procedures we followed but I've a faint recollection that we had to try to get some the data from the troop units themselves and, of course, that was very hard

to do because they were so busy with today and tomorrow that they had very little time to think back to yesterday.

Q. 154. How much trouble did you have with the problem of the Negro soldier? Did you feel that integration would work during the war? What has been the main problem in connection with use of the Negro soldier? Did you approve of General Eisenhower's proposal to use Negro soldiers at the time of the Ardennes?

A. We had the usual difficulties of that day and development with the Negro soldier question. I have previously said that I thought one of my serious mistakes was in the mobilization of these Negro units – I didn't keep those in the North, didn't keep those men of the North in the organizations and station them in the North despite the difficulties of training and the cold winters and the tremendous expense in preparing camps which would be satisfactory for the severe winters of the North. As I said before when we moved these men – or their units – into the South we ran into things which were utterly beyond our control – that is the local customs of the town, the laws regarding the street, bus services, all of the matters of that kind which we could not control, but yet which violently excited the Negroes from the North who were unaccustomed to such matters as segregation as they found in the South – particularly in the very small towns. This was almost insoluble. Jack McCloy – the Assistant Secretary of War at that time – had this in his particular charge and it was an unenviable charge because it was almost beggared of solution until the whole attitude would change. The character of the Negro in most of these southern towns, particularly in the states where they worked in the fields, particularly in states like Louisiana and Mississippi, and to a certain extent in Alabama, in Florida, and to a

certain extent in southern Georgia and in parts of South Carolina, were in quite a different stage of development from those particularly in Virginia and places in the North where there was an accumulation of Negroes such as in New York. And they were all of course, these various groups were working to achieve a national correction, if you may call it that, of these various factors of a racial nature, using the war as an opportunity for that purpose. And of course you must say this – when you are calling on a man to risk his life in the service of the country, he had every right – it would certainly seem – to demand the same rights of the other fellow who was risking his life. And there we had, as I said, an almost insoluble question because we couldn't do away with feelings and reactions and customs in the Deep South, and yet we had those men with us. Their degree of civilization, I will put it, was very marked because where they were closely associated with the home, like what we would call the in the earlier days the "house" Negroes – we had a totally different problem than that dealing with the "field" Negroes. That was particularly the condition in the rice growing or sugar growing and those crops of that nature in the Deep South.

Going back again to the decorations matter, I was very anxious that decorations could be given as close to the battlefield as possible and men could work up all sorts of cases for themselves when they got away from the battlefield, but you couldn't do it there. Only the man that did got in the opinion of his fellow soldiers. So it was highly desirable to give decorations there and I felt it highly desirable to allow the authority to be there and not have it sent far to the rear. I think I spoke once before of the fact that in the first and second armies in the First World War, the matter of decorations at GHQ was in the hands of an officer who got about six months behind and then when they began to get them very frequently, the men who didn't deserve them

got them, and those who get them long after the war, particularly like the DMS, built up cases for themselves. I found, because I was tied to it a little bit by appeals made to General Pershing which I had to handle, that the officer would go to the French authorities and try to crowd a decoration out of them and then he would come to the American authorities and try to force the issue there showing the French decorations as a justification for his America appeal. So that when they were delayed it started to be given long afterwards. They were very frequently, in my opinion, were not justified. And, of course, as I listened to these men they would explain that it was a very sensitive thing—it was only on account of their children they would do it—and they would never have thought of touching the matter personally. I knew at that time because the French Government had informed me that they had haunted the French War Office to get their decorations over there.

Going back to 154 again the question of the Negro soldier, I thought that General Eisenhower's procedure in using Negro soldiers in the fighting platoons at that time was excellent. However, you see one great trouble was the other cases – situations – didn't offer the same opportunity for handling the matter in the excellent manner in which it was done with European forces. There was another problem, the minute you moved them to the United States, then you had a brand new issue involved which related to home conditions. And if you had a unit – which we had – these men demobilized or moved into those regions which had not yet changed at all in respect to the segregation of the Negro from the white population, it was almost impossible to handle. In the fighting though with a certain percentage, I believe it was about 15 per cent of Negroes in the company, they put up a very splendid show. All along it was quite evident that what they lacked was leadership. I know that was so clear in the Meuse-Argonne

battle. And I had personally to deal with this, with the troops, in the reorganization and their movement, of the colored unites that were on the left of the First Army in that fighting. It was lack of leadership – lack of confidence of the men in their non-commissioned officers and particularly in their officers that they had not developed that far. And I found the old-non-commissioned officers of Negro regiments in the Regular Army felt very much the same way I did. One of the misfortunes of that period was that in the political repercussions, they were – these Negro groups in many cases – were rather violently attacking the non-commissioned officers of the old Negro Regular regiments. Because they resented the fact that those men knew what a non-commissioned officer had to have and they knew what the white officer had to have – and what the necessities were and that didn't at all accord with the pressure that was being kicked up in New York, Kansas City and places like that. But the great lack was leadership which involved the confidence of the men in their officers and until they had that it was very, very difficult. And yet that was the demand. And it was a very trying thing to me, with the political pressures – the political attitude generally in regard to a question of this kind – and the very unfortunate statements on the other side of the question of men who should have known better than to talk as they did. We had very splendid men, of course, just as you have now – with Bunche and others – and I know the president at Tuskegee University was quite a friend of mine. And yet he was very much criticized by his own Negro folk – criticized because in a sense he was what I would call an evolutionist while they were revolutionists. And in order to give him status I would turn over my plane as Chief of Staff so that he could move from this place to that place in connection with his duties to help us in these matters and to give him some prestige as it were. But it was a very difficult thing to do and he probably was more criticized than almost any

of the people concerned with this business. Yet he was the one that was supporting me in trying in every way to do what he could in the way that Booker T. Washington would have done. I know when we started to set up the permanent ROTC units after the war, he had made a proposal for a rather large aviation affair down at Tuskegee University and his son was in the Regular Army Air Corps and was a squadron commander. I agreed to do it but I told him I thought it was all wrong – that he would not be able to manage that. It was too much pressure against him at the time and that while we would back him in the installations and financial requirements as far as the War Department could, I thought he was ill-advised. But he felt it was quite important. He went back to Tuskegee and two weeks later he telegraphed me that I was right, that it was not practical to do as he proposed.

Q. 155. What was your opinion of General Hershey's handling of selective service?

A. As to General Hershey and the Selective Service. As far as I knew, he did a very fine job. Of course, there were critics. But any good job has its critics. If it didn't have critics I'd be suspicious.

Q. 155 (?) Army band?

A. (Inaugural parade and Army band). The Army Band was largely a development of my instigation and I had it sent abroad in the hope of getting it going with a good background which the Marine Band had had for years and years. It had many difficulties about it because we had no appropriations for music and things like that, where thousands were allowed for bands of longer service such as the Marine band of course and the Naval band and later on the Air band

came in pretty well. But criticisms are very bad business. So I won't explain why I think the Army band didn't develop as rapidly as it should have during these days of opportunity.

As to General Smith and his comments about the Army band, I was pushing him. He was General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff abroad. I was pushing him to get more publicity for the Army Band, so I think in effect he was carrying out my request and having a very hard time in doing it.

Q. 156. You may consider this an improper question because you may think it requires an immodest answer on your part. However, it would make a valuable answer for your biographer. If you prefer, we could hold this for later and not record it.

Wherein lay your greatest contribution to victory—coordinator, conciliator, administrator, idea man, strategist, etc.?

A. I cannot answer that question, as you anticipated.

Q. 157. You mentioned recently that you once threatened to resign if Secretary Stimson insisted on his views relative to officer training. Was this the only time during the war you made such a threat?

A. That was the only time as I recall that I threatened to resign and I didn't like to do it because I thought it was a very bad business for a public official to come up with a resignation proposition just because the thing didn't go his way, which is so often the case with political appointees, and I didn't think an Army officer had any business doing it unless it was a matter of such great moment that he couldn't continue himself with the thing or with the affair because of a violent

difference in principle. However, I was trying to save the situation and that was the only way I could think of at the time. I regretted it afterwards – thought it partly accomplished its purpose.

Q. 158. This is a picayunish question but historians frequently dispute over such matters as where people had their offices. As a matter of fact someone like Sherwood had you sitting in the Pentagon in 1940. Where did you have your offices in Washington from 1939-45? I know you were in the Munitions Building, but was there another before that?

A. My offices in Washington started when I came in 1938 to the office in the Winder Building across from the State-War and Navy Building when I was head of the War Plans Division. I moved from there to the Deputy Chief of Staff I think in October of 1938. That office was in the next room to the Chief of Staff – again – in the State-War and Navy building – in the traditional offices of the Chief of Staff for many years. When I became Chief of Staff I moved into the Chief of Staff's office in the same building, which was virtually in the next room to the Deputy Chief of Staff's office. That building then came to be vacated in favor of overflows, particularly from the White House Committees and things of that sort and we went to the Munitions Building. I don't know how to describe where that office was except that it was practically over one of the doors. [Sgt. Heffner: "Over the main entrance?"] It was over the main entrance. And I'm amused now to recall that I had quite a time getting the main entrance cleaned up because I thought it was filthy. But I found the Army had no control over that – that was done by some General Service in Washington. Well, I notified them if they didn't clean it up, I was going to do it. And we had quite a hard time about it.

From there we moved into the present offices of the Chief of Staff – no – moved into the present dining room of the Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon and it remained there unit after I left. As a matter of fact, I think it remained there until Louis Johnson became Secretary of Defense and the general unification, as they called it, of the Army and Air and Navy and Marine Corps took place.

Q. 159. I have heard that you never had an aide before Colonel George and that this was due to the fact that you felt your own career had been hampered by having served such a long period as aide. Are either of these accurate?

A. I don't recall exact details in regard to an aide. I had one out at Vancouver who I merely took on my staff because he was ill. He had had a nervous breakdown and his wife had died – and I had known him as a young officer – and so I took him on as an aide without any idea of having him do any duty. And then he left me to go to the Letterman Hospital in San Francisco. I don't recall having a formal aide – though I did have Capt. Claude Adams in the office at the Munitions Building for a time and after that I never had a detailed aide until Colonel George was made my aide. I had several reasons for this. In the first place I thought it important that I be in very close contact with the General Staff – with the staff organization, and with the Secretary of the General Staff, in particular, because he was the one that coordinated, in a sense, all the work of the General Staff and was in contact with all of the senior officers in the Army staff. Therefore I kept in close touch with him – in the closest possible touch with him and I thought that an aide in a sense would rather get in the way. This was a little bit hard on Mrs. Marshall because she had so many duties which involved the necessities of an aide. But actually, the

Secretary of the General Staff who was in effect my aide so far as I had an aide service. And I had a very unusual group of men who went through this service. I think the office of the Secretary and Assistant Secretaries of the General Staff was a very good evidence of the system that I followed. In the first place, that appointment of the Secretary of the General Staff usually went to one of the senior colonels of the Army who was about to be made a brigadier and was considered the most influential appointment you could get unless you were a major general. I found that I gradually worked down from the upper age, older men until I got down to the early thirties, and one of my last secretaries of the General Staff – I think was only about thirty-two when he was made. And yet he had exercised a profound influence and became a great expert in organization. In my earlier affairs with General Pershing I had tried to get into the General Staff organization – if not permanent members of the General Staff – at least workers on the General Staff – young officers who I thought were brilliant. I practically was not able to do this except in a very small way and it took me over a year or year and a half to succeed in this, and it was not until the last moment before I left General Pershing, he as a favor to me, insisted on the attachment to the General Staff of five of these young fellows. Well, within almost weeks, certainly months, they became the principal workers in their sections. But the resistance to these young officers is hard to appreciate today. At the time I had started on this business of trying to get these young officers attached to the General Staff as workers, I tried to get the General Staff officers exchanged with the Navy and that was way back in the early days when I was with General Pershing. The Navy didn't want to take any of them and didn't think they could be anything but liaison officers, but I wanted them as real workers. But when we came to our staff and the heads of the various sections of the General Staff were very warm friends of mine – all

but about one of them – I couldn't get any of them to accept the men. They said they wouldn't have enough experience. Well, it struck me as rather amusing after the war – during the war when we get an army of eight and a half million men and nine theaters of operations I had a reserve officer of thirt-one years as the Secretary of the General Staff operating in the broadest way possible, being sent for by the President at midnight to sit with Churchill and himself in some of their discussions, going with me to the various theaters of operations, acting as the secretary of all the meetings and discussions at Algiers on one occasion when the normal member from the United States' Chiefs of Staff could not be present. And yet at this time I am talking about, when I was trying to get these younger men brought in as assistants if not General Staff officers themselves, I couldn't get anybody to agree with me about it. However, I found after I became Deputy Chief of Staff – before I became Deputy Chief of staff – I found an officer who I thought had rare attainments. I tried to have him brought into the staff and I couldn't get anybody to take him because he didn't have this age, association and experience, as they called it, that he was supposed to have. Finally, the chief of one section took him as a personal favor to me. This particular officer that I am talking about became head of one of the largest sections in the General Staff – and became head of the whole management of various people – countries – that we were involved in, in connection with the gradual organization of their civil establishment - one of the most able officers on the staff. But their prejudices were so deep – not against using civilians but on the grounds that they couldn't know this without years and years of experience and yet when I ended up I had the entire General Staff – head of the General staff business – composed of very young officers, largely from the Reserve. I was doing this purposely in order to release as many trained Regulars as I could for service abroad. However, I had to reverse the

thing at the end and bring in gradually Regular officers to pick up the organization which had been developed in this section of the General Staff. Among the officers in the office of the Secretary of the General Staff in these early days when I first came into the business as Chief of staff were a notable collection, General Bradley was an assistant to the Secretary of the General Staff. General Collins, afterwards Chief of Staff, was an assistant to the Secretary of the General Staff. General Bedell Smith, of notable reputation, was an assistant to the Secretary of the General Staff. There were any number of these men who became corps commanders and performed brilliantly who started under me as secretaries of the General Staff. I moved them out as quickly as I could into other positions but for the time being they were there and rendered a very valuable service during this formative period entering into large operations.

Going back to 159 – the question of an aide. I really had more direct aide service from a Master Sergeant – Powder – who as far as I know is about the only person in the Army at the outbreak of the war who never got a promotion. He was a Master Sergeant at the start of the war and he was a Master Sergeant at the end. However, Powder declined to be a Major Provost Marshal. He preferred to stay where he was and he rendered me most valuable service. He traveled with me and he was much admired by British officers of distinction. He was 6 ft. 4 I think and the usual hash marks – as they call them – covered his sleeve for almost its entire length. I used him in a very independent role. I would often send him with officers – British officers of distinction who came to this country. He would take them down the Shenandoah Valley – take them to Charlottesville. Then he would take them on down to Miami Beach, where we held a Pentagon— that's what they call the thing on the roof, isn't it? [Sgt. Heffner – "Yes sir."] Held a pentagon [penthouse] open for such purposes and look after them while they

were there. I know Sir John Dill – he used to take him to the White Sulphur Springs – which was a hospital – at the time Dill was ill – and stay with him there. And it was rather amusing to hear Dill tell about it because Powder controlled exactly what Dill did, because if the doctor said it, Dill had to do it because Powder was on his back if he didn't do it. He always made quite an impression on these British officers because he was a very fine cut of a soldier. But very able and very well-liked. And as I say, I was able to use him as a sort of guide and cicerone for very distinguished British officers coming to this country and others. And he made matters easier for me in traveling and things of that sort. We had an amusing experience at Yalta. Before going over there, being a little bit trained in what happened – Sergeant Powder with the Secretary of the General Staff Col. Frank McCarthy got a complete outlay of things from Murphy's store – for both women and men, but particularly women – and had them packed in two small trunks – officers field lockers I think. And when we got to Yalta where we were quartered in the summer home of the Tsar and Tsarina, the servants were all the most impoverished, slavey-like looking people. They had been taken from all these destroyed cities and moved down there because there was no one practically left there to look after us. Powder in a sense looked after me directly and saw that I got the proper attention from these people where it was needed. When it came time to go he started to distribute Murphy's store, in effect, among these women. Well, it was just like giving them diamonds. They hadn't been able – probably never in their lives had seen such things – which over here had probably cost a quarter to a dollar. And in that day had nothing whatsoever – and looked it. So very quickly it spread through the building that Powder was the man to get next to. And they all but kneeled in the aisles when they met him in the hallways. Then word came up from the President's delegation on the first floor that please

supply them with the necessary tip procedure. Well, we had done this thing out of the experiences we had, and we had use for all these and I must say I declined to favor them. We went ahead with our own distribution tips as it were. And I would get back presents of sweet champagne so that Powder had my boots filled with this stuff which I couldn't drink myself at all.

Then there was another incident occurred at Yalta which always amused me, but it shows very well what the condition of affairs was. There was practically nothing to buy in the town but Colonel Frank McCarthy, my Secretary of the General Staff and now a very prominent man in the motion picture world, found a painting of a laughing Cossack – an old Cossack laughing – it was a very good painting as it developed because I think it was evaluated for a considerable sum of money in this country. But the great question was to pay for the thing. Money meant nothing because there was nothing the fellow could buy with the money. So finally Frank hit on the scheme of buying the picture for a set of woolen underwear that he couldn't wear because it scratched. And after this was joyfully accepted by the owner of the painting who needed the heavy under clothing more than anything else, it then developed that he had a partner in the enterprise. Well, we couldn't split up the underclothing because there was only one suit, and finally Frank found that he did have another pair of drawers. So, that pair of drawers and the complete suit of underwear paid for the painting of the laughing Cossack which he brought to this country and, as I say, was evaluated for a considerable sum of money.

Going further into the aide question, you suggest here that I felt that I wanted to avoid it because I had been afflicted with a great deal of service of this nature. As a matter of fact I was

and the trouble was this that I was behind a long block in promotions. As a matter of fact, I was a lieutenant fifteen years and I was a lieutenant colonel and a major, but mostly lieutenant colonel, for almost twelve years. I think the Secretary of War tried to make me a brigadier general twelve or thirteen years before I could legally be made. I had been previous to this time a colonel and I had been recommended from Europe by General Pershing to be a brigadier general when I was in my middle thirties and that had been approved by the Secretary of war but General March had not sent it to the Senate and then the end of the war came. I had been chief of operations of an army which had a million men in it but yet I was now back to a captain when I first came home, and then later a major and a lieutenant colonel. Now my lack of rank meant that I could not be put in charge of things because I did not have enough rank to be senior – to be the chairman of this and be the head of that. Well, they got around that by making me an aide. And in my position as aide I operated for the General. For instance, I was a first lieutenant and I was aide to the Commanding General in the Philippines. I was aide to him before he became Commanding General and while he was the head of the training of the ground troops in the Philippines. Well, I did all the work for the training and I wrote the problems and I was really in charge of training in the Philippine Islands, while I was first lieutenant, but only doing it through the name of my chief. The same thing occurred in other places. And when I was with General Pershing after the war I couldn't be given this or that because I didn't have the rank for it. Though I had had the rank previously while the war was going on the therefore, while I was not an aide at all, in my younger days, it was not until I got well into my thirties that I became an aide and for the reasons I have just explained.

Q. 160. What were your views as to the German offer to surrender on one front in Germany in May, 1945?

A. All of this business about the German surrendering was a very involved – well I don't know whether it was so involved [a] question because the reason was very simple. The Germans were trying to surrender to the Americans and the British, being very much afraid to surrender to the Russians because what they had done to the Russian people was something terrific and involved almost millions in their outrageous treatment and destruction of large numbers of the Russian population. So they were very fearful of any surrender to them. And we were very careful to operate with unity, that is, the British and the Americans and the Russians. The Russians were very suspicious that we were combining with Great Britain and would be leaving them out of this and that. For that reason General Eisenhower had a very difficult time in handling this question – in keeping it a triumvirate we might say –as well as the fighting was concerned. The Russians had had terrific losses in the last fighting and had carried a tremendous burden of the combat.

Q. 161. Did you feel that the Marine General Smith was accurate in his strong remarks about the army troops under him in the Pacific?

A. I do not wish to comment about General Smith. My opinion of the matter was too fixed to let me get involved in this thing here.

Q. 162. Was it your decision to bring German and Italian prisoners here during the war?

A. The matter of bringing German and Italian prisoners over here – I don't recall. I've sort of a faint recollection but it isn't clear enough to quote.

Q. 163. Do you care to make any comments on the controversy over the relocation of Japanese on the West Coast during the war?

A. The relocation of the Japanese on the West Coast. Internment camps I suppose this refers to. We were in very great difficulties there because there were large numbers of Japanese almost next door to the airplane factories, particularly in Los Angeles. Seems to me I have commented on this once before but I will go again. And the people out there – notably in Los Angeles and wherever they were close to these great airplane factories – were just bitter in their feeling that the Japanese should not be allowed to stay there. They were suspicious at that time of everybody Japanese. Therefore, it reached such a point that it seemed to be the only thing we could do short of a semi-riot or terrible occurrence out in California to put these people in an internment camp. The details of that, I think, Jack McCloy of the Chase National Bank is more familiar with than I am. It was a very trying duty and trying necessity.

Q. 164. Did we have any basic difficulties with the Australians in our joint campaigns against the Japanese in the Pacific?

A. As to difficulties with the Australians in our joint campaigns with Japan in the Pacific. Well, I would say we got along pretty well. General MacArthur got along pretty well but there were difficulties and there were strong feelings. That's only natural.

[Sgt. Heffner: "We'll have to cut it General.]

End of tape

Q. 165. Did you agree with Navy proposals for seizing Martinique and other possessions held by the Vichy French during the war?

A. As to Martinique and the Vichy French during the War, I don't recall exactly – with sufficient definitiveness just what the details of my attitude were at that time.

Q. 166. Did you share Mr. Roosevelt's anger over De Gaulle's seizure of Miquelon and St. Pierre in Canadian waters during the war?

A. Did I share Mr. Roosevelt's anger over De Gaulle's seizure of Miquelon in St. Pierre in Canadian waters? I can't say that I did because the action was taken more in a sense along the diplomatic line, and we were just getting in the war. I might tell you an incident. I found that Lord Halifax, Lord Beaverbrook, the British Chiefs of staff who were here at the time had no invitations for Christmas Day, so Mrs. Marshall and I invited them all to dinner at midday Christmas dinner at Fort Myer and had them with the family. It was the day of General – Field Marshal Dill's retirement – his birthday, sixty-second I think, and when he ceased to be Chief of Staff and became the representative of the British Chiefs of staff in Washington. While we were at dinner, Mrs. Marshall was seated between Beaverbrook and Lord Halifax, word came to Halifax about these two islands and he and Beaverbrook had a whispered consultation away from the table. Halifax then went to the phone and telephoned and they came back to the table and continued with the Christmas dinner. They were interrupted three times – had to leave the table three times to telephone in regard to the matter of these islands and just what should be done about it. But it was Beaverbrook, I suppose, advising on the publicity end and Halifax, as the American ambassador, who were doing the talking and not the British Chiefs of Staff.

Q. 167. Several writers have described the Army as being isolationist and the Navy Internationalist in the period 1920-37. They say that the Army wished to withdraw from commitments in China and the Philippines but that the Navy insisted on keeping or expanding commitments. Any comment on these statements?

A. I wouldn't say that the Army were isolationists in contrast to the Navy being internationalists. The Navy naturally were in sea touch with all these various countries. The trouble with the Army was there wasn't any Army. I think at one time they said you could seat all the non-commissioned officers of the American Army in the Yankee Stadium in New York, which was about true. We had our largest number of troops in the Philippines, in Hawaii and in Panama, but these were very small groups of troops. We were always fearful— from way back when I had nothing to do with Washington and the War Department up to the time I was in the War Plans Division and later actually there –that public opinion would force us into a move into the Philippines when we literally had no army to send. Considering the time it took us to organize and train a sizeable force – even a small force – the thought of such a move as that was contemplated by the Navy planners at that time is hard to understand. The Navy wished to send an expedition to the Southwest Pacific – notably to the Philippines, early in the struggle – in fact in the early months of the struggle. It was to escort the Army over there for a landing expedition, a reinforcement expedition I guess you would put it, when actually there wasn't any army and what little army we had in the United States would have to be taken completely to pieces in order to find the nucleus for this vast expansion which had to take place. Because we were going from 176,000 troops up to eight and a half million, from an Air Force of 18,000 ground and air to some – I've forgotten, I think about 800,000. Therefore, there was just literally nothing to send

to the Philippines and we tried to give them what we could – to General MacArthur to bolster up his defense – we had to give him the only anti-aircraft regiment we had which was in any condition to go at all merely from the viewpoint in equipment – which was a National Guard regiment from New Mexico. The Regular regiments had been completely taken apart and rarely had more than a battery of guns while they were trying to reform largely from recruits. Therefore, we were very much afraid that public opinion would force us into what we thought would be a great national calamity if we sent a force out to the Philippine Islands because in a sense there was no force. And any move like that requires tremendous numbers of troops and requires all sorts of equipment and supplies. I remember a debate we had – argument we had – before the organization which preceded the Chief of staff – Joint Army-Navy Board – and I had just become a member and I was in a discussion with one of the Naval members – a junior member – though an admiral, about this matter and he was insisting that the plan should go through – I think it was called the Rainbow Plan then. He said that was the national policy and I disagreed with him entirely because the national policy didn't even have an army – except the name army, which was used referring to the entire organization, office forces and everything of the sort.

The Navy never could quite understand the vast difference between their organized fleet and our little stations throughout the country and divisions and Army corps and armies in name only – and for a long time almost not in name. When I concentrated the troops the first time – I have forgotten just when that was but it was before we got into the war – that I was putting them together at the beginnings of mobilization, my onetime division, the Third Division, would have a company in Oregon, in Vancouver, Washington, other places and scattered all over the United

States and only about a fifth of those needed for a division. I concentrated five divisions, and only two of them, as I recall, had at least 60 or 70 per cent of their personnel. That was the beginning and we mobilized, as I recall, 164 units and we were just filled with complications. For instance, they had the tentage. I found the limited number of tents we had was in one part of the country and the poles were in another. I found that the guns – 155s – were in one place and the sighting devices and things of that nature were somewhere else that they didn't know. And we would have the 155s concentrated from this one regiment in this one division at Fort Benning –which was the First Division and they couldn't shoot because they didn't have these other appurtenances which were vital to shooting. You couldn't say that was a state of unpreparedness. There just wasn't any Army. And they didn't have any of these things and you couldn't practically get any money to do with then.

I might tell a little incident that occurred during this mobilization of 164 units to get these five divisions into some kind of real form. It pertained to Fort Benning down there where the First Division was assembled. They didn't have practically anything and they were going into the winter without the necessary shelter for the troops and things of that sort. So we tried to do what we could for them and I went there myself two or three times in order to see at first hand just what the situation really was and they were encamped on that very large reservation. They had gathered up all the loose material they could around there. We had a saw mill to help out and still they were terribly short. They appealed to me on one trip to give them enough money for a post office and enough money for a first-aid setup. Now these were not big buildings. This was canvas or frame lumber just knocked together to shelter these people. It was to be the contrast between being out in the open air and having a tent or something of that sort. They were

down to the fact that there wasn't even any raw lumber left to fix up these people. So I directed, I think, the supply part of the War Department to supply these things right away – give them the authorization for this money to spend. It was a very trivial amount, but still you have to have it in order to get the thing. I went back some weeks later – it was – no, just after the Christmas holidays. I asked them if they had gotten fixed up in these things and they hadn't. They had gone through – in the meantime they had had one of the coldest spells in the history of that country down there – well some of them almost froze up in the situation. Being an old regular organization they didn't make any reclamers to the press and nobody heard anything about it. But I was infuriated because I had directed this thing along about the tenth or fifteenth of December and when I got back to Washington I found - I sent for the head supply fellow – and told him what this was within the hour after my arrival in the War Department. He went right back and then he reported later and he said we've got that all fixed up. You won't hear anything about it. Well, I said I'm not talking about hearing anything about it. I want to know why you can't fix this up – why you didn't fix this up before Christmas when I told you about it – why these fellows had to go through the winter in that situation, or during the Christmas period in that situation. They had no place to open their mail – they had a big mail for the division. I wanted at least a couple of tents or things like that or some little board houses for it. They didn't even get that. There was nothing else left down there you can get unless you chop a tree down and build a log house and that takes a little time, particularly if you are not expert at the business. And I was quite outraged with the thing and I had them make the corrections, then, within the hour, to get this thing straightened out. Well, it all showed the results of the pinchpenny policy we would have to follow in the Army. I don't know who would be said to be to blame. You

might say the Congress because these men had gone before committees and had to account for every dime and had become so sensitive to the extreme criticism they incurred before the Committee if they tried to get a little money that it seemed to me the main purpose of the War Department was to operate in a way that no Congressmen could possibly criticize for spending any money. Well they hadn't spent any money – we didn't have anything. But the worst part of it was the officers had grown so in the habit of being forced into positions of advocating only extreme economy that they just were afraid to spend any money for anything. Later on out in Australia when we were trying to succor MacArthur in the Philippines and I had been given this money - $25 million – without asking for it – not for that purpose but for a general purpose I radioed out or however you do it to the bank in Melbourne for $10 million for any expenses that had to be incurred in this effort. Well nothing was happening and General – Reserve General – he's from Santa Fe and has run for Senator from New Mexico several times and was a lawyer in Washington and was Secretary of War at one time [Hurley] he wanted to go out and I authorized his going and sent him almost within the hour. I wrote him a letter of authorization for this and that – he was always trying to get a similar letter later on - but I gave him broad authority to get at things out there because I could see something was all wrong. There was almost no one in Australia at that time and our military attaché was a – our Minister – no I guess our military attaché, was a Reserve officer who was sick – very prominent – a very fine man – but was in no condition to operate and when my man got out there he started in to try to whip up some business for Gen. MacArthur which meant you had to buy ships – you had to indemnify the owner – you have to look after the owner's family – you have to pay on the barrel head there instantly this, that and the other in order to get them to undertake this very hazardous voyage – none of which

succeeded though we started quite a few. He found that the officers wouldn't spend the money at their disposal. They had been so trained in economy that in this desperate situation you couldn't get them to go down there and buy a ship without a lot of argument – and get it started for the Philippines at the earliest possible moment before we lost Java and Sumatra and those other islands near South Borneo. But it was a very interesting commentary on this affair. I had started them to fly in money – the checks were no good up there. They wanted cash, they didn't want any checks. I sent this money out though – I remember it went through Jodhpur, not Jodhpur, but Bangalore in India, and then when the Japs got down so far as to take Java they couldn't make the flight. The planes wouldn't go far enough to get in to – go down in – to go on down to Australia. And some poor lieutenant of the Air Corps got out in Bangalore sent word back – I have gotten this far I have $500,000 – what shall I do with it? He was stuck in Bangalore and he couldn't go forward and the question was could he go back? [Sgt. Heffner - "That wasn't Senator Anderson was it of New Mexico?"] No. Very well known, but I'm sorry I've forgotten. He was Secretary of War.

Q. 168. Mr. Stimson in his Diary in August 1941 says that Mr. Roosevelt demanded that planes be sent at once to Russia. "Get'em, even if it is necessary to take them from the Army." "This Russian munitions business thus far has shown the President at his worst. He has no system. He goes haphazard and he scatters responsibility among a lot of uncoordinated men and consequently things are never done."

Q. 168. Did you share Mr. Stimson's view? Do you have any comments generally on the problems you faced because of these tendencies of the President?

A. Now to go back to the matter of planes with Russia and President Roosevelt's attitude and reactions. In a sense there was no system at that time. Mr. Morgenthau was handling this for the President because he felt an unwillingness on the part of the War Department – Mr. Woodring in particular – and the War Department was so afraid, I believe – I wasn't in the War Department then that – yes, I was, too – was so afraid that they would give away the secret of our precision bomb – the sighting device – which was really quite a thing at that time. And they were afraid that they would be given away to the French or the British and would then be picked up by the Japanese or the Nazis and would defeat our pre-eminence in this type of equipment for possible Naval actions in the Pacific. So it was a very unsatisfactory period. And Mr. Roosevelt's demands for planes were – in the light of all previous circumstances –were huge. But the trouble was nothing was said much about pilots – nothing was said about ammunition – and nothing was said about the Panama defenses which were in a lamentable situation all these other affairs which were equally, if not of more importance, than the matter of planes. Of course, Mr. Roosevelt was trying to get these planes to France. The collapse of France had not yet occurred, but was threatened – though no one anticipated the rapidity or degree with which it developed. So throughout the matter of the early part of the war planes were his principal consideration. And he had the habit of constantly increasing his demands. We will say he would demand five hundred thousand planes this year; two hundred thousand or whatever it was, and then a few months later he would up the number tremendously. Well of course all the plants that time – factories and other things had been made for this first number – now he upped it to the second, larger number. Well, that was his way of working it up though it was devastating on any planning that you might do, particularly in manufacturing which has to have a long start in the

production of these matters. His idea was to force a reluctant service, a reluctant people and all into war production. But he was doing it almost exclusively through the plane frames rather than the plane engines and things of that sort. And not at all with the other requirements of warfare. And therefore we were concerned deeply with our complete lack of anything in the way of ammunition reserves of artillery and matters of that kind while Mr. Roosevelt was interested, you might say, primarily in air frames. He was thinking first of building up France which had seemingly lost its defense by reason of the efficiency of the Nazi air which accompanied the ground troops. It really wasn't until Mr. Roosevelt got some confidence in us that we got sort of straightened out in this matter. I might explain one of the interludes in this development. I may have done, this, but I don't think so.

Mr. Morgenthau was then in principal charge of airplane production rather than the War Department and he certainly was in charge of the money. And Mr. Roosevelt returned from a fishing trip in the Caribbean and landed on the unfortunate cruiser *Houston* at Tampa – not Tampa, but Miami. Word was sent that a previous budget approval of $26 million which had been turned down by the Committee in Congress would be approved so far as $18 million was concerned and not approved for the remainder. Well, these were small sums but they were tremendous sums with us because we didn't have any money. The part that was turned down involved coast defense security preparations in detecting planes and things of that sort for the West Coast. I was told to see Mr. Morgenthau and I went over to see him and found to my astonishment that it was not for the discussion of the part that had been turned down but for discussion further whether we were to get $18 million. They were approaching the debt limit and things were very stiff in the way of handling money. And that's the situation. Well, I told

Mr. Morgenthau that this situation was tragic. And he was so involved that day that he asked if I could come over the next morning. And I did, and I explained the whole situation so nearly as I could in all its gravity. Well, he was terribly concerned and he made an appointment to see the President, which was a rather historic appointment. We – Morgenthau and I – had had lunch at his private dining room and nobody was to interrupt us at all – THOSE WERE THE ORDERS and yet we were interrupted three times in connection with closing the Stock exchange. Well, we went over to the White House and, I feel very much as though I have talked about this before, anyway we went over to the White House and saw the President. Mr. Morgenthau – Mr. Roosevelt did the talking – and of course mostly Mr. Roosevelt. I always felt that he treated Mr. Morgenthau rather roughly and I always thought it was for my benefit because they were close friend and neighbors. [I'm going to the bathroom.]

The conversation started with Mr. Morgenthau explaining the necessity for having some civilian group to take over a lot of the work that was being – and expand the setup to handle a lot of the work which was then being done by himself as Secretary of the Treasury, by Harry Hopkins as Secretary of Commerce, and by others in a similar, you might say, disorganized manner. Mr. Roosevelt was totally against this – then Mr. Morgenthau, after this lengthy discussion, came to the question of the military preparations alone. And he started off by saying that he wanted to talk about this but he thought it would be better if Mr. Roosevelt let General Marshall state the case. And the President said that he didn't care to hear General Marshall. He already knew what he would have to say unless Morgenthau had something new to throw on the case, there was no necessity of discussing it. That pretty much ended the affair, which had been a very lengthy one though it had been largely between Morgenthau and the President and largely

about this civilian group – or almost entirely about this civilian group. Well I felt that the situation was desperate because if we didn't get something started right away we were wholly lost. And I tried to figure out what to do. And the main conclusion in my mind was I had to do something. But just what it was going to have to depend on the inspiration of the moment. Well I had one conscious thought which was that you had the great advantage when you were standing up and talking down at a person. So when we got up to excuse ourselves – actually we were being dismissed, I went over and stood right over the President and I realized in the rapid thoughts of the moment that he was a very considerate man, very polite and though he had just been pretty rough – and certainly right regarding me, I didn't think that was inherent in his methods. So I said to him, I said "Mr. President, would you give me three minutes?" And he turned to me in the most gracious manner and said, "Why of course, I will give you three minutes." And he started to say something else and I interrupted. Because I knew if he started telling me, I never would get a chance to say anything. So I said I just had lunch with Mr. Morgenthau. He gave orders that he was not to be interrupted. He was interrupted three times regarding the closing of the Stock Exchange. I had things to talk to him about that I think can truly be said not only in the national interest but in the most critical of national interests at the moment, as to time in particular. And I would like to say that first while the matter of this civilian committee was not buy business in one way – in another way it was very much my business because on the military end I would have to depend on that committee to develop the means of producing the supplies and equipment and things that the Army needed and I said, "You said that Harry Hopkins was doing this and Mr. Morgenthau, himself, was doing that, and so and so was doing this other thing and that you yourself were handling the major matters." I

said, " Mr. President, if you had a collection of Supermans here you couldn't do it that way. The task is colossal and it will grow more colossal with every day and it's about to burst on us in full force. And we have to do something and do it fast. And I said, I think the appointment of such a committee is *vital* and *immediate and tomorrow!*" I remember that pretty distinctly. Then I turned to the military end of it. Now I said, "As to the military end of it, Mr. President, I have rather dimmed what I was going to say by the vehemence with which I just remarked on the civilian committee." Well, I said, "We are in a situation now where it's desperate – I am using the word very accurately – where it's desperate. We have literally nothing, nothing – and unless something is done immediately – and even then it takes a long, long time to get any return of it – we are caught in a dreadful position of unpreparedness. And with everything being threatened the way it has been, I feel that I must tell you just as frankly and as vehemently as I can what our necessities are." And then I recited some of the barest facts that I thought would catch his attention and try to divert his thought, temporarily at least, from the sole question of planes. And I had some confidential information about the German artillery production at that time. Well they already had their air and seemingly they had their artillery and yet their production of ammunition, guns, and particularly ammunition over there in a week was something tremendous. That made quite a decided impression on him. If it was true and he assumed I think that it was true. Anyway, when I was finished he asked me several questions and I expanded on those as much as I could in my hurried presentation of the plot and we ended up – I don't know whether at that moment – but anyway out of this came a $790 million appropriation or $970 million – I've forgotten which it is but the record will show that. He had a general meeting at which the Navy was present and the Attorney General's people were present – I know they got quite a sum

– I've forgotten – I think it was almost a $100 million. But that was the beginning of the great Army production. It was followed three weeks later – the fall of France having occurred in the meantime and the eruption out of Holland into Belgium and France had all happened – with another appropriation of about a billion dollars. I know the President was very much upset over going to Congress in the first place and I wrote a good part of the presentation for Congress although he changed a lot of mine – a lot of what I had to say. Then this – three weeks later came this colossal crash in the world history with the fall of France and then the manufacturers expressed a willingness to bid on contracts for production of plane engines which at that time we had not been able to get. They were all afraid to make fixed bids because of their uncertainty as to how labor was going to be handled by the President and labor was getting great many things at that time that they had not had theretofore. So, contracts not being negotiable at that time, they were very much afraid to bid. But with this ominous occurrence in France and Belgium they patriotically began to think more about the country and less about their stockholders and were willing to make the bids. Therefore we instantly went back to the President with a new proposal which involved large numbers of planes and a great deal of war material. He was rather outraged at our coming back so soon for another difficult message to Congress. And I assured him that we had no choice in the matter – we had no choice whatever – we had to do it and do it right then. And I thought from what I had heard from various representatives in Congress who were friends of mine that we could put the matter through with great ease because they were very restless that not enough was being done. And now I thought I couldn't express myself very well politically but that the criticism of the spending would drop from sight for the time being because the necessities of the moment for the national defense. And as I say, out of that came about a

billion dollar appropriation, only three weeks after the previous one, and that time I was allowed to write a good bit of the message.

Q. 169. Langer and Gleason in *THE UNDECLARED WAR* say: "General Marshall and his staff were particularly disturbed by Mr. Churchill's plan to send additional troops and equipment from England to the Middle East." Since they felt that Hitler, once he had defeated Russia, would hit the British Isles, they wanted to stockpile supplies there. President Roosevelt was more inclined to back the Middle East. Is this accurate regarding your feelings in the summer of 1941?

A. Regarding the Langer and Gleason expression in *THE UNDECLARED WAR.* I don't recall being very precise, or voluble I'll put it, on the question of Mr. Churchill's plan to send additional troops and equipment from England to the Middle East. I do recall I think that we were very much worried among ourselves, particularly, General [Embick] it was the man that was afterwards head of the special committee we had helping the chiefs of staff – I will now go ahead. We were concerned about their cutting down their defenses in England and sending out to the Middle East where it didn't look from the viewpoint of our staff planners that they had much chance of building up except at great expense of their own position in England. Actually events proved out that they were right and we were wrong. It was a great hazard but it was a successful hazard. And it was one of the real things that Sir John Dill was in a great measure responsible for, though Churchill was the active pressure behind it – as Prime Minister. In all of those matters the President was inclined to go along with these various –what we thought were discursive moves – dispersive moves – and we were very much afraid that he would become entangled in this matter. I repeat again that the British took the dare and succeeded – through

various hazards as it eventually turned out but nevertheless, succeeded and kept their grip on the Middle East. Of course they felt more urgently that we did what a vital factor this Middle East was to them. But it could only be supplied then by a twelve thousand mile trip around South Africa and it later became responsible for the decisions which involved the further clearance of Africa, the capture of Sicily and the lower boot of Italy.

Q. 170. Did you worry a good bit about the German danger to the bauxite mines in South America (Dutch Guiana in particular) during the fall of 1941?

A. Yes, I was much worried about the question of bauxite in Dutch Guiana particularly at that time. I found out a rather curious thing about bauxite – or rather one that showed my ignorance of the conditions. We found out that the movement of bauxite from certain sources in Europe where it came out through the Mediterranean and then through the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes down to Chicago and there was transferred to rail transportation – it cost more for the rail transportation for the short distances involved to the factories than it did for this entire voyage out of Europe – the voyage in the Mediterranean – across the Atlantic – the voyage down the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes – that was less expensive than the short rail shipments in the United States.

I might tell one incident that occurred as a result of this bauxite concern and particularly the Dutch build-up at Aruba and the adjacent island there right off Venezuela where these largest refineries for oil were established and run by the Dutch government. We had been trying for some time before we got into the war to get the Dutch to agree to our setting up some defenses in these two islands just north of Venezuela for their defense against a raid from the sea – for

example, by a submarine with a field piece on it. Such submarines were operating at that time, or by a raider. The Dutch Cabinet was in London. The Dutch Queen was there or temporarily in the United States. I had to work through the State Department, particularly the President, in order to get the consent of that government to our setting up a minor defense of these batteries of 155 guns at Rubio and whatever the name of the other island is. Well, I couldn't get it. We had gone through two or three months of bickering about the darn thing and I was out at Leesburg at our home place there and there was a tree that Mrs. Marshall wanted two or three limbs cut off of. You couldn't get any labor there at all. I was the only labor available (chuckles). Fortunately, I was in better shape than I am now and I like to do that sort of thing. So she took me out on this Sunday afternoon and sicked me on this tree and I climbed up there with a saw and started on the limbs of this tree. It was quite a climb for me and I'd gotten but a short way along when there came a telephone message from the War Department and from the Chief of Staff's office. And when I went to the phone, climbing laboriously out of the tree – I found out that they had word that there was a German raider in the Caribbean and they were afraid it was after these refineries there off Venezuela. Well, I immediately told the officer – I've forgotten his name now but he was a high-ranking officer – to go immediately to Hyde Park, to fly up there to see the President and see if he would authorize this message to Queen Wilhelmina requesting her immediate decision so that we could act that day to begin to move in some 155 guns. And I went back and climbed up the tree. Climbing up was the hardest thing for me and, as I recall, at first I didn't have on sneakers. Anyway, I got up in the tree and got the saw and started work again and I was called out again by this same fellow that had just been talking to and he had a couple of questions to ask in relation to the meeting with the President which, of

course, had him very much under a strain and then he took off to see the President. I went back up the tree. I hadn't been up the tree but a fairly short time till I got a message from Mr. Roosevelt. I think we had sent word to him ahead of the officer that was coming and he wanted to ask some questions so I of course climbed down out of the tree and went back into the house and got on the telephone to the President and explained the situation and recommended the action I thought out to be taken. And he had several things to say but apparently was going to do it all right and then I left and went back to my peaceful occupation up the tree. That was either the third or fourth climb. When I got up there again – I was getting sort of worn down – when the President thought of something else and sent word for me again and I had to come down out of the tree. That time I just gave up the whole business and changed my clothes and got into the car and drove back to Washington. And we finally did get the authority to go ahead with installing a battery of 155s there. And we got it installed the evening before a German submarine surfaced right near and opened fire on the refineries, which we were successful in driving off. But it was that close a squeeze. And it was the greatest refineries I believe – even greater than Abadan, in the world at that time. I might add that I had occasion to tell this story to King George. I saw him quite frequently then. Mr. Churchill would very often have King George to dinner down at 10 Downing Street in his cellar where he had his cozy little nest, and we would have his Deputy Chief of Staff who was the Labor leader – who later became Chief of Staff of Great Britain – Attlee – who became quite a friend of mine. It would be Mr. Churchill and Attlee and King George and myself, just the four of us as a rule, and on one of these occasions I had occasion to tell this description of my running up and down the tree which struck

the King as very funny and he made me tell it on two other occasions I know and it got rather worn down in the telling.

Q. 171. Do you have any statement about the skill with which Admiral Leahy handled his task as Ambassador to Vichy France?

A. I have no answer to that.

Q. 172. Do you feel that the Liaison Board, consisting of Sumner Welles, Colonel Knox, Secretary Hull, Admiral Stark and yourself functioned well? Would you record a paragraph or so about each of these men which I could use in the book and add any other comments you might not wished published?

A. In regard to the Liaison Board it didn't do much but it did serve to get things together and I think its principal service was probably in bringing the conceptions of Sumner Welles as well as our own – but Sumner Welles in particularly – in contact with the Secretary of State. He and the Secretary weren't together very much on these matters and I don't know how much they talked together. And I think that the President talked very much more to Sumner Welles than he did to the Secretary of State. So in that respect they probably did some good and a conversation with a group like that always did good. My memory has gotten a little tricky here because my thoughts were largely that the meetings were between the Secretary of State – Hull, Knox, Stimson, Stark, and myself. My trouble in going to these meetings I remember was – and I think maybe I have told this – was that Mr. Hull had a very warm office and they generally occurred in the afternoon, the meetings, and he talked in a rather drawling voice. Mr. Stimson talked in a rather drawling voice except when he was made and Colonel Knox didn't talk so much – and we

military end of it hardly talked at all and one afternoon in a very prolonged, long drawn-out affair I fell asleep. I just couldn't keep awake and right in the middle of that Mr. Hull spoke up for one of the first times and said, General Marshall, "What do you think about that?" Well that woke me up and I had a second to think of what I should do and I finally decided I would be honest and I said, "To tell the truth, Mr. Hull, I was sound asleep." And he was very nice to me – he didn't get offended and he might have well cherished that against me indefinitely.

Q. 173. What was your impression of Wendell Willkie? Did you feel that he played an important part in creating unity among Americans prior to World War II?

A. I don't know about Wendell Willkie producing unity among the Americans. I know the President worked with him. And he worked with the President. My trouble with Wendell Willkie was he reflected the reactions of the person right next to him and that got us into very difficult things out in China – difficult situations.

Q. 174. Did you have any part in the destroyer-base deal?

A. My only recollection of the destroyer-base deal occurred when we were arguing it out before Congress and when we were struggling with what we should build in each of these base areas we took over and we had a considerable construction program in mind – or rather the planners did – and Mr. Roosevelt turned them all down and made up put up very temporary buildings and he was exactly right and the War Department was wrong.

Q. 175. I have been told that General Embick was called in on a number of White House conferences in the 1940-41 period because he had been commander of army troops near Warm

Springs and was the general officer best known to President Roosevelt in that period. Any comment on this?

A. General Embick was the name I was searching for before when I couldn't give it and he was never in command at Warm Springs. He was Deputy Chief of Staff and came into intimate contact with the President in discussing some of these things as Deputy Chief of Staff. He was a Coast Artilleryman. He was best known at that time for his designs for the defenses on Corregidor. But he was a very able, analytical man and Mr. Roosevelt had great confidence in his opinions. I used him afterwards as the chairman of the special committee which the Chiefs of Staff could turn over to study various things and to report to us what in their opinions was the right action to take.

Q. 176. I was told recently of a statement by two businessmen that President Roosevelt deliberately kept the nation unarmed prior to 1940 in the hope that we would be attacked and then the country would have to re-elect him. Do you have any comment on this?

A. The question of Mr. Roosevelt deliberately leaving the nation unarmed in the hope that it would be attacked is too silly for me to comment on. His struggle was to get the country in a state of mind where they would support the Congress in appropriations which were necessary to any of the necessities of military preparations. And it was a long battle before he could get enough support to feel in a position that he dared ask for large appropriations. I felt here that I got a vision of the political necessities that had to be considered in what he did. And it took a long time to work up a backing for Congress and they had to have the backing to do the things

that were necessary in the way of getting vast appropriations. I think I have already made my comment on this remark. To me it was just silly.

I might say in connection with the reliability of the people concerned, I heard comments quoted to me by very prominent citizens of Boston about Mr. Stimson. They were worse than silly. They were almost criminal. So you can't take that. Maybe the man was all right when he was talking about banking, but he was completely, tee-totally and outrageously wrong when he was talking about a man of the high honor and experience of Mr. Stimson.

Q. 177. Do you know of any action by President Roosevelt or by any military or political leader during the 1939-42 period which for the purpose of gaining political advantage deliberately exposed this country to attack?

A. No! (Strong)

Q. 178. You have told me that the period 1939-41 was the hardest part of the war for you. What do you consider was the most trying time for the Allied cause generally.

a. Just after the fall of France?

b. At the end of 1940?

c. Shortly before the invasion of Russia?

d. In the fall of 1941 when the Germans were sweeping through Russia?

e. In the period between Pearl Harbor and Midway?

A. The most trying time for the Allies was getting through the period (I am speaking of the Allies assuming that you mean while we were one of the Allies) was getting through the period 1942 when we were deficient in everything and when the pressures were greatest and when the necessity of our going on the offensive was most imperative. If you will recollect, I think the Guadalcanal action was the first offensive operation in the Pacific and the Africa operation was the first offensive operation on the European side – when we moved into North Africa. In all these things we had to do them on a shoestring and we were short of literally everything. And then we were in great tribulations afterwards to support the positions that we had moved into. We knew this to be the case. We had to accept it. And we were forced continually to sit and listen without explaining it, because we couldn't give that to the Nazi information services. Of course, there was a moment after the fall of France and Dunkirk when it looked like the end was pretty near on us. We weren't even in the war then. I remember going to see the British Ambassador. He died later. I have forgotten his name but he asked me to come over to see him. And I came into the Embassy which has those life-sized painting of Queen Alexandra and the King – Edward. And looking at all that splendid setting, which was purposely splendid for the purpose of the British Empire and realizing that it looked almost like the die was cast with the crash of the British Empire when that remarkable escape from Dunkirk was carried out by the spirit of the people.

Of course the period between Pearl Harbor and Midway was the most critical in the Pacific. And there, by a very fortunate series of events, and by very superb action by the Navy and its air – its ships were pretty much crippled at that time – the dominance of the Pacific was recaptured by the Navy. We had army air in it, but they were very small numbers. There was

some Marine air in it, some army air in the defense of Midway. But those were super-critical moments. Then there was another period when it looked like in the naval actions around Guadalcanal that the American navy had been critically defeated, but when daylight came and matters straightened out the Japanese had been critically defeated. Those were very, very trying moments all the way through.

When the Russians moved down and were in the position where the British Chief of Staff felt threatened Abadan – there again was a very critical period. And of course the – I think that's enough of that.

Q. 179. Comments on personalities. In a number of your answers you have made clear your feeling and judgment about several commanders or public figures. I wonder, however, if you would record on the following people a paragraph or so in which you make clear what you feel their contribution was. In some cases, you may want to add other material which you do not want printed.

In the case of American officers, I would be pleased if among other things you would indicate where you first met the officer, and if you selected him for the post he had during the war or appointed him at someone else's suggestion.

What is your opinion of the contribution to American victory of the following officers? In what did they excel? Where do you feel they might have done better (this may not be applicable to most)?

Eichelberger, Krueger, Buckner, Hodges, Simpson, Mark Clark, Patch, Truscott

Devers, Spaatz, Eaker, Doolittle, Collins, Ridgway, Eddy, Truscott, Maxwell Taylor

Bedell Smith, Halifax, Attlee, King George

A. In the list you give me of American leaders beginning with Eichelberger and Krueger, Buckner, Hodges, and so on – I would not wish to comment unless I decide later on that I care to dignify two or three as being the outstanding men and I don't know as I would do that. But I certainly don't intend to characterize each one of these because I think your book would be searched for that and the contentions, and discussions and debates and criticisms would be entirely involved in that rather than in the contents of the book. Of course, Mountbatten and Wavell and Alexander interest me greatly and I could say one or two interesting things about General Antonov, the Russian – the principal one being we had to work together quite a bit, or try to get together – but when I was in Moscow and they had a reception for us – that is for myself and the British Foreign Secretary and the French Foreign Secretary, Antonov did not dare even to come up and speak to me although he was at the reception.

You asked several questions in your letter of February 18. I will undertake to answer them now.

1. I still can't answer you about the Russian base in the Far East that was under discussion in Potsdam. It's the largest city in that section – you might say the extension of the railroad down to, no, I should get the map and look at it, but it's the large city up there. It does not have an open port I don't think in the winter, although it may have. I got involved with the word Petrograd and that tied me up. But it begins with a P. I might say that this put the Russians on this peninsula that sticks out to the city only a short distance across the water from Northern

Japan – Sakhalin Islands in there – and I was very much interested when I made a secret visit to [Sgt. Heffner : Come in – keep talking.]

Come in, come in, come in. Pardon me for not getting up. I'll tell Katherine you're here, and I'll finish just a sentence on that and then I'm done. I've been talking for about an hour and a half. Will you see about Mrs. Marshall and turn that off?

I've lost track of what I was just saying so I will start again. Vladivostok was the name of the place that I've been searching for and a caller – a lady – just came in and provided me what I didn't know myself. I was interested when I was in that rather secret visit to Korea as Secretary of Defense – and nobody knew I was going to be there until I was actually on the ground – we picked up in the cryptographic interceptions the Russian Commander's reaction to my visit to Korea and he moved seven divisions in the vicinity of Vladivostok [lady says Vladivostok] – four were mechanized divisions and three were infantry divisions. And I thought that was rather complimentary that if I could stir up that large a troop moment by just taking a visit out to see the place. But this was Vladivostok. (And the other day when I mentioned a place the Navy wished to get a small group stationed in – it was Vladivostok.) And that of course was very important to us because the peninsula there is just across the straits from Japan – closer almost than the British Channel separates them from France.

Your statement regarding Wickersham is correct. He was the man I was referring to.

The Bell of Adano was the book I was referring to in relation to Patton and Sicily.

I think this covers all the immediate questions. What I have just finished dictating was the last of your questions.

I got your comments in which you seem to agree with me that I should not comment in an evaluation of these various commanders, British and American and so on and some of the civil officials. I think I can comment more on some of the civil officials provided they aren't Americans than I could about the others. But I'm quite convinced that if I get with this, the book or whatever part these come into will be studied by the critics largely in various dissensions regarding my view on this officer and that officer rather than on the records of the main affair is so I am going to keep out of it until I manage to center on one or two that I want particularly to admire.

We haven't got any questions up there have we? [Sgt. Heffner: No sir, we haven't.] I'm going to start very shortly, in my moments when I am not tied up in your questions, with discussions about some of my prewar activities and experiences clear back into my home and schooling and things of that matter which I haven't touched on yet. I've been struggling with the business, not knowing just what to go into. The thing could be immensely elaborate. I only wanted to be very brief. The great question is— it's like the very simple lady's dress is always the most expensive. This is the hardest decision to make. Until I have a rough idea in my mind of those matters, I'm going to have some trouble in getting started on it. Once I get started, I think I can go very quickly on that. But I think we've got to be careful that we don't become involved in this matter very largely in things of this kind, because it involves too much of a book

– too much reading and nobody will go through it unless they consider it merely as a book of reference.

THAT IS ALL THAT I'VE GOT RIGHT NOW.

END OF TAPE

Tape 18M and 19M

Interview with

General George C. Marshall

November 20, 1956

(Last half of Tape 18)

Interview with General Marshall at Pinehurst, November 20, 1956.

Conducted by Forrest C. Pogue

Chapter XVII

Q. 1. What was the background of your Sete proposal?

A. I just don't recall at the present time.

Q. 2. Did you feel that the Bay of Biscayne operation was practicable?

A. [Dr. Pogue – That's the one he tried to get you to do right at the last.] We did not. Added to which we knew that it would take us a long, long time to clear the harbors, as it proved later on. We had a very difficult time clearing the harbor in the north. What harbor is that? [Dr. Pogue – Cherbourg] Yes.

Q. 3. Do you think that the Prime Minister at this time had in mind the possibility of heading off the Russians or was he primarily interested in a big victory in Italy under British command.

A. There are two phases to this question, one with the heading off the Russians, the other the interest in the big victory in Italy under the British command. I don't think it was a question of a big victory in Italy under British command. It was a question of operating in that region and extending it up towards Vienna. I might interject a rather trivial action regarding the Ljubljana Gap. I, of course, was intimately familiar with this from map studies but it is a little difficult to get the complete picture. When I was flying over to the preliminary Malta Conference, I wanted to see Eisenhower and he was coming down from his headquarters to see me. The fighting

around the Bulge was still in progress, but going favorably to us now. The weather was atrocious and Eisenhower came down by private car with Bull. The liaison official in that region – American – had taken a villa outside of Marseille—incidentally was owned by the sister of the famous Rostand, I think, stage impresario. [Dr. Pogue – Maurice Rostand] Our man was of Polish stock and was a duplicate of Hindenburg. His servants or soldier assistants, he picked up largely in Northern Italy. I wanted a haircut so they sent the barber to my bathroom but they sent with him the head butler, I suppose you would call him, to do the translating. While they were cutting my hair I inquired of the barber where was he from. Well, he was from the crest of the Ljubljana Gap, so I devoted the conversation from then on to descriptions of the country, which were going to be very helpful to me. Then the translator or chief butler disagreed with my barber and he, it seems, was at the foot of the Gap. So they spent about an hour and a half educating me as to the country. [Dr. Pogue – It was an unusual briefing, wasn't it?] It was. Later when we got into discussions, the British Chiefs of Staff they were astonished at my knowledge of the Ljubljana Gap. One of them, I think said, "You must have spent the summer there." But I didn't tell them it was the barbers.

[Dr. Pogue – While we are on that, I couldn't get much information on that meeting between you and General Eisenhower except that in Butcher's diary, he says that at one point you told Eisenhower that if they didn't back you up that you would just quit.] If that didn't back me up?

[Dr. Pogue – If they didn't back him up on the campaign, in other words if you were in his place, if you were in Eisenhower's place and they didn't back you up, you would quit.] I don't recall that. [Dr. Pogue – But this was something that someone had told him, Butcher was not down there and he just put down some gossip. But you talked about the campaign up there in the north] Oh, yes, that was down there for, however, most of the conversation went to the fact that

he wanted the mountain division which had just been given to Clark and he, Eisenhower, was seeking reinforcements. I wouldn't do it. I said he was stressing the importance of his situation. I said, we asked you if you wanted that division and you said no that its organization did not suit your purposes, we asked Clark if he wanted it and he cabled, yes, within about an hour and is making magnificent use of it. And Eisenhower said, "I said no" and I said "Yes, you said no, and now you want to turn around and take it away from Clark who said yes, I won't give it to you." He said, "Bull, how about that?" Bull flushed up to the top of his ear and admitted that they had said no because they didn't quite like its organization. [Dr. Pogue – Eisenhower didn't know it] He didn't know it and was very much taken back, Bull was very much embarrassed. [Dr. Pogue – That had an interesting history, that mountain division] Oh, yes. It did a gorgeous job down there in Italy. I will tell you later about that campaign, the finals of that campaign were extraordinarily interesting. You started to ask me a question. [Dr. Pogue – You planned it to be used somewhere else, didn't you?] Planned it to use in the NEPTUNE operation and drop it on the glacier in Norway. Finally we wiped out the heavy water plant on operations along the shore.

Q. 4. The President's statements were so much like your own that I wonder if you drafted his message to Churchill.

A. I haven't any idea. As I told you many of his messages to Churchill, he didn't show us, but I generally got them through Dill. This might have been fixed up there by me and my staff but I have no recollection of what those circumstances were.

Q. 5. President Eisenhower told me in 1954 that in all this early debate, Mr. Churchill never once mentioned the Russian danger as the basis for his argument. Was this also true in your case?

A. I don't recall their bringing that up.

Q. 6. What generally were your own relations with the Prime Minister in these discussions? Did he talk to you much or had he decided that it was better to work on someone else?

A. He would talk to me very frankly and very persuasively and then he finally couldn't turn me, he possibly did turn to someone else. In these conferences, almost invariably, when I arrived, Mr. Churchill had arrived and I think invariably he invited me to dinner with him alone the first night. At Casablanca it was lunch, and at all the other places it was at night. I don't remember at Tehran. I remember most clearly, Egypt. We sat and talked from eight o'clock until about three in the morning. There is when he put his arguments up to me. They were very charming talks as a rule because he was most discursive before we got down to the real business that he had in mind. I might interject a couple of examples. At Cairo, he had taken the house of the British consul general there or head of the commission there in Australia. We first sat out in the courtyard where there was fountain, then went into dinner, and then continued on to the early morning hours. I had been reading on the plane, one of the books in my plane library, I think they're called one man's—well known books, I've forgotten – one man's library or something of that sort, "Every Man's Library". I'd been reading about – I've forgotten for the moment, of course it will come back – this was the subject of many of our debates and discussions. Who's the Jew, the Prime Minister of England? [Dr. Pogue – Disraeli. Lord Beaconsfield or Disraeli. Was it one of his books?] It was in relation him, I think. It doesn't ring quite clear in my mind. Anyway, in this particular thing, I'll give you the name later, I was commenting about this thing that I had just been reading from in "One Man's Library"— "Everyman's Library" and Churchill picked this up and he quoted whole speeches made before Parliament, word for word, got very intense about it and got up and strode around the room making these quotes. It's a famous

parliamentary incident in British history. I should have the man's name on the tip of my tongue, at the moment I can only think of Disraeli, but yet I don't think he was the one. Or Pitt, I think it was Pitt, it was Pitt. It's quite amazing the way Mr. Churchill photographed this stuff. On the plane when he and I were flying over to Algiers with Brooke, I was trying to keep him from bringing up the subject of the Washington Conference, well, all during the earlier part of the trip he was so busy with his own state papers – he'd gotten far behind in – that the hazard of such a conversation didn't arise. But as we were approaching Gibraltar, Mr. Churchill ran out of work and came back and sat down with me and then I knew I was in for it. The point was that I didn't wish to talk to him till I'd had a chance to talk to Eisenhower – the background where Mediterranean operations. What was the island out in the Mediterranean that we never went to? [Dr. Pogue – the Rhodes] the Rhodes, Sicily, etc. – Rhodes, Sicily Sardinia, the southern tip of Italy [Dr. Pogue – Corsica] Yes, Corsica. So, I hurriedly thought up something to talk about and I asked the Prime Minister – told him I had been reading Indian history, not exactly refreshing my mind because my early reading had been from a very immature standpoint. I now was trying to dig out innards of it because I was having so many concerns with officers in India in relation to Burma – China. Lord Halifax had loaned me his copy of a very complete account of the famous – who was the head fellow in India – [Dr. Pogue – Clive?] No, no, he was the fighting fellow – it lasted ten or eleven years this attack on him [Dr. Pogue – Hastings] Warren Hastings [Dr. Pogue – a great trial] I talked to him about that and asked him if the fact that this thing ran for eleven years and then ended in, you might say, no count had changed any of the procedure in Parliament, rules or procedure in Parliament. He told me it had not. Then he gave me the most astonishing resume of such matters, and I remember he got on old Louis XI of France and went on up to Great Britain, his various procedures regarding this affair. Two things were involved:

the impeachment of Hastings, and he contrasted that with a bill of attainder, and he gave me a perfectly remarkable historical discussion of these two factors. I tried to remember them so that I could appear well educated on the case but there were so many tricks to it that I couldn't do it. But he suddenly ran out of soap after about 20 minutes of this. I'd been so fascinated that I hadn't thought up my next deterrent would be, so I asked him about the famous parachute drop of Hitler's number two man in Scotland, Rudolf Hess, on the Duke of Hamilton, I think his estate. Well again he opened up in the most fascinating way, he of course was a party to this, they were trying to turn British favor against Churchill, and over to the side of opposing the continuation of the war. There was a great deal of interest about the Duke of Hamilton. I know that Brooke had never heard this and he was fascinated. I again was overly fascinated and when he got to the end of that—that was about fifteen minutes, and there we were finished again and I didn't have a new subject and I knew that is was certain as faith before dinner this thing would come, so I just made a desperate grab and in a most impolite way, I said, "Well now as I recall from the press accounts you were said to be a leader of the King's party and the great question of his abdication on his marriage to Mrs. Simpson." Well, he took that right up without hesitation and gave me a most interesting account of it, out of which I remember the one thing, the great mistake the King made was just not going ahead and marrying her. He said, "The King could do no wrong, if he had married her, then they could have scratched around and tried to settle this thing." He talked this time for about twenty minutes. It was a marvelous lecture, marvelous. Then the steward, thank God, announced supper (dinner) and it was all over. But I have never heard three more fascinating accounts than he gave on that particular occasion, any one of which could be printed and sold to a magazine for a large amount of money. But I think the most interesting one was the discussion of the bill of attainder and the impeachment and the history of

the whole development of such things. [Dr. Pogue – MacCauley wrote a long account of that trial of Warren Hastings, it is one of the great classics of English history] Yes, I've read in those books. [Dr. Pogue –Oh, that's the one you read, Halifax' copy] I know it was in relation to these books. Dill was very tired in Washington and he suggested that we fly over to Bermuda—it's only about a three hours flight, of course if you could get a plane—and he communicated with the Governor General and we had an invitation of course to stay at Government House and we flew over and we had a perfectly delightful visit. I didn't know anything about these people, was charmed with the wife—Lady Burghley—and went back there afterwards. So we spent a delightful two days or three days there, I've forgotten just what, I know she and I got out there counting red birds and I've never saw so many redbirds in my life. I brought them the music of "Oklahoma" and they were very much taken with "The Surrey With the Fringe on Top" because they had one out there with the fringe around the top. However, going back on the plane to the United States I was reading my "Every Man's Library" and I came across the discussion of Lord Burghley's progenitor, who had been Prime Minister under Queen Elizabeth—Good Queen Bess—for almost sixty years and as matter of fact, he assisted her in the decision for the execution of Mary Queen of Scots, who's Lady Burghley's direct ancestor—great, great, great grandmother or something like that. I was chiding Dill, we'd gone there and stayed and he didn't know a thing about this, I didn't know a thing about it, we learned it all on the plane going back, so I had to read the book to him as we came back to the United States, which I thought was rather funny. [Dr. Pogue – Well it astounds me to find that you read all these things in the middle of the war.] How do you mean? [Dr. Pogue – Well, that you had time for it.] I was on the plane. [Dr. Pogue – But so many people wouldn't have thought of getting into that stuff on India and all that.] Well, India was business. My knowledge of India, you might say, was a

boy's knowledge of India. I hadn't read these things with discretion and penetration, now I needed to know. In doing this I ran into this business of Hastings and I had this thought that I was prolonging the conversation with Churchill. Here is a good one. [Dr. Pogue – Incidentally, had you read as a boy or as a young man G. A. Henty's book?] I read all of them, I know Hamilcar, Hannibal and those people much better through Henty from anybody else. [Dr. Pogue – I've actually taught about Hamilcar from that book because it's magnificent] I've found that it is so much easier to understand the things from his books. [Dr. Pogue – Yes] I read them all. I remember those two in particular. [Dr. Pogue – He had one in India that gave me my first picture of mutiny.] I think I read that. Well, I thought Henty was an accomplished historian. [Dr. Pogue – He was.] But he had the great ability to picture the thing so that you wanted to read it. If you could take boys through history with that right off the bat, they'd all like it. I don't remember how many Henty books I read but I read first Hamilcar and then I read Hannibal and that's my complete memory of Hannibal.

Q. 7. I get the impression that at one time you felt General Eisenhower might be wavering on ANVIL and that you had to keep him firm. Is that impression correct?

A. I don't recall.

Q. 8. Did you have the impression that the British Chiefs of Staff were less set on stopping ANVIL than was the Prime Minister?

A. Yes.

A. I don't agree with the Prime Minister on ANVIL question at all. In fact, I am in almost complete disagreement on every phase of it. He was intent on one thing and he sways all his arguments to justify that one thing. As I told you there was a paper of data that they prepared for me and I couldn't use it because of the way it was written, the castigation of ANVIL. Almost

everything he said to deter us from that operation down there went exactly the other way with a tremendous success. We had very hard fighting on the right in the Vosges Mountains at the end, notably on the capture of that town down there where they had to go up the walls like in the old-fashioned way. The Third Division had such heavy losses. It was a large town on the southern front of the Vosges; I've forgotten the name of it. [Dr. Pogue – Colmar] Colmar, we had very heavy fighting there, all of which deeply concerned Eisenhower's procedures. If you take a commander, say Alexander, in that place, of course he wants it there. MacArthur was just as much opposed to ANVIL as Alexander was for the same reason. He wanted the things his way out there where he was. If you followed every commander, you'd just be lost, we'd be sunk, you'd be all over the place. Our hardest function was trying to keep to the things we could do. I had an example of that that goes into practically everything in the government way, I had an example of that when we trying to get straightened up on the European Recovery Program, as I've often said, it wasn't the idea of the so-called Marshall Plan—it wasn't so much that as it was the execution and how we got through Congress. It took us from June to the following April. I worked on that as hard as if I was running for the Senate or the Presidency. That's what I'm proud of, that part of it because I had foreigners, I had tobacco people, cotton people, New York, Eastern industrialists, Pittsburgh people, the whole west coast going in the other direction, up in the northwest. It was just a struggle from start to finish and that's what I'm proud of, that we actually did that, and put it over. I remember, with some amusement, one day they came in to see me and said they wanted me to see some farmers. I thought they were talking about half a dozen maybe from Ohio. I said I haven't got time for that sort of thing now. Well, they said they've just come from Mr. Taft. Well, I said the farmers were very much involved in this because it affected their farm machinery and all the things they were in short supply of,

fertilizers particularly, so I walked into the room and I found there were almost 60 and they'd just had lunch with Mr. Taft. I sat down at the end of the table and I asked them who was the head fellow and they told me that, I asked them what they were there for, and they told me that, and I talked for about 40 minutes and then got up and left and they remained in the room and reversed themselves on Mr. Taft. [Dr. Pogue – I'll swear. I knew you were active then, but I never realized you did that much.] Oh Lord, I traveled all over the country. I'll tell you later about the West Coast thing because that's really almost dramatic. I did tell you about going out to the Federation of Women's Clubs out there. [Dr. Pogue – Yes] When I wasn't going to things in general. I remember the farmers had a meeting up there at Des Moines, I almost lost my life in that because I got forced down on the only airport that was available, then fifteen minutes later before I even got to the house, a down pour occurred that did they said $10,000,000 of damage in Chattanooga and they got me a clear wire through to the convention and I talked to them over this wire with a loudspeaker. I had quite a time down at Atlanta with the tobacco growers and the cotton growers because they wanted fertilizer very badly and they were very strong organizations and I got them when I got through with my talk there, but I had a very hard time doing it. Then I went down to the West Coast. That was the most interesting and amusing trip, starting with the University of California at Berkeley and going down to the University of California at Los Angeles and I came out of that successfully, but I had to just travel all the time. Pittsburgh was a very difficult thing, I had friends there. They were all nice and listened to me but were wholly and completely unsympathetic. I talked to the Association of Manufacturers up in New York, they gave me a very large luncheon and I had to get them—it was a very hard thing to do—they were always very nice to me there though. I don't know where all else I talked, I think Philadelphia. There were a number of other places I don't recall. But that was a

hard fight. [Dr. Pogue – Oh, it was awful.] That was the thing that I took some pride in, as a matter of fact, the selection of the time and the place was largely down on the basis of what the opposition would be because all America was opposed to appropriating anything else because of the way that the first appropriation, right after the war, had been wasted. We had Bert McCormick leading the attack out in the Middle West and putting on a very heavy barrage. I remember Vandenberg said to me, "You need to belittle this." He said I have to sit up and be called a Benedict Arnold. [Dr. Pogue – You mention being forced down there, I mean landing, did you have any narrow escapes other than that during your time during the war?] Yes, it's peculiar I had most of them near here. I'd get clear around the world and then get in trouble up there in Washington trying to get in. I'm come in and this whole coast would be under fog. In this case came down in a plane … **[Tape 18 ends]**

This is the second part of the interview with General Marshall on November 20, 1056.

I stopped talking about the difficulty of getting the passage of the European Recovery Plan, and accentuated the fact that the idea wasn't so much, in fact that was very little, but the execution was the great trouble, and that posed a very heavy task. I might continue to say that there was so much feeling about further appropriations for Europe that we knew the whole problem was how to meet that opposition. And I first decided to talk at the University of Wisconsin at Madison because I thought that was out in the Bert McCormick area and they were very friendly to me at the University of Wisconsin and they had been trying to give me a degree and I had declined. The time was the latter part of May, I think. And then later we decided that was too soon and we switched clear to Amherst which, as I recall was about the sixteenth of June. Then things

changed so in Europe, it appeared that that was too late. Harvard had offered me a degree several times I'd declined and that was the fifth of May [June]. And then I thought that was a very conservative community and Harvard in particular and that it not be a bad idea to launch the idea up there. So we telegraphed to Harvard to find out if they were still agreeable to give me a degree and that put me in the position of seemingly not going up there for purely a speech purpose, for the purpose of making a speech. And they said that they would be delighted—and that was the fifth of June—and that's the reason the affair was launched there.

As I have indicated our principal concern was not with European reception. I was quite sure they would receive the idea only too willingly, maybe not our restrictions on the terms of acceptance, but I was concerned with how we would manage this thing with the Middle West. It was going to be difficult all over the country, but it would be extraordinarily difficult with the Middle West which inevitably would launch a heavy campaign against it. However when the reaction came it was so dramatic—from London and Paris where Bevin and Bidault were sort of in a race with the leader—that there was no reaction from the Middle West for quite some time. As I recall almost a month, certainly several weeks. Then of course, as they got underway there was a very positive reaction, but we were concerned about the American reaction and the Middle West reaction in particular. Had assumed European approval.

I think that one of the tragic moments in the relationships in Europe was when Molotov took his people back. He had about fifty with him from the meeting in Paris. And he did it all under a misunderstanding. Either the Prime Minister or the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland talked to me at a United Nations meeting—that is talked to me at my office—and he said that he thought the great mistake I made was in not consulting the Russians as well as the British and the French in relation to this recovery plan. And when I told him that I hadn't consulted the

British or French, that in a sense I hadn't consulted anybody, I hadn't mentioned it to a member of Congress. There were only three or four people that were aware of what I was going to do. I think two possibly three in the State Department and the President. No one else because I knew if it got out and got into a debate in Congress beforehand we would never make the move. [Dr. Pogue – You didn't talk to Vandenberg beforehand?] No, not at all. Well this Polish official wouldn't believe that.

WILL YOU STOP THE MACHINE? [Dr. Pogue – here he said turn it off and then said "I made the speech without telling the President." The speech was not finished when I left Washington, so I worked with it on the plane and then at Conant's house. I realized just before making the speech that he hadn't seen it. Of course, he knew what we were doing and we were thinking along the same line.]

The way the speech was primarily built was this. I talked it over with George Kennan in the Plans Section and Chip Bohlen and I told them to each start out wholly independent of the other and give me what they thought. Then I got impatient and right away and I dictated something that I thought. And when theirs came in they were quite apart. It was not a case of one opposing the other. It was almost a totally different approach. And I cut out part of Kennan's speech and part of Bohlen's speech and part of my speech and put the three together, and that was the beginning of the talk. [Dr. Pogue – You didn't use any of Acheson's stuff—you didn't use anything from Acheson?] No. [Dr. Pogue – Because he'd made a speech, you know, in Mississippi.] Yes, I know he did one down there. You heard more of that speech afterwards then at the time. [Dr. Pogue – That's right, it attracted no attention at first, and they are two different thoughts.] I know they are. Cohen cut loose. The President got Acheson to do that. I was opposed to all of that because I didn't want anyone to get stirred up until we went off on

our—I know Cohen made a speech out in California in which these large figures became involved and I was very much put out about that because I wanted to get at the money question very, very carefully. And then the speech [Gen. Marshall's] wasn't at all finished and I took it on the plane and worked on it there. I remember there was one part of the speech that both Chip Bohlen and Kennan were opposed to. I was just trying to think what that was now but it became one of the most effective parts. It's the one that Hoffman uses all the time in his quotes as his guiding instructions. But as I say we were looking for the storm in the direction of the Mississippi. But actually it didn't develop at all until much later. And then we were under the extreme difficulty of dealing with things all of which were in short, in deficiency status—fertilizer, farm machinery, all sorts of tools, a great many things like that, wheat—and then on top of that the Russians as usual put on a strike or something in France and tried to keep it back and we had to appropriate additional money—for which it was a very hard thing to get, I've forgotten how many, $500 millions or something like that—which cut right into our available funds. They did that I think three times. I never went over to London or Paris, it seemed to me, that the French didn't stage a strike right away. Coal, as a rule. It was no easy performance.

Well, I got way astray here. [Dr. Pogue – Well, I'm delighted to get this. We'll go into it more thoroughly sometime because in many ways, don't you feel that this is one of the greatest pieces of work that you've even been associated with.] Yes, well I think it had more momentous consequences. Everyone has forgotten what Europe was at that time. [Dr. Pogue – Absolutely and the victory in Poland and the move toward victory in Hungary it seems to me you have to go back to the Marshall Plan on it to find the reason because it began to—a lot of those people began to—wonder about the Russians, sacrificing them when they could have been in on it to. And I did want to ask one question, you brought up Bevin. I recently read a life of Bevin which

gives him great credit on this because they said you had a great vision but that if Bevin had not pushed forward and approached it very dramatically it never would have been the big thing that it was.] Well, he helped a great deal with that. There was never any question on that. And then it became more or less of a race between Bevin and Bidault as to who would have the leadership. They helped us because it took us away from the Middle West where we were prepared to have a very difficult fight. I know they have come out for Bevin as to –what is the force you have in Europe now, the organization—[Dr. Pogue – NATO] NATO. I haven't read that in full detail, but I started NATO actually from the first jump. I got every living soul, one after the other, in talk to me personally on the thing and to get them stirred up to do this business. [Dr. Pogue – It seems interesting after you had practically finished supposedly your career that then you got into things that were just world shaking.] Yes, well the world was just ready to be shaken to pieces here any minute. Most of my mind was made up in Moscow and returning to Europe—Germany and France—where I could see the disintegration was moving so rapidly that something had to be done in a great hurry.

But this fellow from Poland wouldn't believe that nobody knew about this. But it went much further than he dreamed or I dared to tell him. I was very much afraid that some of George Kennan's assistants might talk or something of that sort.

Incidentally I created that section [Policy Planning Staff.] I was horrified when I got into the State Department to find that what they had said was true and they took pride in it, that each subdivision was a separate industry—a compartment by itself. Which is all of the nonsensical organizational things I have ever heard of. And I take great pride in that and what happened when I was first made Secretary of Defense in how I achieved the change. It wasn't a question of going to law. Byrnes had an associate—a friend of his—from down in Spartanburg, I think,

who was his number two man there in the State Department and had a secretary who was a girl and had a desk in the little room outside my door. She handled his letters and things of that sort. When she left, Carter took her desk and I found out in about two days about this complete state of disorganization. I don't know if you'd call it disorganization, you'd say lack of organization. It just didn't have any. I got to thinking then, as a matter of fact almost always had been a lawyer. Well, lawyers aren't organizers at all, and that holds for Mr. Stimson and all of them, probably the best legal fellow from that point of view was Elihu Root. He saw the necessity for organization though he didn't attempt to carry it out himself in creating the General Staff. So I told Carter to deal with this thing right off. I didn't mean the reorganization plan, but deal with it that way—that everything would come in there through him. He wasn't policy but he would see what it was and he would refer it around to the various people so we would have some coordinated action. Well, he began doing that on the second day I was Secretary of State. And then I got out some short memo on the thing—I'm not even certain of that. But Carter told me would take about six months for them to get the idea of what we were trying to do. Then we began right then to get the thing together so there was some related continuity in the operations of the State Department. Well, I was horrified to find this condition of affairs and I don't want this to ever get out but as a matter of fact it was Eisenhower's—since he's been President—comment to me that his great difficulty in dealing with other sections of the government other than the services, that they didn't have any kind of organization of that sort and you couldn't get your fingers on the damn thing—which was very evident all the time.

[Dr. Pogue – You talked about putting Kennan in there. Did you find that he was one of your best people?] Yes. But the point was to get him in there. I found out that there was nothing—no planning agency—at all. You can't plan and operate at the same. They are two

states of mind. Then I started right off to get that. And when we made the move over there I kept available the office space for that agency, before it was ever organized. My trouble was to get the people. Almost all of them were in very important positions or I wouldn't have wanted them and I was very much averse to taking them away suddenly from their positions. Kennan was there in the War College. I had struggled for a long time to get the State Department to have people there and every time they had turned it down and the last time I brought it up just at the close of the war I went a note to Stettinius. They always told me the same thing that they didn't have men to spare and I said they certainly didn't have any knowledge to spare either. He revoked their reaction and they sent the first people down to the War College for that course. [Dr. Pogue – Well I didn't realize that that came from you. I thought that they had asked to do it.] Oh asked, hell no, I had to gouge them into it. And they, I remember I made it so drastic to Stettinius; he did it within the hour almost.

Well, as I say, I had no planning section and you can't operate and plan at the same time. One or the other is going to suffer from it. Well, as the operations is the forcing procedure which is on your back every day, you naturally do that and the result is the other suffers. Now my problem was to get the people and Kennan was my first choice but I had to wait until about April to get him without disorganizing the course at the War College.

But I finally—I didn't expect to bring him until June—but as I recall I brought him in part time in April, just part time, but mainly to select the other people for me. And at the end of the first six months I think I only had five or six people. Maybe not that many, because I told Kennan I just didn't want to accumulate any ordinary people, they had to be very good or not at all. I'd rather have one good man than five mediocrities. Now once we got that then the problem was not to have a lot of stuff referred to them. After I left they got most of these things

enacted into law that Bob Lovett and I had created. Almost everything they did we had already planned, but we had working in a large respect just about the way you do a battle. You see your colonels, your generals and you talk over all this thing and get them all started on it, each on his part, and then you issue an order which is largely to confirm what you have said orally. Well, I followed that same procedure in connection with that subdivision of the State Department. It wasn't understood at all by the other people. And then my main problem was to prevent them from overloading it with a lot of things which were excrescences, and to get rid of them they wanted to refer it to that Section. Well, I wanted that to handle the most important things we had. When the press got hold of it then they wanted to exploit it. Well, that was the last thing in the world that you wanted. Finally we got the thing going. But you can't imagine what it was when you had no definite planning agency of any kind. You just had a hit or miss affair going on around there. [Dr. Pogue – Well they've got some very fine people, I know about half a dozen.] Well it was a very slow process getting them. I preferred to go right along. For a while we only had three, finally we began to accumulate. [Dr. Pogue – Finally got ten or twelve?] That's what it was supposed to be. [Dr. Pogue – Then Dulles came along and threw nearly all of them out because well he said they were mixed up with bad plans.] Mixed up with what. [Dr. Pogue – Bad plans, you see, that weren't Republican plans. He threw out Kennan, you remember, they have never used him since, which was a great pity.] Didn't have anything to do with politics. In fact, I had them when they submitted a plan; they had no indication of what we wanted when they submitted it. [Dr. Pogue – That's one of those things where he ducked because McCarthy was attacking this planning group, you see.] I see. [Dr. Pogue – He ducked out on it. Nearly all of those men have found big places, oddly enough, in either businesses or universities. One's at the University of Virginia, one is the dean of the School of Advanced

International Studies in Washington, Kennan of course is at that advanced school up at Princeton and it shows what fine brains they were.] I'm still on Chapter 17. [Dr. Pogue – You've more less answered than under question 9.] Well I think I've answered that under question 10, too. [Dr. Pogue – That's what I meant.] I made a very positive statement.

Q. 11. Isn't the Prime Minister here confusing the possible effect of an all-out effort in the eastern Mediterranean and Italy with the possible effect of diverting ANIVL forces to Italy? [Dr. Pogue – What that 11 really means is that the Prime Minister, it seems to me, from his messages at this time in late'43 was mainly interested in the Italian campaign by the British but now he tries to make it out to be that he was trying to head off the Russians, trying to do a lot of stuff there.]

A. I think so. Keep in mind that when you take a commander he's always prejudiced in favor of something in his neighborhood. You take the number two man for General Lear—Bonesteel—Bonesteel was a very fine fellow, he was a commander in Iceland. I stopped at Iceland coming back from something in Europe and just before we left—we were just there a short time—(Bedell Smith and myself) Eisenhower [Bonesteel] took me in his bedroom, we were in this little hut, and he said what about the –I've forgotten the word, it isn't aggrandizement—augmentation program. I don't know what they had then, I think maybe they had about twelve thousand troops, I don't remember and the augmentation I think took them up to thirty or forty, I don't remember. But I had the sad news of telling him we were going to cut his existing command in half. Because the defensive importance of the place had dwindled decidedly by our change of position in Europe. That just about killed Bonesteel. We were cutting down every where we could, you see.

Q. Incidentally, speaking of him when you sent him to Iceland, did you have in mind the possibility he would go to Europe, possibility that he would have a command in Europe later?

A. No, I hadn't thought of that, I don't think. [Dr. Pogue – You see, the newspapers—I remember in going back through it—played him up that you were actually picking him to give him experience so that he could ultimately go to Europe, but that's the typical way they do things.] The man that was more or less seemingly prepared for this thing was—what's his name in the Air Corps that was killed in Alaska [Iceland]—Andrews, because he was first made G-3 of the War Department, and then he was made commander down in the Caribbean area, Latin America Area and then I sent him to Cairo to get into touch with the British and to get their way and to work in there with Eisenhower's headquarters and then I sent him to England. So he had a real preparatory course. But I didn't have in mind that he would be the commander over there. Devers got in there temporarily and he thought right away he was the coming commander.

Q. 12. Who was responsible for the selection of General Hurley for this mission [President's personal representative to China]?

A. I don't recall. I selected Hurley in the first place way back and sent him over to Australia. The President had called me up and asked me who should be the Ambassador to Australia. And I said, "Well I can't answer you that over the phone. One man that I can think of—I don't think is a Republican." "Well," he said, "that may not matter." I thought Hurley was a Democrat. I don't know what he was. I don't know what he is. [Dr. Pogue – He was a Republican] He's a Republican. He said, "Who'd you have in mind." "Well," I said, "Hurley." "Well," he said, "that's alright, we'll make him." And he had his people get in touch with him and they found him in New York and they brought him right down. The President called me up in great distress and said, "I made a mistake about that business—it's the ambassador to New Zealand and not

Australia. Hurley didn't want that a damn bit. But he [Roosevelt] said, "I'll send him over to you and you can settle it." Hurley came to me and I said, "Hurley, the best I can do for you is delay your appointment to New Zealand and I'll send you with your reserve appointment to Australia right away." He saw a message from MacArthur there (he had been Secretary of War when MacArthur was Chief of staff). MacArthur was appealing for something at Corregidor. And he said if "I can just help Doug, if I can just help Doug." I said, "All right you can help him." I sent him around to Handy's organization and had Mac [McIntosh], my little lame messenger, take him. And then I telephoned them and told them Hurley was coming and I'd have a letter there of instructions for him, just keep him there but he was to go straight to the plane. I never let him get out of the department. And I wrote the letter which Hurley always liked because it gave him pretty broad authority. But there was nobody in Australia but a sick ambassador. So Hurley went off and had this money to his credit in Melbourne. And he went up and got into the thing up there and he got hit on the head by a fragment of a bomb and showed everybody that hole in his head where the bomb hit him, and he did a pretty good job. He was always very proud of that fact and very disposed towards me because of the way I sent him off.

And about that time the fellow who used to be head of the American Legion and who was a fine fighter in the Twenty-third Infantry, although he was a Reserve officer, and had a couple of Distinguished Service Medals but was an ardent Republican, from Iowa I think. Anyway he was quite a political factor, having been head of the Legion. He came in and he said he'd been looking around to see if I could get something but he said "I can't get anything." He had tried to see the President and "he doesn't even want to see me." Because he was a very ardent Republican. I said, "What do you mean you want to get something?" He said, "I want to go to this thing; I want to go to this thing. Damn this political business!" I said, "You mean you really

want to go right away?" and he said, "Yes." I said, "Just take this," and I sent for Mac and gave him a note and told them put him right on a plane and don't let him come back here for his hat. And they did, put him on and send him out and he became one of MacArthur's right hand men. Now what the hell's that fellow's name? MacNider. He lost his hat, I put him on that convoy that was just about to sail from Panama. [Dr. Pogue – MacNider had been assistant secretary of air, hadn't he?] Yes, and he just hazed General Summerall. He and—there were two assistant secretaries then—they made it almost unbearable for General Summerall.

I remember those two getting off. Then went off so damned fast they didn't have time to get their handkerchiefs out. [Dr. Pogue – Well, I've heard some of you couriers who'd say that they'd be called up to the office and they never had a chance to go get their hat, they'd go off and their next stop would be Casablanca or somewhere. It impressed the life out of them.] There was another thing too, I didn't want them to hang around talking.

I think [Question 12] that Hurley himself was responsible for it. He was always pushing to go and the minute he got started he wanted to go to Moscow. He always stopped at Moscow en route.

Q. 13. Do you feel that he helped or hindered the situation?

A. I think he complicated it a great deal. And I must say that Stilwell always got in his own way and just was duck soup for Chennault's gambling. Chennault was playing right up to the Generalissimo. And he had Alsop working with him. Alsop even went over to India and told them all there that Stilwell should be relieved. I got the proof and everything on that and the President wouldn't do a damn thing about it. That's when I wanted Stilwell to let me relieve him.

Q. 14. Dr. Matloff was criticized by some who read this chapter. They said that he had attacked the British for being political minded in their planning, but that he overlooked the fact that we were often political too. Do you feel that we were inconsistent on this point during the war?

A. No, I don't think they were too insistent on that point. As a matter of fact they might be criticized for not being enough. [Dr. Pogue – In a question I haven't phrased there, we did feel as the war went along that we didn't want to get in on a business of handing stuff back to the British.] Yes, we were trying to avoid the colonial thing throughout. I heard the President say that the French had made such a mess of Indo-China they ought not get any of it back. I heard Mr. Roosevelt say that. That was before we had gotten into that mix-up there.

Q. 15. On the by-passing of Formosa and General MacArthur's reaction.

A. I am inclined to think that Leahy's reactions are aftermath rather than current reactions. [Dr. Pogue – There's a great deal of controversy over that Pearl Harbor conference, that red manuscript they sent you brings it up, and that's one question they wanted to ask. About six writers, who weren't in on the conference, say that the Pearl Harbor Conference settled everything but Leahy denies it and I suspect he is right on that. That it still was not completely settled before it was tragedy. Well, did you have any strong feelings about this in the way you tended to follow MacArthur's suggestions or as to whether or not they should go to Luzon or by-pass it?] Well, I was listening very carefully to the Navy reactions on the thing and I was always ready for any development in the situation which would make it clear, and it came there because when the famous fighting admiral (Halsey)—when he reported from his fliers what was going on in the Philippines—we switched the whole thing and jumped an operation of MacArthur's and went ahead to land at Leyte. You know about that of course. The change we made at this dinner going on up in Canada—Clark's dinner—when we left the table and went out there and settled

this thing and sent a message to MacArthur that night and altered the thing by abandoning one operation entirely—it was an intermediate jump, and took the next one to the Philippines.

I would say the Philippine operation in a sense—taking particularly MacArthur's arguments—was a political decision as much as it was a military decision. MacArthur thought we never could explain to them if we by-passed them. [Dr. Pogue – He had an argument there from the standpoint of the future.] Oh yes, he had an argument there. He had made all of his arguments on the "I shall return" and all that stuff. Now if we went on by them he was going to be in for a terrible reaction.

MacArthur was anti-naval all the way through, you see and his staff—Sutherland—promoted it and the young Navy went at it. I wouldn't have you get this out, but as a matter of act up to that time I had a very strong position with the young Navy. They were apparently very strong for me and liked the way I was doing things and was somewhat opposed to the way some of the older ones were doing things. [Dr. Pogue – But that older bunch certainly has it in for you because several of them have written books and they picked you for their main target.] I know they did but that's just part of that. [Dr. Pogue – And someone told me that King started to attack you and then after his first stroke he changed and took it out of his book. Not only you but the Army, you see, but that he originally was very bitter. And of course they blame you for the whole reorganization thing, the Department of Defense, and they think that hurt them. It was aimed at them.] Some of those older fellows who were my good friends I notice have turned around on this thing. Of course, that sells the book. You've got to remember that. In this writing it's very hard for a man to write a thing without trying to justify his position and all that sort of thing in connection with it. [Dr. Pogue – Well if for no other reason the fact that you

know your own position quite well and are aware of your good intentions, just a statement of that tends to give it a bias.]

Now you must remember that particular cable exchange between MacArthur and myself on the landing in Japan when he turned down the naval proposition very strongly and advocated the landing. It was a very courageous cable on his part. [Dr. Pogue – He'd like to deny it, though, because later on, you see, it goes counter to his statement that he never did want to go to Japan.] It's right there and specific because I asked him that pointblank question. Have you read the cable? [Dr. Pogue – That's one of those that the Department of Defense published last fall after that Yalta business got up, you see, which just gave the lie to his original statement.]

Who is General Roberts? [Dr. Pogue – General Frank Roberts, of the War Department, your planning staff.] I don't remember him. [Dr. Pogue – I think he came in after General Wedemeyer left, he was a Colonel.]

Have you talked to McCloy? [Dr. Pogue – No sir, I haven't.] He is the man on all this. He has all this. He's the leading actor. [Dr. Pogue – Well this is pretty much right, that you just didn't worry much about it. Those three lines there: do they pretty much summarize your views?] That's about it.

Q. 17. Was General Handy reflecting your views in August 1944 when he suggested that we should be careful not to over-extend by acquiring bases since we would likely not have the forces to defend them?

A. What bases is he talking about in this question 17? [Dr. Pogue – Air bases, naval bases.] Where? [Dr. Pogue – All over the world, Pacific and] Oh, that's coming up all the time. I was very much opposed to that. I was against them on this base thing all over the place. In the Admiralty Island and all those things. I wanted them to make a deal with Australia—Australia to

run the base and we would give them some small sum a year. And the authority to keep somebody there, stores there and all that, which was the economical way to do it. I had quite a continuing fight about the matter of bases. I remember we first got into the question of the Admiralty Islands, up north of Australia and New Guinea and they wanted to have quite an imposing base there. And there were other bases they had picked out in other places. And I was very much opposed to it because I felt certain that they wouldn't be able to support them and we would be land poor all over the place. I tried to get Arnold to give me a list of air bases that they absolutely had to have and the Air could never settle on just the ones they absolutely had to have. They had all of these various places in mind. Well, I was firmly of the opinion that you were not going to get the means to support these things and they would be a weakness instead of a strength. And I made a particular effort to see if I couldn't get them to make this arrangement—taking first the Admiralty Island and having that under the control of Australia. And we would pay them some sum a year—say $500,000. They could obtain labor and all for just a fraction of what it would cost us. And they could have certain supplies there; certain gasoline reserves, maybe only one or two men. But we would have the right to go there for maneuvers and, of course, the immediate availability in case of war. And then I thought we could maintain several that otherwise we wouldn't be able—couldn't possibly support. I couldn't get anybody to treat the matter seriously and I was about to leave. The trouble was the staff didn't visualize what was going to happen. They were almost destroyed as it was by evaporation but Vishinsky saved them in good measure. Which they would never have gotten otherwise. I had seen all this. I had gone through it. I had a little note I had picked up in my loose records from General Pershing coming back from France, writing me that he just couldn't understand what was going on, they were cutting him down to 14,000 men or something like that and the Army was growing

less than it was at the beginning of the First World War. I knew the same thing was going to happen which it did happen. The thing was to have certain things that we felt we had to have and concentrate on them and let everything else peel off. But the trouble was nobody saw that and they'd always come back with the same remark that we had learned our lesson. Well my insistence was that we hadn't learned it and mine today is that we haven't learned it. The American reactions are always going to be quite a bit the same. Because we live far from the trouble, far from the battle area and we just have a cat fit when it, when it's even momentarily threatened us. [Dr. Pogue – It's not like Germany or one like that which has an Army right at their border.] Yes, their constantly on their guard. Great Britain's life depends on this thing. I thought at the end of the war that I had about the best staff that ever was created and yet in these major things none of them agreed with me. But that didn't mean they weren't about as fine a staff as you could get. But they couldn't visualize it. I had gone through this thing before and I knew what it was. I didn't realize I was going to come in as Secretary of Defense and be the victim again of the same damn thing.

[Dr. Pogue – Do you remember one of your men, a General Lincoln, G. A. Lincoln?] Yes. [Dr. Pogue – He was a very fine person.] Yes, he was very able in his reactions. I trusted his reactions quite a bit. He had a very prominent nose. [Dr. Pogue – I think he is in a very good spot because he's thought a lot about history and he as you know head of the History Department at West Point which I think is valuable to have a man that's seen the things he has there to impress it on the cadets.] Yes, he could draw the conclusions and all from it. [Dr. Pogue – Of course you had a good man there during the war, Colonel Beukema was very good, wasn't he?] Yes, he was very good but Beukema as I recall was, well, I shouldn't say this because I don't remember the details, but he got his—I don't know if you would say that he got his foot off the

base but I know he barged into a lot of these things that I don't believe at the time were his business and Mr. Stimson was very friendly to Mr. Beukema. Mr. Stimson gave me specific instructions that nothing was to be done to Beukema to line him up. Well, I wasn't even thinking about Beukema, I didn't know him, had never seen him, and don't even remember just what the things were but he had the War Department very much stirred up.

Q. 18. Do you know why the President changed his mind on the zones of occupation by the time of the second Quebec Conference? (It has been suggested that he did it to get the Prime Minister to accept the Morgenthau Plan).

A. This zone of occupation thing I can't recall at all the business but Jack McCloy is the one who knows this. [Dr. Pogue – Somebody makes the flat statement that they think that Mr. Roosevelt changed as a deal to get the Prime Minster to accept the Morgenthau Plan but I can't find any basis for that.] What really stopped the Morgenthau Plan was a very fine memorandum by Mr. Stimson, [Dr. Pogue – Oh, he wrote a rough one.] And he was so horrified when he found that Morgenthau had got the initials on this plan over there. And that's the reason he went over himself. He went over without being invited—he just went. [Dr. Pogue – You know one of Morgenthau's former associates tried to involve Eisenhower in that. Morgenthau talked to Eisenhower in France and later this associate said well, all he did was to get the ideas from Eisenhower, which isn't true, of course. I think Eisenhower—this was in June—was naturally angry at the Germans but he never proposed such a plan as that.]

Q. 19. In September 1944, Colonel Billo of the Strategy Section of OPD indicated that in postwar settlements the United States was willing to permit the return of all former British possessions except Hong Kong; that the U. S. wanted to remain the dominant power in the Japanese mandates, the Philippines, and China; that the U. S. would like to see Indo-China and

Hong Kong returned to China; and the Philippines to be freed except for certain bases. Did you agree with these views in September 1944?

A. When you say the return of all former British possessions do you mean the return to Great Britain? [Dr. Pogue – Yes.] Well, I don't recall about this question 19. [Dr. Pogue – At any rate, that was not a general War Department thing.] Not that I recall. [Dr. Pogue – You see, I think this is the sort of thing that the man was just throwing out as a suggestion but quite often the historians who don't know the story pick up this thing and they will say—now that's what General Marshall was thinking—that's what the War Department was thinking.]

Q. 20. In March 1944, Marshall wrote the President "Lend-Lease is our trump card in dealing with the U. S. S. R. and its control is possibly the most effective means we have to keep the Soviets on the offensive in connection with the second front."

Does this indicate that you felt you might have to use such pressure on the Russians to keep them on the offensive?

A. I don't know quite how to answer that. Can you give me any suggestions that might lead me to— [Dr. Pogue – Well, unfortunately I don't have any background on it but he quotes it in this book and his impression was that you had decided that the Russians had to be held to this offensive. You, see, they weren't attacking in March because of the weather, March 1944. And we wanted them to attack at the same time Eisenhower did in June and Matloff reading this message of yours gathered that you meant that the only way we could make sure they would attack was to threaten to withhold some of the Lend-Lease stuff. But from what you tell me I don't think that that was in your mind.] Well, I just don't recall enough to give you an answer. I know that their failure to attack there—I was defending them at that time—Mr. Stimson thought the whole thing was going to change, you know. They just couldn't get their vehicles off the

road. [Dr. Pogue – Well Mr. Stimson's was later at the end of the year, wasn't it, at the time of the Bulge?] Yes. [Dr. Pogue – This is at the beginning before we had landed.] I don't recall. [Dr. Pogue – But, I found nothing else in your papers that indicate that you were worried about this.] I was worried about the Russians—that they might be defeated. [Dr. Pogue – Then too this may have been something in connection with keeping Lend-Lease going, that you were giving an argument for.]

STOP YOUR WHEEL

[**Dr. POGUE'S NOTES** – On the matter of Lend-Lease] (Don't print this—the General has a habit of saying this about things which reflect credit on him.) British had no master plan. We had more plans than troops at first. We had some basic plan. We were the only ones with a plan which was comprehensive. When the first hearings came up on Lend-Lease, I hadn't seen the estimates for month. I was always doing this—starting plans, then going ahead with operations. I was called on suddenly to testify. I felt we were in a leaky position. Papers were spread out. But I had not time to read them. One of the men began to belabor me. He said General; don't you know anything about this? I said I haven't seen them for six months and have had about six battles since then. He said but you have approved it. I said yes, but they went on to others for comment. I went through them and cut some out, but my familiarity is dulled by lapse of time and six or seven campaigns. (I may be entirely wrong but my recollection is that he said I will accept it then on your say so). Stimson had been testifying, but he was pedantic (that isn't exactly the word but you know what I mean). When they got the fact that I had gone over them, they began to be conscious of the delays they were imposing.

Later we got on the fact that *Time* once bragged on him (for such things as putting through Lend-Lease), and then turned against him. He said that is because Luce was pro-China;

he went over there and saw only a part of the picture, then began to hit me. Of course, the China lobby was bad. Then the Republicans got the whole thing in politics.

I will show you what the situation was like in China. I was there once when a delegation came up to see the Generalissimo. They were set upon by a mob. Chou En-Lai appealed to me. Unfortunately I didn't know there were women in the delegation or I would have gone to check on the situation. It might have had a dynamic effect. They got it stopped about midnight. One woman was about seventy; she was beaten black and blue. Some of the men were over seventy. I went to Madame (the Generalissimo was there too) and said this is a most terrible thing. The Generalissimo said he would have to check. I said you have your army headquarters here and many of your troops and yet this thing went on from seven to twelve. I asked Madame to go to the hospital. She didn't want to go, but she went. I said to the Generalissimo what you are saying is that your army is completely impotent and I can't swallow that at all. His foot just went a wiggling as it did when he was angry or upset. The people were just coming to talk to him. I don't think they were communists. His people were doing a terrible thing. It got so I was constantly being appealed to by women whose families were being attacked.

The *Life* man was impressed with the people who received him. He convinced one of my staff officers that I was wrong. Thought that Chiang was popular. Roy Howard was also convinced.

Q. 21. Would you say that the belief that Russian would have little capacity to fight for some time after the war was one of the major factors in our misjudging the Russian position after the war?

A. No,

[Dr. Pogue – You answered that next one yesterday pretty much.]

Q. 22. Political difficulties with De Gaulle arose from D Day. In the face of the political impasse, General Marshall attempted to keep the question of French military rearmament on a military basis. Any comment on this problem?

A. Suffers from lack of proper coordination. The State Department in a sense wasn't functioning much. The Foreign Relations field was almost entirely under the President. And there wasn't, in a sense, much to turn to over there. With all great respect for Mr. Hull, he wasn't given much of a field to operate in. Sumner Welles played quite an active part for awhile but he went under in a very questionable situation and as I recall during these periods we didn't have very much to go on. A great contrast to that when I was Secretary of Defense, the Korean War was going on, and Secretary of State Acheson would come over with two or three of his men at the Pentagon and sit with me and the Chiefs of Staffs for hours at a time while we were trying to work out these matters. But there was no such rule with the State Department during the war. As a matter of fact, it seems to me on the guidance thing they got it directly from the President and that not in concise form but rather casual statements.

I know at the time of the Mediterranean affair when we were talking about going in to Casablanca and Algiers all the conferences were in effect put under the War Department to control until this operation was accomplished. At least I was told so and I went ahead on that basis. Murphy would report to me. [Dr. Pogue – As a matter of fact, the State Department had to ask the Army for copies of the cables in order to write their own account of that whole business in North Africa because they all came through the War Department.] Well, that was natural because we couldn't afford to risk any leaks which would have been disastrous to us in a military way and in a naval way also.

WELL THAT'S A PRETTY GOOD PLACE TO STOP, ISN'T IT? YEAH, I GUESS.